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ABSTRACT 
Malawi‟s penal regime has a long history of retributive and deterrent punishment and 
unfair trials. In the absence of a constitutional set up that recognised human rights and 
driven by the need to maintain colonial authority, punishment during the colonial period 
was largely premised on retribution and deterrence. The one-party regime that took over 
after independence was characterised by gross violation of human rights. The adoption 
of the Constitution in 1994 ushered in a more humane regime of punishment premised 
on human rights. Complemented by international law, the Bill of Rights has several 
provisions which clearly intend to create a penal system that is consistent with 
international standards. 
This study examines the extent to which punishment in Malawi reflects international 
and constitutional standards regarding the aims of punishment, the forms of 
punishment, and post-sentencing procedures. In answering this question, the study 
investigates whether, over 20 years after the adoption of the Constitution, Malawi has 
realised the promises of the Bill of Rights for punishment. It therefore analyses the aims 
of punishment, the forms of punishment, and release procedures to determine if they 
comply with Constitution. 
The findings of this thesis reveal that while some progress has been made in aligning the 
penal regime with constitutional and international standards, there are some aspects of 
punishment that are in conflict with these standards. The study proposes some solutions 
to address these gaps.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Before 1994, the constitutional set up in Malawi paid scant attention to human rights, let 
alone the rights of offenders in the penal regime. The 1964 Constitution of Malawi 
contained a Bill of Rights with a number of civil and political rights but this was soon 
substituted with „fundamental principles‟ of government in 1966. Among other things, 
these principles provided that Malawi would recognise the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and adhere to the Law of Nations.1 However, this was superseded by 
section 2(2) of the 1966 Constitution which stipulated that they could be limited by any 
law that was „reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order 
or the national economy‟, a provision which was often abused. 
On 16 May 1994, Malawi adopted a democratic Constitution which came into full force 
on 18 May 1995. The Bill of Rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution 
guarantees several rights that lay the foundation for fundamental changes to the penal 
regime and indeed the criminal justice system as a whole. For instance, it provides for 
the right to dignity,2 outlaws corporal punishment,3 torture4 and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment or treatment.5 Section 16 of the Constitution restricts the 
application of the death penalty. The Constitution also has special provisions for 
sentencing children. For instance, it prohibits the imposition of life imprisonment 
                                                 
1 Section 2(1)(iii). 
2 Section 19. 
3 Section 19(4). 
4 Section 19(3). 
5 Section 19(3). 
2 
without the possibility of parole on person below the age of 18 years.6 Imprisonment of 
children may only be used as a last resort and for the shortest time consistent with 
justice and public protection.7 The Constitution also provides for the right liberty8 and a 
wide range of rights for arrested, detained and sentenced persons.9 For instance, it 
protects the right to be detained in humane conditions,10 to challenge the lawfulness of 
one‟s detention11 and to be released from unlawful detention.12 These provisions 
indicate that the Constitution envisages significant changes to punishment in Malawi.  
The Constitution also embraces international law. For example, customary international 
law is automatically binding on Malawi and its application is subject to the Constitution 
and Acts of Parliament.13 International law can be used as a source of law in domestic 
courts.14 This means that various international standards for punishment contained in 
major international and regional human rights instruments are binding on Malawi and 
that they must be reflected in the penal regime. Moreover, section 11(2)(c) of the 
Constitution enjoins courts to „have regard to current norms of public international law 
and comparable foreign case law‟ when interpreting constitutional provisions. Further, 
in deciding whether a limitation of a right is constitutionally permissible, one of the 
                                                 
6 Section 42(2)(g)(i). 
7 Section 42(2)(g)(ii). 
8 Section 18. 
9 Section 42. 
10 Section 42(1)(b). 
11 Section 42(1)(e). 
12 Section 42(1)(f). 
13 Section 211(3). 
14 Section 211(1). 
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factors to be considered by the court is whether it is recognised in international human 
rights standards.15 
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The provisions in the Bill of Rights suggest far-reaching changes to punishment and 
sentencing. They have implications for the theoretical underpinnings of punishment 
which in turn inform the forms of punishment and post-sentencing procedures. These 
changes inevitably affect the sentencing practices and applicable principles, including 
post-sentencing procedures. This study considers whether 20 years after the adoption of 
the Constitution, punishment in Malawi conforms to constitutional and international 
standards, examining the situation in the country as of September 2014.  
The central research question of this study is: to what extent does punishment in Malawi 
reflect international and constitutional standards regarding the aims of punishment, the 
forms of punishment, and post-sentencing procedures? In answering this question, the 
study seeks to investigate the following questions: what are the theoretical justifications 
for punishment? What should be the relationship between them? What is the position of 
international human rights law regarding the aims and forms of punishment, and post-
sentencing procedures? What is the exact nature of the changes that the 1994 
Constitution sought to bring on theories of punishment, forms of punishment, and 
post-sentencing procedures? Do the current law reforms and sentencing practices since 
1994 reflect these changes?  
In an effort to achieve a more focussed study, emphasis will be placed on the death 
penalty, imprisonment and early release procedures. The death penalty has been selected 
                                                 
15 Section 44(2) of the Constitution. 
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because it is the most severe punishment in Malawi and has witnessed major reform 
since 1994. The choice of imprisonment is based on the fact that it is the most common 
form of punishment in Malawi. The study is mainly limited to the punishment of adult 
offenders; it does not give a detailed examination of the punishment of children in 
Malawi except for some general observations where necessary. 
3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Sentencing is one of the most neglected aspect of a criminal trial.16 The punishment of 
offenders is left to correction officials and society rarely regards offenders as deserving 
of the full protection of human rights. This reasoning has infiltrated the debate on the 
death penalty in Malawi as evidenced recently by the Malawi Law Commission‟s 
assertion that abolishing the death penalty would be seen as condoning murder and 
other capital crimes.17 The Constitution is the supreme law in Malawi18 hence is the 
yardstick against which to evaluate any law or practice. Therefore, it is important to have 
a full understanding of what benchmarks it posits in order to ensure that all individuals, 
including those who find themselves in conflict with the law, enjoy its benefits. This is 
particularly important in respect of penal law and policy since suspects and offenders are 
a vulnerable group in society who run the risk of facing the wrath of society for their 
wrongful actions. 
Since 1994, there has been reform in the criminal justice system in accordance with the 
Constitution. The Special Law Commission on Criminal Justice Reform has reviewed 
major statutes pertinent to criminal justice including the Police Act,19 the Penal Code,20 
                                                 
16 Terblanche (2007) 1. 
17 Malawi Law Commission (2007) Report of the Law Commission on the review of the Constitution 27. 
18 Sections 5 and 199 of the Constitution. 
19 Chapter 3:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
5 
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code (CPEC),21 and the Children and Young 
Persons Act (CYPA)22 which was replaced by the Child Care, Protection and Justice Act 
(CCPJA).23 In 2003, the Prisons Bill was drafted to replace the Prisons Act.24 This study 
is significant in that it examines some of the legal reforms that are relevant to 
punishment. It will identify potential problematic areas and therefore provide a useful 
critique of case law and the law which may inform further reforms. Furthermore, in 
view of the relevance of international law in Malawi, the study is significant in that it will 
highlight whether the country fulfils its obligation to uphold international standards for 
punishment. 
4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Punishment has attracted a relatively substantial number of publications, which have 
examined various issues such as its origins, philosophical foundations and how it is or 
must be imposed by the courts.25 Scholars have also written about the impact of human 
rights on punishment and debated whether certain forms of punishment, particularly the 
death penalty26 and life imprisonment,27 are acceptable in today‟s world. While there is a 
                                                                                                                                          
20 See Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the review of the Penal Code (2000), hereafter 
Penal Code review report. 
21 See Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the review of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Code (2007), hereafter CPEC review report. 
22 Chapter 26:03 of the Laws of Malawi. See Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the 
review of the Children and Young Persons Act (2005), hereafter CYPA review report. 
23 Child Care, Protection and Justice Act 22 of 2010. 
24 Chapter 9:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
25 Ashworth (2010); Bagaric (2010); Carlen (2002); Tonry (2010); Von Hirsch and Ashworth (1998); 
Terblanche (2007); Garland (1993); Tunick (1992); Van der Merwe (1991). 
26 Yorke (2008); Walker (2008); Chenwi (2007); Council of Europe (2004); Trunskett (2003-2004);  
Meister (2003); Nowak (2000); Slama (2001); International Commission of Jurists (2000); Van Zyl Smit 
(1994). 
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lot of literature on punishment in general, only a few scholars have focussed their 
studies on Malawi.28 In his book that covers the entire Malawian Bill of Rights, Chirwa 
devotes two chapters to the significance of the Bill on punishment.29 He aptly notes that 
the Bill of Rights and human dignity in particular „has created a new blueprint for the 
administration of justice‟.30 He states that the right to human dignity demands that fair 
punishments must be imposed and that they be enforced in a humane manner.31 Chirwa 
further questions the constitutionality of the automatic commutation of death sentences 
to life imprisonment by the President in exercise of his power to pardon.32 The Malawi 
Law Commission has produced a number of reports aimed at reforming the criminal 
justice system.33 However, these studies were specifically aimed at effecting legislative 
changes; they do not systematically address issues relating to punishment, whether the 
penal regime is consistent with international law, or how it has changed since 1994. 
Unlike the available literature on punishment, this research will be a sustained study that 
will specifically investigate the extent to which the penal regime in Malawi has 
incorporated constitutional and international standards as envisaged by the Constitution. 
There appears to be no comprehensive study that has specifically tackled this issue. 
Therefore, this study will contribute to the discourse on punishment in Malawi.  
                                                                                                                                          
27 Van Zyl Smit (2006); Du Toit 2006); De Beco (2005); Paluch et al (2003); Van Zyl Smit (2002); Van Zyl 
Smit (1999). 
28 Most of these writings focus on the death penalty. See Hynd (2011); Chigawa (2009); Novak (2009); 
Hynd (2008); Hynd (2008); Nkhata (2007); Hynd (2007). See also Ng‟ong‟ola (1988). 
29 Mainly chapters 7 and 11 which deal with the right to human dignity and children‟s rights respectively. 
30 Chirwa (2011) 126. 
31 Chirwa (2011) 127. 
32 Chirwa (2011) 133-135. 
33 See the CPEC review report; the CYPA review report; the Penal Code review report.  
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5 METHODOLOGY 
This study will draw from Malawian law, mainly the Constitution, statutes and case law 
to determine the relevant sentencing laws and standards. It will rely on textbooks and 
journal articles in examining the theories of punishment (namely deterrence, 
rehabilitation, retribution and incapacitation) and their impact on aims and forms of 
punishment, and post-sentencing procedures. Provisions in the Bill of Rights will be 
considered to determine their significance on theoretical underpinnings of punishment. 
The thesis will consult international and regional human rights instruments and 
jurisprudence to identify international standards for punishment.  
In order to establish the forms of punishment and sentencing principles, the study relies 
on the relevant legislation, case law and sentencing guidelines. A critical analysis of cases 
from the High Court and Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal (MSCA) will be done in 
order to determine the courts‟ understanding of the aims of punishment, how they 
interact with each other and how sentencing decisions have used the Constitution and 
international law. Although magistrate courts handle the bulk of criminal matters, they 
are not courts of record. Cases decided in these courts must be confirmed by the High 
Court. Confirmed cases are binding on the magistrate courts. Most of the time, judges 
incorporate sentencing guidelines when confirming or overturning a case from the 
lower court. In addition, the confirmed cases are reported in the Malawi Law Reports 
hence providing easier access. Law reform initiatives relevant to punishment will be 
critically analysed to determine whether and to what extent the changes envisaged by the 
Bill of Rights have been implemented by legislation. 
8 
6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
This study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter two discusses the traditional theories 
of punishment, namely, retribution and utilitarianism. The latter includes deterrence, 
incapacitation and rehabilitation. In this chapter, the study explores the philosophical 
underpinnings of punishment and how they are reflected in sentencing practices. 
Chapter three examines international standards for punishment. It scrutinises various 
international and regional instruments including treaties and soft law in order to 
understand the international human rights law framework for the aims and forms of 
punishment, and early release procedures. 
Chapter four provides a brief background to punishment in Malawi with a view to 
understanding the significance of the 1994 Constitution. It also explores some of the 
significant developments relating to punishment that culminated in the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1994. In addition, the chapter gives a brief overview of the relevant 
constitutional provisions that have an impact on punishment. Chapter five is devoted to 
the forms of punishment in Malawi. It describes the available sentencing options and 
broadly notes the circumstances in which they are imposed. Placing particular emphasis 
on the death penalty and life imprisonment, the chapter investigates whether the forms 
of punishment are consistent with constitutional and international standards  
Chapter six then focuses on the aims of punishment in Malawi. It considers sentencing 
decisions to understand how courts have justified punishment and determine whether 
they reflect the constitutional and international standards. Chapter seven considers the 
framework for early release in Malawi and the extent to which it is in line with the 
Constitution and international human rights law. Chapter eight outlines the main 
9 
findings of the study and makes some recommendations on how some of the 
problematic issues identified in chapters five to seven could be addressed.  
10 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the relevance and role of theories of punishment 
in a criminal justice system. This will provide the philosophical framework which will be 
used in analysing the sentencing practices in Malawi. In the context of this study, it is 
important to examine the justifications for punishment because they are of judicial and 
legislative relevance and have important policy implications.1 They not only inform 
sentencing principles and practices but also determine the nature and severity of 
sentences.2 The goals of punishment are also relevant in the execution of sentences and 
therefore affect post-sentence procedures such as parole.  
The justification for punishment invokes three key questions: why punish? Who should 
be punished? How much? Theories of punishment fall into two groups: utilitarian and 
retributivist.3 Utilitarian theories are more concerned with preventing future crime while 
retributivist theories focus on the past; that is, punishment as being deserved by 
offenders. Utilitarian theories include deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. The 
chapter will examine the core of each theory and examine its major criticisms.  
                                                 
1 See Spohn (2008) 23-30. 
2 D‟Ascoli (2011) 33. 
3 Hudson (1996) 1. 
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2 RETRIBUTION 
2.1 Definition and justification 
As noted above, the main difference between retribution and utilitarianism is that the 
latter is forward looking as it justifies punishment by the benefits that can come out of 
it, while the former is backward looking, justifying punishment by the fact that an 
offender has committed an offence. Retribution does not focus on the benefit that can 
be derived from punishment.  
Although there are various versions of retribution,4 the theory of retribution is generally 
based on four basic claims: the principle of wilful wrongdoing, the principle of 
proportionality, the principle of necessity, and the principle of inherent justice. The 
principle of blameworthiness or wilful wrongdoing is based on the notion of individual 
autonomy which recognises that human beings are rational moral agents. This principle 
holds that the justification for punishment is the blameworthiness of an offender who 
willingly commits an offence. Therefore, guilt is a prerequisite for punishment: 
offenders deserve to be punished for their wrongdoing. By implication, the innocent 
should not to be punished.  
The second retributive principle is the principle of proportionality. Proportionality is an 
essential consequence of the theory of retribution as it is based on the principle of just 
deserts. It demands that punishment must fit the crime; that is, the quantum of suffering 
inflicted on the offender should be proportional to the gravity of the crime. In 
determining the severity of punishment, a court must look to the moral culpability of 
                                                 
4 Retribution includes the repayment theory, desert theory, penalty theory, minimalism, satisfaction 
theory, fair play theory, placation theory, annulment theory and denunciation theory: see Cottingham 
(1979); Walker (1999). 
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the offender and the seriousness of the offence. Serious offences should be punished 
more severely than minor offences so as to reflect the moral gravity of the offences.5 
The gravity of an offence can be gleaned from the harm it causes and the moral 
culpability of the offender. Considerations external to the offence should have a 
minimal role, if any, in determining the punishment. Therefore, factors such as the 
prospect of rehabilitation, a plea of guilt, character, cooperation with the state, and prior 
convictions should not be major considerations in sentencing. The severity of a 
punishment, on the other hand, is determined by „the degree to which [it interferes] with 
people‟s interests …. The more important the interests intruded upon by a penalty are 
… the more severe the penalty should be considered‟.6 Kant invoked the principle of 
just desert as the only principle that can ensure proportionality in sentencing and should 
be the basis for punishment.7 
The third principle of retribution is the intrinsic goodness of punishment. Punishment is 
seen as justified in itself. The fact that the criminal has wilfully done wrong is in itself a 
justification for inflicting him with harm.8 Central to retribution is the Kantian principle 
of the moral worth or dignity of a person which frowns upon the imposition of 
punishment for other purposes:  
Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good 
either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed 
                                                 
5 Hart (1968) 234. 
6 Von Hirsch (1998) 185-189. 
7 Kant (2010) 32. The principle of lex talionis or „an eye for an eye‟ has been attacked as a „barbaric law of 
retaliation in kind‟. However, this criticism is based on a mistaken understanding that the principle 
demands that an offender should suffer the same harm that he has caused the victim, a conclusion that 
can understandably be drawn from a literal reading of the principle. Kant did not use the principle in this 
literal sense: see Fish (2008). 
8 See Anderson (1997). 
13 
only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never 
to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another, nor mixed up with the 
subjects of real right. Against such treatment his inborn personality has a right to protect him, 
even though he may be condemned to lose his civil personality … The principle of punishment 
is a categorical imperative, and woe unto him who crawls through the windings of eudaimonism 
in order to discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its 
amount by the advantage it promises.
9
 
This is not to say that benefits should not be derived from punishment. As Packer 
observes, the principle is that while other goods may be derived from punishment, they 
must not be pursued for their own sake.10 
The fourth retributive principle is that of necessity. This principle stipulates that 
punishment is obligatory and that a state has a right to punish offenders. Moore claims 
that the moral culpability of an offender gives rise to a „duty to punish‟ on the part of 
society such that „we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is 
achieved‟.11 
2.2 Critical appraisal of retribution 
Retribution is correct to claim that the catalyst for punishment is really the fact that a 
person has wilfully committed a wrong and that punishment must be proportional to 
the gravity of the crime. The principle of proportionality is recognised as a central 
concept in sentencing that has been embraced in several international instruments and 
national constitutions. It „is rooted in the rule of law, legal safeguards and guarantees 
                                                 
9 Kant (2010) 31-32. Emphasis in original. 
10 Packer (1973) 184.  
11 Moore (1998) 150. The right to punish is also based on individual autonomy: Duff (1986) 70; Gardner 
(2008) 480. 
14 
against the excessive use of force‟ that effectively prohibit misuse and arbitrariness of 
punishments.12 Retribution does however have its difficulties. 
Retribution can be criticised to the extent that it fails to take into account social factors 
that influence criminal behaviour. It advocates the view that we are morally free to 
exercise equal choice in deciding whether to commit a crime regardless of our position 
in the social order. This fails to account for the problem of just deserts in an unjust 
world. As a result, retribution ignores the external factors that account for criminality 
such as poverty, disadvantage and discrimination, upbringing and unemployment. 
The second criticism of retribution relates to its claim that those who commit crimes 
deserve to be punished. Cavadino and Dignan rightly argue that from a moral point of 
view, the desire to punish wrongdoers could be an emotion to be suppressed rather than 
indulged.13 In fact, as will be discussed in chapter five,14 there are situations where a 
court may decide not to convict let alone impose punishment despite the fact that an 
offence has been proved. Hart15 and Jacobs16 have argued that retribution does not 
provide a general justifying aim for punishment but only its distributive principles; 
namely that only the guilty should be punished, and only in proportion to the gravity of 
their crime. 
A further criticism of retribution is its rejection of the consequences of punishment as a 
crucial part of the justification for punishment. This leads to an untenable position, in 
that punishment would be justifiable even if it increased the crime rate.17 While it is 
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important to ensure that punishment is kept with the limits of the principle of 
proportionality, there is a legitimate public interest in state punishment. This is not only 
because the criminal justice system is funded by the public but also because it can hardly 
be denied that the goal of crime prevention can benefit society as a whole by making it 
safer. The challenge is how this goal can be achieved with due respect to the rights of 
offenders including the right to human dignity. In this regard, Kant‟s observation that 
offenders must not be used merely as a means to an end is instructive. It entails that the 
severity of punishment must not be detached from the gravity of the offence; that 
punishment must not be imposed simply to achieve some benefit such as community 
protection or deterrence. This is consistent with the right to human dignity and, to some 
extent, the right to liberty in cases where imprisonment or any punishment that involves 
restriction of liberty is imposed. 
Retribution has also been criticised for its failure to clearly define proportionality. As 
noted by Frase, „excessiveness and disproportionality are meaningless concepts in the 
absence of a clearly defined and defensible normative framework‟.18 In order to 
understand the principle of proportionality „it is necessary to determine the factors that 
are relevant to the seriousness of the offence and how offence severity should be 
gauged‟.19 A further challenge to proportionality is the inconsistent treatment of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing. The legislature and the courts should 
strive to treat these factors consistently and to develop standards as to when particular 
forms of punishment may or may not be imposed. For instance, imprisonment, despite 
its duration, is generally regarded as a severe form of punishment. Minor offences 
should not attract imprisonment. 
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In summary, it cannot be disputed that what triggers crime is the commission of an 
offence. Therefore, retribution lays the foundation for punishment. It also provides the 
distributive principles of punishment through the principle of proportionality. This 
limits the extent of punishment that can be imposed on an offender and guards against 
the objectification of an offender as means to an end. However, retribution can only 
achieve justice in an ideal society. This is because it does not pay attention to social 
factors that may influence criminal behaviour. Further, retribution can never deal with 
crime in light of its rejection of the consequences of punishment; punishment cannot be 
pursued for its own sake without any consideration as to how its impact on society. As 
will be shown in the section immediately below, utilitarian theories are attractive for 
recognising that punishment must result in the general betterment of society. 
3 UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
Utilitarian theories of punishment are rooted in the general theory of utilitarianism. This 
discussion will be limited to the general principles that underpin the theory of 
utilitarianism.20 The first part of this section will define utilitarianism. Thereafter, the 
section will look at the utilitarian theories of punishment namely deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation and restoration. 
3.1 Definition of utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is a moral theory that states that the ultimate good of society is to achieve 
happiness or pleasure and to avoid pain. It judges conduct by its ability to increase 
happiness or reduce pain. Utilitarianism is governed mainly by the principle of utility, or, 
as Mill called it, „the greatest happiness principle‟.21 According to Bentham, who is 
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regarded as the main founder of utilitarian philosophy, this principle „approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to 
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is 
the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness‟.22 An action is 
morally reasonable and defensible if it produces „the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number‟ of people. A fundamental problem in utilitarianism is how to measure 
happiness. In the context of curbing crime, individuals may desire to see more arrests, 
others more convictions and others harsher punishments.23 However, in each case, the 
desired result is ultimately a reduction or elimination of crime. 
In terms of punishment, utilitarianists admit that it is, in itself, evil as it causes 
unhappiness to an offender. Indeed, Bentham declared that „all punishment is mischief; 
all punishment is in itself evil‟.24 However, utilitarianism justifies punishment by its 
future consequences: crime reduction or prevention. Crime is regarded as a source of 
pain that reduces aggregate happiness of the society because it causes many societal 
problems, suffering to its victims and makes society unsafe. Punishment is designed to 
reduce the incidence of crime in society.25 While bringing unhappiness to the punished, 
punishment leads to a greater good: it will increase the general happiness of society as it 
reduces or eliminates crime. This happiness will be experienced through a more secure 
and orderly society. The pain of punishment is justifiable only if it has the result of 
increasing the total happiness of a community through crime prevention.26 This means 
that from a utilitarian point of view, punishment is a means to an end. However, 
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Beccaria opined that punishment should be „necessary; the least possible in the case 
given‟.27 Similarly, Bentham believed that punishment should be used as sparingly as 
possible and not in circumstances where the end sought can be achieved by milder 
means.28 
There is an underlying assumption in utilitarianism that potential offenders are rational 
actors who carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of punishment before 
deciding to commit a crime. Just punishment is thus that which does not exceed the 
degree of intensity required to deter others.29 
3.2 Critical appraisal of utilitarianism 
Unlike, retribution, utilitarianism does not ignore the consequences of punishment. 
Therefore, it may be relevant in assessing harsh punishment that satisfies retribution but 
has no benefit on society. This would be vital in assessing the acceptability of some 
forms of punishment. However, utilitarianism also has its problems which disqualify it 
from being a dominant penal theory. 
The first criticism of utilitarianism is that it instrumentalises offenders as a means of 
crime prevention. Utilitarianism regards the happiness of the community as more 
important than that of the individual. As noted above, this is in direct conflict with 
Kantian philosophy which underlies the concept of human dignity and views man as an 
end in himself and not merely a means to an end. As will be discussed in chapter three, 
the right to human dignity must not be overridden in the punishment of an offender. 
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The second shortfall of utilitarianism is that it overemphasises the positive 
consequences of crime on society and fails to pay adequate attention to the offence and 
the offender. As a result, the individuation of punishment becomes problematic. In 
addition, ignoring the offence makes it difficult to ensure that just punishment is 
imposed, making equality of punishment elusive. Ultimately, utilitarianism fails to give 
any guidance as to the quantum of punishment. This is not to say that utilitarianism 
does not embrace proportionality. In fact, Bentham postulated that „the evil of the 
punishment should not exceed the evil of the offence‟ and that serious offences that 
cause greater harm to society should be punished more severely than minor offences so 
as to motivate offenders to stop at the lesser crime.30 Beccaria also embraced 
proportionality as a measure of punishment.31 However, these principles remain vague 
in as far as proportionality is concerned. In the absence of the retributive principle of 
just desert, utilitarianism fails to dictate how much punishment would be just in any 
given case, except requiring that the punishment should be sufficient to have a deterrent 
effect.32 
This leads to a third weakness of utilitarianism, namely that it encourages severe or 
harsh sentences. Indeed, utilitarianism holds that proportionality is not an absolute 
principle; it may be violated where this will increase happiness.33 It is worth noting, in 
this regard, that the principle of proportionality is closely linked to the principle of 
parsimony which is acknowledged in utilitarianism. This principle dictates that the least 
restrictive or least punitive punishment necessary to achieve defined purposes‟ should 
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be imposed.34 As noted above, both Bentham and Beccaria stressed that punishment 
must be used sparingly and in a manner that does not bring unnecessary unhappiness to 
an offender. In practice, this entails, for example, that imprisonment must not be 
imposed on offenders when other less restrictive means can be used. It may therefore 
be argued that this allays concerns that utilitarianism justifies the use of stiff 
punishment. However, repeat offenders may attract stiffer punishment than that 
justified by the severity of the instant offence. To this extent, the harshness of the 
punishment may be justified on the basis of utilitarianism. 
Lastly, it can be argued that utilitarianism ignores societal issues beyond the victim. The 
structure and stratification of society must change if happiness is to be increased for 
every member of society. 
In conclusion, utilitarianism views punishment as a collective good whose relevance is 
questionable if it does not bring about societal good through reducing or preventing 
crime. This is a noble goal. In fact, punishment may be seen as irrelevant even if 
retributive sentences were imposed but had no positive outcome on society. 
Abandoning utilitarian theories altogether will make punishment futile as it will bring no 
benefit to society. Punishment must not be so lenient that their deterrent effect is 
negligible. However, if left unchecked, utilitarianism can lead to harsh punishments that 
are justified only by their ability to prevent or reduce crime. Therefore, crime prevention 
must be pursued within the confines of the principle of proportionality.  
The next section will discuss the three utilitarian justifications for punishment: 
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.  
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3.3 Deterrence 
3.3.1 Definition and justification 
The theory of deterrence is a utilitarian theory of punishment that justifies it by its 
ability to prevent future crime in society. The punishment of an offender, though 
unpleasant and bringing unhappiness to him, is justified by its overall benefit of 
increasing societal happiness through crime prevention. Deterrence is mainly attributed 
to the early works of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy 
Bentham. 
Deterrence occurs when a person refrains from an action because of the fear of the 
possible unpleasant consequences of that action. In terms of punishment, it entails that 
offenders or potential offenders will not commit further offences for fear of being 
punished. In order to achieve this, the punishment must be sufficient to outweigh the 
profit of the offence.35 Deterrence can be specific or general. Specific deterrence aims to 
discourage the punished offender from re-offending by instilling fear in the offender of 
being punished again.36 On the other hand, general deterrence aims at preventing 
potential offenders from committing crimes. It depends on the frightening effect of 
punishment emanating from the risk of discovery and punishment outweighing the 
temptation to commit an offence.37 
Severity and certainty of punishment are key concepts in deterrence.38 Both Beccaria and 
Bentham were of the view that punishment must exceed the benefits derived from the 
crime committed. By severity is meant not only the quantum but also the nature of 
                                                 
35 Bentham (1982) 166. 
36 Cavadino and Dignan (2002) 34. 
37 Andenaes (1974) 7. 
38 Apel and Nagin (2011) 411, 412. 
22 
punishment. Unjust punishments are those which exceed the quantum that was 
necessary to achieve deterrence. The quantum of punishment must rise with the profit 
of the offence.39 Beccaria regarded the certainty of arrest and punishment as more 
fundamental to the preventive force of punishment than severity.40 Severe punishment 
must be coupled with the certainty of not only being caught but also convicted; 
otherwise, the punishment remains a threat on paper. In addition, punishment must be 
swift. Beccaria posits that „[t]he more immediately after the commission of a crime a 
punishment is inflicted, the more just and useful it will be‟; that is, the immediacy of 
punishment is crucial in that it ensures that punishment is seen as the inevitable 
consequence of crime.41 This implies that the swiftness of punishment will add to its 
deterrent effect.42 Beccaria regarded the prerogative of mercy and other forms of early 
release or reduction of sentences based on mitigating factors as detrimental to the 
certainty of punishment. He writes: 
To show mankind that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the 
necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, and is the cause of their 
considering every punishment inflicted as an act of injustice and oppression. The prince in 
pardoning gives up the public security in favour of an individual, and, by his ill−judged 
benevolence, proclaims a public act of impunity.43 
The underlying assumption of deterrence is that human beings are rational actors. As 
such, they will weigh the profit of crime against its cost including the applicable 
punishment. Proponents of deterrence therefore accept that deterrence is an 
inappropriate consideration for the mentally ill, young or those who committed the 
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offence while provoked.44 On the other hand, severe, swift, certain punishment will act 
as a deterrent for rational beings. This means that, in addition to severity and certainty, 
the citizenry must be adequately informed about the applicable punishment and those 
meted out.45 This is particularly important for general deterrence.46 Bentham stated that 
punishment is inefficacious where the „the penal provision, though established, is not 
conveyed to the notice of the person on whom it seems intended that it should operate‟.47 
The public must also have sufficient details about the crime.48 
3.3.2 Critical appraisal of deterrence 
Deterrence reiterates both the merits and demerits of utilitarianism discussed earlier. 
The first criticism of deterrence is that it runs the danger of justifying excessive 
punishment on the basis of its perceived positive consequences. Consequently, it 
dehumanises an offender, failing to recognise man as an end in himself. This is contrary 
to the principle put forward by Kant that human beings are ends in themselves and 
should not be treated as means to an end. In the South African case of S v Makwanyane49 
the Constitutional Court held that deterrence „instrumentalises the offender for state 
policy‟ and „dehumanises … and objectifies him … as a tool for crime control. This 
objectification … strips the offender of his … human dignity‟.50 However, this criticism 
is only valid where, for purposes of deterrence, the punishment imposed on an offender 
is increased beyond that which is otherwise proportional to the offence committed.  
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Another weakness with deterrence is that it is used to justify stiffer sentences. Any penal 
policy that increases the length or nature of punishment applicable is generally based on 
deterrence.51 There has been a shift in modern times from the certainty of punishment 
to its severity. The problem is that like utilitarianism in general, deterrence fails to 
provide a measure for the quantum of punishment. If penalties must be „sufficiently‟ 
severe, then the prevalence of an offence will mean that a punishment has not achieved 
general or specific deterrence which in turn will be taken to mean that the punishment is 
too lenient. Therefore, severer upon severer sentences may be imposed if the desired 
effect is not achieved.52 In some cases, the law may even resort to mandatory and 
minimum sentences. These sentences run the risk of disproportionality because they 
restrict or rule out a court‟s sentencing discretion and therefore ignore the 
circumstances of an offender. 
The preceding paragraph shows that like utilitarianism, deterrence focusses mainly on 
whether the punishment is sufficiently severe to act as a deterrent; thereby trivialising 
the circumstance of the offence and the offender. In addition, it ignores other factors 
that lead to criminality and systemic factors that may be relevant to punishment. 
Therefore, a penal system based solely on deterrence will only achieve skewed justice. 
Ignoring the individual means that deterrence is not prepared to accept reformation and 
early release. This undermines the individual even further. Early release mechanisms are 
integral to imprisonment and, in some cases, the failure to release an offender can 
violate the rights of the offender concerned and amount to cruel, inhumane and 
degrading punishment.53 
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Lastly, there are questions about whether deterrence works in practice and whether 
stiffer punishments help to reduce crime. There is no doubt that penalties do have a 
general deterrent effect.54 Indeed, few would argue that people would refrain from 
committing crimes if criminal activity attracted a reward. However, the relation between 
the severity of punishment and its deterrent effect is a complicated one. Proponents of 
deterrence like Andenaes state that this complication arises because the fear of 
punishment is not the only factor that serves as a disincentive to committing crimes; the 
state of mind of the public and the intensity of policing are also important.55 More 
importantly, some people are deterred by moral considerations or fear of disapproval 
from those close to them, regardless of the severity of the punishment or knowledge of 
it.56 Admittedly, the nature and severity of punishment is the easiest factor to regulate. 
In summary, deterrence aims to prevent crime through the threat of punishment. This 
would necessitate that factors like prevalence of the crime should be taken into account 
when sentencing an offender. Although there is no conclusive evidence as to how far 
deterrence works, deterrence can play a limited role in punishment: people may learn 
from punishment, thus it may provide a disincentive to crime. However, as noted above, 
a purely deterrence-based policy can result in harsh sentences. Proportionality 
considerations must therefore play a role in deciding the severity of punishment. 
Further, in light of the inconclusive evidence regarding the relation between severity of 
punishment and its deterrent effect, the legislature and the courts should be wary of 
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increasing punishment as though deterrence were „an article of faith‟.57 The personal 
circumstances of the offender should also be considered.  
Lastly, by requiring that the law and punishment must be communicated to the public, 
deterrence reinforces the principle of legality which stipulates that criminal laws must be 
clear so that ordinary people must know the proscribed conduct and its punishment. 
This will make punishment a proactive, as opposed to a reactive, measure against crime. 
3.4 Incapacitation 
3.4.1 Definition and justification 
Incapacitation (or community protection) involves rendering an offender incapable of 
committing further offences by his temporary or permanent removal from society. As a 
utilitarian theory, incapacitation justifies punishment if it reduces or prevents the further 
harm that would have been caused to the community by the future crimes that would 
have been committed by the punished offender. This means that punishment is justified 
by the risk that the offender is believed to pose to society in the future. Therefore, the 
utilitarian value of incapacitation is that it promotes community protection and thereby 
increases the happiness of members in a community. The theory of incapacitation 
advocates for imprisonment as the most useful form of punishment.58 Other methods 
include the death penalty, dismemberment, probation, disqualification from driving, and 
other measures that limit the physical ability of offenders to commit further offences. 
The incapacitative model maintains that sentencing on the basis of the offence does not 
satisfactorily guarantee public protection. Incapacitation can be general (collective) or 
specific. General incapacitation involves the imprisonment of offenders irrespective of 
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the aim of imprisonment or the risk posed by individual offenders.59 It can be pursued 
by adopting a „tougher on crime‟ policy. On the other hand, specific incapacitation 
refers to the imprisonment of certain offenders identified as having a high risk of 
reoffending. It is usually invoked for serious offences, habitual offenders and those 
deemed to be dangerous. This may justify the use of indeterminate or preventive 
sentences on the basis of future risk. Specific incapacitation is based on the presumption 
that recidivism or dangerousness can be predicted accurately from an offender‟s 
personality or characteristics, such as drug use and criminal history. Bottoms and 
Brownsword claim that where an offender poses a „vivid danger‟ of seriously harming 
other people, it would be justified to impose a longer than deserved sentence on the fact 
of his dangerousness since there is a substantial and immediate likelihood of serious 
injury occurring.60 
Incapacitation also plays a role in post-sentence procedures concerning early release 
such as parole in that early release from prison may be denied on the ground that an 
applicant is a dangerous person with a high risk of re-offending if released into the 
community.  
3.4.2 Critical appraisal of incapacitation 
As a utilitarian theory, incapacitation is prone to criticism advanced earlier against 
utilitarianism. It objectifies an offender in that punishment is primarily aimed at 
incapacitating an offender to secure community protection. General incapacitation is 
particularly problematic in the light of the right to liberty since it may justify the 
imprisonment of an offender even where he does not pose a threat to society. Specific 
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incapacitation ignores the conduct of an offender and looks at his future actions. This 
fundamentally violates the whole idea of crime and criminal responsibility which is 
incompatible with allocation of blame for future conduct. Criminal responsibility can 
only ensue from past behaviour; that is, offenders must be punished for what they have 
actually done and not what they may do in the future.  Therefore, justifying punishment 
by predictions as to future criminal behaviour may place the principle of proportionality 
and the presumption of innocence in jeopardy. Proportionality dictates that punishment 
should be based on the blameworthiness of an offender and the seriousness of the 
crime.  
Incapacitation can be used to justify the imposition of harsh sentences since it does not 
pay sufficient attention to the offence committed.61 This may ignore the rehabilitative 
potential of an offender and social factors that may contribute to criminal behaviour. 
Selective incapacitation relies on the characteristics of an offender which have no 
bearing on the blameworthiness of the offender. The presumption of innocence 
requires that a person should only be punished for the crime he has committed, not for 
anticipated offences. Selective incapacitation effectively punishes offenders for crimes 
not yet committed. In this regard, there is strong argument against indeterminate 
sentences and predictions of future dangerousness. Indeterminate sentences are 
imposed on the basis of future risk, „not on the need for punishment for the offence‟.62 
This means that they are punishments for crimes not yet committed or indeed which 
may never be committed. This infringes the right to liberty and security of the person. 
Indeterminate sentences also lack the element of proportionality essential in a humane 
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punishment. Further, the presumption of innocence is also breached since an offender 
is punished on the basis of a prediction that he poses a risk to society and is therefore 
adjudged guilty of future misconduct based on „judicial intuition‟.63 This directly 
contradicts the overall purpose of sentencing which is to punish an individual for the 
offence he has committed.64 
A further criticism of incapacitation is that by focussing on past offences in predicting 
future criminality, it may violate the principle of double jeopardy which states that a 
person must not be punished twice for the same offence. This is because an offender 
with a previous conviction may be punished more severely on the basis of his record. 
This is evident in cases involving preventive sentences where the law may prescribe that 
an offender who has a certain number of convictions may be liable to preventive 
imprisonment. Such a sentence often entails that an offender will be punished more 
severely than if he were a first offender. In such cases, the offender is essentially 
punished for previous offences in respect of which punishment was already served.  
Another problem with incapacitation is related to the prediction of future behaviour, 
which invariably requires an assessment of the likelihood of reoffending and the 
rehabilitative potential of an offender. As Van Zyl Smit rightly observes, predictions of 
future dangerousness are „notoriously hard to make‟.65 Experience and research has 
shown that future behaviour cannot be accurately predicted so as to determine who will 
reoffend.66 Even in the case of habitual offenders, where proof of past criminal 
behaviour is available, it cannot be said with certainty that they will commit further 
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offences. Mistaken predictions will lead to injustice and disproportionate sentences 
where a convict is held for longer solely on the basis of the prediction when the 
sentence would have been less in the absence of the prediction.67 Poignantly, it can 
hardly be argued that accurate predictions can be made; this is because unless an 
offender in fact commits an offence as predicted, the accuracy of the prediction remains 
unproven. 
Lastly, incapacitation can be seen as a shortcut to fighting crime. Predispositions to 
crime are at the core of incapacitation and yet they hint at problems which if dealt with 
may contribute to making society safer. However, instead of fixing the problems, 
incapacitation uses them to justify the removal of an offender from society. This 
neglects the fact that despite his wrongdoing, an offender remains a member of the 
community. Furthermore, as Wilson points out: 
Incapacitation cannot be the sole purpose of the criminal justice system; if it were, we would put 
everybody who has committed one or two offences in prison until they were too old to commit 
another. And if we thought prison too costly, we would simply cut off their hands or their 
heads. Justice, humanity and proportionality, among other goals, must also be served by the 
courts.68 
In other words, incapacitation does not seek to redress the underlying causes of crime in 
attempt to provide, if possible, a long-lasting solution to crime. As such, an offender 
may be prevented from engaging in certain criminal activity while in custody but upon 
his release go back to crime. This would be undesirable and in cases where the 
likelihood of recidivism is detected, life imprisonment may be imposed. Therefore, 
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other aims of punishment such as rehabilitation should play a role in the sentencing 
process.  
Despite these criticisms, the need to protect the community is a noble goal. However, 
incapacitation cannot form the sole basis of punishment. This would lead to the use of 
harsh forms of punishment such as castration which are now generally considered cruel. 
Another undesirable result would be the use of long prison sentences and, especially 
where general incapacitation is employed, an overall overuse of imprisonment with its 
attendant problems such as overcrowding. This would be not only expensive but also, 
where unwarranted, lead to unnecessary disruption to the family life of the offender. 
Incapacitation should therefore have a very limited role in punishment. Indeed, a penal 
system founded on incapacitation alone would be counterproductive to international 
standards on punishment which promote restraint in the use of imprisonment.69  
In conclusion, the theory of incapacitation emphasises the need to promote community 
protection through punishment. Some of the challenges that incapacitation faces include 
the prediction of predicting future behaviour and how this is reconcilable with criminal 
responsibility. Further, the incapacitative model provides justification for harsh 
sentences. Nevertheless, incapacitation can play a limited role in punishment, especially 
where serious serial offenders are involved and public safety has been compromised. It 
is argued, however, that in cases involving serial offenders, the punishment should not 
be based on their criminal record but the instant offence they have committed. For 
instance, a serial rapist should not be sentenced to life imprisonment on a conviction for 
theft simply because of his criminal record. On the whole, except for instances in which 
the death penalty is imposed, incapacitation only provides a quick but short-term 
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solution to crime by removing offenders from society. This ignores the underlying 
causes of crime. It is this very weakness that is the strength of rehabilitative model.  
3.5 Rehabilitation 
3.5.1 Definition and justification 
Rehabilitation is a theory of punishment that aims at preventing future offending by 
reforming the offender. It focuses on reducing or eliminating the perceived underlying 
causes of crimes through correctional interventions.70 The aim of rehabilitation is to 
reform and train the offender so that he returns to society as a law abiding citizen. From 
a utilitarian point of view, rehabilitation justifies the punishment of offenders by its 
outcome: reforming offenders into law abiding citizens will reduce their propensity to 
commit crimes; this will reduce the incidence of crime in society and thus increase the 
overall happiness of its members. Rehabilitation also increases the happiness of the 
offender‟s life by enabling him to live a crime-free life. Therefore, rehabilitation can also 
enhance public safety. While incapacitation attempts to achieve public safety by 
removing an offender from society, rehabilitation attempts to do so by reforming the 
offender. Rehabilitation therefore entrenches the view that an offender remains part of 
the community.  
The underlying assumption of rehabilitation is that by dealing with the factors, such as 
the social and personal circumstances of offenders that lead to criminal activity, 
offenders can become responsible law abiding citizens. In other words, not all 
individuals exercise choice in deciding whether to commit a crime regardless of their 
                                                 
70 Welch (1995). 
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position in the social order.71 Rehabilitation involves the participation of offenders in 
various rehabilitative programmes aimed at reformation of the offender. These 
programmes may include drug and alcohol programmes or anger management sessions. 
Rehabilitation is also the object of programmes aimed at equipping offenders for a 
better life in the community such as vocational or educational skills, counselling, 
psychological assistance and support. 
Duff argues that to attempt to reform an individual is to treat him with great concern 
and as an end in himself.72 Similarly, Cullen asserts that rehabilitation reinforces the 
human dignity of offenders by demanding that they reflect on their lives and take 
necessary steps to free themselves from the things that lead them into crime.73 A 
fundamental problem that remains unanswered is how to determine the period of time 
necessary for an effective rehabilitative process to take place. Rehabilitationists have 
traditionally supported preventive detention and indeterminate prison sentences.74  
Rehabilitation may at times require that an offender should be imprisoned in order to 
avail himself for rehabilitative programmes. Short sentences are seen as more conducive 
to rehabilitation. Such sentences may be combined with other forms of punishment 
such as community service or probation. Where a long sentence is imposed, it may be 
combined with a suspended sentence to ensure that an offender does not spend a long 
time in prison.75 
                                                 
71 Cullen and Gilbert (1998) 21. 
72 Duff (1986) 242-266. 
73 Cullen (2010). 
74 Dubber (1998) 129-130. 
75 Rotman (1990) 148. 
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3.5.2 Critical appraisal of rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is fundamentally different from deterrence and incapacitation in that it 
seeks to redress the factors that induce crime. It therefore places emphasis on the 
offender by seeking to reduce his predisposition to criminal behaviour. This is a unique 
benefit of rehabilitation in that it has the potential to simultaneously benefit the 
offender and the society. Indeed, improving an offender‟s life is necessary to reduce 
crime.76 As Cullen and Gilbert rightly observe,  
[S]ocial and personal circumstances often constrain, if not compel, people to violate the law and 
unless efforts are made to enable offenders escape these criminogenic constraints, little relief in 
the crime rate can be anticipated. Policies that insist on a vengeful posture toward offenders 
promise to succeed only in fostering hardships that will, if anything, deepen the resentment that 
many inmates find it difficult to suppress upon release back into society.77 
In addition, rehabilitation promotes the idea that an offender continues to be a part of 
the community since it makes the re-integration of an offender into society easier. 
Successful rehabilitation is more likely to be realised where measures of long-term 
adjustment are in place such as family support or a job. However, rehabilitation has 
some challenges. 
Firstly, rehabilitation is not based on the criminal action but the ability of an offender to 
rehabilitate. This raises concern in relation to how rehabilitation can ensure the equality 
and individuation of punishment.78 As a result, the use of longer and indeterminate 
                                                 
76 Cf Von Hirsch and Maher (1998) 27, who argue that claiming that rehabilitation is humane „confuses 
humanitarian concerns with treatment-as-crime-prevention‟ because although it may improve the life of 
the offender, the ultimate goal is to reduce recidivism. 
77 Cullen and Gilbert (1998) 23. 
78 Lewis (2010), who argues that rehabilitation removes the concept of desert from punishment thus 
breaks the only connection between punishment and justice. 
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sentences may be justified even for child offenders. This requires that proper 
consideration should be given to how rehabilitation is implemented. Imprisonment 
being in essence a deprivation of liberty, its duration cannot be determined unilaterally 
by the potential of an offender to rehabilitation.  
Secondly, rehabilitation may be associated with stigma as it labels offenders as sick and 
in need of treatment.79 Allen further states that rehabilitation disregards the principles of 
consent and voluntarism of an offender to treatment since an offender has no choice on 
how his rehabilitation should be achieved as it is imposed by a court.80 Dubber argues 
that rehabilitation fosters the view that offenders are incapable of rational self-
determination.81 These criticisms do not dispel the fact that rehabilitation may improve 
the life of an offender. Arguments that rehabilitation stigmatises an offender become 
tenuous when it is recalled that offenders are already stigmatised and labelled by a 
criminal conviction. The aim of rehabilitation is not to entrench such stigma but to 
correct the situation by attempting to redress the underlying causes that led to the 
stigma in the first place. Concerns that rehabilitative measures are forced on offenders 
are more applicable to remedial measures that are so intrusive that the offender‟s 
consent is reasonably required. In practice, very few offenders can object to positive 
measures such as capacity building skills or counselling. Further, it may be necessary to 
establish a good rapport between offenders and prison officials or professionals. 
                                                 
79 See Brody (1998) 11, arguing that rehabilitation assumes that there is „a lingering equation between 
crime and psychopathology‟. 
80 Allen (1998) 15. 
81 Dubber (1998) 127. 
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Beyond that, one should not lose sight of the fact that punishment cannot always be 
negotiated.82 
It must also been mentioned that rehabilitation can prove to be complex and expensive. 
Rehabilitation works in some cases but, unfortunately, rehabilitationists are yet to come 
up with appropriate treatments for each offender.83 Rehabilitation is costly in that the 
success of the rehabilitative programmes depends on the availability of human and 
financial resources. Therefore, it remains a challenging objective for penal systems in 
developing countries. However, it may also be argued that rehabilitation promotes the 
need for humane conditions in prisons.84 Further, even without rehabilitative 
programmes, imprisonment is expensive. It may therefore be desirable that offenders 
are not sent to prison for its own sake but with the aim of improving their lives so that 
their proclivity to commit crime is substantially reduced or eliminated altogether. This 
may ensure that prisoners do not return to prison. 
In summary, rehabilitation has moral value in recognising that criminals can become 
better persons. It is internationally accepted that rehabilitation must have primacy in 
dealing with child offenders. If crime is largely explainable by upbringing and social and 
psychological conditions, rehabilitation should be very relevant if implemented properly. 
Most of the concerns raised above can be adequately addressed and, in any case, do not 
                                                 
82 As shown in sections 3.3 and 4.2 of chapter five, there are some of penalties such as community service 
and periodic imprisonment where an offender‟s consent is required by law. However, it can hardly be said 
that the court engages the offender in a dialogue. As Bagaric points out, „a dialogue requires 
approximately equal parties in order that there is a meaningful opportunity for a genuine exchange of 
views‟: see Bagaric (2001) 76. 
83 Von Hirsch and Maher (1998) 27; Packer (1968) 56. 
84 Cf Bagaric (2001) 157, who argues that rehabilitation is an incentive to commit crime because it takes 
away the pain of punishment by emphasising the interests of the offender. This criticism ignores the fact 
that a criminal conviction is a precondition for accessing rehabilitation programmes and that criminal 
convictions usually entail stigma and damage to a person‟s reputation.  
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discredit the core function of rehabilitation. Focussing on rehabilitation during 
imprisonment can make prison life more humane and promote the need for humane 
conditions of detention. In terms of sentencing, the rehabilitative model encourages a 
court to take into account the personal circumstances of an offender including his 
background. Further, rehabilitation is inherently opposed to whole life sentences as it 
emphasises the reintegration of the offender into society at some point. This is 
consistent with international human rights law which recognises rehabilitation as the 
major aim of punishment.85 
3.6 Conclusion on utilitarian theories 
Utilitarian theories of punishment justify punishment by its perceived future benefits. 
Deterrence seeks to prevent future offending by the threat of punishment; 
incapacitation aims at reducing crime by removing the offender from society; and 
rehabilitation seeks to prevent reoffending by reforming the offender. These theories 
have a common goal of community protection. Rehabilitation is a particularly attractive 
theory as it attempts to redress the underlying causes of crime and emphasises the 
reintegration of the offender into society. It should therefore play a greater role in 
punishment. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed two main theories of punishment, namely retribution and 
utilitarianism, in order to establish the philosophical underpinnings of punishment and 
how they are reflected in sentencing practices. Retribution is retrospective as it considers 
punishment to be deserved by offenders. It emphasises that punishment must fit the 
gravity of the crime; this is an important principle. However, retribution does not give 
                                                 
85 See section 2 of chapter three. 
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sufficient attention to social factors that may contribute to criminal behaviour. More 
importantly, it can be faulted for failing to consider the outcome of punishment as 
necessary; there is a legitimate public interest in the punishment of offenders. Therefore, 
retribution fails to provide a convincing general justifying aim for the existence of 
punishment as an institution or practice. Retribution must be relegated to a distributive 
principle of punishment, whereby it acts as a guide on the quantum of punishment; 
punishment must at the least reflect the gravity of an offence and the circumstances of 
an offender. This is based on an understanding that perceives the principle of 
proportionality as a limiting principle, providing for an upper limit on punishment while 
leaving room for judicial discretion in determining the actual sentence imposed in each 
case. This allows a court to take into account other considerations when sentencing 
while at the same time being restrained on the maximum punishment it can impose.86 
Utilitarian theories like deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation are prospective as 
they justify punishment by its ability to prevent future criminality or reduce reoffending.  
Generally, utilitarianism provides a strong general justification for punishment in that it 
looks at its positive consequences on society; namely the general betterment of society 
through crime prevention and reduction. This gives punishment a useful role in society 
and creates a framework against which the relevance of certain forms of punishment 
such as the death penalty and lengthy prison sentences may be questioned. Deterrence 
draws attention to the impact of crime on society while incapacitation highlights the 
importance of community protection. Incapacitation may be particularly relevant in 
cases where the safety of the community has been greatly compromised and in extreme 
                                                 
86 See Morris (1998) 184: „The concept of desert defines relationships between crime and punishments on 
a continuum between the unduly lenient and the excessively punitive within which the just sentence may 
on other grounds be determined‟. 
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cases of serious serial offenders where rehabilitation is not possible. This means that 
general incapacitation should not be employed. This will ensure that imprisonment is 
used with restraint and the principle of parsimony will also be promoted in that other 
less severe forms of punishment will be imposed in cases that do not justify 
imprisonment. However, both deterrence and incapacitation run the risk of harsh 
sentences and objectifying offenders in the pursuit of crime prevention largely because 
they tend to overlook the offence, the offender and factors that affect criminality. It is 
here that retribution would provide a ceiling on the acceptable quantum of punishment 
by reference to the gravity of the offence committed. At the same time, the law needs to 
ensure that rehabilitation efforts are not ruled out altogether. 
Rehabilitation seems to be a more generally relevant theory. In its pursuit of crime 
reduction or prevention, rehabilitation focusses on reducing an offender‟s tendency to 
commit crime by redressing factors that may induce crime. Rehabilitation should 
therefore play a greater role on punishment since it questions and tackles the underlying 
causes of crime in order to reform an offender and promote his reintegration into 
society. This approach entrenches the right to human dignity and the requirement of 
humane detention conditions. However, its implementation must be properly managed. 
As shown in the following chapter, the right to dignity demands that rehabilitation must 
be an integral part of punishment. Even in cases involving serious offenders, the 
potential for rehabilitation must not be ignored. Accordingly, incapacitation cannot 
justify a once-off decision that such offenders must be locked away for the rest of their 
lives.  
40 
International law also stresses that rehabilitation must be the essential aim of 
punishment. In the next chapter, the thesis will discuss key international standards for 
the aims and forms of punishment, and release mechanisms for prisoners.  
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR PUNISHMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has shown that both retributive and utilitarian theories have a role 
to play in punishment. It concluded that rehabilitation is an attractive theory of 
punishment because it aims to achieve crime prevention through the rehabilitation of 
offenders and therefore has the potential to assist them live crime free lives. The aim of 
this chapter is to discuss the standards for punishment and sentencing in international 
human rights law. An examination of international law on punishment is important to 
this study because international law has a crucial role to play in Malawi. Section 11(2)(c) 
of the Constitution provides that courts of law „shall have regard to current norms of 
public international law and comparable foreign case law‟ where it is „applicable‟ in 
interpreting the Constitution. International law is also a source of law in terms of 
section 211 of the Constitution. Further, section 44(2) of the Constitution, provides that 
permissible limitations to rights must be „recognised by international human rights 
standards‟.1  
The source of international standards for punishment and sentencing is mainly 
international human rights instruments and guidelines. This chapter will draw on various 
international human rights instruments under the United Nations (UN) and regional 
systems and relevant case law emanating from these instruments. The first section will 
analyse the international human rights law position on the aims of punishment. 
Thereafter, the chapter will look at the position of international law with regard to 
selected forms of punishment. In particular, it will look at the international standards on 
                                                 
1 The relevance of international law in Malawi is discussed in greater detail in section 4.2.1 of chapter four. 
42 
the death penalty, imprisonment and briefly non-custodial forms of punishment. The 
chapter dwells on death sentences and imprisonment because they are the most 
common forms of punishment that have been addressed in international law. In 
addition, the main focus of the thesis is on imprisonment and death sentences because 
of the situation in Malawi where the latter is the most severe punishment while the 
former is the most commonly imposed. The final section of the chapter will examine 
international standards for early release. 
2 THE AIMS OF PUNISHMENT 
International treaties rarely make reference to the objectives of punishment. Indeed, of 
the three main justifications of punishment (deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation), it 
is only rehabilitation that is mentioned at treaty level. Article 10(3) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2 provides that the penitentiary system 
shall have as its essential aim the reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners. A 
similar provision is contained article 5(6) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (American Convention)3 which states that imprisonment must have „as an 
essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners‟. The Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), which monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, has observed, in 
relation to article 10(3) of the ICCPR, that „[n]o penitentiary system should be only 
retributory; it should essentially seek the reformation and social rehabilitation of the 
prisoner‟.4 In General Comment 21, the HRC placed significance on the specific 
measures applied during detention in order to ascertain whether article 10(3) has been 
                                                 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/6316 (1966). 
3 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123, entered into force 
18 July 1978. 
4 HRC General Comment No 21 „Article 10 (Humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty)‟ UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev1, 33 (1994) para 10. 
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complied with. These measures include education, vocational guidance and training, 
work programmes for prisoners, categorisation of offenders, the disciplinary system, 
solitary confinement, contact with family, and provision of assistance post-release.5 In 
Hankle v Jamaica,6 the author claimed that his life sentence for murder which included a 
non-parole period of 20 years was inconsistent with article 10(3) of the ICCPR. The 
HRC found the complaint inadmissible. In her dissenting opinion, Ms Christine Chanet 
found that article 10(3)  
should have prompted the Committee to admit the communication and examine on its merits 
the compatibility of a mandatory penalty of 20 years with a text stipulating that the aim of that 
penalty is to rehabilitate the offender. The question to be argued should have been the following: 
does not the inability to modify the penalty for such a long period constitute an obstacle to the 
social rehabilitation of the prisoner?7 
This reasoning indicates that lengthy imprisonment and mandatory sentences may be 
inconsistent with rehabilitation.  
The emphasis on rehabilitation is also evident in regional human rights systems. In the 
European region, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights or ECHR)8 does not 
have a provision that corresponds to article 10(3) of the ICCPR. However, the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has affirmed that rehabilitation is consistent with 
human dignity and that prisoners serving life sentences must be provided with activities 
                                                 
5 HRC General Comment No 21 „Article 10 (Humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty)‟UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev1, 33 (1994) paras 10-12. 
6 Hankle v Jamaica Communication No 710/1996. 
7 Hankle v Jamaica Communication No 710/1996. 
8 Strasbourg, 26.XI.1987 (1987). 
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that will help them improve themselves. In addition, various Council of Europe 
instruments point to rehabilitation and eventual social reintegration as the core aim of 
imprisonment. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that while 
punishment remains one of the purposes of imprisonment, „the emphasis in European 
penal policy is now on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly towards the 
end of a long prison sentence‟.9 In Kafkaris v Cyprus,10 Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-
Sandström and Spielmann JJ of the ECtHR held that in the light of human rights, 
sentences must not only have a punitive purpose but „must also encourage the reform 
and social reintegration of those convicted‟.11 They considered that reintegration into 
society is a legitimate requirement of sentencing and that „questions may be asked as to 
whether a term of imprisonment that jeopardises that aim is not in itself capable of 
constituting inhuman and degrading treatment‟.12 
In the African region, the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (African 
Charter)13 is silent on the aims of punishment. However, several African instruments 
elevate rehabilitation and reintegration as a main aim of punishment, especially 
imprisonment. For instance, article 17(3) of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (the African Children‟s Charter)14 states that the „essential aim‟ of 
subjecting a child to the criminal justice system must be „his or her reformation, re-
                                                 
9 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, 
para 115. 
10 Kafkaris v Cyprus ECHR 21906/04. 
11 Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström and Spielmann in 
Kafkaris v Cyprus ECHR 21906/04 para 5. 
12 See the Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström and 
Spielmann in Kafkaris v Cyprus ECHR 21906/04 para 98. 
13 African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev 5, 21 (1986). 
14 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered 
into force 29 November 1999. 
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integration into his or her family and social rehabilitation‟. Further, article 30(1)(f) of the 
African Children‟s Charter provides that where expectant mothers, nursing mothers or 
mothers of young infants are imprisoned, „the essential aim of the penitentiary system 
will be the reformation, the integration of the mother to the family and social 
rehabilitation‟. The 1996 Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, the main 
instrument in the African region on the rights of prisoners, recommends that „prisoners 
should be given access to education and skills training in order to make it easier for 
them to reintegrate into society after their release‟.15 These recommendations were also 
adopted in 2002 through the Ouagadougou Declaration on Accelerating Prison and 
Penal Reform in Africa.16 Paragraph 5 of this declaration states that: 
Greater effort should be made to make positive use of the period of imprisonment or other 
sanction to develop the potential of offenders and to empower them to lead a crime-free life in 
the future. This should include rehabilitative programmes focusing on the reintegration of 
offenders and contributing to their individual and social development.  
These principles are also supported by article 14 of the 2002 Draft African Charter on 
Prisoners‟ Rights.17 
The fact that rehabilitation features prominently in international law does not mean that 
it is the only recognised aim of punishment. Indeed, international human rights law 
supports deterrence, community protection and restoration as legitimate goals of 
punishment. For instance, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-
                                                 
15 Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström and Spielmann in 
Kafkaris v Cyprus ECHR 21906/04, para 7. 
16 See Ouagadougou Declaration on Accelerating Prison and Penal Reform in Africa, ACHPR/Res 64 
(XXXIV) 03. 
17 African Charter on Prisoners‟ Rights, adopted by the eleventh session of the Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Vienna, 16-25 April 2002. 
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custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules)18 refer to public safety, just retribution, 
deterrence, social reintegration and rehabilitation.19 International instruments have 
linked rehabilitation and community protection or incapacitation. For instance, rule 58 
of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners20 stipulates that the 
ultimate aim of imprisonment and any other measure derivative of liberty is community 
protection against crime, and that „[t]his end can only be achieved if the period of 
imprisonment is used to ensure, so far as possible, that upon his return to society the 
offender is not only willing but able to lead a law-abiding and self-supporting life‟. The 
Tokyo Rules make reference to incapacitation and deterrence by stating that a proper 
balance must be struck „between the rights of individual offenders, the rights of victims, 
and the concern of society for public safety and crime prevention‟. The jurisprudence of 
the HRC also indicates that public protection and deterrence may be pursued by a 
criminal justice system through the imposition of imprisonment. On its part, the 
ECtHR has held that a state has a responsibility to protect the public from violent crime 
and that this is the justification of punitive sentences.21 Thus, in T and V v United 
Kingdom,22 the court justified the imposition of indeterminate sentences on children for 
retributive and deterrent purposes. As shown further below,23 the case law of 
international human rights bodies generally endorse the imposition of life imprisonment 
and the continued detention of a prisoner on the basis of his dangerousness. 
                                                 
18 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) UN Doc 
A/45/49 (1990). 
19 See the preamble to and rule 8(1) of the Tokyo Rules. 
20 Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners UN Doc ESC Res 663C (XXIV) 1957. 
21 T and V v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 121, paras 92 -100 and 93 -101; Weeks v United Kingdom 
(1998) 10 EHRR para 47. 
22 T and V v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
23 See section 3.2.2 below. 
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The traditional objectives of punishment are also recognised in international criminal 
law. The tribunals have pointed out that while rehabilitation should be one of the 
primary aims of punishment, it should not play a predominant role nor be given undue 
weight because of the gravity of the offences that come before them.24 The tribunals 
consider that the main purposes of international sentencing are deterrence and 
retribution.25 However, the tribunals have attempted to strike a balance between 
retribution and rehabilitation in sentencing an offender.26 Some scholars have argued 
that deterrence, rehabilitation and reformation are not proper aims for offences as 
serious and of the magnitude as those that the tribunals deal with.27 This indicates that 
while it remains a primary concern in sentencing, rehabilitation may not be an 
overriding consideration in very grave offences. 
It is important to mention that the UN international criminal tribunals generally lack a 
definitive sentencing framework.28 Scholars are also divided on what the aims of 
international sentencing should be. D‟Ascoli, for instance, argues that „there is an 
                                                 
24 See for instance Prosecutor v Delalic et al Judgment Case No IT-96-21 16 November 1998 (ICTY); 
Prosecutor v Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para 185. 
25 Prosecutor v Delalic et al Judgment Case No IT-96-21, 16 November 1998 (ICTY) para 806.; Prosecutor v 
Anto Furund‘ija, Judgement, Case No IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 288; Prosecutor v Duško Tadic, 
Sentencing Judgement, Case No IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, 11 November 1999, paras 7-9; Prosecutor v Kupreškic 
Judgement, Case No IT-95–16-T, 14 January 2000, para 848. For cases from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) see Prosecutor v Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, Case No ICTR-97-23-S, 
4 September 1998, para 28; Prosecutor v Akayesu, Sentence, Case No ICTR-96-4-S, 2 October 1998, para 
19; and Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Case No ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999, para 456. 
26 Such as in Prosecutor v Ruggiu Judgment and Sentence Case No ICTR-97-32-I 1 June 2000 (ICTR) para 
33; Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996 (ICTY) para 2; Prosecutor v Furundzija 
Sentencing Judgment, December 1998 (ICTY) para 291. 
27 See Ohlin (2009). 
28 See also Henham (2003) 66; Henham (2007). 
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absence of penological justification for international sentencing‟.29 Due to the lack of 
coherence on the aims of sentencing in international criminal law, coupled with the 
unique nature of the crimes it deals with, there is limited guidance that can be offered to 
national jurisdictions by the sentencing jurisprudence of the tribunals. However, it is 
noteworthy that despite the gravity of the crimes in international criminal law, the death 
penalty is not a competent penalty.30  
The above discussion shows that international human rights law favours rehabilitation 
as the major aim of imprisonment. This reflects the position adopted in chapter two 
that rehabilitation is an attractive aim of punishment in that it incorporates both the 
betterment of society through crime reduction and the life of the offender by improving 
his life. Rehabilitation is seen as a means to achieve community protection by reducing 
recidivism. There is also a clear link between rehabilitation and the eventual release from 
prison. As noted in chapter two,31 the aim of rehabilitation is to ensure that the offender 
is able to live a crime free life. This envisages the offender‟s release from prison at some 
point. Schabas has rightly pointed out that a legal regime which prevents the eventual 
release of a prisoner who has demonstrated „reformation and social rehabilitation‟ would 
be inconsistent with article 10(3) of the ICCPR.32 As discussed below,33 life 
imprisonment without the possibility of early release does not take rehabilitation 
seriously. Another important consequence of rehabilitation is that the conditions of 
                                                 
29 D‟Ascoli (2011) 135. Bassiouni argues that the primary goal of international sentencing must be the 
preservation of world peace: see Bassiouni (2004) 86. He also opines that the aim of internal criminal 
justice must be retribution and just deserts, discounting the propriety of rehabilitation and social 
reintegration in this sphere: see Bassiouni (2003). For more discussions on the aim of international 
sentencing, see Akhavan (2001) who emphasises deterrence. 
30 See section 3.1 below. 
31 See section 3.5 of chapter two. 
32 Schabas and Sax (2006) 9. 
33 Sees section 3.2.2 below. 
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imprisonment must be conducive to rehabilitation. In this regard, rehabilitation 
programmes are important. Rehabilitation also requires a move away from punitive 
measures that encourage long prison sentences based on retribution, incapacitation or 
deterrence alone. Further, mandatory minimum sentences may also be incompatible 
with rehabilitation as they „circumvent the goal of rehabilitation … by requiring 
punishments that are more retributive and fail to take into account the individualized 
nature of the crime and the opportunity for rehabilitation‟.34  
The international standards for the aims of punishment inform the position of 
international human rights on the forms of punishment.  
3 FORMS OF PUNISHMENT 
3.1 The death penalty 
International law does not prohibit the death penalty per se. The major human rights 
instruments protect the right to life in a qualified fashion by proscribing the „arbitrary 
deprivation‟ of life.35 For example, article 6 of the ICCPR states that „[e]very human 
being has the inherent right to life … No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life‟. 
Guarantees for the right to life are also enshrined in a similar fashion under regional 
human rights instruments including the ECHR,36 the American Convention37 and the 
African Charter.38 Although the application of the death penalty is permissible under 
international law, international law places a number of restrictions on its use.  
                                                 
34 Centre for Law and Global Justice (2012) 46. 
35 Article 6(1).  
36 Article 2(1). 
37 Article 4(1). 
38 Article 4(1). 
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3.1.1 Restrictions on the death penalty 
Article 6 of the ICCPR and several other international human rights instruments 
stipulate a number of restrictions on the use of the death penalty which have attained 
the status of customary international law. The first restriction on the use of the death 
penalty relates to the category of offences that may attract a death sentence. The UN 
General Assembly has affirmed that in order to fully protect the right to life, there is 
need to progressively restrict the number of capital offences „with a view to the 
desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries‟.39 Article 6(2) of the ICCPR 
states that the death penalty must be applied only for the „most serious offences‟.40  
Although this limitation is an established principle of international law, it is quite 
controversial because international law does not provide a specific list of offences that 
may not be punished with death.41 According to the HRC, the restriction of the death 
penalty to the „most serious offences‟ means that the death penalty must be used as „a 
quite exceptional measure‟.42 The HRC has further stated that article 6 of the ICCPR 
will be violated where the death penalty is used for „offences which cannot be 
characterized as the most serious, including apostasy, committing a third homosexual 
act, illicit sex, embezzlement by officials, and theft by force‟.43 According to the HRC, 
other offences which do not warrant the death penalty include robbery, traffic in toxic 
and dangerous wastes, abetting suicide, property offences, corruption and non-
homicidal offences.44 Expanding on this, the UN Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of 
                                                 
39 „Capital punishment‟ GA Res 2857 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971. 
40 Article 6(2) of the ICCPR; article 4(2) of the American Convention.  
41 Schabas (2002)273. 
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the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty (ECOSOC Safeguards) provide that 
capital offences „should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or extremely grave 
consequences‟.45 In addition, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions has stated that the death penalty should be eliminated for 
economic crimes, drug-related offences, victimless offences, and actions relating to 
moral values including adultery, prostitution and sexual orientation.46 Article 4(4) of the 
American Convention excludes the use of the death penalty for political offences or 
related common crimes. 
The second restriction relates to the categories of offenders who can be sentenced to 
death. Article 6(5) of the ICCPR prohibits the use of the death penalty for offences 
committed by persons below the age of 18 years and the execution of pregnant women. 
This prohibition is also contained in other international human rights instruments such 
as article 37(a) of the CRC, article 4(5) of the American Convention, article 30(1)(e) of 
the African Charter, and article 5(3) of the African Children‟s Charter (as read with 
article 2 of the African Children‟s Charter). It is notable that article 4(5) of the American 
Convention prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on persons who are above the 
age of 70 years. Further, article 30(1)(e) of the African Children‟s Charter prohibits the 
imposition of the death penalty on not only pregnant women but also „mothers of 
infants and young children‟. A similar provision is found in article 4(2)(g) of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa47 which establishes that the death penalty shall not be applied to 
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pregnant or nursing women. The ECOSOC Safeguards further prohibit the use of the 
death penalty on mentally retarded prisoners, including those who develop a mental 
disorder while on death row.48 They also urge states to prescribe a maximum age beyond 
which the death penalty may not be imposed or executed.49 
A further observation that must be made with regard to the restriction on offenders is 
that it is only the African human rights system which extends protection to mothers of 
nursing and young children (a generous interpretation of these instruments can also 
accommodate primary caregivers). A challenge in this regard is that the instruments do 
not provide a definition of a „young‟ child. Furthermore, an offender will not be in a 
position to care for a young child in prison, which is the likely place such an offender 
would end up if the death penalty is reserved for serious offences.50 Release on parole 
may come at a time when an offender‟s child is mature and has, after all, grown 
accustomed to a life without the primary care of his biological mother. 
Furthermore, some instruments prohibit the imposition while others prohibit the execution 
of the death penalty on certain offenders. For instance, article 6(5) of the ICCPR states 
that the death penalty should not be carried out on pregnant women. This implies that a 
sentence of death may be passed on a pregnant woman but may not be carried out 
during the pregnancy. On the other hand, article 30(e) of the African Children‟s Charter 
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on pregnant women and mothers of 
infants and young children. This means that a court must not sentence a pregnant 
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woman to death thus saving her from the death penalty altogether. It can be argued that 
the exemption of pregnant women from the imposition of the death penalty position 
offends the right to equality.  
Firstly, it allows for the differential treatment of offenders based on sex in an 
unjustifiable manner since men are automatically excluded. Secondly, it discriminates 
between not only women who are pregnant and those who are not, but also ultimately 
between fertile and barren women. In this regard, it must be emphasised that pregnancy 
does not affect an offender‟s culpability. In any case, pregnancy is determined at the 
time of sentencing. Thus, even where female offenders participate in a capital crime 
together, only those who are not pregnant at the time of sentencing are at risk of the 
death penalty. This differentiation places greater emphasis on the unborn child than one 
already born. For instance, a woman may be sentenced to death if she gives birth a day 
before the sentence is passed while a woman who gives birth a day after gets life. This 
problem is not farfetched since in practice sentencing decisions may be passed long 
after conviction. As such an offender who may have been pregnant at the sentencing 
hearing may no longer be pregnant when the sentence is passed. In such a case, such an 
offender is no better position than an offender who delivered her child shortly before 
the sentencing hearing and yet only the latter faces a potential death sentence. The 
reverse is also not implausible: an offender may become pregnant after the sentencing 
hearing but before sentence is passed. In other scenarios, an offender may already be a 
nursing mother at the time she is convicted of the crime and yet she may be sentenced 
to death while her co-accused who is pregnant at sentencing but miscarries later only 
faces life imprisonment at worst. Since for obvious reasons the time of sentencing is not 
fixed, it is arbitrary to let it determine whether an offender should be considered for 
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death or life. Therefore, short of abolishing the death penalty, the position under the 
ICCPR (which prohibits execution rather imposition) appears to be a more desirable 
position because it ensures that offenders convicted of capital crimes are treated equally. 
The third restriction on the death penalty is that procedural safeguards must be followed 
in all capital cases. This restriction is inherent in the proscription of the „arbitrary‟ 
deprivation of life. The death penalty may only be imposed after a trial that complies 
with the right to a fair trial and other international human rights norms. Article 6(2) of 
the ICCPR specifically states that the death penalty may not be imposed retroactively or 
in a manner inconsistent with the ICCPR or the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.51 Further, article 6(4) of the ICCPR requires 
that: „Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of 
the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be 
granted in all cases‟. Regional human rights instruments also embody various procedural 
safeguards for the imposition of the death penalty that echo the provisions of the 
ICCPR. For instance, articles 4(2) and (6) of the American Convention prohibit the 
retroactive application of the death penalty and guarantees the right to apply for 
amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence. Procedural safeguards for the use of the 
death penalty have been reiterated in the ECOSOC Safeguards and other UN 
resolutions.  
The HRC has held that the death penalty may only be imposed after a fair trial that 
observes all the provisions of the ICCPR.52 In General Comment No 6, it noted that 
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article 6 of the ICCPR requires that the procedural guarantees in the ICCPR relating to 
a fair trial must be observed. In Reid v Jamaica,53 the HRC stressed that the imposition of 
the death penalty following a trial that has not complied with the provisions of the 
ICCPR would violate article 6 of the ICCPR.54 Observations parallel to those of the 
HRC have also been made by the ECtHR and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights (African Commission) regarding the lawfulness of the death penalty 
under the ECHR and African Charter respectively. For instance, the ECtHR has held 
that the imposition of the death penalty following an unfair trial „must be considered, in 
itself, to amount to a form of inhuman treatment‟.55 On its part, the African 
Commission has held that execution after an unfair trial amounts to an arbitrary 
deprivation of life.56 
International human rights law requires that the prerogative of mercy must be more 
than an act of mercy that is not subject to legal scrutiny. For the right to seek mercy to 
be realised, states must adopt legislative and other measures that establish certain 
procedural guarantees for prisoners on death row. This position is clear from the 
jurisprudence of international human rights bodies. For instance, the Inter-Inter-
American Commission held in Rudolph Baptiste v Grenada57 and in Donnason Knights v 
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Grenada58 that the right to seek pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence 
encompasses certain minimum procedural guarantees for condemned prisoners, in order 
for the right to be effectively respected and enjoyed. These rights include the right to 
submit a request for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence, to be informed of 
when the competent authority will consider the offender‟s case, to make 
representations, in person or by counsel, to the competent authority (such as an 
advisory committee on the prerogative of mercy), to receive a decision from that 
authority within a reasonable period of time prior to his execution, and not to have 
capital punishment imposed when such a petition is pending decision by the competent 
authority. Thus in Paul Lallion v Grenada,59 the Commission found that the applicants 
rights under article 4(6) of the American Convention had been violated by the state‟s 
failure to guarantee him the rights to apply for pardon, amnesty or commutation of 
sentence; to make representations to the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of 
Mercy, and to receive a decision on his application a reasonable time before his 
execution. In Michael Edwards et al v The Bahamas,60 the Commission again found a 
violation of article 4(6) of the American Convention in light of the state‟s failure to, 
among other things, prescribe a procedure for applying for pardon, to provide the 
criteria for the exercise of the powers of the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of 
Mercy and to inform the applicant of the details of when his application would be 
considered. The Commission also faulted the state for failing to afford the applicant the 
right to receive and challenge evidence presented to the Committee.  
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It is important to note that the death penalty raises a number of other human rights 
concerns. In particular, concerns have been raised about the compatibility of the death 
penalty with the right to human dignity and the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment. Particular attention has been drawn to the conditions on 
death row, the death row phenomenon and the methods of execution. The conditions 
on death row refer to the prison conditions in which a prisoner is kept while awaiting 
execution. Prison conditions must comply with minimum international standards as set 
out in the ICCPR and other international instruments. Under article 10(1) of the 
ICCPR, all persons deprived of liberty have the right to live in conditions that are 
consistent with the right to human dignity. The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners provide for minimum basic standards in respect of 
accommodation, hygiene, exercise, medical treatment, religious services and library 
facilities for prisoners.61 
In the European region, the ECtHR held in Soering v United Kingdom62 that while the 
death penalty itself may not infringe the ECHR, the circumstances relating to the death 
penalty may raise issues that render it contrary to article 3 of the ECHR. In particular, 
the court pointed out that among other factors, „the manner in which it is imposed or 
executed, the personal circumstances of the condemned person and the 
disproportionality to the gravity of the crime committed, as well as the conditions of 
detention awaiting execution‟ may bring the death penalty under article 3 of the 
ECHR.63 Although the methods of execution are not regulated by human rights 
instruments, executions must be carried out in a manner that causes the least possible 
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suffering.64 Various methods have been found to be unacceptable. For instance, the 
HRC has found that the use of gas chambers violate the prohibition of cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment.65  
In view of the many concerns with the death penalty, it is not surprising that there is 
growing support for its abolition. 
3.1.2 The international trend towards abolition 
There is a global trend towards abolition of the death penalty. The wording of article 
6(6) of the ICCPR clearly indicates that abolition is favourable to a restricted use of the 
death penalty.66 The HRC has stated that article 6 of the ICCPR „refers generally to 
abolition in terms which strongly … suggest that abolition is desirable. The Committee 
concludes that all measures of abolition should be considered as progress in the 
enjoyment of the right to life ...‟67 The conclusions of the HRC have been supported by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions who has 
called on states that still practice the death penalty to take steps towards its abolition.68 
The UN Commission on Human Rights has noted that „abolition of the death penalty 
contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive development 
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of human rights‟.69 The observations of the HRC have also had the support of the UN 
General Assembly and culminated in the 1989 adoption of the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. The preamble to 
the protocol declares that the protocol is an international commitment to the abolition 
of the death penalty; that the „abolition of the death penalty contributes to enhancement 
of human dignity and progressive development of human rights‟; and that all measures 
towards abolition should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life. 
Accordingly, article 1 of the protocol prohibits state parties from applying the death 
penalty in their jurisdictions while article 2 commits them to taking steps towards its 
abolition. Article 3 of the protocol does not allow any state to make reservations except 
for the application of the death penalty in times of war.  
In addition to the optional protocol, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions 
that urge states that maintain the death penalty to establish a moratorium on executions 
with a view to abolishing it.70 These resolutions also call upon states to progressively 
restrict the use of the death penalty and to reduce the number of offences for which it 
may be imposed, as well as to refrain from reintroducing the death penalty once 
abolished. In its resolutions, the General Assembly has indicated that it is mindful that 
„any miscarriage or failure of justice in the implementation of the death penalty is 
irreversible and irreparable‟ and that it is convinced that „a moratorium on the use of the 
death penalty contributes to respect for human dignity and to the enhancement and 
progressive development of human rights‟, and is consistent with the fact that „there is 
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no conclusive evidence of the deterrent value of the death penalty‟. This gravitation 
towards abolition is also evident at regional level.  
For instance, articles 4(2) and (3) of the American Convention prohibit the extension of 
the death penalty to new or additional crimes and the reestablishment of the death 
penalty in states that have abolished it. Further, in 1990, the OAS General Assembly 
adopted the Protocol to the American Convention to Abolish the Death Penalty. Like 
the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, this protocol prohibits states parties from 
applying the death penalty, with a possible reservation for its application in times of 
war.71 The European human rights system has progressively moved from a position that 
allowed the restricted application of the death penalty to one that prohibits it in all 
circumstances. In the European region, the Council of Europe, in 1983, established the 
abolition of the death penalty except in times of war or imminent threat of war.72 In 
2002, Protocol No 13 concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances 
was adopted. The preamble to this protocol notes that state parties are „convinced that 
everyone‟s right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and that the abolition of 
the death penalty is essential for the protection of this right and for the full recognition 
of the inherent dignity of all human beings‟. Since membership into the Council of 
Europe requires the abolition of the death penalty, all member states have either 
abolished the death penalty or have put in place a moratorium on executions. In light of 
these developments, the ECtHR in Al‐Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK,73 recognised the right 
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not to be subjected to the death penalty‟. Elaborating on the nature of this right, the 
court stated:74 
Judicial execution involves the deliberate and premeditated destruction of a human being by the 
state authorities. Whatever the method of execution, the extinction of life involves some 
physical pain. In addition, the foreknowledge of death at the hands of the State must inevitably 
give rise to intense psychological suffering. The fact that the imposition and use of the death 
penalty negates fundamental human rights has been recognised by the Member States of the 
Council of Europe. 
In the African region, concern over the disregard for procedural safeguards in capital 
trials led the African Commission to adopt the „Resolution Urging the State to Envisage 
a Moratorium on the Death Penalty‟ in 1999.75 The resolution emphasises the right to 
life and calls on all state parties that still maintain the death penalty to: „a) limit the 
imposition of the death penalty only to the most serious crimes; b) consider establishing 
a moratorium on executions of death penalty; and c) reflect on the possibility of 
abolishing death penalty‟.76 A similar resolution was adopted in 2008. In a 2013 
statement, the Commission observed:77 
The death penalty, by its absolute and irreparable nature, is incompatible with any policy to 
reform offenders, is against any system based on respect for human beings, impedes the unity 
and reconciliation of people emerging from conflict or serious crimes, and jeopardises criminal 
justice by making it absolute whereas it has to remain attentive to possible errors. 
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The Commission has doubted the deterrent effect of the death penalty as compared to 
life imprisonment and urged states to commute death sentences to life imprisonment 
and to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.78 
It is noteworthy that international criminal tribunals have also moved away from the use 
of the death penalty. While the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals created to try crimes 
committed during World War II applied the death penalty,79 this is not the case with 
current international tribunals. Indeed, the maximum penalty available to the 
International Criminal Court is life imprisonment.80 This is also the case with the special 
criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia,81 Rwanda,82 Sierra Leone83 and Cambodia.84 Lastly, the 
wave of abolition is also evident in the abolition of the mandatory death penalty and the 
death penalty itself in several jurisdictions across the world.85 
In conclusion, it can be said that international law on the death penalty permits its use 
within restricted circumstances with the aim of gradual restriction and eventual 
elimination. The European human rights system has progressively moved from a 
position that allowed the restricted application of the death penalty to one that prohibits 
it in all circumstances. In many cases, the abolition of the mandatory death penalty or 
the death penalty itself is replaced by mandatory or discretionary life sentences. The 
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following section considers the international law position on imprisonment and life 
imprisonment. 
3.2 Imprisonment 
3.2.1 General principles 
Imprisonment is a severe form of punishment as it restricts the liberty of an offender.86 
It is therefore desirable to discuss the right to liberty in international law and its 
implications for imprisonment. The right to liberty is protected in all major human 
rights instruments. Article 9(1) of the ICCPR states that: „Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law‟. The right to liberty is also protected at 
regional level by article 5 of the ECHR, article 7 of the American Convention87 and 
article 5 of the African Charter.88 
The prohibition of arbitrary detention is an important feature of the right to liberty. The 
HRC has noted that article 9(1) of the ICCPR applies to all forms of detention including 
imprisonment pursuant to a criminal conviction. Thus, the concept of non-arbitrariness 
applies to judicial decisions including the imposition of imprisonment. This requires that 
imprisonment pursuant to a conviction must also be justified. The right to liberty and 
the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of liberty requires that a court must give 
adequate reasons for sentences involving deprivation of liberty. The Council of Europe 
has recommended that while courts should generally give „concrete reasons‟ for 
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sentences imposed, „specific reasons should be given when a custodial sentence is 
imposed‟.89 The reasons must show the relation between „the particular sentence to the 
normal range of sentences for the type of crime and to the declared rationales for 
sentencing‟.90 The Principles and Best Practices for the Protection of Persons Deprived 
of Liberty in the Americas91 state that: „Orders of deprivation of liberty shall be duly 
reasoned‟.  
International law also has standards on the appropriate reasons for the deprivations of 
liberty. For instance, the preamble to the Tokyo Rules declares that „the restriction of 
liberty is justifiable only from the viewpoints of public safety, just retribution and 
deterrence‟. In the European region, the 1992 European Rules on Community Sanctions 
and Measures encourage the restriction of imprisonment to serious offences and the use 
of non-custodial measures in dealing with offenders.92 In Bouchet v France,93 ECtHR held 
that it is imperative that deprivations of liberty must be „strictly necessary‟ since a state is 
bound to choose a measure that is least restrictive on the rights of a prisoner.94 In the 
African region, the African Commission has adopted a number of recommendations 
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that urge state parties to consider non-custodial penalties.95 For instance, the overuse of 
imprisonment is discouraged by the Kadoma Declaration on Community Service 
Orders96 which endorses the use of imprisonment for community protection.97 The 
African Commission has also encouraged states to adopt laws on alternative forms of 
punishment98 and has recommended that states should adopt „[m]easures such as parole, 
judicial control, reductions of sentences, community service, diversion, mediation and 
permission to go out‟.99 The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of 
Detention in Africa has noted that community sanctions can help to decongest prison 
and ensure that the social lives of minor offenders are not disrupted.100 
With respect to the right to liberty under article 9 of the ICCPR, the HRC has observed 
that detention should not continue beyond the period for which there is appropriate 
justification.101 Imprisonment may be lawful under national standards but unlawful or 
arbitrary under international standards. In A v Australia, the HRC held that „the notion 
of “arbitrariness” must not be equated with “against the law” but be interpreted more 
broadly to include such elements as inappropriateness and injustice‟.102 The ECtHR has 
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stated that arbitrary detention will arise where liberty is deprived without restraint. In 
Saadi v United Kingdom,103 the court said that arbitrariness  
includes an assessment whether detention was necessary to achieve the stated aim. The detention 
of an individual is such a serious measure that it is justified only as a last resort where other, less 
severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or 
public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained.104 
This passage indicates that the deprivation of liberty must be used with restraint in order 
to escape arbitrariness. It also shows that a sentencing court must pay attention to non-
custodial sanctions in sentencing an offender. To be sure, the first sentencing option 
should not be imprisonment.  
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR requires that mechanisms must be available for persons 
deprived of their liberty to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court of 
law. This provision is particularly important in cases of life and long-term imprisonment 
and preventive sentences imposed on the basis of an offender‟s dangerousness. As 
discussed further below, reviews of such sentences are necessary since every person has 
the potential to change and thus become less dangerous.105  
In Rameka et al v New Zealand,106 the HRC had an opportunity to consider the 
consistency of preventive detention with article 9 of the ICCPR. The applicants had 
been found guilty of various serious offences107 and sentenced to indefinite preventive 
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106 Rameka et al v New Zealand Communication No 1090/2002. 
107 The first applicant was convicted of one charge of aggravated burglary, one charge of assault with 
intent to commit rape, and indecent assault. The second was found guilty of 11 counts of sexual offences 
against a 12 year old boy. The third applicant was found guilty of sexual violation by rape, two charges of 
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sentences which were reviewable after 10 years by the Parole Board. The law upon 
which they were sentenced allowed for preventive sentences where the offender posed a 
„substantial risk of re-offending‟108 and the sentences were „expedient for the protection 
of the public‟.109 Based on psychiatric assessment reports, the sentencing courts had 
found that the applicants presented a substantial risk of offending and that in the case of 
the first applicant there was a 20% risk of committing further sexual offences. In 
sentencing the second applicant, the court had found that his case warranted a finite 
sentence of at least seven and a half years but opted to impose a preventive sentence 
because „no appropriate finite sentence would adequately protect the public, and that 
preventive detention, with its features of continuing supervision after release and 
amenability to recall, was the appropriate sentence‟.110 
The HRC held that preventive sentences are permissible in principle for purposes of 
public protection. However, where a preventive sentence has been imposed and the 
punitive part of the sentence has been served, the continued detention of the offender  
must be justified by compelling reasons, reviewable by a judicial authority, that are and remain 
applicable as long as detention for [public protection] continues. The requirement that such 
continued detention be free from arbitrariness must thus be assured by regular periodic reviews 
of the individual case by an independent body, in order to determine the continued justification 
of detention for purposes of protection of the public.111 
                                                                                                                                          
sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection, indecent assault, burglary, two charges of aggravated 
burglary, two charges of kidnapping, being an accessory after the fact, three charges of aggravated 
robbery, demanding with menaces, and unlawfully entering a building. Previously, he had committed 
multiple offences in three earlier incidents, involving breaking into homes and engaging in sexually-
motivated violence, including two rapes. 
108 Section 75(3A)(b) of  the Criminal Justice Act 1985, New Zealand. 
109 Section 75(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, New Zealand. 
110 Rameka et al v New Zealand Communication No 1090/2002, para 2.5. 
111 Sections 75(2) and 3A(b) of  Criminal Justice Act 1985, New Zealand. 
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On the facts of the case, the HRC found that the preventive sentences imposed on the 
first and third applicants were not arbitrary. This was because they were reviewable by 
an independent and impartial parole board which could order their release and whose 
decisions were subject to judicial review.112 In the case of the second applicant, the HRC 
noted that since the court had indicated that a seven a half year sentence was warranted 
and parole could only be considered after 10 years in cases of preventive sentence, he 
would have to serve two and a half years for preventive purposes before he could be 
considered for release. It held that his detention for two and half years was in 
accordance with Australian law and not arbitrary. The HRC found, nevertheless, that 
the second applicant‟s situation to be inconsistent with article 9(4) of the ICCPR 
because he could not challenge the legality of his detention for two and a half years and 
would instead wait until he had served 10 years.113 
However, nine committee members dissented.114 In a joint opinion, four members 
mainly took issue with the finding that preventive detention was not arbitrary. They 
questioned the adequacy of the assessment criteria for determining dangerousness or the 
possibility of commission of a repeat offence and challenged „the very principle of 
detention based solely on potential dangerousness‟.115 They found that the science 
underlying a finding such as a 20% risk was unsound and thus rendered the resulting 
detention arbitrary. The members held that preventive sentences are essentially an easy 
                                                 
112 Para 7.3 
113 Para 7.2. New Zealand had contended that since the Parole Board had a discretionary power to 
consider release before expiry of the 10 year period meant that the second applicant could be considered 
earlier in his sentence. This was rejected by the HRC on the basis that the Board had never invoked this 
discretionary power. 
114 Messrs Bhagwati, Ahanhanzo, Yrigoyen and Ms Chanet. 
115 See the Individual Opinion of Messrs Bhagwati, Ahanhanzo, Yrigoyen and Ms Chanet. 
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extension of the penalty of imprisonment and that the preventive part of such sentences 
is actually a penalty and not just a measure for public protection. By placing reliance on 
a prediction of dangerousness, the law had effectively replaced the presumption of 
innocence by that of guilt. As a result, the presumption of innocence in article 14(2) and 
the principle of legality in article 15(1) of the ICCPR had been violated.  
Mr Lallah, another HRC member who dissented, found a breach of the ICCPR on a 
number of grounds. He faulted the majority for erroneously assuming that preventive 
sentences are consistent with the ICCPR. He noted that article 15(1) of the ICCPR 
prohibits not only ex post facto criminalisation of past conduct but also punishment for 
future crimes which may never be committed. In his view, the distinction between the 
„punitive‟ and „preventive‟ periods of preventive sentences has no significance since the 
offender remains in prison even after the „punitive‟ period is served. This meant that the 
offender is effectively punished for acts which it is feared might occur in the future, and 
not past acts as required by article 15(1) of the ICCPR. He therefore found that 
preventive sentences are in principle not consistent with the ICCPR and suggested that 
a better option would be for states to adopt supervisory measures to monitor past 
offenders upon release where „there are reasonable and good grounds for apprehending 
their re-offending‟.116 
The requirement that deprivations of liberty must be properly justified is also reflected 
in the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment. This principle requires that a 
criminal justice system must provide a wide range of non-custodial measures in dealing 
                                                 
116 See Individual Opinion of Lallah. Article 15(1) reads in part: „No one shall be held guilty of any 
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.‟ 
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with offenders and that imprisonment should be for the shortest time possible. The 
promotion of non-custodial sanctions is mainly aimed at the social reintegration of 
offenders.117 The principle of last resort is well-recognised in international and regional 
documents.118 Article 30(1)(a) of the African Children‟s Charter specifically provides that 
priority must be given to a non-custodial sentence when sentencing expectant mothers 
and mothers of infants and young children. This is a laudable development, propelled by 
the fact that in most parts of Africa mothers are the primary care takers of children.119 
Although the provision makes specific reference to mothers, it is applicable to primary 
caregivers since its rationale is to ensure that children are cared for. Hence, fathers or 
guardians who are primary caregivers can all benefit from this provision. The African 
Commission has also encouraged states to adopt laws on alternative forms of 
punishment.120 It has encouraged the use of non-custodial measures especially for minor 
offenders and has generally recommended the use of measures such as suspended 
sentence, conditional or early release, parole and remission of sentences to improve the 
rehabilitation of offenders.121 
                                                 
117 Preamble to the Tokyo Rules. 
118 See for instance United Nations Resolution VIII of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders (1990) para 5; article 37(3)(b) of the CRC; preamble to the Tokyo Rules; 
rules 13 and 19 of the Beijing Rules; rule 2 of the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty; 1997 Kadoma Declaration on Community Service Orders; Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of 
Action on Accelerating Prison and Penal Reform in Africa. 
119 Chirwa (2002)168. 
120 See for instance Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: Mission to the 
Republic of South Africa 14-30 June 2004, 38; Mission Report to the Republic of Botswana 14 - 18 May 2005, 
Recommendation on Corporal Punishment; Report on the Promotional Mission to the Republic of Mauritius 
August 2006, para 165. 
121 See for instance Prisons in Cameroon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in 
Africa (Report to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on the Visit of the Special Rapporteur on 
Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa from 2-15 September 2002) ACHPR/37/OS/11/43. 
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In summary, international law proscribes the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Any 
deprivation must be justifiable; it must be necessary to achieve the aim sought and must 
be used as a last resort. A court must carefully consider the propriety of non-custodial 
sanctions. In particular, imprisonment must only be imposed where it is strictly 
necessary for serious offences and in order to achieve deterrence, just retribution and 
community protection. Therefore, the seriousness of an offence would not in itself 
justify imprisonment. Further, a detainee must be given an opportunity to challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention before a court of law. These international standards for the 
use of imprisonment show that imprisonment is indeed a severe penalty. It is therefore 
understandable that life imprisonment, like the death penalty, continues to raise human 
rights concerns. 
3.2.2 Life imprisonment 
Life imprisonment can mean different things in different jurisdictions. It may mean that 
a prisoner will spend the rest of his life in prison or that he may be released or 
considered for release after serving a certain period of his sentence. In addition, the 
length of some sentences may be so long that they exceed the normal life span. Such 
sentences can be regarded as life sentences because a prisoner may spend the rest of his 
life in prison.122 While the death penalty is specifically referred to in the main 
international human rights instruments, life imprisonment has not attracted such 
prominence. Indeed, specific reference to life imprisonment at treaty level is only found 
in article 37a of the CRC. Although life imprisonment is permitted in international law, 
certain restrictions on its use must be observed.  
                                                 
122 Bernaz (2013). 
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Firstly, life imprisonment without the possibility of release should not be imposed for 
offences committed by persons below the age of 18 years.123 Regional human rights 
bodies have affirmed this position in their jurisprudence.124 Further restrictions on the 
use of life imprisonment have been derived from various rights under international 
human rights instruments. These include the rights to human dignity and liberty and the 
prohibition of cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment. The imposition of life 
imprisonment must comply with human rights. Thus, as is the case with every other 
sentence, life imprisonment may only be imposed where it is proportional to the offence 
and the offender. Since life imprisonment is a severe sentence, it must only be imposed 
for serious offences committed in aggravated circumstances and where it is warranted 
by community protection.  
Article 77(1)(b) of the ICC Statute represents a desirous blend of these requirements by 
stating that life imprisonment may only be imposed „when justified by the extreme 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person‟. A life 
sentence that is disproportionate to the offence committed would violate the right to 
human dignity and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. The 
1994 UN Recommendations on Life Imprisonment125 go as far as stating that certain 
international safeguards regarding the death penalty may be applicable to life 
imprisonment. For instance, life sentences must only be imposed where there is „clear 
                                                 
123 Article 37a of the CRC; rule 2 of the Beijing Rules. 
124 See for instance decision by the ECtHR in Weeks v United Kingdom 10 EHRR 293; Hussain v United 
Kingdom 22 EHRR 1; V and T v United Kingdom 30 EHRR 121. 
125 UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch „Life Imprisonment‟ para 14. 
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and convincing evidence‟ and only for „intentional crimes, with lethal or extremely grave 
consequences‟.126 
Thirdly, there must be a realistic prospect of release for prisoners sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Although an explicit prohibition of life imprisonment without parole at 
treaty-level is only recognised in the CRC with respect to children, there is clear 
international law support for the proposition that all prisoners must be offered the 
possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release. Indeed, as noted earlier, article 
10(3) of the ICCPR requires that the prison system must have as its essential aim the 
reintegration and social rehabilitation of an offender. This is in line with article 10(1) of 
the ICCPR which requires that persons deprived of their liberty must be treated with 
„humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person‟. The human dignity 
of prisoners is intricately related to their having the prospect of being reintegrated into 
society.127 
The need for the possibility of release is also echoed by various UN and regional 
instruments and the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies. In the 
European region, CPT has observed that it is inhuman to imprison a person for life 
without any realistic hope of release.128 The Council of Europe has adopted a number of 
resolutions concerning life and long-term imprisonment that underline the desirability 
of the availability of early release. For example, it has adopted several recommendations 
on how to „increase and improve the possibilities for these prisoners to be successfully 
                                                 
126 Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty (ECOSOC 
Safeguards) ECOSOC Res E/RES/1984/50 (1984). 
127 Van Zyl Smit and Snacken (2009) 8.  
128 CPT Report on the visit to Bulgaria from 4 to 10 May 2012 CPT/Inf (2012) 4 December 2012, para 32; CPT 
Report on the visit to Switzerland from 10 to 20 October 2011 CPT/Inf (2012) 25 October 2012, 26. 
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resettled in society and to lead a law-abiding life following their release‟.129 In addition, 
the 2003 Recommendation on Conditional Release (Parole) states that the law should 
provide for conditional release to all prisoners including those serving life sentences.130 
Similarly, the 2006 European Prison Rules emphasise that the regime for all sentenced 
prisoners should be „designed to enable them to lead a responsible and crime-free life‟ 
and that mechanisms be put in place to prepare prisoners for release.131 This position is 
also found in the 1999 Recommendation concerning prison overcrowding, the 2003 
Recommendation on conditional release, and the 2006 European Prison Rules. The 
ECtHR has held that there must be „a real and tangible prospect‟ of release for prisoners 
sentenced to indeterminate sentences such as life imprisonment; otherwise such a 
sentence would amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.132 It has also held 
that compassionate release only for those who are terminally ill or close to death is not a 
sufficient prospect of release as it fails to provide any hope of release for life prisoners 
„should they seek to demonstrate that their continued imprisonment was no longer 
justified on legitimate penological grounds and thus contrary to article 3 of the 
Convention‟. In Vinter and others v UK133 the court held that a life sentence must be 
reducible at the time of its imposition so that a prisoner is able to „work towards his 
rehabilitation‟: 
                                                 
129 See Recommendation Rec (2003)23 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the 
Management by Prison Administration of Life Sentence and other Long-term Prisoners. 
130 Recommendation Rec (2003)22 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Conditional 
Release (Parole) (24 September 2003) para 4a. See also Resolution (76) 2 of the Council of Europe‟s 
Committee of Ministers on the treatment of long-term prisoners.  
131 See paras 102.1 and 103.2 of Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on the European Prison Rules. 
132 Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 21906/04 (12 February 2008) para 6 of the Joint Dissenting Judgment 
of Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens. 
133 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013. 
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[I]n cases where the sentence, on imposition, is irreducible under domestic law, it would be 
capricious to expect the prisoner to work towards his own rehabilitation without knowing 
whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be introduced which would allow 
him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be considered for release. A whole life prisoner is 
entitled to know, at the outset of his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and 
under what conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take place or may be sought. 
Consequently, where domestic law does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review of 
a whole life sentence, the incompatibility with article 3 on this ground already arises at the 
moment of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration.134 
This means that rehabilitation is linked to the prospect of release and that prisoners 
serving life sentences must be provided with rehabilitative programmes through which 
they may improve themselves in preparation for social reintegration.135 The emphasis on 
rehabilitation entails that prisoners must, as of right, be offered rehabilitative programs 
whilst in prison in order to prepare them for reintegration into society. 
Fourthly, the prospect of release must be accompanied by procedural safeguards. This 
requires that an adequate release mechanism must be in place. A decision on continued 
detention affects the liberty of an offender and thus requires that the review mechanism 
must comply with international safeguards.136 
The imposition of life imprisonment is usually based on the dangerousness of an 
offender. Dangerousness is susceptible to change137 and it can hardly be argued that all 
lifers will always be a danger to society.138 Since the length of imprisonment in itself can 
                                                 
134 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, 
para 122. 
135 Van Zyl Smit et al (2014) 65-71. 
136 See section 4 below. 
137 Thynne, Wilson and Gunnel v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 666 para 76. 
138 Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation R (2003) 22 on Conditional Release (Parole), para 4. 
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amount to inhuman and degrading treatment,139 even in countries where there is no 
distinction between „penal‟ (non-parole period) and „risk‟ (parole period) elements of a 
life sentence, there is need to consider release:  
The question whether conditional release should be granted in any individual case must … 
principally depend on an assessment of whether the term of imprisonment already served 
satisfies the necessary element of punishment for the particular offence and, if so, whether the 
life prisoner poses a continuing danger to society …. [T]he determination of both questions 
should in principle be in the hands of an independent body, following procedures containing the 
necessary judicial safeguards, and not of an executive authority.140 
In fact, the need for release does not simply raise the question of whether a lifer can live 
a law-abiding life upon release, but whether it is abusive to detain him or her further.141 
Once the tariff of a life sentence is served, the justification for continued detention 
becomes the offender‟s dangerousness. Continued detention must thus be judicially 
reviewed at regular intervals to assess whether the prisoner still poses a danger to 
society.142 Although there is no fixed period of interval between sentence reviews, the 
law should be flexible enough to allow a prisoner serving life imprisonment to seek 
release earlier than the stipulated period on humanitarian or other grounds.143 
In summary, international law recognises that life imprisonment is a heavy penalty 
which should be used sparingly subject to certain limitations. These include that life 
sentences must be proportional to the offence, that there must be a realistic possibility 
                                                 
139 See para 4 of the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fura-Sandström in Leger v France 11 April 2006 
(Application No 19324/02) 
140 Kafkaris v Cyprus ECHR 21906/04, Concurring Opinion of Judge Bratza. Cypriot law had no 
distinction between „penal‟ and „risk‟ elements of a life sentence. 
141 Van Zyl Smit (1999) 34. 
142 Hussain v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 1; Singh v United Kingdom No 23389/94 (1996). In Hirst v 
United Kingdom Application No 40787/98 it was held that a two year interval is too long. 
143 Oldham v United Kingdom No 36273/97 (2001), ECHR 2000-X, para 28-37. 
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of release and that the law must provide a review mechanism which guarantees due 
process. Without the possibility of release, life imprisonment amounts to a cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment. Further, since life imprisonment is used for 
community protection, the dangerousness of an offender is a key factor in its 
imposition. As such, there is need to consider from time to time whether the continued 
detention of a prisoner remains lawful in that he still poses a danger to society. If a 
prisoner ceases to be dangerous, he may be released. The following section considers 
the international standards for early release of prisoners in general. 
4 EARLY RELEASE 
Early release is the release of an offender from prison before the expiry of his sentence. 
It can take many forms such as remission, conditional or absolute release, parole and 
pardon. It reinforces the rights to human dignity and liberty. Early release also 
reinforces the theory of rehabilitation since it gives an offender a chance to live a crime-
free life in society. This recognises that each offender has the potential for rehabilitation. 
Early release is also grounded in the right of persons deprived of their liberty to 
challenge the lawfulness of their detention. While article 37 of the CRC prohibits life 
imprisonment for children without the possibility of release, the UDHR or ICCPR do 
not make specific reference to the prospect of release for prisoners. Similarly, the 
American Convention, the African Charter and the ECHR also do not have specific 
provisions for early release.  
However, a range of UN and regional declarations and resolutions require that prisoners 
must have a prospect of release. For instance, rule 80 of the Standard Minimum Rules 
for Treatment of Prisoners states that from the beginning of a prisoner‟s sentence 
consideration must be given to his future after release. Further, rule 61 states that 
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imprisonment should not emphasise the exclusion of prisoners from society but their 
continuing part in it. This is a clear indication that prisoners are expected to be released 
from prison at some point. In the European region, Resolution (76) 2 on the Treatment 
of Long-term Prisoners144 encourages states to ensure that all prisoners are considered 
for release and states that „considerations of general prevention alone should not justify 
refusal of conditional release‟.145 Further, the Recommendation on Conditional Release 
(Parole) requires the introduction of early release legislation.146 As stated earlier, the 
African Commission has recommended the use of conditional or early release, parole 
and remission of sentences to improve the rehabilitation of offenders.147  
It is worth noting that with the exception of the ICTR, the maximum sentence available 
to the UN tribunals is a life imprisonment with the possibility of release. For instance, 
article 110(3) of the Rome Statute makes a life sentence reviewable after 25 years of 
imprisonment. Considering that these tribunals deal with serious crimes like genocide, 
the recognition of early release for offenders is significant as it reinforces the view that 
every person is capable of becoming a better person with time and that the gravity of an 
offence should not cancel out the possibility of release. 
The possibility of release is particularly important for prisoners serving life 
imprisonment and long prison terms. The ECtHR has held that the prohibition of cruel, 
                                                 
144 Resolution (76) 2 on the Treatment of Long-term Prisoners, para 10 (now covered by 
Recommendation Rec(2003)23 on the Management of Life-Sentence and other Long-Term Prisoners). 
145 Resolution (76) 2 on the Treatment of Long-term Prisoners, para 10 (now covered by 
Recommendation Rec(2003)23 on the Management of Life-Sentence and other Long-Term Prisoners). 
146 See Recommendation Rec (2003) 22 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Conditional 
Release (Parole). 
147 See Prisons in Cameroon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa (Report 
to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on the Visit of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of 
Detention in Africa from 2-15 September 2002) ACHPR/37/OS/11/437.  
79 
inhuman and degrading punishment will be violated where life sentences do not have a 
possibility of review and the prospect of release.148 The court gave three reasons for this 
finding. The first reason is that since detention can only be justifiable if based on a 
penological ground (retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation), it is 
important to evaluate whether a life sentence remains justifiable after a number of years 
have been served. This is because with time, the balance between the justifications for a 
life sentence may shift and create the possibility that further detention is unnecessary.149 
The second reason is that a whole life sentence means that a prisoner will never atone 
for his offence:  
[W]hatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, 
his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable. If anything, the punishment becomes greater 
with time: the longer the prisoner lives, the longer his sentence. Thus, even when a whole life 
sentence is condign punishment at the time of its imposition, with the passage of time it 
becomes … a poor guarantee of just and proportionate punishment.150 
The last reason given by the court for rejecting irreducible life sentences is that they are 
inconsistent with the right to human dignity because they deny an offender a chance of 
release. Approving the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe,151 the court held that respect for human dignity requires a 
rehabilitation-oriented approach to punishment and imposes a duty on „the prison 
authorities to work towards the rehabilitation of an offender and that rehabilitation was 
                                                 
148 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, 
para 110. 
149 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, 
para 111. 
150 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, 
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constitutionally required in any community that established human dignity as its 
centrepiece‟.152 The court emphasised that these principles „applied to all life prisoners, 
whatever the nature of their crimes, and that release only for those who were infirm or 
close to death was not sufficient‟.153 
Therefore, whole life sentences are inconsistent with human rights. Similarly, the hope 
of release would be denied to long-term prisoners where the sentence imposed is 
beyond their life expectancy. Such sentences are de facto irreducible life sentences and 
should be treated the same way as life sentences. It can be argued then that lengthy 
imprisonment can amount to inhuman and degrading punishment.  
International jurisprudence is to the effect that once the punitive element of a sentence 
is served, the continued detention remains lawful only as long as the rationale for its 
initial imposition exists.154 Prolonged detention will become arbitrary if the offender no 
longer poses a dangerous risk to society.155 If dangerousness is the basis for continued 
detention, it is paramount that the criteria used to determine whether the offender is still 
dangerous must be sound. Ideally, review should be made by professionals. As Stokes 
has observed, „an uncritical appraisal of how risk and dangerousness are precisely 
defined and assessed can … open the door to indefinite and arbitrary detention‟.156 Thus 
a change in circumstances that reduces the dangerousness of an offender, such as 
                                                 
152 Vinter and others v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, 
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advancement in age and sickness can be grounds for early release.157 Imprisonment of 
such individuals is solely based on retribution and is therefore a violation of human 
dignity.158 
With regard to the body responsible for considering release, the HRC held in Rameka et 
al v New Zealand159 that the possibility of release must be considered by an independent 
judicial body.160 Similarly, in Stafford v United Kingdom,161 the ECtHR stated that 
consideration for release must be done by a judicial body (a „court‟) that is impartial and 
that meets standards of due process.162 In other words, release procedures must not be 
at the mercy of the executive alone and must be procedurally fair.163 Further, the body 
must actually have the power to order the release of the offender concerned and comply 
with procedural safeguards for the applicant;164 an advisory panel will not suffice.165 In 
Kafkaris v Cyprus,166 the dissenting judges of the ECtHR found that on the facts of the 
case, the possibility of pardon did not offer „a real and tangible prospect‟ of release. This 
was because: 
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[T]here is no obligation to inform a prisoner of the Attorney-General‟s opinion on his application for 
early release or for the President to give reasons for refusing such an application. Nor is this the 
President‟s practice. In addition, there is no published procedure or criteria governing the operation 
of these provisions. Consequently, a life prisoner is not aware of the criteria applied or of the reasons 
for the refusal of his application. Lastly, a refusal to order a prisoner‟s early release is not amenable to 
judicial review. This lack of a fair, consistent and transparent procedure compounds the anguish and 
distress which are intrinsic in a life sentence and which, in the applicant‟s case, have been further 
aggravated by the uncertainty surrounding the practice relating to life imprisonment at the time.167
 
This passage accurately reflects the pardon process in most countries. Due to the 
secrecy surrounding the granting of pardons which results in most prisoners not 
knowing what factors pardons are based on, the possibility of pardon is not a sufficient 
guarantee of release.168 
As noted above,169 the UN has rightly suggested that the safeguards applicable to the 
death penalty may justifiably be applied to life imprisonment. Therefore, in light of the 
importance of the possibility of release to life sentences, it can be said that the standards 
applicable to the right to seek pardon in death penalty cases must be applied to the 
standard of early release mechanisms in cases of life and long-term imprisonment. As 
discussed earlier,170 these standards include transparency in the pardon process, clear 
stipulation of pardon procedures and criteria and participatory rights for offenders. 
The above discussion demonstrates that early release is well recognised in international 
human rights law as it is emphasised in several human rights instruments. Early release 
facilitates the rehabilitation and social reintegration of an offender. Early release is a 
                                                 
167 Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 21906/04 (12 February 2008) para 6 of the Joint Dissenting Judgment 
of Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens. 
168 Van Zyl Smit (2001) 302. 
169 See section 3.2.2 above. 
170 See section 3.1.1 above. 
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crucial part of imprisonment, especially for life and long sentences. These sentences 
must offer a real prospect of release and must be amenable to review. The importance 
of early release is underlined by the fact that a life sentence that denies an offender the 
chance of release infringes the right to human dignity. It also runs the risk of being a 
disproportionate sentence that would violate the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment. Whole life sentences might also amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation liberty if the continued detention of offender is no longer justifiable on 
penological grounds. Since the liberty of an offender is at stake in early release decisions, 
it is imperative that such decisions are made by an independent judicial body with the 
power to release the offender. In addition, the process of early release must comply with 
internationally accepted procedural safeguards. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the international standards for punishment by examining the 
aims and forms of punishment, and early release. With respect to the aims of 
punishment, the chapter has explained that while international law recognises both 
utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment, it considers rehabilitation and social 
reintegration as essential aims of punishment. It has also explained that rehabilitation is 
consistent with the right to dignity. International law also links community protection to 
rehabilitation and requires that rehabilitative programmes must be available to prisoners 
so that they may equip themselves for reintegration into society.  
In its analysis on forms of punishment, the chapter has observed that the death penalty 
remains permissible in international law. However, there is international consensus that 
the use of the death penalty must be restricted. For instance, it may only be imposed for 
the most serious offences; should not be applied to offences committed by children; 
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may not be executed on pregnant or nursing women; and must only be applied where 
following a fair trial. Further, offenders sentenced to death must have a right to seek 
pardon or commutation of the sentence. These restrictions on the use of the death 
penalty are part of a global trend towards its abolition. 
The chapter has also noted that imprisonment is a severe form of punishment because it 
deprives an offender of his liberty. International law therefore requires that 
imprisonment should be used with restraint and only for serious offences, as a last 
resort and for community protection. Greater restraint is imposed on the use of life and 
long-term imprisonment. Prisoners serving such sentences must be given a chance to 
rehabilitate themselves during imprisonment and the law must provide for a realistic 
possibility of release. In addition, there must be an adequate release mechanism that 
complies with due process guarantees. This includes the requirement that prisoners 
must have participatory rights in the early release process and that early release must be 
administered by an independent judicial body with the power to order the release of an 
offender. 
In view of the constitutional provisions on the role of international law, the penal 
regime in Malawi must reflect these international standards. It is apposite to first 
provide an overview of the evolution of the criminal justice system in Malawi before 
assessing whether the country‟s penal system is consistent with international standards.  
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CHAPTER 4 
BACKGROUND TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The thesis has so far demonstrated that while punishment may serve both retributive and 
utilitarian goals, rehabilitation offers a more generally attractive justification. This view is 
entrenched by international human rights law which requires that rehabilitation and the social 
reintegration of an offender should be the major aim of a penal regime. The aim of this chapter 
is to provide a historical evolution of punishment in Malawi from the pre-colonial era to 1994. 
Such a history will provide an important backdrop to understanding the reforms to punishment 
envisaged by the 1994 Constitution and the jurisprudence on sentencing that has emerged since 
1994. In keeping with the aims of the study, the chapter attempts to trace the evolution of the 
criminal justice system in Malawi in respect of the aims, methods and enforcement of 
punishment. Particular emphasis will be placed on the developments during the colonial period 
because it has had a great influence in the making of the Malawian legal system today. The 
colonial period will be discussed in two parts. The first will outline the earlier years of 
colonialism from 1891 to 1936 which witnessed a repressive penal regime as the colonial 
government sought to establish its rule. The second part will look at the reform period from 
1937 to 1964 which saw the introduction of several reforms in the criminal justice system aimed 
at creating a more rehabilitative system of punishment. 
The chapter also provides a brief overview of the Constitution and the key features of the Bill of 
Rights. This will lay the background to the detailed analysis of the implications of these 
provisions for penal policy and practice in Malawi. In addition to its own human rights 
provisions, the new Constitution emphasises the significance of international law Therefore, this 
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chapter will also highlight the relevance of international law in Malawi as a driver of legislative 
and legal practice reform. 
2 BACKGROUND TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
2.1 The pre-colonial era 
Before colonisation, judicial power was exercised by traditional chiefs in conjunction with the 
traditional advisors of the traditional court.1 There was no concept of separation of powers.2 
Cases were determined using unwritten rules of customary law applicable to the tribe concerned.3 
There were various forms of punishment that exhibited different purposes.4 For instance, 
retributive elements were evident in the use of capital punishment5 and mwabvi.6 Writing on pre-
colonial punishment in Central Africa, Clifford states that death and banishment were often 
imposed for offences that threatened community safety.7 This shows that during this era, public 
protection was seen as a justification for severe punishment. However, literature also indicates 
that restorative justice was a primary objective of punishment and that compensation was 
pursued even in serious cases such as murder and rape.8 Recourse to death or exile was only 
made if the offence also undermined public safety or compensation was not paid.9 Other forms 
of punishment at the time included slavery, mutilation, chastisement and outlawry.10 The form of 
                                                 
1 Von Benda-Beckman (2007) 34. 
2 Nkhata (2010) 96. 
3 Kanyongolo (2004) 197. 
4 See Chanock (1970) 84 who notes that punishment during this period reflected retributive, utilitarian and 
restorative elements. 
5 Death was executed by spear thrust, burning or drowning: see Flemming (1971). 
6 The mwabvi ordeal involved the use of a poisonous drink concocted from the mwabvi tree (erythrophleum 
suaveolens) administered by a traditional medicine man. Anyone who died after drinking the concoction was 
believed to be guilty while those who vomited and survived were taken to be innocent: see Morris (1966) 186. 
7 Clifford (1969) 241-242. 
8 Pete (2008) 41-42. 
9 Hynd (2011) 436. 
10 Flemming (1971); Maliwa (1967). 
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punishment applied depended on whether the crime was committed within a family or between 
families; clemency was common in intra-family crimes.11 
During the pre-colonial era, the recognition and protections of human rights was limited to 
concepts of communal solidarity and patriarchy.12 However, this does not mean that customary 
law at the time had no protections for accused persons. The notion of human dignity was 
recognised and, when trying criminal cases, the chiefs were aware of general notions of human 
rights such as „the safeguards relating to a fair and public trial, respect for physical and 
psychological integrity of the person, marriage and family rights, and group and individual 
property rights‟.13 However, pre-colonial societies were also characterised by practices 
inconsistent with human rights such as discrimination against women and practices such as the 
administration of mwabvi.14 
2.2 The colonial era, 1891 to 1964 
2.2.1 A repressive beginning, 1891 to 1936 
The Malawian criminal justice system has all the hallmarks of the English legal system due to 
British colonisation of the country (then called Nyasaland) from 1891 to 1964. The colonial 
government introduced several laws to govern their new territory. In 1902, the British Central 
Africa Order-in-Council15 introduced the concept of the separation of powers.16 It created the 
High Court with civil and criminal jurisdiction over all matters17 while the enactment of laws was 
                                                 
11 Flemming (1977) 6. 
12 Nkhata (2010) 96. 
13 Chirwa (2011) 2-3. 
14 Mwambene (2008) 36-37.  
15 Malawi was at the time known as British Central Africa. It was later named Nyasaland by the Preamble to the 
Nyasaland Order-in-Council in 1907. 
16 Chigawa (2006). 
17 Article 15(1) of the British-Central Africa Order in Council, 1902. 
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left to the Commissioner.18 It also introduced the English model of justice through article 15(2) 
that contained a reception clause for English law in Malawi. Customary law was only applicable 
to the extent that it was not „repugnant to the principles of justice and morality‟ or „inconsistent 
with any law in force‟.19 This principle was later strengthened by the 1907 Nyasaland Order-in-
Council20 which created the Legislative Council to pass legislation.  
In the sphere of criminal justice, criminal law and procedure was governed by „the English 
common law, the doctrines of equity, and statutes of general application, supplemented by some 
local enactments‟.21 In 1925, the Colonial Office in London decided to draft a model code for 
East Africa to be applied in a number of protectorates including Malawi.22 The Penal Code23 and 
Criminal Procedure Code24 were enacted five years later with local adaptations.25 Giving effect to 
the then current English criminal law and procedure,26 the Penal Code was (and remains) the 
main criminal law statute defining crimes and prescribing their punishments while the Criminal 
Procedure Code governed the conduct of criminal proceedings. The Penal Code created new 
crimes while in some cases traditional offences were modified and punished in new ways; some 
old punishments were abolished or their mode of execution changed.27 For instance, the use of 
                                                 
18 See article 4 of the British-Central Africa Order in Council, 1902. 
19 Article 20 of the Order-in-Council provided that: `In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives are parties, 
every court shall (a) be guided by native law so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or 
inconsistent with any Order-in -Council or Ordinance and (b) shall decide all such cases according to substantial 
justice without undue regard to technicalities of procedure and without undue delay'. 
20 Nyasaland Order-in-Council, 1907. 
21Harris (1974) 18. 
22 Harris (1974) 18. 
23 Penal Code Act No 22 of 1929, Laws of Nyasaland, 1929. 
24 Criminal Procedure Code, Laws of Nyasaland, 1929. 
25 Harris (1974) 18. 
26 For instance, the definition of some crimes like treason and piracy was determined by reference to the „law for the 
time being in force‟ in England at the time the offence was committed: see Read (1963) 6. 
27 Chanock (1971). 
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mwabvi to detect and punish offenders was abolished,28 death was now executed through hanging 
and the use of fines, corporal punishment and imprisonment was introduced. The government 
embarked on the construction of prisons, building at least 24 prisons by 1964. The conditions in 
most prisons soon became poor because they were underresourced, overcrowded and 
unsanitary.29 
In the early years of colonisation, the judicial functions of chiefs were not legally recognised.30 
However, they existed informally as chiefs continued to deal with both civil and criminal 
matters.31 In 1933, the Native Courts Ordinance was passed to allow for the establishment of 
native courts.32 These courts were presided over by chiefs and applied customary law subject to 
the repugnancy clause. Their jurisdiction was prescribed and only applicable to legal disputes 
between Africans. These courts could impose a sentence of up to six months and could not try 
offences punishable with death or life imprisonment.33 The native courts slowly adopted corporal 
punishment and imprisonment as they found it more difficult to enforce their judgments and 
chiefs were accused of corruption.34 As a result, English punishments were incorporated into 
customary justice.35 
With regard to punishment, the colonial government used criminal law to advance their own 
interests and maintain their authority. The death penalty was primarily aimed at deterrence; 
„rather than retribution against an individual, an execution was a didactic measure seeking to 
                                                 
28 The use of mwabvi was regarded as repugnant to the principles of justice and therefore contrary to article 15(2) of 
the British Order in Council: see Forster (2001) 279. 
29 Milner (1969). See Bernault (2007) 55 for an overview of condition in colonial prisons; 
30 Von Benda-Beckman (2007) 38 notes that the legal recognition of traditional courts was possible in view of the 
District Administration (Native) Ordinances No 13 of 1912 and No 11 of 1924 which permitted the government to 
authorise chiefs to exercise certain judicial functions. 
31 Von Benda-Beckman (2007) 39; Chimango (1977) 46. 
32 Native courts were later named African courts by the African Courts Ordinance 17 of 1947. 
33 Chimango (1977) 46. 
34 Hynd (2011) 444. 
35 Hynd (2011) 444. 
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deter others from challenging colonial order‟.36 Death was a mandatory sentence for murder and 
treason but discretionary in rape cases.37 The law prescribed mandatory life sentences for 
pregnant women convicted of crimes carrying a mandatory death sentence. Persons below the 
age of 18 in similar circumstances were to be detained at the Queen‟s pleasure.38 In practice, 
death was often imposed for murder and, during political crises, treason; rape was rarely 
punished with death.39 The final say on the death penalty lay with the Governor who could 
confirm the sentence or exercise mercy through executive clemency, pardon and commutation 
through the royal prerogative of mercy.40 
Curiously, although capital punishment was imposed as a mandatory sentence, death sentences 
were often commuted to life imprisonment or lesser terms of imprisonment.41 On the one hand, 
this practice minimised the retributive character or harshness of the penal regime. On the other 
hand, it rendered criminal punishment prone to political manipulation.42 The procedure for 
commutation entailed a review of the sentence by the Governor-General based on reports by the 
trial judge regarding the case and the sentence. This process mitigated the harshness of the 
mandatory death penalty.43 In her studies on the history of the death penalty in British Africa, 
Hynd44 suggests that although there were no written principles for the granting of mercy or 
reasons for mercy, „the rationales behind mercy [could]  be inferred from the case details, judges‟ 
                                                 
36 Hynd (2008). 
37 Section 179 of the 1929 Penal Code and section 316-320 of the 1929 Criminal Procedure Code. 
38 Section 26 of the Penal Code. 
39 Hynd (2010) 544.  
40 Hynd (2008) 405. 
41 Hynd (2010) 546. Over two thirds of prisoners sentenced to death benefitted from the prerogative of mercy in 
colonial Malawi: see Hynd (undated) 7. 
42 Hynd (2010) 545. 
43 Nowak (2014) 81. 
44 Hynd (2012). 
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recommendations, and confidential reports prepared by district officers on the background to a 
case‟.45 
In some cases, mercy was based on established and rational principles stipulating the crimes 
which deserved mercy and those which did not. In the light of the emphasis on deterrence, 
offences that threatened public order or colonial authority were punished more severely.46 This 
reflected a skewed rationale for the death penalty as it then became a tool of political oppression. 
In principle, the governor often issued execution warrants in cases of murder involving 
„deliberately and callously undertaken‟ killings committed by hired assassins or in furtherance of 
selfish objectives such as rape, robbery or theft.47 According to Hynd, mercy was also exercised 
in favour of women, youth, and the elderly were generally saved from the death penalty even for 
violent offences.48 She states that offenders who had committed murder in circumstances which 
reflected diminished responsibility (due to factors such as intoxication, insanity, provocation 
through insults, and killing of suspected witches) also benefitted from mercy. This, Hynd 
continues, was based on the belief that the fear of punishment would not prevent the 
commission of such crimes because they were not symptomatic of criminality.49 Despite the 
mass commutations of death sentences to imprisonment, a proposal50 to make the death penalty 
discretionary was rejected by the Colonial Office in 1922.  
Where the death penalty was not commuted to a life sentence, it was executed through hanging 
and, to a lesser extent, by a firing squad.51 Contrary to the practice in England,52 executions were 
initially performed publicly purportedly to enhance the deterrent effect of the death penalty. 
                                                 
45 Hynd (2011) 443. 
46 Hynd (2012) 87. 
47 Hynd (undated) 7-8. 
48 Hynd (2011) 443; Hynd (2007) 16. 
49 Hynd (2011) 443.  
50 See the Punishment of Murder (Natives) Ordinance, 1922. 
51 Hynd (2008) 440. 
52 Britain had abolished public executions in 1868. 
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African males and community members from the offender‟s village were ordered to witness 
these public executions.53 However, the calmness or struggles of offenders as they were 
executed, coupled with botched executions, undermined the intended purpose of the death 
penalty and blurred the line between judicial killing and murder.54 This forced the colonial 
government towards legal reform which among other things saw the move from public to 
private executions in prisons.55 More specifically, two botched executions in 1924 compelled the 
government to centralise private executions in Malawi at Zomba Prison.56 The practice of having 
witnesses during executions was also abandoned.57 And although calls for the reintroduction of 
African witnesses in the cell executions were made in London in 1940, they were rejected on the 
basis that the practice was „contrary to all principles of decency and decorum‟.58 
During this early period of colonialism, imprisonment was generally reserved for serious 
offences and „troublesome‟ offenders.59 Life imprisonment was prescribed for a number of 
offences including manslaughter and robbery. In some cases, offenders could be sentenced to 
preventive imprisonment of up to 14 years for purposes of public protection.60 According to 
Bernault,61 penal labour remained „a hidden form of forced labour‟ throughout the colonial era in 
Africa and colonial prisons were known for producing cheap labour for settlers. All prisoners 
had to work unless they were sick or infirm. Prisoners, mostly first offenders, worked in prison 
farms to produce food and learn agriculture techniques, while others performed hard labour on 
                                                 
53 Hynd (2011) 443. 
54 Hynd (2008) 409. 
55 Smith (1996) 236. 
56 Hynd (undated) 12. 
57 Hynd (2011) 443.   
58 Chief Justice Thomas „Procedures to be followed in murder cases in Nyasaland, 1924-59‟ February 1940, National 
Archives of Malawi 4-4-8R 2952. 
59 Hynd (2008) 438. 
60 See for instance Guza v R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 136 (HC); R v Daliyani [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 370 (HC); 
Crispin v R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 340 (HC); R v Sinya [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 223 (HC); William v R [1961-1963] 2 
ALR Mal 104 (HC). 
61 Bernault (2007). 
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public work projects. Prisoners serving long sentences were involved in skills training such as 
carpentry and tailoring. While this served the rehabilitative function, the conditions of 
imprisonment and hard labour were harsh. As a result, prisoners often escaped or attempted to 
do so and organised protests and riots.62 
Corporal punishment was also a widely used form of punishment. It was executed in public for 
deterrent and retributive purposes.63 According to Chanock, Malawi had the highest use of 
corporal punishment in Africa at the time.64 Corporal punishment was used for a wide range of 
offences and could be imposed alongside fines and imprisonment.65 Fines were usually imposed 
in minor offences but also as collective punishment or in reparation for damage to property 
incurred during civil unrest.66 
While retribution and deterrence were the main aims of punishment of adult offenders, the 
sentencing policy regarding young offenders was characterised by mercy and exhibited elements 
of rehabilitation. Although young offenders were subjected to whipping,67 the law and practice 
generally shielded them from extreme punishment such as imprisonment and the death penalty. 
As noted earlier, the Penal Code prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on persons 
below the age of 18 years and provided that they should be detained at Her Majesty‟s pleasure. 
Where an offence warranted imprisonment, young offenders were instead sent to Montfort 
Marist Mission at Likulesi.68 
                                                 
62 Bernault (2007) 55-57. 
63 Hynd (2011) 443-444. 
64 Chanock (1985) 126. 
65 See section 28 of the Penal Code. The law prohibited the imposition of corporal punishment on females, males 
sentenced to death and males above 45 years: see section 28(2) of the Penal Code.  In the case of adult offenders, 
imprisonment was a condition precedent for corporal punishment: see R v Mpama [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 40 (HC). 
66 Hynd (2011) 444-445.  
67 Hynd (2011) 444. 
68 Prisons Department Report (1944) 
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2.2.2 The reform period, 1937 to 1964 
After 1937, there was a growing realisation that punishment ought to be humane and more 
geared towards the reformation of an offender.69 Hence, in 1945, the Colonial Office urged a 
shift in sentencing policy in the colonies towards reformation of offenders. It noted that „the 
only effective method of protecting society from criminals who are again released into society is 
to introduce reformative measures wherever practicable‟ such as probation and the abolition of 
corporal punishment.70 Efforts at penal reform in Malawi were notable in the prison service 
where the authorities introduced the provision of social activities such as football leagues, 
establishment of prison libraries, a probation service and after-care measures for released 
offenders.71 An effort was made regarding the reformation of female and young prisoners. 
Women were taught to read and write English, and offered skills training in cooking, knitting, 
sewing and hygiene to ensure that they were welcomed back into society upon release.72 
The shift in policy also resulted in the enactment of various penal laws including the Prisons 
Ordinance,73 the Children and Young Persons Ordinance,74 the Probation of Offenders Act,75 
and the Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Act.76 It is noteworthy that most of 
the statutes introduced after 1945 are still in force today.77 The Prisons Ordinance (later called 
                                                 
69 Roberts (1937) 93. 
70 Fry (1951) 90. 
71 Nyasaland Protectorate Annual Report on the Administration of the Prisons Department during the Year 1955. 
72Nyasaland Protectorate Annual Report on the Administration of the Prisons Department during the Year 1947. 
73 Prisons Ordinance Act No 27 of 1945, which was later amended by Prisons Amendments Acts Nos 9 of 1955, 8 
of 1957, 42 of 1959 and 26 of 1962. 
74 Children and Young Persons Ordinance, 1946. This law was based on the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act 
of England. 
75 Probation of Offenders Act No 10 of 1945, now Chapter 9:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
76 Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Act 16 of 1954, now Chapter 9:03 of the Laws of Malawi. 
77 These include the Prisons Act, Chapter 9:02 of the Laws of Malawi; Probation of Offenders Act, Chapter 9:01 of 
the Laws of Malawi; and the Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Act, Chapter 9:03 of the Laws of 
Malawi. 
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the Prisons Act from 1955) restructured the prison service and formalised the treatment of 
prisoners including the management of prison labour and prison discipline, and the provision of 
remission of sentences, release on licence, release of seriously ill and long term prisoners 
including those serving life sentences.78 
The Children and Young Persons Ordinance was enacted to improve the treatment of young 
offenders, although the sentencing policy for young offenders was somewhat better than that for 
adults even before 1945. The centrality of rehabilitation and reformation to this Ordinance was 
clear from the words of the then Chief Justice who noted that the Ordinance 
is designed to keep children (under the age of 12) and young persons (age 12 to 16) who have offended out 
of prison as far as possible and out of association with adult offenders. These juvenile offenders are 
required to be tried in a juvenile court which should be in a different building or room from that of the 
Magistrate‟s ordinary court; special investigation is made into the home life of the offender; and special 
punishments, alternative to imprisonment which latter should be used only as a last resort, are set out in 
the Ordinance. Probation and detention in an approved school are important forms of punishment, both 
having reform as their object.
79 
Among other things, the Ordinance prohibited the imprisonment of a child and permitted the 
imprisonment of young persons only upon proof that he was „so unruly or of so depraved a 
character‟ that he was not a fit person to be detained in an approved school or home.80 Section 4 
recognised the principle of the best interests of the child by requiring that a court must have due 
regard to the welfare of the child. The Ordinance provided for a wide range of non-custodial 
alternatives in dealing with young offenders.81 In addition to probation services, the Ordinance 
also made provision for the probation of young offenders and the establishment of reformatory 
institutions which would act as places of detention for children with the main object of 
                                                 
78 See Parts XVIII to XXI of the Prisons Act as amended by Act 26 of 1962; section 35 of the Prison Regulations. 
79 Quoted in Degabriele (2001) 10-11. 
80 Section 10 of the Ordinance. 
81 See section 16(1) of the Ordinance. 
96 
 
reformation.82 According to Degabriele,83 reformatory schools offered moral talks, prayers and 
various training in agriculture, bricklaying, tailoring, carpentry and joinery, and leather work to 
child offenders and street children; with time, the schools also concentrated on academic 
matters.  
The latter years of colonisation also saw a change in the structure of the local courts. In 1962, the 
Local Courts Ordinance extended the jurisdiction of local courts to disputes between Africans 
and non-Africans.84 This ordinance also relinquished the judicial power of chiefs and instead 
endowed Commissioners to establish such local courts as they thought fit. This system was not 
part of the High Court system as appeals from the native courts were first heard by the Native 
Commissioners before being taken to the High Court.85 Thus, Malawi now had a two-tiered 
court system. 
In summary, it can be observed that with the exception of young offenders, punishment during 
the early years of colonial rule was shaped by the theories of retribution and deterrence. For 
instance, offenders were subjected to public executions and flogging and the criminal law 
sometimes used as a means of political control and manipulation. The treatment of women and 
children was much better, but the general criminal justice system was cruel. However, efforts 
were made to reform criminal justice in the later years of colonisation resulting in the enactment 
of laws that sought to make reformation as one of the goals of punishment. These reforms 
improved the treatment of women and children and introduced some procedural safeguards. 
However, they did not completely dismantle the retributive and deterrence structure of 
punishment. Thus, the death penalty continued to be used and the right to a fair trial was not 
given constitutional protection. 
                                                 
82 Section 16 of the Children and Young Persons Ordinance. 
83 Degabriele (2001) 13. 
84 Ordinance 8 of 1962. 
85 LJ Chimango „Tradition and the traditional courts in Malawi‟ (1977) CILSA 39, 46. 
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2.3 The post-colonial era, 1964-1994 
The dawn of independence in 1964 under the leadership of Dr Kamuzu Banda and a new 
constitution did little to improve the criminal justice system in Malawi. On the contrary, it 
marked the beginning of a 30-year dictatorial rule by „one of the most repressive regimes in 
Africa‟.86 
At the beginning, the regime gave the impression that it was interested in respecting and 
promoting human rights. Thus, in October 1966, President Banda established a commission to 
review criminal justice in Malawi with the aim of simplifying the practice, procedure and rules of 
evidence and improvising the efficiency and consistency of administration of justice.87 The 
commission made various recommendations to improve the administration of criminal justice in 
general. However, the commission did not pay much attention to punishment and its aims.88 
Surprisingly, some of its recommendations urged stricter administration of punishment such as 
increasing the working hours of prisoners and sought to exclude any consideration of time spent 
on remand during sentencing unless the offender concerned had opted to hard labour while 
awaiting trial.89 These recommendations were not adopted when the Criminal Procedure Code 
was amended in 1967.90 
With minor amendments to the existing law, the government continued using most of the 
criminal justice laws from the colonial period, including the Penal Code91 and the Criminal 
Procedure Code (renamed the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code (CPEC))92 and the 1946 
                                                 
86 Meinhardt and Patel (undated) 3. 
87 Baker (1967). 
88 See Report of the Presidential Commission on Criminal Justice in Malawi February 1967. 
89 Baker (1967) 150, citing the Report of the Presidential Commission on Criminal Justice in Malawi (February 1967). 
90 See the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code, Act 36 of 1967. 
91 Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi.  
92 Chapter 8:01 of the Laws of Malawi. The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code were mainly aimed at 
consolidating the procedural and evidential aspects of criminal proceedings, and simplifying it to make it more 
efficient and easier to understand: see Baker(1967) 149; Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code, Act 36 of 1967. 
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Children and Young Persons Ordinance (renamed the Children and Young Persons Act 
(CYPA)).93 The CYPA was amended to widen the protection of young offenders from 
imprisonment by defining children as persons below the age of 14 years and young persons as 
those between 14 and 18 years.94 Section 16(1) of the Act widened the non-custodial alternatives 
when sentencing young offenders. Furthermore, the list of punishments had to be read in 
ascending order of seriousness from the least to the most punitive: it was the duty of the court to 
give priority to the least punitive punishment first such that custodial sentences were at the far 
end of sentencing options.95 Section 11(1) of the CYPA continued to prescribe mandatory 
detention of young offenders at the President‟s pleasure in cases of murder. The Board of 
Visitors met at least three times a year to consider the progress of young offenders towards 
reform.96 DeGabriele97 states that although the CYPA still emphasised reformation and social 
reintegration in the treatment of young offenders, the government focussed more on reform and 
behavioural treatment than social reintegration. The result was that successful reintegration into 
society was compromised since young offenders spent long periods in reformatory institutions 
until the authorities decided that the offender had been reformed and could therefore be released 
in to society.98 To worsen matters, young offenders could be sent to prison upon attaining the 
age of 18 years in a reformatory institution.99 
Significant changes in criminal justice during the post-colonial period included the creation of a 
traditional court system that was parallel to and exercised concurrent jurisdiction with the High 
                                                 
93 Children and Young Persons Act, Chapter 26: 03 of the Laws of Malawi. The government also introduced new 
laws that were generally regarded as repressive such as the Forfeiture Act, Chapter 14:06 of the Laws of Malawi; the 
Decency in Dress Act, Chapter 7:04 of the Laws of Malawi; Preservation of Public Security Act, Chapter 14:02 of 
the Laws of Malawi. 
94 Section 2 of the CYPA. 
95 See Rep v Mwenda [1999] MLR 356 (HC). 
96 Degabriele (2001) 42. 
97 Degabriele (2001). 
98 Degabriele (2001) 18, 19, 20. 
99 Degabriele (2001) 20.  
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Court in 1969.100 Traditional courts were later allowed to try murder and treason and to pass the 
death sentence, a move which would be instrumental in facilitating the government‟s desire to 
clamp down on political opponents.101 This was very problematic for a number of reasons: unlike 
the High Court, presiding officers in the traditional courts were unqualified, procedural 
safeguards such as the presumption of innocence were not fully observed and legal 
representation was essentially prohibited. These courts mainly tried political opponents and in 
some cases imposed death sentences after unfair trials that did not comply with human rights 
standards such as the right to legal representation.102 The third change occurred in 1967 with the 
introduction of mandatory sentences relative to the amounts misappropriated, and reverse onus 
provisions to curb the prevalence of theft by public servants.103 Another change was the 
introduction of discretionary death sentences for armed robbery and burglary in 1970.104 
The forms of punishment remained largely the same throughout the one-party regime. Corporal 
punishment was imposed on young and old offenders alike. Imprisonment remained a common 
form of punishment. The mandatory death penalty was maintained for murder and treason105 
while rape continued to attract a discretionary death sentence. Children and pregnant women 
continued to be excluded from the application of the death penalty. Following in the footsteps 
of the colonial government, the government maintained general deterrence as the justification 
for public executions.106  
                                                 
100 See the Local Courts Amendment Act, 1969. The traditional court system consisted of the National Traditional 
Appeal Court (NTAC) at its apex, then the Regional Traditional Court of Appeal (RTCA), the District Traditional 
Court of Appeal (DTCA), the District Traditional Court, and Grade A and Grade B traditional courts. The NTAC 
was the final court in the traditional court system, hearing appeals from all the other courts. 
101 Most political opponents were tried in traditional courts: see Meinhardt and Patel (undated) 4. 
102 See Human Rights Watch (1994); Amnesty International (1993). 
103 Section 286 of the Penal Code. For a detailed discussion of this amendment, see Ng‟ong‟ola (1988) 72. 
104 Penal Code Amendment Act 44 of 1970; sections 301 and 309 of the Penal Code. 
105 The mode of execution for treason was now at the discretion of the Minister of justice. A post held by President 
Banda himself: see section 26(1) of the 1969 Penal Code. 
106 Baker (2001) 265. 
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The prerogative of mercy was still available to prisoners including those on death row. After 
Malawi became a republic in 1966, the final say on the death penalty lay with the President.107 
The presidential pardon was exercised in consultation with an Advisory Committee whose 
members were appointed by the President himself.108 Amnesty international reports that Banda 
rarely exercised mercy and that there were at least 30 executions a year, mostly of political 
opponents.109 
In general, the 1966 Constitution paid scant attention to the protection of human rights. The 
one-party regime did not do much to improve the situation. In fact, throughout that period, the 
country was in „a perpetual state of emergency‟,110 „characterised by oppression, intolerance and a 
lack of respect for human rights, the rule of law and constitutionalism‟.111 Criminal trials were 
conducted under procedures which did not meet international human rights standards. Prisoners, 
especially political opponents, were treated with contempt and subjected to torture and cruel 
treatment.112 Arbitrary detentions without trial, facilitated by the Preservation of Public Security 
Act,113 were the order of the day and left several political detainees in prison for long periods of 
time. Prison conditions were appalling.114 In some cases repeat convicts were subjected to a „hard 
core‟ program upon expiry of their sentences. Under this program, prisoners were sent to Nsanje 
                                                 
107 The President had the power to pardon „any person concerned in or convicted of any offence either free or 
subject to lawful conditions‟ and „substitute a less severe form of punishment‟ than the one imposed by a court: see 
sections 60(a) and (c)of the 1966 Constitution. 
108 Except in cases dealing with death sentences. Sections 61(2) to (4) of the 1966 Constitution. The President was 
not bound to seek the advice of the committee in pardoning non-convicted persons: see section 61(2). 
109 Amnesty International (1993) 19; Nowak (2014) 48.  
110 Banda v Attorney General (1996) MLR 445 (HC) 461. 
111 Chirwa (2011) 4. 
112 See Gonthi v Attorney General (1996) MLR 48 (HC) 52-53. 
113 Preservation of Public Security Act, Chapter 14:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
114 Human Rights Watch (1990) 42-43. 
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Prison or Dzaleka Prison where they would be „stripped naked, chained to the floor of their cells 
and either denied food or … given quarter-rations. Many are reported to have died as a result‟.115 
As calls for change were getting louder in the early 1990s, it was clear that the criminal justice 
would form an area of attention in the constitutional talks. Indeed, even before the new 
constitution was adopted in 1994, several important legal reforms were agreed upon. In 1993, 
Malawi acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)116 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).117 Traditional courts 
were suspended and a moratorium was placed on death penalty executions (saving about 120 
people from the gallows).118 In addition, international observers were allowed to inspect prisons, 
some repressive laws were repealed119 and 229 political prisoners were released.120 Parliament 
passed the General Amnesty Act121 which declared a general amnesty to create a conducive 
environment for the return of Malawian exiles. To crown it all, the new Constitution containing 
a detailed Bill of Rights was adopted. It came into provisional force on 18 May 1994 and full 
force on 18 May 1995. 
3 STRUCTURE AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 
It is useful to give a brief description of the current structure and criminal jurisdiction of courts 
in Malawi. The Supreme Court sits at the apex of the court system, exercising appellate 
                                                 
115 Human Rights Watch (1990) 44. 
116 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI), UN DOC A/6316 (1966) acceded to 
on 22 December 1993. 
117 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 
acceded to on 22 December 1993. 
118 Amnesty International (1994)3. 
119 These include the Forfeiture Act, Chapter 14:06 of the Laws of Malawi; the Decency in Dress Act, Chapter 7:04 
of the Laws of Malawi; and sections allowing detention without trial under the Preservation of Public Security Act, 
Chapter 14:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
120 Amnesty International (1994) 3. 
121 Chapter 14:05 of the Laws of Malawi. 
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jurisdiction over cases from the High Court.122 The second highest court is the High Court which 
has both appellate and original criminal jurisdiction.123 It has the power to try any offence under 
the Penal Code,124 hear appeals,125 review cases from subordinate courts,126 and pass any sentence 
as provided by law.127  
Subordinate courts are established under section 110 of the Constitution and include magistrate 
courts, the Industrial Relations Court, traditional or local courts and the courts martial. The bulk 
of criminal cases is tried by magistrate‟s courts which are divided into five categories: resident 
magistrates, first grade magistrates, second grade magistrates, third grade magistrates, and fourth 
grade magistrates. Resident magistrate‟s courts are presided over by professional magistrates with 
a minimum of a law degree while lay magistrates with basic legal training or a law diploma 
preside over courts of the first to fourth grade magistrate. Resident, first grade and second grade 
magistrates may try any offence except treason, concealment of treason, piracy, manslaughter, 
murder and genocide or attempts to commit or aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring the 
commission of any of these offences.128 The criminal jurisdiction of second grade magistrate‟s 
court is further limited by section 13(2) of the Penal Code which states that they cannot try rape, 
attempted rape and defilement. Meanwhile, third and fourth grade magistrates may only try 
                                                 
122 Sections 104(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
123 Section 108 of the Constitution. 
124 Section 7 of the CPEC. 
125 Section 346(1) of the CPEC. 
126 Section 15(1) of the CPEC. 
127 Section 10 of the CPEC. 
128 See section 13 of the CPEC. In practice, resident magistrate‟s courts are further divided into chief resident 
magistrate‟s courts, principal resident magistrate‟s courts and senior resident magistrate‟s courts. These designations 
refer only to seniority of the magistrate; they have no bearing on the jurisdiction of the court. All resident 
magistrates have the same civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
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offences whose maximum penalties do not exceed their penal jurisdiction of three years and one 
year respectively.129 The penal jurisdiction of courts in Malawi can be illustrated as follows:130  
Table 1: Jurisdiction of courts 
                                                 
129 See sections 13(3) and (4) of the CPEC; R v Sarif Confirmation Case No 109 of 2012 (third grade magistrates 
have no jurisdiction to try housebreaking since the maximum penalty is death or life imprisonment); R v Msowoya 
Confirmation Case No 332 of 2011. 
130 The table is drawn from sections 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the CPEC and sections 23 and 24 of the Local Courts Act. 
131 This refers to community service, police supervision, public work, attendance centre orders, dismissal, discharge, 
probation, and binding over.  
132 Or K 20,000 in contempt of court cases: see section 38(1)( c) of the Local Courts Act. 
 
Court 
Type of sentence 
Death Imprisonment 
(maximum 
sentence) 
Preventive 
sentences 
Fines Other 
penalties131 
High Court Yes Life  Yes No limit  All 
Resident Magistrate No 21 years Yes No limit All  
First Grade Magistrate No 14 years Yes No limit All 
Second Grade Magistrate No 10 years No K 200 000 All 
Third Grade Magistrate No 3 years No K 150 000 All 
Fourth Grade Magistrate No 1 year No K 100 000 All 
Local courts  No 1 year No K 5 000132 Compensation, 
forfeiture, 
dismissal, 
community 
service   
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The above discussion indicates that the relationship between the jurisdiction of the courts and 
punishment is quite complex. The severity of the punishment is not the determinative factor. 
Indeed, while third and fourth grade magistrates cannot try offences that exceed their penal 
jurisdiction, this is not the case with resident and first grade magistrates who can try capital 
offences such as rape, robbery and burglary although they cannot impose death or life 
imprisonment which are the maximum penalties for these offences. Furthermore, resident and 
magistrate courts cannot try manslaughter, which is a non-capital offence, nor other capital 
offences such as murder and genocide. Interestingly, second grade magistrates can try burglary 
but not rape, yet both are capital offences.  
It seems therefore that the jurisdiction of the courts in Malawi is based more on the quest for 
justice than the severity of the applicable punishment. Cases which are assumed to be more 
complex are reserved for higher courts. The margin of error widens as the experience or 
expertise of the court diminishes. Therefore, a second grade magistrate is more likely to err in its 
judgment than a first grade magistrate. This is also evident when one considers the fact that 
convictions by second grade magistrates do not render an offender liable to preventive 
imprisonment even if the other criteria in section 11 of the CPEC are met.133 The emphasis on 
justice is also the rationale for the automatic review procedure in that the length of 
imprisonment that entitles an offender to automatic review of his case increases as the level of 
the court decreases.134 The explanation for giving resident and first grade magistrates the same 
                                                 
133 Only convictions by the High Court, resident and first grade magistrates are taken into account: see section 11 of 
the CPEC. Preventive imprisonment is discussed in section 3.3 of chapter five.  
134 Section 15(1)(b) of the CPEC requires automatic review of every case where a subordinate court imposes a fine 
exceeding K 1, 000; or two years in the case of a resident magistrate‟s court; one year in the case of a first or second 
grade magistrate‟s court; or six months in the case of a third or fourth grade magistrate‟s court. Section 15(3) of the 
CPEC provides that a failure to review sentences subject to automatic review entitles the offender concerned to 
immediate release at the expiration of the periods prescribed in section 15(1). In In Rep v Isaaki Confirmation Case 
No 410 of 2005, 2, NyaKaunda Kamanga J observed that section 15(3) ensures that there is no prolonged 
confinement of prisoners in the face of the risk of an unfair trial arising from a disproportionate sentence. 
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jurisdiction in terms of which offences they may try could be that in practice, the latter are often 
experienced magistrates although they do not have law degrees like the former. However, this 
argument makes it difficult to explain the seven-year difference in their penal jurisdiction.  
4 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE KEY CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
Unlike its predecessors, the 1994 Constitution contains numerous provisions that are particularly 
relevant to the administration of criminal justice and punishment. These provisions relate to the 
fundamental principles of government, the Bill of Rights and the relevance of international law 
to the Malawian judicial system.  
4.1 Fundamental principles 
The Constitution elaborates a number of fundamental principles that underpin its framework 
and serve as a guide to state action. Of these the entrenchment of the supremacy of the 
Constitution is probably most noteworthy.135 According to section 5 of the Constitution, every 
law or act of government that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution shall be 
invalid to the extent of any such inconsistency. This provision is important because most of the 
laws that apply to punishment in Malawi predate the Constitution. It calls for the examination of 
every law, practice and procedure concerning punishment in the light of the new Constitution. 
The Constitution also enshrines the principle of the separation of powers.136 In vesting legislative 
powers in parliament,137 the power to initiate and implement policies and laws in the executive,138 
and the enforcement and interpretation of laws in the judiciary,139 the Constitution seeks to 
create a division of powers in the area of punishment as a means of curbing the abuse of the 
                                                 
135 Section 199 of the Constitution reads: „This Constitution shall have the status as supreme law and there shall be 
no legal or political authority save as is provided by or under this Constitution‟. 
136 Sections 7, 8 and 9 provide for separate duties and functions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
respectively. 
137 Section 8. 
138 Section 7. 
139 Section 9. 
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rights of accused and convicted persons and maintaining a humane system of punishment. Thus, 
the Constitution expressly requires the state to „promote law and order … through the humane 
application and enforcement of laws and policing standards‟.140 Importantly, the criminal 
jurisdiction has been reserved for the high court system, leaving little room for the re-emergence 
of traditional courts with competing jurisdiction in this field.  
Since the new Constitution was adopted, death sentences have been routinely commuted to life 
imprisonment and no executions of prisoners on death row have occurred.141 The government 
has also initiated several legal reforms in the criminal justice system, culminating in the adoption 
of amendments to the Penal Code, the CPEC and the Police Act.142 The CYPA was repealed and 
replaced by the Child Care, Protection and Justice Act (CCPJA).143 In 2003, the Prisons Bill was 
drafted with a view to replace the Prisons Act. All these reforms are aimed at bringing the 
punishment regime into compliance with the Constitution and international standards.  
4.2 Key features of the Bill of Rights 
The Bill of Rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution heralds fundamental changes to 
the administration of punishment in Malawi, at both substantive and procedural levels. Among 
other things, the Constitution protects the right life in section 16 which states that „no person 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life‟. The wording of this provision indicates that there 
are instances in which deprivations of life would not infringe the right to life. The courts have 
not defined the meaning of arbitrariness in this provision.144 According to Chirwa,145 the 
                                                 
140 Section 13(m). Although this principle is not justiciable, courts are enjoined to have regard to it not only when 
applying and interpreting the Constitution and legislation but also when reviewing decisions by the executive: see 
Masangano v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 15 of 2007, 34-35 and 44-45. 
141 Amnesty International (1997) 1. 
142 Chapter 3:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
143 Act 22 of 2010. 
144 In Kafantayeni v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 25 of 2005, the mandatory death penalty was challenged 
on the ground, inter alia, that it amounted to arbitrary deprivation of life in that its „imposition is without regard to 
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prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life means that „the state must refrain from killing 
people without justification‟. He also asserts, based on Malawi Congress Party and Others v Attorney 
General and Another,146 that the term „arbitrary deprivation of life‟ means the deprivation of life 
without due process or respect for the right to a fair trial.147 This meaning is consistent with 
section 16 which states that the execution of the death penalty does not amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation of life if it satisfies three conditions. The first is that it must be imposed by a 
„competent‟ court that is established by law, independent and impartial, and has the jurisdiction 
and expertise to try capital crimes.148 Secondly, the death penalty may only be imposed for crimes 
that are recognised under the laws of Malawi. Thirdly, an offender must have been convicted of 
an offence.  
The Constitution protects the right to equal and effective protection under the law149 and 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of „race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth or other status‟.150 The right 
to equality entails that all persons, including offenders, should be treated equally. In Masangano v 
Attorney General and Others,151 the High Court said that despite the fact that prisoners are lawfully 
deprived of their liberty through imprisonment, they remain equally entitled to fundamental 
rights. Therefore, prisoners are entitled to all rights guaranteed to „every person‟ subject to 
necessary limitations on account of their imprisonment. Secondly, the Constitution enshrines the 
right to human dignity in section 19(1). Specifically, it requires that human dignity must be 
                                                                                                                                                        
the circumstances of the crime and is thus arbitrary‟. However, the High Court did not make a finding on this 
ground. 
145 Chirwa (2011) 92. 
146 Malawi Congress Party and Others v Attorney General and Another [1996] MLR 244 (HC) 292-295. 
147 Chirwa (2011) 93. 
148 Chirwa (2011) 98. 
149 Section 20(1). 
150 Section 20(1). 
151 Masangano v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 15 of 2007, 37. 
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respected in all judicial proceedings or any proceedings before any organ of state and during the 
enforcement of a penalty152 and prohibits corporal punishment, torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment.153 These provisions have significant implications for the 
aims and severity of criminal punishment and the manner in which it is enforced. 
The Constitution also recognises a range of rights that seek to protect the liberty of persons. The 
right to personal liberty is expressly protected under section 18 of the Constitution. In Re 
Chizombwe154 it was stated that liberty must be given due respect and should not be unduly 
interfered with. In buttressing the protection of liberty, the Constitution protects several other 
specific rights. These include the right to be promptly informed of the reason for one‟s 
detention,155 the right to be brought before a court of law within 48 hours,156 and the right to be 
released from detention with or without bail.157 The Constitution also guarantees the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of one‟s detention and to be released immediately if such detention is 
unlawful.158 The fact that this right is guaranteed to „sentenced‟ prisoners is significant. It creates 
the foundation for a challenge to a sentence of imprisonment even after a final order has been 
made by the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal (MSCA). Section 42(1)(e) can also be used to 
challenge the continued detention of prisoners sentenced to long-term and life imprisonment. 
The wording of section 42(1) encompasses „every‟ sentenced prisoner regardless of the length of 
his sentence. The Constitution also protects the right to be detained in conditions that are 
consistent with human dignity.159 Section 42(1)(b) state that humane conditions include „at least 
                                                 
152 Section 19(2). 
153 Section 19(3).  
154 In re Chizombwe [1991] 14 MLR 482 (HC) 486. 
155 Section 42(2)(a). 
156 Section 42(2)(b). 
157 Section 42(2)(e). 
158 Section 42(1)(e) and (f). 
159 Section 42(1)(b). 
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the provision of reading and writing materials, adequate nutrition and medical treatment at state 
expense‟.  
Although the CPEC has codified some procedural guarantees in criminal trials, by specifically 
recognising the right to a fair trial in section 42, the Constitution sought to build a human right 
based criminal justice system. Kafantayeni v Attorney General160 confirmed that the right to a fair 
trial extends to sentencing.161 The right to a fair trial as defined under section 42 includes the 
rights to be sentenced within a reasonable time after conviction162 and not to be sentenced to a 
more severe punishment than that prescribed at the time of the commission of the offence.163 It 
also includes the right „not to be prosecuted again for a criminal act or omission of which he or 
she has previously been convicted or acquitted‟.164 Commonly known as double jeopardy, this 
principle does not only relate to cases where an accused is tried twice for the same offence but 
also to the consideration of substantive elements of one offence in punishing another.165 Double 
jeopardy may also result from taking into account previous convictions where this leads to the 
punishment of an offender for a crime he was already punished for.  
An essential element of the right to a fair trial is the presumption of innocence. This right is 
provided for in section 42(2)(f)(iii) of the Constitution. The presumption of innocence does not 
apply in the traditional sense to the sentencing phase of a trial. However, it has been argued that 
the prosecution bears the burden to prove disputed facts that may have a major impact on the 
                                                 
160 Kafantayeni v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 25 of 2005. 
161 Kafantayeni v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 25 of 2005. 
162 Section 42(2)(f)(x). 
163 Section 42(2)(f)(vi). 
164 Section 42(2)(f)(vii). 
165 Rep v Dzinjamala Confirmation Case No 133 of 2002. This also makes sense in light of the guideline that a 
sentence for burglary must not to be unduly influenced by the amount of good stolen since burglary serious based 
on the trespass involved. An offender must not escape punishment simply because the felony intended was not 
committed or little was stolen. Rep v Kachingwe Confirmation Case No 85 of 2007. 
110 
 
sentence imposed.166 The Supreme Court of Canada has held that an offender must „be granted 
the protection of the reasonable doubt rule‟ during sentencing which is the „vital juncture‟ of the 
criminal process that „poses the ultimate jeopardy to an individual‟.167 It has also been suggested 
that the presumption of innocence prohibits a court from punishing the offender for offences he 
has not been convicted of. It is on this basis that the minority in Rameka et al v New Zealand,168 
discussed in chapter three,169 were of the view that preventive sentences and indeed sentences 
based on the future risk posed by the offender infringe the presumption of innocence. The right 
to a fair trial includes the right „to have recourse by way of appeal or review to a higher court 
than the court of first instance‟.170 This right provides a means through which an accused can 
seek a more favourable outcome to a decision of a lower court. The appellate process is also an 
important check on lower courts that can promote consistency and fairness in the administration 
of justice.171 
The Constitution also contains additional provisions for children who are defined as persons 
under the age of 18 years.172 For instance, it requires that they must be treated in a manner that 
promotes their „reintegration into society to assume a constructive role‟.173 Further, children may 
only be imprisoned as „a last resort and for the shortest period of time consistent with justice and 
public protection‟.174 The imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of release on 
children is specifically prohibited by section 42(2)(g)(i). 
                                                 
166 Schwikkard (1999) 64-65. 
167 R v Gardiner [1982] 2 SCR 368 (SCC) 415, citing Olah (1980) 121. 
168 Rameka et al v New Zealand Communication No 1090/2002. 
169 See section 3.2.1 of chapter three. 
170 Section 42(2)(f)(viii). Prisoners who were sentenced before the adoption of the Constitution are at liberty to 
appeal their sentences if new grounds exist: see section 205 of the Constitution. 
171 Trechsel and Summers (2005) 362. 
172 Section 42(2)(g). 
173 Section 42(2)(g)(v). 
174 Section 42(2)(g)(ii). 
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To avoid the wanton limitation of rights, section 44 of the Constitution carefully stipulates 
conditions which must be met in order for a limitation to be justifiable. The limitation must be 
prescribed by law, reasonable, recognised by international human rights standards and necessary 
in an open and democratic society.175 Section 44(3) further provides that the limitation should 
not negate the essential content of the right and must be of general application.176 These 
requirements are conjunctive177 and the onus of proving that a limitation is justifiable rests on the 
party who seeks to rely on the limitation.178 In determining whether a limitation is reasonable, it 
must be shown through evidence that it is not arbitrary and that there is a rational connection 
between the limitation and the objective it seeks to achieve. Further, the objective itself must be 
of sufficient importance and it must be proved that the means adopted will in fact achieve it. In 
addition, reasonableness requires that the limitation must be proportional to the objective it 
seeks to achieve; that is, the limitation must be the least restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
It was held in John Tembo and Another v the Attorney General,179 that „for a limitation to pass muster 
it has to pursue a legitimate aim and secondly there has to be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed to limit the right and the aim sought to be 
achieved‟. Proportionality is central to the determination of whether a limitation is „necessary in 
an open and democratic society‟. This requirement entails that the limitation must serve „a 
legitimate purpose or a compelling public purpose that is necessary in an open and democratic society‟.180 
A limitation will be necessary if it is the least restrictive means to achieve the objective. Chirwa 
notes that in determining whether a limitation is necessary in an open and democratic society, 
courts have considered whether the limitation fosters the underlying principles of the 
                                                 
175 Section 44(2) of the Constitution. 
176 Section 44(3) of the Constitution. 
177 See Chirwa (2011) 45, citing Chikopa J in Wavunduka Mwenitete v Fishani K Mkandawire Civil Appeal Case No 29 of 
2000 (unreported). 
178 Friday A Jumbe and Humphrey C Mvula v Attorney General Constitutional Cases Nos 1 and 2 of 2005. 
179 John Tembo and Another v Attorney General Civil Cause No 50 of 2003. 
180 Chirwa (2011) 49. Emphasis in original 
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Constitution and the principles of national policy contained in sections 12 and 13 of the 
Constitution respectively.  
4.2.1 The relevance of international law 
Unlike the previous constitution‟s vague and ambiguous references to international law, the 
current Constitution commits Malawi to respecting international law.181 As was seen in chapter 
three, this body of law contains a wide range of principles that are relevant to criminal 
punishment.  
According to the Constitution, international law serves as a general guide to governance. One of 
the principles of national policy enshrined in section 13(k) of the Constitution urges the 
government „to govern in accordance with the law of nations and the rule of law and actively 
support the further development thereof in regional and international affairs‟. International law 
can also be used as a source of law in domestic courts. Customary international law is 
automatically binding on Malawi and its application is subject to the Constitution and Acts of 
Parliament.182 However, Malawi is dualist183 in as far as international treaty law is concerned and 
section 211(1) requires that legislation must be passed before a treaty becomes part of domestic 
law. Once domesticated, international treaty law is as good as statutory law and is subject only to 
the Constitution184 and repeal by Parliament.185 In Malawi Telecommunications Ltd v Makande and 
Omar,186 the MSCA held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)187 is part of 
the laws of Malawi and that under the 1966 Constitution there was no need for the 
                                                 
181 Chirwa et al (undated) 27. 
182 Section 211(3) of the Constitution which reads: „Customary international law, unless inconsistent with this 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament, shall form part of the law of the Republic‟. 
183 See Maluwa (1995) 31. 
184 Chirwa (2011) 30. Statutory law has primacy over all laws except the Constitution: see section 48(2) of the 
Constitution.   
185 See section 211(2) of the Constitution. 
186 Malawi Telecommunications Ltd v Makande and Omar MSCA Civil Appeal No 2 of 2006. 
187 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 (1948). 
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domestication of international treaties. This means that all agreements entered into before 1994 
have domestic force in Malawi.188 This is important because Malawi ratified key treaties before 
1994 including the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (African Charter),189 the 
ICCPR,190 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),191 the ICESCR192 the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT),193 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Children‟s Charter).194 In Moyo v Attorney General,195 the High Court affirmed that the 
CRC has domestic force in Malawi.196 Apart from the ICESCR, these instruments contain 
important international standards for punishment and indeed the criminal justice system as a 
whole as discussed in chapter three. Their domestic application in Malawi is a victory for human 
rights in general and the criminal justice system in particular. This is because these instruments 
can be used to complement gaps in the Constitution and legislation. A good example is that since 
the Constitution does not clearly stipulate the general aims of punishment, the gap is easily filled 
by article 10(3) of the ICCPR which states that reformation and social reintegration must be the 
essential aims of any penitentiary system.  
Apart from being a source of law, international law can also be used in interpreting the 
Constitution.197 Section 11(2)(c) of the Constitution requires that in interpreting the Constitution, 
                                                 
188 See also Kalinda v Limbe Leaf Civil Cause No 542 of 1995, (unreported); Hansen (2002) 46(1) 31. 
189 Ratified by Malawi in 1989. 
190 Ratified by Malawi in 1993.  Malawi has declined to sign the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (GA Res 
44/128, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989)) which calls for the abolition of the death penalty. UDHR provisions now form 
part of customary international law (see Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (1980)) and hence automatically binding 
on Malawi: see Mwambene, above note 29, 79. 
191 Ratified by Malawi in 1991. 
192 Ratified by Malawi in 1993. 
193 Ratified by Malawi in 1996. 
194 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
195 Moyo v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 12 of 2007. 
196 Moyo v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 12 of 2007. 
197 Chirwa (2005) 233. The use of international law and jurisprudence from foreign jurisdictions is a common feature 
of most domestic courts, especially in the determination of human rights issues: see McCrudden (2003) 2. 
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courts must take into account, where applicable, international law and comparable foreign case 
law. Courts are also required to have regard to international human rights standards in 
determining whether a limitation to a right is justifiable.198 Courts can have recourse to 
international law standards, regardless of whether they are binding on or ratified by Malawi or 
not, including soft-law norms as contained in general comments, international declarations, and 
charters.199 In addition, courts may have regard to jurisprudence emerging from such 
instruments.200 The Constitution also stresses the application of international standards in prison-
related matters. Indeed, the Inspectorate of Prisons, which monitors the conditions, 
administration and general functioning of penal institutions,201 is enjoined to take „due account of 
applicable international standards‟ in the exercise of its powers.202 
This discussion clearly shows that the Constitution aims at establishing a criminal justice system 
that is consistent with international human rights. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that from 1891 to 1994 criminal law and punishment largely focussed on 
retribution and deterrence and were often used as political tools. Looking back at the colonial 
period, it can be said that for the most part, while some notable strides were subsequently made 
to establish a more humane framework for criminal justice in Malawi, little was done to protect 
the rights of offenders in as far as punishment was concerned. The forms of punishment were 
largely punitive in nature, save for where young offenders were treated with some leniency and 
subjected to rehabilitation-oriented punishment. The attainment of independence in 1964 did 
little to improve the criminal justice system. The human rights of accused persons, let alone 
                                                 
198 Section under section 44(1) of the Constitution. 
199 Chirwa (2005) 233. 
200 Chirwa (2011) 27. 
201 Section 169(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
202 See section 169(1) of the Constitution. 
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those of convicted prisoners, were neither given legal protection nor respected in practice. The 
government continued to apply colonial laws which were often amended to increase the severity 
of the applicable punishments.  
The 1994 Constitution heralds radical changes to the criminal justice system in general and to 
punishment in particular. It has several provisions that are relevant to the punishment of 
offenders including fundamental rights such as the rights to life, dignity and liberty and the 
prohibition of cruel and inhumane punishment. The domestication of international treaties such 
as the ICCPR augments the constitutional guarantees for accused and convicted persons. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Constitution has triggered significant law reform initiatives in 
the criminal justice system.  
The crucial question remains whether, over 20 years after its adoption, the promises of the 
Constitution concerning punishment have been fulfilled. In the next three chapters, the thesis 
considers this question by examining the forms and aims of punishment, and the early release 
system in Malawi. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE FORMS OF PUNISHMENT IN MALAWI 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has argued that the 1994 Constitution of Malawi envisages 
significant changes to punishment in Malawi and places certain restrictions on the forms 
of punishment. The study has also demonstrated that international standards endorse 
rehabilitation as the essential aim of punishment and also restricts the application of 
certain forms of punishment such as the death penalty and life imprisonment. The aim 
of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the forms of punishment in Malawi 
conform to the Constitution and international standards and to identify the aims of 
punishment that influence the imposition of the forms of punishment discussed. The 
discussion in this chapter is limited to a discussion of the following penalties listed in 
section 25 of the Penal Code:1 
a. Death 
b. Imprisonment: This may take three forms: periodic imprisonment; suspended 
imprisonment; preventive imprisonment; and life imprisonment. 
c. Financial penalties: These include fines; compensation; forfeiture 
d. Community/supervisory sentences: These include community service; police 
supervision; public work; attendance centre orders; and 
e. Orders in lieu of punishment: These include dismissal, discharge, probation, and 
binding over. 
                                                 
1 Section 25(a) to (p) of the Penal Code, Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi as amended by Penal Code 
Amendment Act 1 of 2011.  
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The main reason for selecting these punishments is that the Penal Code is the main 
penal statute in Malawi. The chapter will put more emphasis on the death penalty and 
imprisonment because, as stated in chapter one, the death penalty is the most severe 
punishment in Malawi while imprisonment is the most common form of punishment. 
Secondly death and imprisonment, particularly life and preventive sentences, raise 
constitutional concerns regarding the rights to life, liberty and the prohibition of cruel, 
inhumane or degrading punishment. The purpose for considering non-custodial 
penalties is to give a more rounded representation of the sentencing options and to note 
the new forms of punishment introduced after 1994. The chapter will therefore not 
dwell much on these penalties.  
The first part of this chapter describes the forms of punishment then the second 
analyses them against the Constitution and international standards. The chapter will first 
consider the death penalty before looking at imprisonment and non-custodial 
punishments. The discussion in this chapter reflects the position in Malawi as of 
September 2014 when research for this thesis was concluded. 
2 THE DEATH PENALTY 
2.1 Introduction 
There has been a de facto moratorium on executions in Malawi since 1992, effected at a 
time when the country was undergoing a political transition from one party rule to 
democracy. In 2000, the Malawi Law Commission (the Commission) made some 
recommendations regarding death sentences. For example, it recommended that all 
mandatory sentences including the death penalty for murder and treason should be 
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abolished.2 It also recommended that the procedure for executions must be uniform to 
avoid any abuse of the discretion and any „discrimination‟ in the execution of the death 
penalty.3 
Until 2007, death was a mandatory sentence for murder and treason. 200 mandatory 
death sentences were handed down between 1995 and 2007 for murder.4 However, by 
2007, 169 of these sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment.5 As of June 
2014, there were 29 prisoners on death row.6 Parliament had not yet considered the 
Commission‟s recommendations by the time the mandatory death penalty for murder 
was successfully challenged in 2007.7 When the Penal Code was finally amended in 
2011,8 most of the Commission‟s recommendations were adopted: murder now attracts 
a discretionary sentence of „death or imprisonment for life‟9 and all death sentences 
must be executed by hanging within the precincts of the prison in which an offender is 
                                                 
2 Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the Review of the Penal Code (2000) 21, hereafter 
Penal Code Review Report. This was in keeping with the Commission‟s recommendation in favour of 
retaining judicial discretion in sentencing for offences: see Penal Code Review Report 28. 
3 Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the Review of the Penal Code (2000) 21, hereafter 
Penal Code Review Report. See also section 27 of the Penal Code Amendment Bill, 1999. Similar 
recommendations were later made by the Commission in its report on the review of the CPEC: see 
Malawi Law Commission (2003) Report of the Law Commission on the Review of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Code 27, hereafter CPEC Review Report. 
4 Centre for International Human Rights (2010).  
5 Babcock and McLaughlin (2013) 182. 
6 United Nations Human Rights Committee „Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under 
article 40 of the Covenant‟ CCPR/C/MWI/Q/1/Add.2 (25 June 2014) para 15. It is unclear whether 
these prisoners are yet to be considered for commutation or the President has declined to commute their 
sentences. 
7 Kafantayeni and others v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 12 of 2005 (HC) (hereafter Kafantayeni). 
8 Penal Code Amendment Act No 1 of 2011. 
9 See section 210 of the Penal Code.  
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detained.10 However, the mandatory death sentence for treason was retained.11 This 
leaves treason by a civilian12 as the only offence that attracts a mandatory death sentence 
in Malawi. 
The following section considers the restrictions on the use of the death penalty before 
discussing the High Court‟s decision that struck down the mandatory death penalty for 
murder and the circumstances in which death is imposed. 
2.2 Restrictions on the death penalty 
There are a number of restrictions on the use of death sentences in Malawi. Firstly, it 
may only be imposed for 12 offences. The Penal Code has eight capital offences, namely 
treason, piracy, rape, genocide, robbery, burglary, housebreaking and murder.13 In 
addition, the Defence Force Act (DFA)14 prescribes death for aiding the enemy, 
communication with the enemy, mutiny, failure to suppress mutiny, treason and 
murder.15 From 1995, death sentences have only been passed for murder.16 Since a 
discretionary death sentence gives a court power to impose a lesser sentence including 
life imprisonment, it is peculiar that at present, with the exception of treason and 
                                                 
10 Section 26(1) of the Penal Code. 
11 See section 38 of the Penal Code. 
12 Treason attracts a discretionary death sentence under section 80(3) of Defence Force Act, Chapter 
12:01 of the Laws of Malawi, as amended by Act No 11 of 2004 (DFA). 
13 See sections 38, 63, 133, 209, 217A(2)(a), 301(2) and 309 of the Penal Code.  
14 Defence Force Act, Chapter 12:01 of the Laws of Malawi, as amended by Act No 11 of 2004. 
15 Section 34, 33, 40(1), 41 and 80(3) of the DFA. An attempt to commit a capital offence is punishable 
with „any greater punishment than imprisonment‟: see section 76 of the Act. 
16 The Advocates for Human Rights and World Coalition against the Death Penalty „Malawi: 22nd Session 
of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review - United Nations Human Rights Council, April 
2015 -May 2015‟ (September 2014) para 3. 
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mutiny,17 all capital crimes are punishable with „death or imprisonment for life‟.18 It 
appears that the reason for this is to ensure that life imprisonment is also available to 
offenders convicted of these crimes.19 As explained further below,20 the absence of 
statutory or judicial guidance as to when murder should attract death and when it should 
attract life raises some perturbing anomalies. 
The second restriction relates to the categories of offenders who may be sentenced to 
death. The law states that persons who are mentally ill are not criminally responsible for 
the actions21 and that in cases of diminished responsibility, a conviction of manslaughter 
and not murder must be recorded. In the latter scenario, an offender would only face a 
maximum of life imprisonment.22 Additionally, section 72(2) of the Prisons Act23 
stipulates that where an offender is „adjudged to be a mentally disordered or defective 
person‟ while on death row and his „sentence has not, at the time he is certified to be of 
sound mind, been commuted to a term of imprisonment, the Minister24 shall report the 
matter to the President‟. This is obviously done so that the President considers the 
offender concerned for mercy.  
                                                 
17 Mutiny is punishable with „death or any other punishment‟ under section 40(1) of the DFA. 
18 See sections 38(1) and 210 of the Penal Code. See also section 33(1), 34(1), 40(1), 41(a) and 80(3)(a) of 
the DFA. 
19 See CPEC Review Report 157. 
20 See section 2.4.2 below. 
21 Section 12 of the Penal Code. 
22 Section 214A of the Penal Code. The onus is on the state to show that that an offender satisfies the 
requirements for diminished responsibility and is therefore entitled to a conviction of manslaughter: see 
section 214A(2). 
23 Chapter 9:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
24 This refers to the Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security under whose ministry the Malawi 
Prisons Service falls. 
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The law also excludes the imposition of death sentences on pregnant women25 and on 
persons who were under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence.26 
In the latter case, section 26(2) of the Penal Code states that an offender should be 
sentenced to detention at the pleasure of the President on the advice of the Board of 
Visitors appointed under the Children and Young Persons Act (CYPA).27 With respect 
to pregnant offenders convicted of a capital offence, a court „shall‟ sentence her to life 
imprisonment „instead of‟ death.28 Section 327(1) of the CPEC requires that in all cases 
where a woman is convicted of a capital offence, a court must inquire as to whether she 
is pregnant. If the offender responds in the affirmative or the court „thinks it fit to 
order‟, pregnancy must be proved or disproved through evidence.29 Section 327(3) 
creates a rebuttable presumption against pregnancy which may only be overcome when 
the fact of pregnancy „is proved affirmatively to [the court‟s] satisfaction‟. A finding that 
a woman is not pregnant may be challenged on appeal and the court must set aside the 
death penalty and pass a sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with section 
327(4) of the CPEC.  
The third restriction on the death penalty in Malawi relates to procedural safeguards, 
including the right to a fair trial, which must be adhered to before and after the 
                                                 
25 Section 26(4) of the Penal Code; sections 328 of the CPEC. 
26 See sections 26(2) of the Penal Code and section 141 of the Child Care, Protection and Justice Act 22 
of 2010 (CCPJA). 
27 Children and Young Persons Act, Chapter 26:03 of the Laws of Malawi. This statute has since been 
repealed by the CCPJA. The reference to the CYPA in section 26(2) of the Penal Code should therefore 
have been made to the Child Case Review Board established under Part VII of the CCPJA. Section 141(1) 
of the CCPJA mandates this Board to make recommendations to the President on the release of child 
offenders. 
28 Section 26(4) of the Penal Code. See also sections 327(4) and 328 of the CPEC. 
29 Sections 327(2) and (3) of the CPEC. 
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imposition of the death penalty. As stated in the previous chapter, the death penalty has 
constitutional recognition through section 16 of the Constitution which states that the 
execution of the death penalty does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of life. This 
is subject to the condition that the penalty is imposed by a competent court following a 
conviction of an offence under Malawian law.30 As noted in chapter four,31 detained and 
sentenced prisoners are entitled to a wide constellation of rights including legal aid, 
detention in humane conditions that are consistent with human dignity, and appeal.  
The last restriction on death sentences is that an execution may only be performed on 
the authority of an execution warrant signed by the President. Section 326 of the CPEC 
requires that every case in which a death sentence is imposed must be sent to the 
President for consideration for mercy under section 89(2) of the Constitution.32 The 
judge must forward the court record and his recommendations or observations 
regarding the case to the President „[a]s soon as conveniently may be‟ after the sentence 
has been passed.33 In response, the President must issue a death warrant, commute the 
sentence or grant a pardon.34 In the case of a pardon, the pardon should specify whether 
it is free or conditional.35 This procedure ensures that all prisoners on death row are 
considered for mercy.  
                                                 
30 Section 16 of the Constitution. 
31 See section 4.2 of chapter four. 
32 See section 326 of the Penal Code. 
33 Section 326(1) of the CPEC. 
34 Section 326(3) of the CPEC.  
35 Section 326(6) of the CPEC. 
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While there is no general automatic right to appeal a death sentence, offenders 
sentenced to death under the DFA have an automatic right to appeal the sentence.36 
Further, execution of such offenders may only take place with the approval of the 
President.37 In other words, the President must exercise his prerogative of mercy in 
relation to death sentences imposed under the DFA. However, the right to appeal and 
approval by the President are inapplicable where death is imposed on an active member 
of the Defence Force and the Defence Council confirms and certifies that „it is essential 
in the interests of discipline and for the purposes of securing the safety of the [Defence] 
Force … that the sentence should be carried out forthwith‟.38 
Overall, Malawian law ensures that the application of the death penalty is restricted. As 
explained in chapter three, restrictions on death sentences are part of a global trend 
towards the abolition of the death penalty. Unfortunately, „Malawi has no intentions and 
immediate plans‟39 to abolish the death penalty or ratify the Second Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.40 The country has also 
rejected calls to put in place a de jure moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its 
final abolition.41 The official reason for retaining the death penalty is public opinion.42 
                                                 
36 Section 150 of the DFA. 
37 Section 112 of the DFA. The President has a general power to review findings and sentences of courts-
martial: see section 113 of the DFA. 
38 See the proviso to section 150 of the DFA.  
39 United Nations Human Rights Committee (2012) para 18. See also United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (2014) para 14. 
40 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1642 UNTS 414, 15 December 1989. 
41 See Malawi Human Rights Commission (2013) 1; Malawi Human rights Commission (2014) 30; Human 
Rights Council (2011) para 105.  
42 See United Nations Human Rights Committee (2012) para 18: „Section 8 of the Constitution stipulates 
that the legislature when enacting laws shall reflect, in its deliberations, the interests of all the people of 
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On a positive note, Malawi has made some strides towards abolition, most notably the 
de facto moratorium on executions which has been observed for almost two decades 
now and the ground-breaking ruling that the mandatory death penalty is 
unconstitutional in 2007.  
2.3 The demise of the mandatory death penalty 
Until 2007, Malawi prescribed mandatory death sentences in cases of murder and 
treason. In practice, courts were often hesitant to enter pleas of guilt for murder charges 
because of the automatic death sentence applicable.43 In Kafantayeni v Attorney General,44 
the High Court had to determine the constitutionality of the mandatory imposition of 
the death penalty in murder cases as provided in section 210 of the Penal Code. The six 
petitioners premised the challenge on the grounds that the mandatory death penalty: a) 
amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of section 16 of the 
Constitution; b) was inhuman and degrading in violation of section 19(3) of the 
Constitution; c) violated the right to a fair trial by denying judicial discretion in 
sentencing; and d) violated the principle of separation of powers.45 
In its determination, the court observed that while the death penalty is sanctioned by 
section 16 of the Constitution in the proviso to the right to life, it did not save its 
mandatory requirement.46 With regard to the ground that the mandatory death penalty 
for murder amounted to inhuman and degrading punishment, the High Court stated 
                                                                                                                                          
Malawi and shall further the values explicit and implicit in the Constitution. Malawi will continue to listen 
to the voices of its people regarding the issue of death penalty‟. 
43 See Rollin (2003) 5.  
44 Kafantayeni v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 12 of 2005 (HC), hereafter Kafantayeni. 
45 See sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Constitution. 
46 Kafantayeni, 6. 
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that proportionality is a relevant factor in deciding whether a punishment is cruel, 
inhuman and degrading.47 Citing with approval the dictum of Bryon CJ in Reyes v The 
Queen,48 the court said:49 
The issue here is whether it is inhuman to impose a sentence of death without considering 
mitigating circumstances of the commission of the offence and the offender; whether the dignity 
of humanity is ignored if this final and irrevocable sentence is imposed without the individual 
having any chance to mitigate; whether the lawful punishment of death should only be imposed 
after there is a judicial consideration of the mitigating factors relative to the offence itself and the 
offender. 
The court further noted that because there may be varying degrees of factors such as 
criminal culpability, participation, and heinousness, not all murders are the same and 
therefore it is not proper to impose the same punishment for all murders. The court 
reasoned that the mandatory death penalty violated the right to human dignity as it 
precluded a court from considering the personal circumstances of the offender and the 
circumstances of the offence.50 Applying section 19(2) of the Constitution,51 the court 
held that the right to human dignity requires that a court must consider the 
circumstances of the offence and the offender before a death sentence can be 
imposed.52 Thus, the court held that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional 
because it did not allow for the consideration of the personal circumstances of the 
offence and the offender: 
                                                 
47 Kafantayeni, 11, quoting Chaskalson JP in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 94.  
48 Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, 249. 
49 Kafantayeni, 11. 
50 Kafantayeni, 9-11. 
51 Section 19(2) states: In any judicial proceedings or in any other proceedings before any organ of the 
State, and during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity shall be guaranteed. 
52 Kafantayeni, 10.  
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[A] sentencing regime which imposes a mandatory sentence of death on all murderers, or 
murderers within specified categories, is inhuman and degrading because it requires sentence of 
death, with all the consequences such a sentence must have for the individual defendant, to be 
passed without any opportunity for the defendant to show why such sentence should be 
mitigated, without any consideration of the detailed facts of the particular case or the personal 
history and circumstances of the offender and in cases where such a sentence might be wholly 
disproportionate to the defendant‟s criminal culpability.53 
Relating to the right to a fair trial, the court affirmed that this right extends to 
sentencing and thus „the principle of “fair trial” requires fairness of the trial at all stages 
of the trial including sentencing‟.54 The court conceded the contention of the applicants 
that section 210 stifled the sentencing jurisdiction of a court because it in essence 
prohibited a court from passing a sentence and limited its power to the determination of 
the guilt or innocence of an offender. The court therefore found that the mandatory 
death sentence violated the right to a fair trial in that it was inconsistent with the right to 
appeal and review of a sentence by a higher court.55 In addition, section 210 was held to 
unjustifiably infringe the right of access to justice.56 
The court therefore found that section 210 was unconstitutional to the extent of the 
„mandatory requirement for the death sentence for the offence of murder‟ and ordered 
that the applicants must be brought before the trial court for „proper‟ sentencing.57 The 
court was quick to point out that it did not outlaw the death penalty per se.58 
                                                 
53 Kafantayeni, 7-8, citing Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, 247. 
54 Kafantayeni, 13. 
55 Kafantayeni, 13.  
56 Section 41(2) reads: „Every person shall have access to any court of law or any other tribunal with 
jurisdiction for final settlement of legal disputes‟. 
57 Kafantayeni, 15. 
58 Kafantayeni, 15. 
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Kafantayeni has been approved by the MSCA in several decisions.59 It is a landmark 
decision for sentencing policy in Malawi. It is a good example of the impact of the Bill 
of Rights on punishment. Kafantayeni reiterates that constitutional values should be 
respected in the imposition of punishment. Courts have a duty, flowing from the 
prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and the 
right to dignity, to mete out sentences that are proportional to the offence.60  
Kafantayeni is also an affirmation of the court‟s authority in the area of sentencing and 
reflects the judiciary‟s opposition to mandatory sentences in general. Kafantayeni is 
therefore significant for mandatory sentences in general.61 It is worth noting in this 
regard that Malawi has had a fair share of mandatory sentences. Previously, the law 
provided for mandatory sentences for the offences of murder, treason,62 armed 
robbery,63 burglary,64 rape,65 theft by servant and theft by public servant.66 By 1994, only 
murder, treason and theft by public servant retained mandatory sentences. In 1995, 
mandatory minimum sentences were introduced for official corruption67 and other 
                                                 
59 See, for instance, Namizinga v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007; Jacob v Rep Criminal Appeal 
No 16 of 2006 Manda v Rep Criminal Appeal No 15 of 2007; Thife v Rep Criminal Appeal No 19 of 2007; 
Alumeta v Rep Criminal Appeal No 31 of 2001; Namboya v Rep Criminal Appeal No 14 of 2005; Ngulube and 
another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 35 of 2006; Khovwa v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 6 of 2007; Uladi v 
Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 5 of 2008; Khwalala v Rep Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2008. The call for 
resentencing hearings was also made in Yasin v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 25 of 2005.  
60 See Nkhata (2007)110.  
61 See Nkhata (2007)109. 
62 Section 38 of the Penal Code. 
63 Section 301 of the Penal Code prescribed a mandatory death penalty. 
64 Section 133 of the Penal Code. 
65 Section 309 of the Penal Code.  
66 Section 283(4) of the Penal Code. For a detailed discussion of the mandatory sentences for this offence, 
see Ng‟ongola (1988). 
67 See sections 90, 91 and 92 of the Penal Code as amended by Penal Code Amendment Act 21 of 1995. 
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corrupt practices68 but were later abandoned in 200469 and 201170 respectively upon 
recommendation of the Law Commission.71 At present, only treason and theft by public 
servant72 attract mandatory sentences. 
The usual justification for mandatory sentences remains prevalence of the offence and 
deterrence.73 The mandatory sentences for theft by public servant are the most 
frequently applied. They were first prescribed in the form of a scale introduced in 197374 
and last revised in 199675 which stated minimum prison sentences for specified amounts 
of money stolen subject to maximum of life imprisonment.76 The minimum sentences 
could only be departed from if the accused made full and voluntary restitution or the 
amount stolen was below K500.77 Courts have long expressed opposition to the 
mandatory sentences for theft by public servant from as early as 1975.78 The main 
criticism was that the mandatory sentences resulted in heavier punishment than that 
                                                 
68 See section 34 of the Corrupt Practices Act 18 of 1995. 
69 See sections 56-58 of the Penal Code Amendment Act 1 of 2011. 
70 See section 17 of the Corrupt Practices Act 17 of 2004. 
71 See Penal Code Review Report 34; section 58 of the Penal Code Amendment Bill, 2009. 
72 The mandatory sentences were prescribed in the form of a scale which stated minimum prison 
sentences for specified amounts of Act 21 of 1996. 
73 See for instance Msowoya (2006) 66, who notes that prevalence of corrupt practices was the basis for 
mandatory sentences in the Corrupt Practices Act; Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission 
on the Review of the Corrupt Practices Act (2002) 6. 
74 Penal Code Amendment Act 20 of 1973. 
75 See section 286(4) as amended by Penal Code Amendment Act 21 of 1996. 
76 Section 283(5) of the Penal Code as amended by Penal Code Amendment Act 21 of 1996. 
77 Section 283(4).See for instance Rep v Foster Confirmation Case No 1690 of 2005. See also Rep v Tembo 
Confirmation Case No 187 of 2013. 
78 Ng‟ongola (1988) 85-87. In some cases, courts would acquit accused persons in order to evade the 
mandatory sentences: see Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the Review of the Corrupt 
Practices Act (2002) 36.  
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warranted by the offence79 and were unduly oppressive in light of depreciation of the 
Malawian currency.80 In Rep v Kotamu,81 it was held, obiter, that the sentences were 
excessive and „even with the best of intentions, could be degrading, cruel and inhuman 
treatment or punishment‟.82 In Rep v Mussa,83 the High Court, on its own motion, 
applied the reasoning in Kafantayeni and held that mandatory sentences for theft by 
public servant prescribed in section 283(4) of the Penal Code were arbitrary at law and 
therefore unconstitutional. However, this decision was later overruled on appeal.84 
The MSCA held that Kafantayeni was limited to the mandatory death penalty and could 
not be extended to other mandatory penalties under the Penal Code.85 It can be argued 
that the MSCA failed to correctly apply the underlying principles advanced in Kafantayeni 
and affirmed by the MSCA in several decisions. The reasons given by the High Court 
for declaring the mandatory death sentence unconstitutional apply to mandatory 
sentences in general. While the court emphasised the irrevocable nature of the death 
penalty, its reasoning easily transcends this limitation. The court stressed that 
proportionality and the individuation of punishment are integral elements of acceptable 
punishment that complies with the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment. The court also endorsed the centrality of proportionality to this 
prohibition. The bottom line in Kafantayeni is that offenders must be afforded a chance 
                                                 
79 See for instance Mkomba v Rep Criminal Appeal No 121 of 1975.  
80 See Mkata v Rep Criminal Appeal No 10 of 1995, cited in Chirwa (2011) 136. 
81 Rep v Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012. 
82 Rep v Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012, 4. The court made the comments in the process of 
issuing sentencing guidelines for offences involving dishonesty. Although the court inadvertently cited 
section 283(4) as it read before its amendment in 2010, the comments cannot be faulted. 
83 Rep v Mussa Criminal Appeal No 43 of 2009 (hereafter Mussa). 
84 Mussa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 2 of 2011.  
85 Mussa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 2 of 2011, 8. 
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to present mitigating evidence during sentencing and that courts must retain sentencing 
discretion.  
It can hardly be said that these principles are only applicable to the mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty. Indeed, in striking down the mandatory death sentence 
for murder in Kenya, the Supreme Court of Appeal doubted if different arguments 
could be sustained in respect of mandatory sentences for other capital offences.86 In 
Uganda, the court struck down all mandatory death sentences.87 The decision in Mussa 
indicates a wholly retributive and deterrent approach to sentencing which is a setback to 
the progressive jurisprudence embodied in Kafantayeni. The sentencing scale for theft by 
public servant was finally abandoned in 2011 only to be replaced with a general 
minimum sentence of two years imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment.88 
In the light of Kafantayeni, not even the mandatory death penalty for treason can pass 
constitutional muster.89 
Kafantayeni is also significant in as far as theories of punishment are concerned. As 
explained in chapter two, retribution emphasises punishment as just deserts while 
                                                 
86 See Mutiso v R Criminal Appeal 17 of 2008 (30 July 2010) (Kenya Court of Appeal). See also Gichane v R 
Criminal Appeal No 277 of 2007 (abolishing the mandatory death penalty for attempted robbery with 
violence in Kenya). 
87 See Attorney-General v Kigula [2009] UGSC 6 (Constitutional Appeal No 6 of 2003). 
88 See section 283(4) of the Penal Code as amended by Penal Code Amendment Act 1 of 2011. This 
amendment had already been passed by the time the MSCA made its ruling. It is unclear why the court 
did not take cognisance of this fact. The old section 283(4) was also applied in the 2013 case of Rep v Isaac 
Moyo and 10 Others Criminal Case No 2 of 2011, 6-7 where a series of 14 year sentences were imposed. 
The new penal provision is more punitive than its predecessor because it makes no provision for 
departure in any circumstances. The minimum sentence of two years is applicable without exception in 
respect of petty amounts of money stolen or full restitution. 
89 Cf United Nations Human Rights Committee (2014) para 19. 
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deterrence focusses on how punishment acts as a deterrent to future criminality.90 It was 
pointed out in that chapter that one of the major problems with both retribution and 
deterrence is that these theories do not consider social and other factors that influence 
criminal behaviour.91 Further, the chapter noted that deterrence is the main justification 
for mandatory sentences.92 Indeed, as stated in chapter four, the main justification for 
the mandatory death penalty in Malawi was retribution and deterrence.93 It can be 
observed then that by striking down the mandatory death penalty and highlighting the 
importance of proportionality in sentencing, Kafantayeni moves away from a wholly 
retributive or deterrent justification for punishment. 
Lastly, Kafantayeni is a crucial step towards the abolition of the death penalty in Malawi. 
Between 1995 and 2007, all death sentences were imposed as a result of their mandatory 
imposition in murder cases. Kafantayeni was the only basis for not imposing mandatory 
sentences for murder between 2007 and 2011. After Kafantayeni, the High Court has only 
imposed one death sentence.94 This indicates that courts have been reluctant to impose 
death sentences for any of the other capital crimes. In some cases, judges have 
expressed their opposition to the death penalty and rejected it altogether on the basis 
that it is a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.95 In Rep v Sukali and another,96 
Mwase J held that death would not be appropriate even where the murder „was the most 
heinous, barbaric, brutal, cruel act that [went] against the civility of mankind ... To repay 
                                                 
90 See sections 2.1 and 3.3 of chapter two. 
91 See section 2.2 and 3.3..2 of chapter two. 
92 See section 3.3.2 of chapter two. 
93 See section 2.2.1 of chapter four. 
94 The MSCA has upheld 13 death sentences imposed under the mandatory death penalty regime: see The 
Advocates for Human Rights and World Coalition against the Death Penalty (2014) para 13 
95 See for instance Rep v Sukali and another Criminal Appeal No 21 of 2011. 
96 Rep v Sukali and another Criminal Appeal No 21 of 2011. 
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life for life would mean two lives lost. Death as it were is cruel, degrading and inhuman 
punishment‟.97 
Kafantayeni entitled over 180 prisoners to resentencing hearings. Research indicates that 
most of the prisoners on death row have spent over 15 years in prison and their cases 
have potentially mitigating factors such as provocation, diminished capacity, capacity to 
reform and lack of criminal records which may tilt their sentences against the death 
penalty.98 However, there have been unreasonable delays in the resentencing process. 
Over seven years later, five of the petitioners in Kafantayeni have not been resentenced.99 
It was not until February 2014 that the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC) in 
conjunction with the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and Legal Aid Bureau 
embarked on a project to commence resentencing hearings.100 As of September 2014, 
only one person had been granted a resentencing hearing by the High Court while the 
MSCA had upheld 13 of the 18 death sentences it has reviewed on appeal.101 
Another issue relates to the position of the 169 prisoners whose death sentences had 
already been commuted to life at the time Kafantayeni was decided. These prisoners are 
also entitled to resentencing hearings because the commutations were based on an 
unconstitutionally imposed death sentence.102 The fall of the mandatory death penalty 
                                                 
97 See also Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 6, noting that Namibia has 
„justifiably‟ abolished the death penalty; Rep v Cheuka and others Criminal Case No 73 of 2008, 51, stating 
that the proviso to section 16 permitting the death sentence as limitation to the right to life was outlawed 
in Kafantayeni made it „clear that the right to life is inviolable‟! 
98 Babcock and McLaughlin (2013) 182. 
99 The Advocates for Human Rights and World Coalition against the Death Penalty (2014) para 13. 
100 United Nations Human Rights Committee (2014) para 15; Malawi Human Rights Commission (2013) 
47. 
101 The Advocates for Human Rights and World Coalition against the Death Penalty (2014) para 13. 
102 Cf Obuoka v R Criminal Appeal No 164 of 2000 (KSC). 
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has prompted courts to look more closely at the circumstances in which death may be 
imposed. There have been several cases in which murder has been punished with fixed 
prison sentences.  
2.4 Circumstances justifying the death penalty 
2.4.1 Guidance from case law 
In practice, the death penalty is only imposed in murder cases.103 Since Kafantayeni, 
courts are generally wary of imposing death sentences. As of June 2014, there were 29 
offenders (all male) on death row, out of which only one offender has been sentenced 
to death after Kafantayeni.104 In keeping with the general principle that maximum 
penalties must only be imposed for the worst instance of a crime,105 courts have 
repeatedly stressed that the death penalty must be reserved for the worst cases of 
murder. For example, Rep v Malizani106 held that death for murder is only justified if an 
offender „fits into the exceptions that come into play when a maximum sentence must 
be imposed‟.107  According to Rep v Mulinganiza and another108 murder should be punished 
with a death sentence „only in rare, very rare circumstances‟ and that the onus is on the 
prosecution to justify its imposition. The court essentially held that there is a rebuttable 
                                                 
103 There have been no treason convictions in Malawi since 1994. 
104 See United Nations Human Rights Committee (2014) para 15. This assertion is only correct if taken to 
mean cases in which the High Court has actually imposed a death sentence and not to include cases in 
which the MSCA has upheld death sentences imposed before 2007.     
105 See Ayami v Rep [1990] 13 MLR 19; Chikakuda and others v Rep [1997] 2 MLR 288 (HC) 293-294; Rep v 
Chimeto and others Confirmation Case No 919 of 1997. 
106 Rep v Malizani Criminal Case No 219 of 2010, 5. 
107 See also Jacob v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2006; Rep v Matimati Criminal Case No 18 of 
2007; Ngulube and another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 35 of 2006 MSCA; Rep v Masula and others Criminal 
Case No 62 of 2008; Uladi v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 5 of 2008. 
108 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 4 (hereafter Mulinganiza). 
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presumption in favour of life. This position is impressive because it recognises that an 
offender remains entitled to the right to life and that there is a presumption against the 
death penalty. Unfortunately, this standard is not observed in imposing the death 
penalty, more so since the courts do not often pay attention to the burden of proof 
during sentencing.  
In Chimenya v Rep,109 the MSCA stated that „courts will certainly wait for appropriate 
circumstances before imposing the death penalty‟.110 It emphasised that it would be 
undesirable to have an „assemblage of factual particulars‟ that will justify the imposition 
of death because each case must be determined on its own facts and that even in similar 
cases, the appropriate sentence may differ „depending on the situation of the offender, 
the victim and the community at large‟.111 The court held that the relevant factors to 
consider include „the manner in which the murder was committed, the means used to 
commit the offence, the personal circumstance of the victim, the personal 
circumstances of the accused and what might have motivated in the commission of the 
crime‟.112 Citing with approval the case of Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh,113 the MSCA 
held that the death penalty must only be imposed  
for special reasons which have direct nexus with the necessity for hanging the murderer by law 
… [T]hat one stroke of murder hardly qualifies for this drastic requirement, however gruesome 
the killing or pathetic the situation, unless the inherent testimony oozing from … the murderous 
appetite of the convict is too chronic and deadly that ordered life in a given locality or society or 
                                                 
109 Chimenya v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 8 of 2006 (hereafter Chimenya). 
110 Chimenya, 4. 
111 Chimenya, 4-5. 
112 Chimenya, 5. 
113 Prasad v State of U-ttar Pradesh (1979) AIR 916 (SC). 
135 
in prison itself would be gone if this man were now or later to be at large. If he is an 
irredeemable murderer, like a blood thirsty tiger, he is to quit his territorial tenancy.
114
 
This provides authority for the principle that the gravity of a murder cannot in itself 
justify a death sentence. In addition, the possibility of reform, and the adequacy of a 
fixed sentence and life imprisonment must all seriously be considered before death is 
imposed. Ultimately, the passage indicates that community protection should be the 
justification for a death sentence; that is, death would be justified if the offender is „an 
irredeemable murderer‟ who cannot ever safely be released into the community or kept 
in prison. This test establishes a high standard for the imposition of the death penalty 
because community protection can be ensured through life imprisonment.115 However, 
courts are yet to establish a test for determining the capacity for reform116 and the test 
established in Chimenya is not adhered to in sentencing.  
Indeed, even in Chimenya, the MSCA did not apply its own test. In casu, there were 
frequent illnesses and deaths in the accused‟s family. The accused then consulted about 
15 witchdoctors who all informed him that the deceased, his elderly aunt, was 
responsible for all the illnesses and deaths. He then bought a gun and shot the deceased. 
The court found that the accused „probably was motivated by his wild belief that the lady 
was a witch‟ but that „this belief was not available to [him] as a mitigating factor‟.117 It 
concluded that the accused deserved the death penalty because he had planned his crime 
and had killed an unsuspecting old woman „in cold blood and in the most brutal 
                                                 
114 Chimenya, 4. 
115 See Trimingham v The Queen Privy Council Appeal No 67 of 2007, para 23, holding that execution is not 
necessary to remove an offender from society since life imprisonment can achieve the same objective. 
116 See section 3.4.3 below. 
117 Chimenya, 5. Emphasis added. 
136 
circumstances‟.118 This finding does not accord with the test explained earlier. For 
instance, the accused could hardly be described as „an irredeemable murderer‟ such that 
society would not be protected from him through imprisonment. The accused was a 
first offender and his character was not questioned. These circumstances should have 
militated against a death sentence because they point to the prospect of rehabilitation.119 
Moreover, the murder was clearly motivated by his belief in witchcraft, a factor which 
indicated that the offender was not a hardened criminal.  
Courts have at times proffered reasons for the death penalty that strongly suggest an „an 
eye for an eye‟ approach. For instance, the MSCA in Khoviwa v Rep120 upheld the death 
sentence because the appellant and his accomplice „had assaulted and stabbed a 
defenceless person who was fleeing the scene of a fight to save himself from trouble. 
The appellant and his accomplice did not want to give the deceased a chance to live. His 
conduct on the material day was inexcusable‟.121 There was no mention of the 
circumstances of the accused. In Chinkango v Rep,122 the court also upheld the death 
penalty on the basis that the accused „appears to be a violent and evil person‟ and 
therefore did not deserve leniency.123 
In general, murder has been punished with death where the killing was brutal, gruesome, 
or committed in cold blood;124 unprovoked;125 for outrageous motives such as the 
                                                 
118 Chimenya, 5. 
119 See Rep v Glasten Criminal Case No 104 of 2008, 6. 
120 Khoviwa v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 6 of 2007, 3. 
121 Khoviwa v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 6 of 2007, 3. 
122 Chinkango v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2009. 
123 Chinkango v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2009, 7. 
124 Jacob v Rep Criminal Appeal No 16 of 2006 (MSCA); Manda v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 15 of 
2007 (MSCA); Mawondo v Rep MSCA Criminal Case No 8 of 2008. 
125 Khwalala v Rep Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2008. 
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removal of body parts;126 committed during or to facilitate a felony.127 In Khwalala v 
Rep,128 the accused, described as a „hardened criminal‟,129 was sentenced to death for 
murdering a fellow prisoner while serving a sentence of death.  
In other cases, however, courts have demonstrated a mitigated approach to death 
sentences where imprisonment has been imposed even though the murder was 
committed in a gruesome and brutal manner. In Rep v Matimati,130 the defendants were 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of two victims who had been hacked to 
death and one of the bodies burnt. Similarly, in Rep v Masula and others,131 the court 
refrained from imposing the death penalty although the murders were planned, 
„unprovoked‟, „senseless‟, and committed in concert and in the course of committing 
felonies. Similarly, in State v Silumbu and others,132 the accused killed the deceased and sold 
his skin for witchcraft rituals. He was sentenced to 30 years for the murder. 
Imprisonment has also been imposed where the murder was committed during an 
argument. 
Courts have also found the absence of a dangerous weapon as a mitigating factor.133 In 
Rep v Tembo,134 15 years were imposed for the murder of the deceased using a panga 
                                                 
126 Thife v Rep MSCA Criminal appeal Case No 19 of 2007. 
127 Alumeta v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal Case No 46 of 2002; Mawondo v Rep MSCA Criminal Case No 8 
of 2008. 
128 Khwalala v Rep Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2008. 
129 Khwalala v Rep Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2008, 3. 
130 Rep v Matimati Criminal Case No 18 of 2007. 
131 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008. 
132 See for instance State v Silumbu and others Criminal Case No 39 of 2009. 
133 See for instance Uladi v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 5 of 2008. 
134 See for instance Rep v Tembo Criminal Case No 12 of 2008. 
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knife during an argument. In State v Namwayi,135 the accused was sentenced to 12 years 
for the murder of her husband using a sickle following family disputes. In Ngulube and 
another v Rep,136 the MSCA set aside the death penalty and imposed 20 years for murder. 
The court found it mitigating that the killing occurred after a quarrel influenced by 
alcohol; the weapon used was not a dangerous one; the accused no criminal record and 
there was no evidence of bad character; there was no clear motive; and the severity of 
the injuries could not be determined.137 In Rep v Mwenendeka,138 the court imposed 15 
years for the murder of the deceased who had died as a result of a concoction made and 
administered by the accused as part of a witch-hunting exercise.  
Other grounds that have been found mitigating include poor health,139 youth140  and the 
lack of a criminal record.141 In Rep v Malizani,142 a 35 year old first offender was 
sentenced to 27 years for murder. In Namizinga and another v Rep,143 the accused was 
sentenced to 25 years for the murder of a security guard whom he gagged and tied him 
up in order to facilitate a burglary. The MSCA noted that although the offence had been 
committed in concert and in the course of committing a felony, the offender was a 
young (22 years) and first offender who had pleaded guilty to the offence. Another 
mitigating factor was that the accused were „heedless of the possibility of actually killing 
                                                 
135 State v Namwayi Criminal Case No 12 of 2009. 
136 Ngulube and another v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 35 of 2006. 
137 The deceased died two days after the incident. 
138 Rep v Mwenendeka Criminal Case Number 17 of 2009. 
139 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010. 
140 Namizinga and another v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007. 
141 Ngulube and another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 35 of 2006; Namboya v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 14 
of 2005; Rep v Ganizani and another Criminal Appeal No 261 of 2010. 
142 Rep v Malizani Criminal Case No 219 of 2010. 
143 Namizinga and another v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007. 
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the deceased‟ as „their minds were focussed on the burglary‟.144 The court found that 
these „circumstances could not be described as the worst and deserving of the maximum 
penalty‟.145 Accordingly, the death sentence was substituted with a 25 year sentence.146  
The emotional state of an offender may also be a favourable factor. In Namboya v Rep,147 
death was reduced to 15 years. The appellant was frustrated with the harassment she 
was suffering at the hands of her ex-husband and father of one of her children. The ex-
husband often came to the appellant‟s home and took away property. One night, he 
took away almost all her property. The appellant, convinced that she was being harassed 
because of the child she had with her ex-husband, then resolved to kill the child by 
administering an insecticide. Writing on behalf of the court, Nyirenda JA strongly 
condemned the appellant‟s actions then remarked: 
However, we do not [entirely] ignore the oppression that the poor woman was going through … 
[T]he appellant is a first offender and she is a fairly young lady. She was only 28 years old at the 
time she committed the offence.148 
Other cases have advocated for a more stringent approach to circumstances justifying 
the death penalty. In Mulinganiza, Kamwambe J held that in murder cases, „courts should 
be more inclined to impose a life sentence … than [a] death sentence unless the state 
                                                 
144 Namizinga and another v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007, 3. The remarks of the court 
regarding the intention of the accused suggest that the proper offence should have been that of 
manslaughter and not murder. 
145 Namizinga and another v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007. 
146 See Namizinga and another v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007. 
147 Namboya v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 14 of 2005. 
148 Namboya v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 14 of 2005 (SCA) 4. 
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convinces the court otherwise‟.149 This position partly reflects the settled sentencing 
practice that where there are two alternative penalties, a court must impose the lighter 
sentence unless there are reasons for the heavier one to be imposed. However, in the 
absence of proper sentencing guidelines as to when death is a justifiable sentence, it is 
quite vague to restrict death sentences to cases where the state has convinced the court 
that a case calls for the death penalty. The real question is: what circumstances should 
convince a court that an offender deserves the death penalty? On another note, 
Mulinganiza reflects a purely retributive approach to sentencing which, as discussed in 
chapter two, is undesirable. Further, contrary to section 210 of the Penal Code, it 
suggests a mandatory life sentence for murder which would be unconstitutional. 
Mulinganiza is a classic example of the problems with prescribing death and life as 
alternative sentences. 
2.4.2 The problem with alternative death and life sentences 
It is important to stress that, with the exception of treason, all other capital offences are 
punishable with „death or imprisonment for life‟. This means that they are both capital 
and non-capital offences. However, the law does not stipulate the circumstances in 
which the same offence may be a capital or non-capital crime; it simply provides for 
death or life imprisonment in the alternative. In other words, there is no guidance as to 
when the same offence should be considered a capital crime and when it should be seen 
                                                 
149 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 5. Cf Rep v Sukali and another Criminal 
Appeal No 21 of 2011: „The appropriate sentence for the worst form of murder would be a life sentence 
with possibility of … release‟. 
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as attracting a maximum of life imprisonment. Robbery, for instance, attracts 14 years.150 
However, it will attract „death or imprisonment for life‟ 
[i]f the offender is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument, or is in 
company with one or more other person or persons, or if, at or immediately before or 
immediately after the time of the robbery, he wounds, beats, strikes, or uses any other personal 
violence to any person.151 
While this provision specifies the circumstances in which robbery attracts death or life 
imprisonment, it falls short of distinguishing capital from non-capital robbery, let alone 
the circumstances in which robbery should attract life imprisonment. The same can be 
said of genocide152 and all other capital crimes under the Penal Code. The DFA does not 
fare any better. For instance, failure to suppress mutiny is punishable with life 
imprisonment153 but attracts „death or life imprisonment‟ if it „was committed with 
intent to assist the enemy‟.154 Similarly, communication with the enemy is punishable 
with life imprisonment if committed „without authority‟155 but where „it is committed 
„with intent to assist the enemy‟, an offender is liable to „death or life.156  
The lack of clarification in the penal provisions for capital crimes can be contrasted with 
several provisions which provide different penalties for the same offence depending on 
the circumstances in which the offence is committed. Theft provides a good example. It 
                                                 
150 Section 301(1) of the Penal Code. 
151 Section 301(2) of the Penal Code. 
152 Genocide attracts 21 years but is punishable with death or life imprisonment where it the killing of any 
person has occurred: see sections 217A(2)(a) and (b) of the Penal Code. 
153 Section 41(b) of the DFA. 
154 Section 41(a) of the DFA. 
155 Section 34(2) of the DFA. 
156 Section 34(1) of the DFA. 
142 
is generally punishable with five years‟ imprisonment157 but the law specifies aggravating 
circumstances in which theft attracts 10 or 14 years.158 Further, theft by public servant is 
punishable with a mandatory minimum term of two years and a maximum of life 
imprisonment.159 Similarly, sexual activity with a child is punishable with 14 years160 but 
attracts 21 years when committed in „circumstances of aggravation‟ which are 
outlined.161 
The prescription of „death or life‟ as a maximum alternative sentences is regrettable for 
several reasons. Murder, for example, is routinely regarded as a capital offence. Courts 
are yet to attach any significance to the fact that murder carries a maximum of both life 
and death. This shows that sentences imposed are rarely, if ever, determined from the 
view that life imprisonment is the maximum sentence. It is not surprising then that the 
amendment of section 210 has had no practical impact on sentencing in murder cases, 
more so since it was made after the mandatory death penalty was outlawed in 
Kafantayeni. Courts seem to assume that the law has merely abolished the mandatory 
death penalty. Indeed, it has been said that death has never been imposed for rape 
because „though the ultimate sentence [for rape] is death … section 133 of the Penal 
Code … mentions both the death penalty and life imprisonment. This is unlike [the] 
penalty in murder cases which only mentions death‟.162 This misses the fact that life 
                                                 
157 Section 278 of the Penal Code. 
158 Theft carries 10 years if the thing stolen is a will, postal matter, vessel, vehicle, aircraft or draught: see 
sections 279, 280, 282(h) and (i) of the Penal Code. A similar punishment is applicable for theft of a thing 
in transit, or from the person of another, a dwelling-house, a public office, or a vessel: see sections 
282(a)(b)(c)(f) and (e).  Further, theft of livestock is punishable with 14 years under section 281.  
159 Section 283(5) of the Penal Code. 
160 Section 160B(1) of the Penal Code. 
161 See sections 160B(2) and (3) of the Penal Code. 
162 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 5. Emphasis supplied. 
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imprisonment is specifically prescribed for murder. It may also indicate that courts 
believe death sentences are only justifiable in murder cases. Indeed, courts stress the 
availability of the death penalty only in murder cases yet overlook it for rape, burglary 
and robbery.  
Second, the lack of clarification creates inconsistency in sentencing because it gives a 
court too much discretion. It also generates confusion and results in offenders not being 
sentenced on the same footings. For example, housebreaking and burglary were said to 
carry a maximum sentence of „death or life‟ in Rep v William,163 while Rep v Hassan164 cited 
death as the maximum. In Nyangu v Rep,165 robbery was said to carry a maximum of life 
imprisonment, completely ignoring death as a prescribed penalty. According to Rep v 
Chinguwo,166 „[l]ike manslaughter, both burglary/housebreaking and robbery carry life 
imprisonment as punishment, although death is the maximum for the first two‟. 
Moreover, confusion is evident in Rep v Mawaya167 where the High Court asserted: „It is 
trite law that rape is a capital offence which carries a maximum sentence of death or 
life‟!168 
These pronouncements are significant because the maximum penalty obviously 
determines the punishment imposed by a court; the higher the maximum penalty, the 
                                                 
163 Rep v William Confirmation Case No 195 of 2004. See also Rep v Sarif Confirmation Case No 109 of 
2012; Rep v Mussa Criminal Appeal No 44 of 1995; Rep v Misomali Confirmation Case No 738 of 2000; R v 
Namasita and another Confirmation Case No. 309 of 2000; Rep v Nangwiya Confirmation Case No 608 of 
1997; Rep v Mawaya and others Confirmation Case No 794 of 2000 (rape said to carry maximum sentence of 
„death or life imprisonment‟). 
164 Rep v Hassan Criminal Appeal No 102 of 2005; Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 554 of 1996.  
165 Nyangu v Rep Criminal Appeal No 173 of 2005. 
166 Rep v Chinguwo Criminal Case No 53 of 2008. 
167 See in Rep v Mawaya and others Confirmation Case No 794 of 2000. 
168 See in Rep v Mawaya and others Confirmation Case No 794 of 2000. 
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higher the range of sentences a court may impose.169 A sentence based on life as a 
maximum sentence will likely to result in a lesser sentence than one premised on a 
maximum of death.170 On the one hand, recognising „death or life‟ as a maximum 
sentence is inherently problematic because it cannot be the case that both death and life 
imprisonment are maximum sentences for the same offence without qualification. As 
ultimate penalties, both life and death must be reserved for the worst instance of 
murder, rape and other capital crimes. This principle cannot be applied if both death 
and life are regarded as maximum penalties without further elaboration. The emphasis 
on death as the maximum penalty for murder gives the impression that the imposition 
of life imprisonment is seen as a lenient penalty imposed in lieu of the death penalty 
when in fact life imprisonment is a maximum penalty in its own right. On the other 
hand, recognising death as the maximum ignores the specific mention of life 
imprisonment as a competent penalty. The same applies to the recognition of life 
imprisonment as the maximum. Fixed prison sentences would be passed more easily 
where life imprisonment is regarded as a maximum unlike where death is considered to 
be the ultimate penalty. Indeed, manslaughter is routinely punished with fixed prison 
sentences because it attracts a maximum of life. 
It cannot be doubted that a life sentence or indeed any other prison term is a competent 
penalty where a discretionary death sentence is prescribed. It is therefore peculiar that 
despite this fact, the law specifically mentions life imprisonment. Courts seem unsure of 
and are yet to grapple with the rationale for the provision for death and life as 
                                                 
169 Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998. 
170 See for instance, Rep v Jordan Criminal Case No 74 of 2008, citing Rep v Matimati Criminal Case No 18 
of 2007 („a capital offence like murder should not be punished like manslaughter which carries a 
maximum of life imprisonment‟). 
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alternative sentences for the same offence. In the context of rape, Kamwambe J has 
remarked that the law refers to both death and life ultimate „for unknown reasons‟.171 
This lack of appreciation is also evidenced in that courts have not established any 
guidelines for the punishment of offences that attract both life and death.  Such 
guidelines exist in cases where a fine and/or imprisonment are provided for the same 
offence. A fine can always be imposed in substitution of imprisonment in accordance 
with section 27(3) of the Penal Code.172 Section 29(1)(b) of the Penal Code states that a 
court has discretion to impose either penalty where the law provides for both 
imprisonment and a fine.173 Courts have made several pronouncements on how this 
discretion must be exercised. It is settled sentencing practice that, as a general rule, 
where both a fine and/or imprisonment are prescribed, an offender is entitled to a fine 
unless the circumstances dictate that imprisonment would be the most appropriate 
penalty.174 The duty to consider a fine seems to arise only where a fine is specifically 
mentioned in the penal provision itself; a court cannot easily be faulted for not imposing 
a fine where only imprisonment is provided. The general principle that emerges is that 
where a penal provision provides for more than one penalty, a court must impose the 
lesser penalty unless the heavier penalty is justified.  
From this analogy, it can be said that in the context of death and life sentences, a court 
cannot simply decide whether to impose life or death. Such an approach would not 
                                                 
171 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 5. 
172 Section 27(3) of the Penal Code. 
173 See Rep v Pitasoni Confirmation Case No 1143 of 2001; Rep v Mdala and another Confirmation Case No 
403 of 2000; R v Zagwa [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 415; Rep v Jongwe Confirmation Case No 1211 of 1995; Rep 
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reflect the specific mention of life imprisonment. Life imprisonment must be carefully 
considered before the death penalty is imposed. This does not mean that a court must 
simply ask, as a starting point, whether life imprisonment is an appropriate penalty. 
Rather, as a starting point, life imprisonment must be deemed as the maximum sentence 
such that a court must only resort to death if this maximum is found wanting. This is 
where the approach to the „death or life‟ provisions becomes complicated: how can a 
maximum sentence be considered inadequate? If, as a maximum penalty, life 
imprisonment would be appropriate only for the worst instance of an offence, justifying 
recourse to the death penalty would be an uphill battle. After all, the worst offender is 
yet to come before the courts.175 
Therefore, in view of the wording of the penal provisions for capital offences in Malawi, 
it is insufficient for courts to simply say that death must be reserved for the worst 
instance of murder. This begs the question: at what point is life imprisonment rendered 
inappropriate? Since life imprisonment is as much a maximum penalty for murder as is a 
death sentence, neither penalty should be imposed unless a court is convinced that the 
facts of the case render it a worst instance of murder. This is particularly important in 
light of the real possibility, deduced from practice, that a life sentence effectively means 
spending the rest of one‟s life in prison. In the result, the death penalty must only be 
imposed if life imprisonment is not a suitable punishment.176 In turn, life imprisonment 
may only be imposed if all other options including a shorter term are not appropriate. 
This should make the death penalty an extremely rare sentence. This position is in 
                                                 
175 In exercising restraint on the use of maximum sentences, courts often state that the worst offence is 
yet to occur: see, for instance, Rep v Chimeto and others [1997] 1 MLR 90 (HC] 92. 
176 It is assumed here that a death sentence is a more severe sentence than life. However, there are 
suggestions that life imprisonment is a harsher penalty than death especially where the prison conditions 
are intolerable. 
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tandem with the principle of legality which requires, inter alia, that, as far as possible, 
penal provisions must be construed restrictively in favour of an accused. 
Ultimately, unlike penalties such as fixed imprisonment and fines, it is undesirable to 
provide for life imprisonment and death as alternative maximum sentences for a crime. 
This is because life and death are severe forms of punishment and yet the difference 
between them is a matter of life and death. The options that come with a discretionary 
life sentence serve to show that there is big difference between life and death sentences. 
Indeed, life imprisonment may be substituted with a fixed term, a fine, compensation 
and other non-custodial sentences and orders that may be imposed in substitution of 
imprisonment.177 Moreover, though unlikely in practice, life imprisonment may be 
suspended.178 None of these options are available for death sentences.  
In the absence of statutory or judicial guidance as to when an offence is a capital or 
non-capital crime attracting life imprisonment, section 210 and other similar 
provisions179 fail to ensure equal treatment of offenders during sentencing. This is 
because a court may approach the sentencing process regarding the same crime as a 
capital offence or one that carries a life sentence. The provisions are fraught with 
uncertainty and inconsistent with the principle of legality and, by implication, violate the 
right to a fair trial. An offender who is charged with offences like murder and rape is left 
guessing as to whether the crime he has committed carries death or life. 
                                                 
177 See sections 27(1) and (2) of the Penal Code; sections 4.1 and 4.2 below.  
178 See sections 339 and 340 of the CPEC. Suspended sentences are explained in section 3.2 below. 
179 See sections 38, 133, 301(2), 309(1) and 309(2) of the Penal Code which provide for similar penalties 
for treason, rape, armed robbery, housebreaking and burglary respectively. 
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3 IMPRISONMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the forms of imprisonment in 
Malawi. Apart from immediate fixed sentences, there are four forms of imprisonment; 
namely, suspended sentences, periodic imprisonment, preventive imprisonment, and life 
imprisonment. This section will focus more on preventive and life sentences and the 
circumstances in which they are imposed because of the issues that they raise.    
It is notable that section 140 of the CCPJA prohibits the imprisonment of children for 
any offence. Section 2 of the Act defines a child as a person below the age of 16 years. 
This definition was held unconstitutional in State and others ex parte Kashuga180 on the basis 
that it is inconsistent with section 42(2)(g) of the Constitution which provides special 
protection for persons below the age of 18 in the criminal justice system.181 Under the 
CCPJA, the only custodial sanction applicable to child offenders is a reformatory 
order182 which is reserved for serious crimes as stipulated in Schedule Six of the 
CCPJA.183 Section 140, and indeed the whole scheme of the CCPJA, portrays a clear 
                                                 
180 State and others ex parte Kashuga Miscellaneous Application No 129 of 2012. 
181 State and others ex parte Kashuga Miscellaneous Application No 129 of 2012, 15-16. In casu, the applicant, 
who was 16 years at the material time, was sentenced to two years for burglary by a second grade 
magistrate‟s court.  This was apparently based on the fact that the CCPJA defines a child as a person 
below the age of 16 years and therefore the applicant was treated as an adult. The applicant argued, 
among other things, that since section 42(2)(g) of the Constitution defines a child as a person below the 
age of 18 years, the definition of a child under the  CCPJA was unconstitutional and that he should have 
been treated as a child. As such he should have benefitted from section 140 of the CCPJA which 
prohibits the imprisonment of a child for any offence.   
182 In terms of section 146(1)(h) of the CCPJA. 
183 The list includes punishable by death, attempting to murder, attempting to murder by convict, 
accessory after the fact to murder, written threats to murder, conspiracy to murder, aiding suicide, 
disabling in order to commit felony or misdemeanour, stupefying in order to commit felony or 
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shift from a punitive to a more rehabilitative and restorative approach in the 
punishment of children.  
3.2 Suspended and periodic imprisonment 
Imprisonment may be suspended on conditions for up to three years184 or two years in 
the case of Local Courts.185 Suspension was not applicable to mandatory sentences until 
2010.186 The aim of suspended sentences is rehabilitation and deterrence. They give an 
offender „a chance to reform and become a good member of community‟187 but „with a 
real threat that if they commit another offence during the period, the suspended 
sentence will be revived‟.188 Suspended sentences are particularly encouraged for first 
offenders since they are deemed as „disposed to law abiding‟.189 This presupposes that 
first offenders have a higher chance of rehabilitation than repeat offenders. Section 
340(1) of the CPEC requires that in cases of first offenders, imprisonment must be 
suspended „unless it appears to the court, on good grounds … that there is no other 
appropriate means of dealing with him‟. Further, immediate imprisonment of first 
                                                                                                                                          
misdemeanour, acts intended to cause grievous harm or prevent arrest, preventing escape from wreck, 
intentionally endangering safety of persons travelling by railway, attempting to injure by explosive 
substance, maliciously administering poison with intent to harm, infanticide and manslaughter. 
184 Section 339(1) of the CPEC. Suspension may relate to the whole or part of the sentence: see section 26 
of the Local Courts Act 9 of 2011. Cf Rep v Mbewe [1973-1975] 7 ALR Mal 124 (HC); Rep v Wasembe 
[1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 131 (HC). 
185 Section 26 of the Local Courts Act. 
186 See section 339(1) of the CPEC as amended by Act 9 of 1999; Rep v Kambalame Criminal case No 108 
of 2002, 3. While this general restriction was removed in 2010, Parliament rejected proposals to remove 
this restriction with respect to community service: see CPEC Review Report (2003) 163; section 243(a)(ii) of 
the 2004 CPEC Bill. Surprisingly, similar recommendations regarding section 340 of the CPEC and other 
sentences and orders were adopted:  see for instance section 337(1) and 338(1) of the CPEC. 
187 Kalambo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 199 of 1975. 
188 Rep v Matindi Confirmation Case No 1699 of 1976. See also Rep v Manyamba [1997] 2 MLR 39 (HC). 
189 Rep v Namichire Confirmation Case No 803 of 2000, 7. 
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offenders is subject to automatic review under section 15(1) of the CPEC. Although 
there is no limit on the length of a sentence which can be suspended, practice shows 
that only short sentences are suspended. Consequently, suspended sentences are usually 
ordered in minor offences committed in mitigating circumstances. However, courts 
have also suspended sentences for serious offences on humanitarian considerations such 
as the health or domestic obligations of an offender in the case of primary caregivers.190 
The second form of imprisonment is periodic imprisonment („weekend or public 
holiday imprisonment‟), a new form of imprisonment introduced in 2011. Section 
28A(1) of the Penal Code provides that imprisonment may be served intermittently on 
weekends or public holidays, with an offender serving at least 24 hours a week. The 
following conditions must be met before an order is made: the period of imprisonment 
may not exceed three months; the accused must be in employment at the time of the 
offence or conviction; he would continue to be in such employment but for the 
conviction and sentence; and discontinuance from such employment would cause 
hardship to his dependants.191 In addition, the accused must consent to serve 
imprisonment intermittently and there must be „satisfactory arrangements‟ in prison for 
the sentence to be so served.192 
Periodic imprisonment reflects a rehabilitative orientation to punishment since it 
minimises the disruption to an offender‟s life by allowing him to remain in society for 
the greater part. This also means that an offender is not secluded from society and 
                                                 
190 See for instance Rep v Moyo and 10 Others Criminal Case No 2 of 2011 (suspending a series of 14 year 
sentences). Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010 suggested that courts must seriously consider 
suspending sentences for offenders from 61 years.  
191 Section 28A(2) of the Penal Code. 
192 Section 28A(1)(b) of the Penal Code.  
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therefore his social reintegration into society is likely to be successful. It is too early to 
gauge the success of periodic imprisonment.193 However, since it may only be imposed 
for sentences of up to three months, it is reasonable to expect that periodic 
imprisonment will be used for minor offences. It is unlikely to be used for serious 
offences where an offender is considered to pose a threat to society or where 
incapacitation is deemed necessary. Three months is a very low threshold which does 
not typically warrant immediate imprisonment. It is likely that periodic imprisonment 
will be imposed in cases where the offence is minor but a court considers it 
inappropriate to impose a non-custodial sanction or suspended sentence. It must be 
emphasised however, that periodic imprisonment must only be imposed if a court is 
satisfied that immediate imprisonment is an appropriate sentence because continuous 
imprisonment can be served in default.194 
3.3 Preventive imprisonment 
As its name suggests, preventive imprisonment is aimed at preventing an offender from 
committing further crimes, thereby protecting the community. According to section 11 
of the CPEC,195 preventive imprisonment may only be imposed if: a) the offender is 
above 21 years old; b) is convicted by the High Court, or by a court of a resident or first 
grade magistrate of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of five years or 
more; c) has been convicted on at least three previous occasions, since he attained the 
age of eighteen years, of offences punishable with imprisonment for a term of five years 
or more; d) has been sentenced on at least two previous occasions to imprisonment, 
                                                 
193 So far, there appears to be no case in which periodic imprisonment has been imposed. 
194 Section 28A(5) of the Penal Code. 
195 This provision has its roots in section 21 of the Prevention of Crime Act of England 1908 which 
provided for preventive detention. 
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other than a [suspended] sentence which has not taken effect; and e) the court is 
satisfied that it is expedient for the protection of the public that he should be detained 
in custody for a substantial time.  
In calculating the length of imprisonment, a court must consider two elements. The first 
is the punitive element of the sentence which is the sentence that would have been 
imposed if ordinary imprisonment was applicable. This element must not exceed the 
maximum punishment provided for the offence. The second element is the period 
necessary for the protection of the public.196 It is clear from section 11 that a preventive 
sentence must be between five and 14 years‟ imprisonment. Courts are encouraged to 
impose the deserved sentence under the relevant provision rather than invoke section 
11 where a longer sentence is impossible under the former. Consequently, section 11 
should not be invoked for offences attracting up to five years unless the second element 
demands higher than maximum.197 Since the maximum sentence is 14 years, preventive 
imprisonment entitles a court to punish an offender three times the least maximum. 
A preventive sentence must only be imposed in the public interest for community 
protection198 in circumstances where it is the only sentence that can achieve this 
purpose.199 This inherently assumes that an offender is likely to commit further offences 
                                                 
196 See Rep v Daliyani [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 370 (HC). 
197 Manda v Rep (1) [1993] 16(2) MLR 579 (HC); Mlenga v Rep [1973–1975] 7 MLR 223 (HC). Section 11 
only entitles a court to impose one sentence even where there are multiple convictions: see Rep v Mrekhe 
[1973-1975] 7 ALR Mal 397 (HC); Unyolo v Rep [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 187 (HC). 
198 Guza v R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 136 (HC); Rep v Daliyani [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 370 (HC); Crispin v 
R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 340 (HC); R v Sinya [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 223 (HC); William v R [1961-1963] 
2 ALR Mal 104 (HC). 
199 Rep v Edison Confirmation Case No 3055 of 1975. 
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and that his detention is necessary to incapacitate him. Even where all the conditions are 
met, imposition of preventive imprisonment remains within the discretion of a court.200 
Not much has changed with regard to preventive imprisonment since 1994. The only 
changes are that the two-year cut line for previous imprisonment has been raised to five 
years; the minimum age has been raised from 16 to 18 years;201 and inactivated 
suspended sentences no longer count as previous sentences. According to case law 
reviewed during this research, it appears that the use of preventive imprisonment has 
decreased significantly in the constitutional dispensation.202 This could be due to 
negative judicial attitude to this form of imprisonment. As early as 1961, there was 
judicial opposition to the harshness of a preventive sentence. It was described as an 
„exceptional‟203 and „anomalous‟204 sentence in view of its severity. Rep v Daliyani205 noted 
that preventive imprisonment is a unique form of punishment in that an offender serves 
a sentence that exceeds what is proportional to the crime by an additional period 
necessary for the protection of the public. Preventive imprisonment has also been 
criticised as justifying the use of previous convictions as a ground for enhancing a 
                                                 
200 Guza v R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 136 (HC); Rep v Sokole [1973-1975] 7 ALR Mal 356 (HC). 
201 At the time, children below the age of 18 were not liable to conviction (see section 2 of the CYPA). 
However, section 2 of the CCPJA defines a child as a person below the age of 16. This means that 
persons between the age of 16 and 18 are treated as adults within the criminal justice system and hence 
liable to conviction. Nevertheless, with respect to section 11 of the CPEC, persons aged 16 to 18 years are 
exempted. 
202 The author was unable to find any case in which this sentence was imposed after 1994. 
203 Edson v Rep [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 289 (HC), noting that it can result in an offence punishable with 
two years being punished with 14 years. At the time the case was decided, preventive imprisonment was 
applicable for convictions in respect of offences that attracted two years or more: see Crispin v R [1961-
1963] 2 ALR Mal 340 (HC) 342. 
204 Rep v Daliyani [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 370 (HC) 374. 
205 Rep v Daliyani [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal  370 (HC). 
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sentence. As a result, it comes dangerously close to double punishment.206 Indeed, Cram 
J warned that preventive sentences could „lead to institutionalisation along with the 
abiding sense of grievance that the punishment is for offences for which punishment 
has already been served‟.207 
In the pre-1994 case of Crispin v R,208 the High Court held, without much analysis, that 
preventive sentences were not inconsistent with the 1688 Bill of Rights which 
prohibited harsh and unusual punishment. In 2003, the Law Commission, also without 
elaboration, noted that preventive imprisonment is a justifiable limitation on right to 
personal liberty in accordance with section 44 of the Constitution.209 
It can therefore be observed that despite criticism of preventive imprisonment, this 
form of punishment is justified for its perceived utilitarian benefits of incapacitation and 
community protection. As noted in chapter two, these are noble goals especially for 
serious offences. However, as will be shown further below,210 preventive sentences raise 
a number of constitutional issues.  
                                                 
206 See Crispin v R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 340 (HC) 342: Preventive sentences duplicate „punishment by 
imprisonment in respect of earlier punishments by imprisonment at the time regarded as adequate by the 
courts imposing them; Maikolo v R [1964–1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA) 591: „Scrupulous care is to be 
exercised before imposing this exceptional sentence which can lead to institutionalisation along with the 
abiding sense of grievance that the punishment is for offences for which punishment has already been 
served‟. Noting that it is unreasonable and improper to enhance a sentence merely because of previous 
convictions and citing with approval Lord Caldecote CJ in R v Betteridge, Cram J continued: „[I]t is not right 
to hold over a man‟s past offences which have been dealt with by appropriate sentences, as we must 
assume [that] past offences have been dealt with, and add them up and increase … the severity of 
sentence for a later offence. That is dangerously like punishing a man twice for an offence‟. 
207 Maikolo v R [1964–1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA) 591. 
208 Crispin v R [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 340 (HC) 342-343. 
209 See CPEC Review Report (2003) 17-18. 
210 See section 5.2 below. 
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3.4 Life imprisonment 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Life imprisonment is the most severe form of imprisonment in Malawi. The aim of this 
section is to examine the nature of life imprisonment in Malawi, the theories of 
punishment that inform it and the circumstances in which it is imposed. The section will 
also look at the changes to life imprisonment after 1994. A major issue with life 
imprisonment is whether it means a whole life sentence (imprisonment for the rest of an 
offender‟s life without the possibility of parole) or imprisonment for a stipulated period 
after which an offender is eligible for parole. It is therefore apposite to begin with a 
discussion of the meaning of life imprisonment in Malawi. 
3.4.2 The meaning of life imprisonment 
Strictly speaking, there is no statutory definition of life imprisonment in Malawi. There 
are a number of meanings that may be ascribed to it. For instance, section 111 of the 
Prisons Act requires that every four years, a report must be prepared for prisoners 
serving a life sentence or a sentence beyond seven years. This may provide authority for 
the proposition that a life must be reviewed every four years and so carries a tariff of 
four years.211 This interpretation may be counter-productive. For example, it may be 
inconsistent with the principle of proportionality which entails that sentences imposed 
for more serious offences should be more severe than those imposed for lesser 
offences. Four years is a very low threshold for life imprisonment which is prescribed 
for serious offences in light of other sentences prescribed for other offences. This 
                                                 
211 Section 11(1) reads: „At the end of every four years‟ imprisonment of each prisoner undergoing 
imprisonment for life, or for a period exceeding seven years, the Commissioner shall forward [to the 
Minister] a report upon such prisoner‟. 
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problem is magnified by the fact that release under section 111 may be unconditional 
since it is subject to the prerogative of mercy.212 In practice, life prisoners are not 
considered for release every four years. 
Judicial comment on the meaning of life imprisonment points to both a determinate and 
whole life sentence. The former is only to be found in the decisions of Mwaungulu J 
who has expressed the view that a life sentence is 35 years because imprisonment may 
only be imposed after the age of 19 and the life expectancy is (was in 2013) 55 years.213 
He has used this definition of life imprisonment as 35 years as an additional criterion for 
determining if a sentence is cruel, inhuman and degrading, which in turn feeds into the 
determination of whether a sentence is manifestly excessive.214 This suggests that a 
sentence may be rendered unconstitutional on the sole basis of its length depending on 
how close it is to a 55 year sentence. 
                                                 
212 The prerogative of mercy is provided for in section 89(2) of the Constitution and may be granted with 
or without conditions in terms of section 326(6) of the CPEC. The prerogative of mercy is discussed in 
detail in chapter seven. 
213 See Rep v Jeke Confirmation Case No 178B of 2013, 4; Rep v Yasin Confirmation Case No 219 of 2012; 
Rep v Mushali and another Confirmation Case No 242 of 2013, 4; Rep v Assam and another Confirmation Case 
No 907 of 2008, 4; Rep v Samson and another Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010, 4. See also Rep v John 
Confirmation Case No 528 of 2010, 4; Rep v Nelson and another Confirmation Case No 1852 of 2005, 4; Rep 
v Naluso Confirmation Case No 387 of 2013, 4; Rep v Matemba Confirmation Case No 243 of 2012, 4; Rep 
v Mapeni Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010; Rep v Kaufa Confirmation Case No 314 of 2011, 3; Rep v 
Naphazi Confirmation Case No 386 of 2011, 4; Rep v Chikwana Confirmation Case No 131 of 2013, 4. In 
fact, imprisonment may only be imposed on offenders above 16 years since the CCPJA defines a child as 
a person below the age of 16. Therefore, in terms of  Mwaungulu J‟s reasoning, a life sentence would be 
38 years. 
214 See Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 of 2013, 3; Rep v Kanyumba and another Confirmation Case 
No 904 of 2008, 4; Rep v Mulolo and another Confirmation Case No 362 of 2012, 4; Rep v Kandodo and two 
others Confirmation Case No 240 of 2013, 4; Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 130 of 2013; Rep v 
Makoko Confirmation Case No 469 of 2009, 4; Rep v Headson and 4 Others Confirmation Case No 129 of 
2013, 4; Rep v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013, 3; Rep v James Confirmation Case No 244 of 2013, 
3. 
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The predominant view is that life imprisonment means a whole life sentence. In Rep v 
Cheuka and others,215 the accused was sentenced to an effective term of 12 years for 
manslaughter which carries a maximum of life imprisonment.216 Deliberately refraining 
from imposing the maximum sentence, the court said that the offender‟s „life 
imprisonment is regarded as longer than the number of years of imprisonment a court 
may impose‟.217 In other words, the indeterminate nature of whole life sentences renders 
it a disproportionate sentence since a court may never know how long an offender has 
to live. The understanding of life imprisonment as a whole-life sentence is also evident 
in cases such as Rep v Masula and others.218 Chombo J held that since the accused were 
unlikely to be reformed, it was necessary to protect the public by locking them away for 
the rest of their lives.  
The view that a life sentence is a whole-life sentence is perhaps most clearly seen in 
Moyo v Attorney General219 where the High Court, sitting as a constitutional court, held 
that the detention of child offenders at the pleasure of the President is not the same as 
life imprisonment. In its unanimous judgement, the court reasoned that detention at the 
president‟s pleasure 
presupposes that there will be constant reviews of the juvenile‟s conduct … The aim is always 
that a child … should only be recommended for release if he has shown [remorse] and if he has 
been adequately rehabilitated to the extent that he is no longer a danger to the society. Being so 
held at the pleasure of the president should not therefore be construed as life imprisonment. 
                                                 
215 Rep v Cheuka and others Criminal Case No 73 of 2008. 
216 Section 208 of the Penal Code. 
217 Rep v Cheuka and others Criminal Case No 73 of 2008. 
218 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008. 
219 Moyo v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 12 of 2007, 10-11. 
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This passage implies that what distinguishes detention at the President‟s pleasure from 
life imprisonment is that in the latter case an offender will spend the rest of his life in 
prison, regardless of whether he ceases to be a danger to society. In addition, the court 
excludes the need for review and the role of rehabilitation in life sentences.  
The 2003 Prisons Bill proposes a new definition of life imprisonment. In terms of 
clause 53(1)(b) of the Bill, a life prisoner will be eligible for parole after serving 12 years. 
Further, clause 56 creates a possibility that life prisoners may be released both 
conditionally and unconditionally before the tariff period has lapsed if „the prison 
system is so overcrowded that the safety, human dignity or physical care of prisoners is 
being affected materially‟.220 In keeping with the spirit of section 111 of the Prisons Act, 
order 141(2) of the 2003 Draft Standing Orders provides that after a lifer has served 
four years of his sentence „a copy of the record and an assessment of their characters 
shall be sent to the Chief Commissioner [of Prisons] who may make special 
recommendations‟. However, it is not clear what the Commissioner‟s recommendations 
may be upon receipt of the review report under order 141(2). It is likely that these 
recommendations will almost always relate to the prisoner‟s progression during the 
sentence depending on his needs to ensure rehabilitation. Indeed, unlike the Prisons 
Act, the Prisons Bill does not hint on the possible release of prisoners serving life 
sentences as a result of this report.  
Overall, it can be observed that there is no clarity as to the meaning of life 
imprisonment in Malawi. While the Prisons Act requires a report on every life sentence 
after four years, case law indicates that the predominant view is that life imprisonment is 
a whole life sentence. From a human rights perspective, the proposals in the Prisons Bill 
                                                 
220 These provisions are discussed in detail in section 2.3 of chapter 7. 
159 
are commendable because they give clarity on the meaning of life imprisonment and 
afford a possibility of release to life prisoners. However, 12 years could be seen to be on 
the lower side, particularly when it is recalled that the maximum fixed sentence for 
imprisonment under the Penal Code is 21 years.221 The problems with such a low tariff 
are explored further in chapter seven.222 In practice, courts are quite slow to impose life 
sentences; the bulk of life sentences being served today are a result of the mass 
commutation of death sentences to life since 1994. 
3.4.3 Restrictions on life sentences 
Like the death penalty, life imprisonment is subject to some restrictions. As noted in the 
previous chapter,223 section 42(2)(g)(i) of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release on persons below the age of 18 
years.224 The second restriction relates to the category of offences which are punishable 
with life imprisonment. Malawi has over 40 offences that attract life sentences, including 
genocide (where the offence consists of killing); murder; manslaughter; concealment of 
treason; robbery; forgery of wills, judicial records and bank notes; rioting after 
proclamation and related offences such as demolishing buildings; and rescuing or 
attempting to rescue from lawful custody a person sentenced to death or imprisonment 
for life or charged with an offence punishable with death or life.225 In practice, courts 
exude considerable restraint in imposing life sentences. 
                                                 
221 Section 217A(2)(b) of the Penal Code. 
222 See section 3.2 of chapter 7. 
223 See section 3.4.3 of chapter five. 
224 Section 42(2)(g)(i) of the Constitution. 
225 See sections 39, 78, 79, 114(1)(a), 210, 211, 217A(2)(a), 301, 357 and 358 of the Penal Code. Other 
offences punishable with life include promoting war; inciting to mutiny; inducing soldiers or policemen to 
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3.4.4 Circumstances in which life imprisonment may be imposed 
Although it is prescribed for myriad offences, life imprisonment is rarely imposed in 
Malawi. The general principle remains that life sentences should be reserved for serious 
instances of the offence committed in aggravating circumstances and also where a 
serious offender is seen as a danger to society. It has been suggested, for example, that a 
life sentence would be appropriate for rape where an offender‟s „behaviour has 
manifested perverted or psychopathic tendencies or gross personality disorder, and 
where he is likely, if at large, to remain a danger to women for an indefinite time‟.226 
Further, courts have said that theft by public servant may be punished with life 
imprisonment where the case involving large sums of money by higher public officials 
                                                                                                                                          
desert; aiding prisoners of war to escape; taking unlawful oaths to commit capital offences; preventing or 
obstructing the making of proclamation; rape; attempted rape; defilement of girls under 16 years; incest by 
males of a female person under the age of 16 years; manslaughter; murder; attempted murder; aiding 
suicide, killing unborn child, disabling or stupefying in order to commit felony or misdemeanour; causing 
or committing an act intended to grievous harm or prevent arrest, preventing escape from wreck; 
intentionally endangering safety of persons travelling by railway; kidnapping or abducting in order to 
murder; theft by public servant; attempted aggravated robbery; housebreaking; burglary; arson; casting 
away ships; destroying or damaging an inhabited house or a vessel with explosives; destroying or 
damaging a river bank or wall, navigation works or bridges; forgery of wills or documents of title to land, 
judicial record, power of attorney, bank note, currency note, bill of exchange, or promissory note; 
counterfeiting coin; and making preparations for coining; illegal possession of Indian hemp: see, 
respectively sections 40, 41, 43, 44, 54, 77, 114(1)(1), 133, 134,138, 157, 209, 211, 223, 228, 231, 233, 235, 
236, 237, 261, 283(4), 301(2), 302(2), 309(1) and (2), 337, 341, 344(2), 344(3), 372 and 373 of the Penal 
Code; and regulation 19(1) as read with section 4(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Chapter 35:02 of the 
Laws of Malawi. The DFA has three offences that are punishable with life, namely, aiding the enemy; 
unauthorised communication with the enemy; and failure to suppress mutiny: see sections 33(1), 34(2) 
and 41 of the Act.  
226 Rep v Makuluni Confirmation Case No 276 of 2001, citing with approval R v Billam (1986) 82 Cr App R 
347. Life imprisonment has never been imposed for rape: see Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case 
No 306 of 2010, 5. 
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and a serious breach of trust‟.227 However, it is unlikely that such offences involving no 
loss of life can be punished with life sentences. Indeed, courts exercise restraint even in 
sentencing manslaughter and murder.  
In practice, life imprisonment is reserved for manslaughter and, since 2007, murder.228 
Manslaughter is normally punished with fixed prison sentences229 which have ranged 
from to 30 years.230 This indicates that courts are reluctant to impose life sentences. 
Indeed, in Rep v Eneya and others,231 the accused were sentenced to 18 years for 
manslaughter in circumstances described as „most cruel and gruesome‟ and which came 
                                                 
227 Rep v Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012. 
228 See for instance, Rep v Matimati Criminal Case No 18 of 2007; Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 
65 of 2008. 
229 For an overview of sentencing trends in manslaughter cases, see Nyirenda (2009) 11-22. 
230 See Rep v Chimbiri Criminal Case No 72 of 2008; Rep v Mkandawire Criminal Case No 11 of 2009; Rep v 
Nkhokwe Criminal Case No 50 of 2008; Rep v Mwale Criminal Case No 13 of 2008; Rep v Chinguwo Criminal 
Case No 53 of 2008; State v Kaunda Criminal Case No 6 of 2008; Rep v Phiri Criminal Case No 1 of 2008; 
State v Phiri Criminal Case No 2 of 2008; State v Nyirenda Criminal Case No 5 of 2008; Rep v Saulos 
Criminal Case No 44 of 2008; Rep v Lingisoni and another Criminal Case No 74 of 2009; Rep v Jedu Criminal 
Case No 4 of 2008; Rep v Jere Criminal Case No 49 of 2005; Rep v Singileti Criminal Case No 9 of 2005; 
State v Phiri Criminal Case No 11 of 2008; Rep v Kotoma Criminal Case No 24 of 2009; Mapira v Rep 
Criminal Case No 8 of 2008; State v Mbale Criminal Case No 32 of 2008; Rep v Simbewe Criminal Case No 
39 of 2009; Phiri v Rep Criminal Case No 11 of 2008; Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008; R v 
Tongole and another Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2011; Rep v Chinguwo Criminal Case No 53 of 2008; Rep v 
Kaira and 3 Others Criminal Case No 40 of 2008; Rep v Mathuso Criminal Case No 27 of 2008; Rep v Cheuka 
and others  Criminal Case No 73 of 2008; Rep v Chimimba and anther Criminal Case No 11 of 2009; Rep v 
Mbowe Criminal Case No 21 of 2008; Rep v Mwale Criminal Case No 13 of 2008; Rep v Katimbe Criminal 
Case No 29 of 2008; Zakaliya v Rep Criminal Case No 30 of 1997; Rep v Eneya and others Criminal Case No 
53 of 2003; Rep v Danger Criminal Case No 83 of 2009; Rep v Samaliya and 6 others Criminal Case No 17 of 
2009. 
231 Rep v Eneya and others Criminal Case No 53 of 2003. 
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„as close to murder as manslaughter can get‟.232 In Malemba v Rep,233 the MSCA, noting 
that the accused was a first offender, doubted the propriety of the life sentence imposed 
on him for manslaughter.234 In sentencing for manslaughter, courts have recognised the 
generic sentencing factors such as lack of previous convictions,235 youth,236 plea of 
guilt,237 provocation,238 the brutal nature of the attack and extent of the injuries,239 the 
domestic environment in which the offence was committed,240 and whether a dangerous 
weapon was used.241 In Rep v Glasten,242 the court refrained from imposing a life sentence 
for manslaughter holding that the accused was not a public threat and had a prospect of 
rehabilitation.243 The court premised this finding on the fact that he was a first offender 
and had not used a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, the accused was given a lenient 
short sentence to afford him a chance to reform and come out of prison to be a „very 
responsible citizen‟.244 
                                                 
232 Rep v Eneya and others Criminal Case No 53 of 2003, 4. On appeal, the sentence was reduced to 10 years 
on the premise that the deceased was partly to blame for his death: see Eneya and others v Rep Criminal 
Appeal No 15 of 2006. 
233 Malemba v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 63 of 1995. 
234 The court did not reach any finding on the appeal because the appellant had since died. 
235 Rep v Timba Criminal Case No 88 of 2009; Dandaula v Rep Criminal Appeal No 11 of 2008. 
236 Rep v Chinguwo Criminal Case No 53 of 2008; State v Mbale Criminal Case No 32 of 2008. 
237 Rep v Timba Criminal Case No 88 of 2009; Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008; Rep v Danger 
Criminal Case No 83 of 2009; Rep v Tongole and another Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2011; State v Mbale 
Criminal Case No 32 of 2008. 
238 Rep v Timba Criminal Case No 88 of 2009. 
239 Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008. 
240 Rep v Danger Criminal Case No 83 of 2009, holding that the circumstances of the offence constituted 
domestic violence which must be prevented by imposing stiffer punishment. 
241 Rep v Glasten Criminal Case No 104 of 2008, 6. 
242 Rep v Glasten Criminal Case No 104 of 2008. 
243 Rep v Glasten Criminal Case No 104 of 2008, 6. 
244 Rep v Glasten Criminal Case No 104 of 2008, 6. 
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With respect to murder, it has been said that a life sentence with possibility of release 
would be an appropriate sentence for the worst form of murder.245 It has also been 
suggested, more generally, that life imprisonment would be appropriate where 
rehabilitation of an offender is unlikely.246 However, the potential for rehabilitation is 
not easy to fathom. In Rep v Masula and others,247 the defendants were convicted on two 
counts of murder after they strangulated two victims in order to steal their cell phones. 
During sentencing, Chombo J ruled out the possibility of reform:248 
Counsel for the convicts argued that if given an opportunity the convicts would reform. Ironically 
he went on to inform the court that when the [first] convict was released on bail he committed 
another murder and he was re-arrested as a result of that other murder. This court therefore fails 
to agree with counsel‟s argument that there is a chance of the convicts reforming. 
This is an insufficient basis for depriving an offender of liberty for the rest of his life. 
The court placed no significance on the fact that the offenders were young, had no 
criminal record, and had not displayed a high level of criminality.249 It also failed to 
individually consider the chances of reform for the other three defendants. This case 
shows that courts do not systematically analyse the prospect of rehabilitation in 
sentencing offenders. 
As stated earlier, case law indicates that murder continues to be regarded as a strictly 
capital offence and that there are difficulties – and perhaps confusion – in recognising 
life imprisonment as a competent penalty for murder and other capital crimes. In 2012, 
                                                 
245 Rep v Sukali and another Criminal Appeal No 21 of 2011.  
246 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008. 
247 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008. 
248 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008, 3. 
249 The court described the offenders as „reckless people‟: see Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 
of 2008, 3. 
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the High Court in Mulinganiza attempted to provide some clarification regarding the 
circumstances in which murder may be punished with death and life imprisonment. The 
facts were that the second accused, aged 31, was hired by the first accused, aged 82, to 
kill the first accused‟s husband. The second accused killed the deceased by crushing his 
head with a hammer in his sleep. 
In passing sentence, the court was at pains to demonstrate that „life imprisonment is the 
only alternative sentence in murder convictions‟ and that a court may, in exercise of its 
discretion, impose a term years if there are „special mitigatory factors‟.250 He held that 
the general principle is that courts should be more inclined to impose a life sentence 
than a death sentence unless the state convinces it otherwise. The court observed that 
an assessment of sentencing patterns following the decision in Kafantayeni suggests that 
murder has been punished with fixed sentences only in circumstances where a 
manslaughter conviction should have in fact been entered due to provocation or lack of 
mens rea or the use of non-lethal weapon.251 Citing Rep v Jordan,252 the court said that it 
was strongly persuaded 
that in a murder conviction in Malawi, the lesser sentence one can impose is life imprisonment 
which will at least accord the court an opportunity to exercise its [discretionary] powers to 
determine on sentence; otherwise, imposition of a term sentence, such as 15 years 
imprisonment, may call for persuasive factors to reduce a murder conviction to one of 
manslaughter so as to justify the term sentence. May be, so as to eradicate this confusion, Malawi 
should positively respond to the call for the abolishment of [the] death penalty. 
                                                 
250 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 4-5. 
251 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 3: „One is at a loss [as to] why murder 
convictions were maintained in the circumstances. I hope that in the near future this mist shall be clarified 
by the highest court of the land‟.   
252 Rep v Jordan Criminal Case No 74 of 2008. 
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Applying this reasoning, and without much reference to the mitigating factors, the court 
had „no hesitation‟ in imposing a life sentence on the second accused. In sentencing the 
first accused the court found that the fact that she was 82 years old and terminally ill as 
a result of psychosis and cervical prolapse constituted „special mitigatory factors‟ 
warranting such a departure from life imprisonment that a conditional discharge in 
terms of section 337(1)(b) of the CPEC was justified. The court hinted that had it not 
been for the illness, the first accused would have also been sentenced to life 
imprisonment.253 
This decision may be extolled for promoting restraint in the use of the death penalty. 
However, one should not lose sight of its major flaw in that the court proceeded from 
the basis that murder is a strictly capital offence, thereby considering life imprisonment 
not as a prescribed sentence but a lesser sentence to the death penalty. Indeed, if this 
case is read in light of section 210, which the court did not refer to at all, the problems 
with its conclusions become apparent. For example, the decision elevates life 
imprisonment to a mandatory sentence for murder that may only be departed from in 
certain circumstances; that is, unless there are „special mitigatory factors‟, murder must 
be punished with life imprisonment. This places a legal burden on an offender to prove 
mitigating factors, a departure from the principle that the onus is on the state to prove 
aggravating factors. This implies that murder carries two sentences: a) a mandatory life 
sentence which is applicable unless an offender shows that there are „special‟ mitigation 
factors justifying a lesser term; and b) a discretionary death sentence to be imposed if 
the state sufficiently proves aggravating factors. 
                                                 
253 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 5: „Since her illness has come to be known 
to me before passing sentence, I have therefore assumed jurisdiction to consider illness in passing 
sentence. This situation would obviously not have arisen had I passed sentence already‟. 
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This position is legally untenable. For instance, a mandatory life sentence would be 
unconstitutional and liable to the general criticisms against mandatory minimum 
sentences.254 Although the court did not refer to the aims of punishment in its decision, 
it is apparent that priority was placed on retribution and moral blameworthiness of an 
offender. This is because the court dismissed the propriety of fixed prison sentences for 
murder by stating that murder may only be punished with such sentences when the 
circumstances of the case in fact only satisfied manslaughter.255 It is worth noting that 
while the rationale for this provision was to remove the mandatory death sentence for 
murder, the amendment was done on the general acceptance on the part of the Malawi 
Law Commission that mandatory sentences are inconsistent with the Constitution.256 In 
any case, a mandatory life sentence for murder is wholly inconsistent with section 210 
which simply provides that murder is punishable „with death or imprisonment for life‟.  
Secondly, Mulinganiza is inconsistent with sections 27(1) and (2) of the Penal Code. 
These provisions, without casting a legal burden on an offender to justify a departure 
from a life sentence, endow a court to impose a shorter term or a fine.257 Thirdly, the 
court‟s suggestion that murder should only be punished with fixed prison sentences if 
the circumstances are such as would reduce murder to manslaughter is objectionable. It 
                                                 
254 See section 2.3 above. 
255 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 3: „In all these cases … we see that term 
sentences were imposed due to lack of mens rea, provocation, use of a non-lethal weapon etc. All these 
cases could have passed for a manslaughter conviction with ease and the same term sentences meted. One 
is at a loss why murder convictions were maintained in the circumstances. I hope that in the near future 
this mist shall be clarified by the highest court of the land‟. 
256 See Penal Code Review Report 56: „The Commission resolved to maintain its approach of recommending 
discretionary sentences for all offences including the offence of murder‟. 
257 Where the maximum is life imprisonment, reasons for a fine must be very strong: see Rep v Katsabola 
[1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 200 (HC) (no fine for manslaughter). Cf Rep v Solomon and another Confirmation 
Case No 123 of 1998 (fine rare for felony even if extenuating circumstances exist). 
167 
not only reflects that the test for what constitutes „special mitigatory factors‟ is high but 
also flies in the face of the right to a fair trial.  An offender cannot not be expected to 
show that he is not guilty of murder after conviction. It is the duty of the court to 
ensure that an accused is convicted of the right offence. After all, manslaughter is a 
competent verdict on a charge of murder.  
Lastly, it should also be pointed out that the court‟s assertion that murder has been 
punished with term sentences only where the proper charge should have been 
manslaughter is not entirely correct. As discussed above, courts have imposed fixed 
sentences for murder in light of ordinary mitigating factors that would not have justified 
reducing murder to manslaughter.  
To conclude on life imprisonment, it can be observed that life sentences are aimed at 
incapacitation and community protection. Courts generally exercise considerable 
restraint before imposing it and do so only in serious cases of homicidal offences. In the 
light of this fact, it is unlikely that attempts and non-homicidal offences such as rioting, 
demolishing buildings and arson will be punished with life.  
4 NON-CUSTODIAL SANCTIONS 
4.1 Forfeiture and monetary penalties 
Forfeiture involves the confiscation of property (or an equivalent sum of money) 
involved in the commission of a crime. The aims of forfeiture are to ensure that an 
offender does not reap any profit from criminal activity (such as forfeiture of smuggled 
goods) and to prevent further commission of crime by teaching an offender that crime 
does not pay but only leads to suffering through punishment. Forfeiture may also 
prevent crime by depriving an offender of the existing means of committing a crime. 
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For instance, the law allows the confiscation of the means of transportation used to 
smuggle goods.258 
Monetary penalties can take the form of a fine or compensation.259 Fines may be 
imposed in substitution of or in addition to imprisonment.260 It is trite that except in 
exceptional circumstances, felonies and serious misdemeanours must be punished with 
immediate imprisonment and not fines.261 Fines are aimed at retribution262 and 
deterrence by depriving an offender of the financial benefit of the offence committed.263  
                                                 
258 See section 159(1) of the Customs and Excise Act, Chapter 42:01 of the Laws of Malawi. Other 
statutes that provide for forfeiture include the Penal Code (section 30), the Firearms Act (Chapter 14:08 
of the Laws of Malawi), the Weights and Measures Act (Chapter 48:04 of the Laws of Malawi), the 
Dangerous Drugs Act (Chapter 35:02 of the Laws of Malawi), and the Explosives Act (Chapter 14:09 of 
the Laws of Malawi). 
259 Compensation need not be monetary.  
260 Section 27(3) of the Penal Code. Section 23(3) of the Local Courts Act stipulates that fines should only 
be ordered against accused persons who can afford to pay them.    
261 Rep v Moffat and others Confirmation Case No 123 of 1998 (it should be „unoften‟ that a felony is 
punished with a fine). See also Rep v Napolo and others Confirmation Case No 932 of 1999 (escape from 
lawful custody to attract immediate imprisonment to express court‟s opprobrium, fine to be imposed 
rarely); Rep v Chilenje (1996) MLR 361 (HC) 363 (imposing a fine for a serious offence from which the 
offender has or may have reaped a financial benefit is „clawback on illegal opulence, supposed or real‟; 
Banda v Rep Criminal Appeal No 134 of 1996 („to impose a fine for serious offences is tantamount to 
creating the impression that grave moral turpitude can be purged by payment of money‟; Masambo v Rep 
11 MLR 384 (SCA); Rep v Namatika [1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 166; Rep v Mpando [1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 
326 (HC); DPP v Katsabola [1973-1974] 7 ALR Mal 69 (SCA). Only strong mitigating factors in serious 
cases can justify a fine being imposed. For instance, the fact that the offender is a first offender is not 
sufficient to impose a fine for rape: see Rep v Mthali [1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 289 (HC). Where the 
maximum is life imprisonment, reasons for a fine must be very strong: see Rep v Katsabola [1971-1972] 6 
ALR Mal 200 (HC) (no fine for manslaughter). Cf Rep v Solomon and another Confirmation Case No 123 of 
1998 (fine rare for felony even if extenuating circumstances exist). 
262 Chindamba v Rep Criminal Appeal No 16 of 2009. Cf Namputo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 33 of 2007; 
Goode v Rep [1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 461 (HC). 
263 Rep v Akimu Revision Case No 9 of 2003. 
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Compensation can be ordered in addition to or in substitution of the prescribed penalty 
for any offence and to „any‟ person who has suffered personal injury or loss of 
property.264 It can also be ordered out of a fine.265 The aim of compensation is to 
minimise the loss suffered by a victim of crime and to promote reconciliation between 
an offender and a victim or the community. Further, compensation can also be used to 
achieve restorative justice in minor cases through informal reconciliation processes 
under section 161 of the CPEC.266 This means that compensation can be used as a tool 
to resolve criminal matters out of court in a manner that gives victims a central role in 
the resolution of a crime and diverts minor offenders from the criminal justice system. 
This can speed up cases and reduce the backlog of criminal cases.267 There seems to be 
no case in which section 161 has been invoked.  
In practice, however, compensation is rarely awarded in criminal cases.268 This indicates 
that punishment is not oriented towards victim compensation and restorative justice. 
Courts are more inclined to order compensation in cases where the victim suffered 
physical injury such as in cases of assault and causing grievous bodily harm. However, 
                                                 
264 Section 32 of the Penal Code. The Malawi Judiciary Magistrates’ court sentencing guidelines (2007) stress that 
compensation must be considered in passing any sentence.  
265 However, compensation need not be monetary. 
266 Section 161 of the CPEC provides: „In all cases a court may, without formality, promote reconciliation 
and encourage and facilitate the settlement in an amicable way of proceedings for common assault, or for 
any other offence of a personal or private nature not amounting to felony, and not aggravated in degree, 
on terms of payment of compensation or other terms approved by the court and may thereupon order 
the proceedings to be stayed or terminated.‟ See also section 25 of the Local Courts Act. 
267 CPEC Review Report, 85. 
268 See Mkandawire (2001). 
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there is no legal basis for this limitation; the injury suffered need not be physical.269 The 
law now makes it clear that compensation can be awarded for personal injury or loss of 
property.270 Compensation may be awarded as general damages for emotional harm, and 
pain and suffering (such as terror, shock, distress).271 
4.2 Community penalties 
Community penalties include community service,272 public work,273 attendance centre 
orders274 and police supervision.275 Of these, only community service is regularly 
imposed. With the exception of police supervision, community penalties are generally 
imposed for minor offences committed in extenuating circumstances. The aims of 
community penalties include restriction of liberty, reparation and prevention of re-
offending.276 They may also help with the reformation of an offender.  
                                                 
269 In Chisuse v Rep [1978-1980] 9 MLR 141 (HC), a compensation order was made against the appellant 
who had been convicted of theft by trick. The court ordered that his properties that were being held by 
the state should be sold and the proceeds shared proportionately amongst the victims. 
270 Section 32 of the Penal Code as amended by section 23(a) of the Penal Code Amendment Act 2011. 
See also CPEC Review Report 25: „“injury” includes both injury to the person and injury involving loss of 
property‟. 
271 Malawi Judiciary Magistrates’ court sentencing guidelines (2007). 
272 Section 364(A) of the CPEC.  
273 See sections 2 and 3 of the Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Act, Chapter 9:03 of the 
Laws of Malawi. This penalty has practically fallen into disuse due to administrative problems: see Malawi 
Law Commission Report of the Commission on the review of the Traditional Courts Act (2007) 45 which also notes 
that community service can achieve the same purpose as public work if managed properly. 
274 Section 25 of the Penal Code. 
275 Section 25 of the Penal Code. 
276 Malawi Judiciary Magistrates’ court sentencing guidelines (2007) 57. 
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The punishment of community service was introduced in 1999277 with a primary view to 
reduce prison congestion. Other aims such as reparation and rehabilitation are 
secondary.278 Community service may be imposed for any offence which carries a 
discretionary sentence as a condition of a suspended fine or imprisonment not 
exceeding 12 months. It appears that the reformation and welfare of an offender is 
central to community service. For instance, where practical or possible, counselling is 
available on request.279 In addition, the membership of the National Committee includes 
a representative from the Social Welfare Department and organisations with „an interest 
in the well-being or reformation of prisoners‟.280 Further, District Social Welfare 
Officers are members of the District Committee on Community Service.281 Moreover, 
the fact that community service can only be imposed on a suitable and willing offender 
and that a court must have regard to his attitude also shows that an offender is central 
to community service.282 Courts have held that community service sentences are 
unsuitable for deterrence and thus not preferable for serious offences.283 
Attendance centre orders are a new form of punishment introduced by the 2010 Penal 
Code Amendment Act. Although the law does not elaborate when and how this 
punishment should be imposed and implemented, it is reasonable to expect that the 
centres will offer various services and activities such as vocational training, counselling 
                                                 
277 See section 339(2) of the CPEC. For a general overview of community service in Malawi, see Malawi 
National Committee on Community Service (undated). 
278 Kishindo (2012) 1, 21. 
279 Rule 11(3) of the Community Service (General) Rules GN 34/2000. 
280 See rule 3(2)(e) and (j)(i) of the Community Service (General) Rules GN 34/2000. 
281 Rule 10(2)(f) of the Community Service (General) Rules GN 34/2000.  
282 Refusal to perform community service entitles a court to ignore the option and order the offender to 
serve the prison sentence: see Rep v Pitasoni Confirmation Case No 1143 of 2001. 
283 Rep v Akimu Revision Case No 9 of 2003. 
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and organised leisure activities. Therefore, such orders will have rehabilitative and 
incapacitative connotations.  
Police supervision is quite different from other community penalties in that it is only 
imposed on repeat offenders as an additional penalty and comes into operation upon 
expiry of a prison sentence.284 This penalty is therefore aimed at reducing re-offending 
which is a means of achieving crime prevention and promoting community protection.  
4.3 Orders in lieu of punishment 
This section deals with the aims of orders, which are not, strictly speaking, punishment. 
They include reconciliation processes, binding over (or orders to find security), 
discharge, probation and dismissal. Reconciliation processes are provided for in section 
161 of the CPEC. With regard to binding over, a court may order an offender to enter 
into a bond „to keep the peace and be of good behaviour‟ for a specified period not 
exceeding one year.285 If the bond is broken, the bond may be forfeited in accordance 
with section 125 of the CPEC. The aim of binding over is to promote peace in the 
community and deter an offender from re-offending. Discharge, probation286 and 
dismissal may only be imposed where  
the court thinks that the charge is proved but is of the opinion that, having regard to the youth, 
old age, character, antecedents, home surroundings, health or mental condition of the accused, or 
to the fact that the offence has not previously committed an offence, or to the nature of the 
                                                 
284 Section 342(1) of the CPEC states that police supervision may only be ordered against an offender 
who has been convicted more than once of an offence punishable with more than three years‟ 
imprisonment.  
285 Section 338(1) of the CPEC. 
286 Malawi does not have a functioning probation system for adult offenders. 
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offence, or to the extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, it is 
inexpedient to inflict any punishment …
287
 
Discharge may be absolute or on condition that an offender refrains from committing 
further offences during a period of up to 12 months.288 Probation may be imposed on 
various conditions in order to prevent a repetition of the same offence or the 
commission of other offences.289 Conditional discharge and probation may be 
considered as postponed sentences since an offender will be liable to sentence if he 
breaches the conditions set by a court.290 Section 337(5) requires that a court must warn 
the accused of this consequence. These orders act as deterrents because the possibility 
of receiving a sentence may act as an incentive for an offender to abide by the bond 
conditions and refrain from committing further offences. An order of dismissal of a 
charge is also aimed at deterrence. Since it is mandatory that a caution or admonition 
must be given in cases of dismissal,291 dismissal acts as a warning to an accused, thereby 
creating a possibility that he will refrain from committing further crimes. Courts usually 
dismiss charges in dealing with minor offences committed in extenuating circumstances. 
Dismissal would also be appropriate for offences of vagrancy, loitering (or being an idle 
and disorderly person), nuisances by drunken persons and other offences which are in 
fact more properly seen as social problems than criminal behaviour.  
It may be argued that section 337 is a reaffirmation of well-established sentencing 
principles in as far as aggravating and mitigating factors are concerned. However, the 
                                                 
287 Section 337(1) of the CPEC. Emphasis supplied. See also section 24 of the Local Courts Act providing 
for a similar provision in relation to local courts. 
288 Section 337(1)(b) of the CPEC. 
289 See section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, Chapter 9:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
290 Section 341(1) of the CPEC. 
291 Rep v Ng’oma Confirmation Case No 988 of 2007. 
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provision depicts a departure from sentencing principles in that it allows a court to 
consider the relevant sentencing factors in the alternative and make an order which may 
otherwise be seen as manifestly inadequate. This is evident from the wording of the 
opening paragraph of section 337(1). Ordinarily, mitigating factors cannot be considered 
independently of the seriousness of an offence; the significance of mitigating factors is 
diminished when the offence is very serious. However, section 337 makes it possible for 
a court to isolate mitigating factors from the seriousness of an offence. This is well 
demonstrated in Mulinganiza where an 82 year old and terminally ill murder convict was 
discharged.292 The court, noting that imprisonment would be an inappropriate penalty in 
the circumstances, said that it was 
concerned with the welfare of the convict and this is the time that the court should be enticed to 
employ humanitarian considerations as the circumstances dictate or demand. This is the whole 
purpose of section 337 of the [Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code] which should be 
considered and facts in issue examined regardless of the seriousness of the offence. The court 
cannot afford to be impersonal, for if it were so, then genuine justice would fail to be attained.293 
This shows that section 337 permits a court to focus on the circumstances of an 
offender in deciding how to deal with him. This depicts allowance for non-retributive 
ways of dealing with offenders. Further, it recognises that crime may be influenced by 
social factors such as home surroundings. 
                                                 
292 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010.  
293 Rep v Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 7. Emphasis supplied. 
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5 ASSESSMENT OF THE FORMS OF PUNISHMENT 
5.1 The death penalty 
The moratorium on the death penalty in Malawi is consistent with the global trend 
towards the abolition of the death penalty. Even though the death penalty may not be 
outlawed any time soon, it is clear from the preceding discussion that the restrictions on 
the death penalty in Malawi reflect a number of international standards. For example, 
the law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for offences committed by persons 
below the age of 18. Further, the exclusion of pregnant women from the application of 
the death penalty in section 26(4) of the Penal Code and section 328 of the CPEC 
resonates with international standards such as article 30(1)(e) of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children‟s Charter).294 With regard to 
procedural safeguards, the Constitution itself proscribes the arbitrary deprivation of life. 
This entails that it would be unlawful to impose a death sentence without compliance 
with a fair trial. In addition, death sentences are automatically considered for mercy 
through section 326 of the CPEC. Further, the abolition of mandatory death sentences 
in Malawi is a milestone in restricting the application of the death penalty in Malawi. 
However, there are several problems with the application of the death penalty in 
Malawi. For one thing, it cannot be said that death sentences are an „exceptional 
measure‟ because the scope of crimes in Malawian law exceeds the bounds of 
internationally acceptable capital crimes. Of the 12 capital crimes, only genocide and 
murder can be classified as serious crimes by international standards. Even then, 
genocide, regardless of whether killing was involved, is not a capital crime in 
international criminal law. This puts the imposition of the death penalty for genocide in 
                                                 
294 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
176 
Malawi at odds with the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)295 to 
which Malawi has been a party since 2002.296 Paradoxically, since murder is a capital 
crime in Malawi, the scheme of the Penal Code would be questionable if genocide 
involving killing were not punishable with death.  
For another thing, the law does not clearly distinguish non-capital from capital murder. 
The same applies to all the offences punishable with death, except treason, since the law 
puts death at par with life imprisonment. The absence of any stipulation on how courts 
must approach offences punishable with death and life imprisonment in the alternative 
gives too much leeway to courts in deciding the circumstances when death is not only 
the appropriate sentence but also whether it is the applicable maximum sentence. Worse 
still, courts have not paid much attention to the availability of life imprisonment in the 
penal provisions of capital offences. That murder is punishable with „death or life 
imprisonment‟ belies the recognition that this offence may be adequately punished with 
different punishment depending on the circumstances of the case.  
Moreover, sentencing trends discussed above raise doubts as to whether death sentences 
are reserved for exceptional cases. Although death is now rarely imposed, most of the 
death sentences that the MSCA has upheld do not fit the category of the worst of the 
cases of murder. Mitigating circumstances are rarely fully addressed during sentencing 
and there are inconsistencies in the weight given to factors such as youth. This is 
notwithstanding the insistence in several cases that death, as a maximum sentence, must 
be imposed rarely and in the worst instance of an offence.  
                                                 
295 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1998. 
296 The Rome Statute does not have domestic force in Malawi: see Nkhata (2011) 277. 
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Furthermore, the alternatives for children and pregnant women found guilty of capital 
crimes are not immune from criticism.  For children, the mandatory alternative of 
detention at the pleasure of the President raises a number of constitutional concerns, 
the full consideration of which is beyond the scope of this study. It is sufficient to point 
out that this penalty is inconsistent with international human rights standards on the 
imprisonment of children297 and indeed the Constitution.298 It is therefore regrettable 
that in a decision that has been criticised on a number of grounds,299 the 
constitutionality of detention at the President‟s pleasure was unsuccessfully challenged 
in Moyo v Attorney General.300 
With regard to pregnant women, it is important to mention that the overall impression 
from section 26(4) of the Penal Code and sections 327(4)301 and 328 of the CPEC is that 
life imprisonment is mandatory for pregnant women convicted of capital offences. As 
such, these provisions violate the right to a fair trial. The Malawi Law Commission 
made it clear that what is now section 327(4) would need to be amended should the 
recommendation on the removal of mandatory death sentences be passed.302 The 
Commission‟s expectation was not just that the imposition of the life sentences would 
be discretionary but also that such an amendment would entail that the imposition of 
life imprisonment in lieu of a death sentence was not only be applicable to pregnant 
                                                 
297 See Odhiambo (2005) 387-388. 
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women. As argued in chapter three,303 the exclusion of pregnant women from the 
application of the death penalty offends the right to equality. 
Actually, the Law Commission was aware of the discriminatory undertones of the law in 
this regard. It noted that section 327(4) of the CPEC  
is discriminatory between a pregnant woman and other women convicted of the same 
offence. The pregnant woman may get away with life imprisonment after giving birth 
while as the other women who may give birth before sentencing is not afforded the 
same treatment.304 
Surprisingly, the Commission found solace in the fact that murder would be punishable 
with death or life imprisonment should the Penal Code Amendment Bill305 be passed 
because that would mean that life imprisonment is available to all women depending on 
the circumstances of each case.306 With respect, this reasoning is unconvincing. For 
instance, it is injudicious to refrain from amending an impugned provision in the hope 
that such an amendment will be made if another proposed amendment is adopted. It 
should be remembered that the mandatory death penalty for murder was still in force at 
the time when the CPEC Review Report and the 2004 CPEC Amendment Bill (CPEC 
Bill) were drafted since neither had the Penal Code Bill been passed nor Kafantayeni 
decided. The CPEC Bill was passed in 2010 and the Penal Code Amendment Act 
followed in 2011. As noted in chapter five, the Penal Code has retained the mandatory 
death penalty for treason. The implication is that there is no compelling reason to 
amend section 327(4). Possibly due to the fact that in practice only the mandatory death 
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penalty for murder was used, the Commission clearly overlooked the fact that section 
327 does not only apply to murder cases but to „[e]very case where a woman is 
convicted of an offence punishable with death‟.307 It is important to mention that 
beyond the mandatory death sentence scenario, the automatic imposition of life 
sentences on pregnant women would be indefensible. The wording of the relevant 
provisions in the Penal Code and CPEC should therefore be amended to reflect their 
application to mandatory death sentences. The same goes for section 26(3). Better to do 
this though unlikely than have drawn out procedure of court appeal. 
The failure of the Law Commission to recommend an amendment to section 327(4) of 
the CPEC also means that it did not recognise the problems with prescribing a penalty 
of „death or life imprisonment‟ without further guidance on the circumstances in which 
an offence should attract death or life.308 Even if all mandatory death sentences were 
abolished such that life imprisonment remained open to all women and indeed all 
offenders, the integrally discriminatory nature of section 26(4) of the Penal Code and 
section 327(4) and 328 of the CPEC would not disappear. More crucially, the 
Commission disregarded the core of its own argument which was that pregnant women 
are unjustifiably favoured by the law. This argument turns on the realisation that it is the 
discriminatory exposure to the death penalty that is unjustifiable and not necessarily the 
fact that life imprisonment was not available to all offenders, male or female, convicted 
of capital crimes. Therefore, the fact that life imprisonment is now a competent penalty 
for murder does not resolve the matter because unless an offender is a pregnant woman 
at the time of sentencing, the death penalty may be imposed on him or her. This will be 
the case for all capital crimes.  
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A further issue which arises with regard to the exclusion of pregnant women from the 
application of the death penalty is how the MSCA must proceed where it finds that an 
appellant was pregnant at the time of sentencing in the trial court but is not pregnant at 
the time of appeal. Should the death penalty exemption apply in such cases? It appears 
that there would be no reasons to save an appellant in such cases. In fact, section 327(4) 
assumes that an appellant is still pregnant at the time of sentencing and requires that the 
MSCA must set aside the death penalty if it finds that „the woman is pregnant‟.309 
The issue here is that pregnancy does not appear to be a justifiable reason for excluding 
women from the death penalty in toto. Indeed, as the Commission itself pointed out, 
„even the argument that the law seeks to protect the life of the unborn child and to 
afford a pregnant woman a chance to take care of her child cannot justify this 
disparity‟.310 After all, a child born before sentencing would also need care depending on 
its age. Mindful that the Affiliation Act311 required that a child should be maintained up 
to the age of 16 years, the Commission also added that the real issue is whether „a 
mother is expected to look after the child while in prison‟.312 The answer to this is 
obviously in the negative since a child is only allowed in prison until it is weaned.313 
Moreover, prisons are not safe places for pregnant women, let alone babies or young 
children, and it is undesirable to separate babies and young children from their 
                                                 
309 Emphasis supplied. It is evident that section 327(4) was wrongly drafted in the 2010 CPEC; the words 
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mother.314 It becomes increasingly evident then that the rationale for the proscription of 
imposing the death penalty on pregnant women loses its force in the face of such 
pronouncements.  
One might argue that the Commission was in a difficult position because removing the 
protection afforded to pregnant women would have meant expanding the scope of the 
death penalty in Malawi. However, a restriction which is ultimately discriminatory is 
undesirable. Accordingly, short of abolition of the death penalty, the exclusion of 
pregnant women only from execution as provided in articles 6(5) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)315 and 4(2)(j) of the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa316 is 
preferable. 
A further shortfall from international standards on the death penalty is that Malawian 
law does not have a maximum age for offenders who may be sentenced to death. There 
are also reports that some death row inmates were sentenced to death for murder 
committed before they attained the age of 18 years.317 In addition, while mentally ill 
offenders are not criminally responsible for their actions and those with diminished 
responsibility may only be convicted of manslaughter (and therefore suffer life 
imprisonment at worst), the law does not explicitly prohibit the imposition of the death 
penalty on offenders with mental illness if the condition develops after commission of 
the crime. Further, the principle of diminished responsibility, as codified in section 
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214A of the Penal Code, only applies to murder suspects. Other offenders with 
diminished responsibility remain at risk of a death sentence. Indeed, there are reports of 
mentally ill prisoners on death row,318 though it is unclear if their conditions arose 
before or after sentencing. With one state psychiatrist,319 the availability of psychiatric 
reports on the mental state of an offender remains a big challenge in Malawi. 
Practice also casts serious doubt on Malawi‟s compliance with respect for fair trial rights 
in capital trials. For instance, lengthy pre-trial and post-trial detention in despicable 
prison conditions, and insufficiency and ineffectiveness of legal aid services320 are 
inconsistent with international standards on the death penalty and also section 19 of the 
Constitution. Legal aid is in general only available in murder trials in the court of first 
instance.321 In addition, prison conditions are unspeakable and have been held to 
amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.322 Despite a court order to 
improve prison conditions,323 they remain unacceptably poor.324 Some prisoners spend 
between one month and two years on death row before their sentences are commuted 
to life.325 Prisoners under sentence of death are kept „literally in the shadow of the 
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gallows‟ at Zomba Central Prison.326 In line with the Prisons Act, they are segregated 
from other prisoners and, ordinarily, may only have access to prison officers, a visiting 
justice and a religious minister.327 Access to a lawyer, relatives and friends is subject to 
the approval of and conditions set by the Commissioner of Prisons (Commissioner).328 
These restrictions reflect the law in 1968 which cannot pass constitutional muster in 
view of the right to dignity and a fair trial. These circumstances render the application of 
the death penalty arbitrary. 
The arbitrary application of the death penalty may also be heightened by the changing 
attitudes of judicial officers towards the death penalty. As noted earlier, some judges 
have openly stated their opposition to the death penalty. Needless to say, judges who are 
not in favour of the death penalty rule it out as a competent sentence for capital crimes. 
Of course, as Terblanche329 tells us, the personal and philosophical differences of 
judicial officers are „an inevitable yet unfortunate‟ factor in sentencing which „is unfair 
and unjust‟ as it has nothing do with the crime and infringes the right to equality.330 Few 
can dispute that magistrates also hold different views regarding the justifiability of the 
death penalty. Consequently, when faced with the capital crimes of rape, robbery, 
burglary or housebreaking, sentencing will differ. In addition, since magistrates cannot 
impose a death sentence, the referral of cases to the High Court for sentencing where 
death is considered to be an appropriate penalty will only be made by magistrates who 
are not opposed to the death sentence. Ultimately, offenders sentenced by magistrates 
opposed to the death penalty, and whose sentences are not remitted for sentencing to 
                                                 
326 Babcock and McLaughlin (2013), who note that some cells have a direct view of the gallows. 
327 Sections 104 and 105 of the Prisons Act. 
328 Section 105 of the Prisons Act. 
329 Terblanche (2007). 
330 Terblanche (2007) 118-119. 
184 
the High Court, will irreversibly be saved from the death penalty because an appellate or 
reviewing court‟s penal jurisdiction is limited to that of the trial court. The thrust of this 
argument is that the differing views of judicial officers serve to amplify the arbitrariness 
of the death penalty because its imposition may be determined by chance. While the 
perceptions of judicial officers regarding punishment influence their use of almost all 
forms of punishment, it is particularly worrying when such perceptions are openly held 
and allowed to determine whether an offender lives or dies. This is supported by 
Chaskalson P when he said in S v Makwanyane:331 
[T]here cannot be perfect equality as between accused persons in the conduct and outcome of 
criminal trials. We have to accept these differences in the ordinary criminal cases that come 
before the courts, even to the extent that some may go to gaol when others similarly placed may 
be acquitted or receive non-custodial sentences. But death is different, and the question is, 
whether this is acceptable when the difference is between life and death. Unjust imprisonment is 
a great wrong, but if it is discovered, the prisoner can be released and compensated; but the 
killing of an innocent person is irremediable. 
In the same case, Sachs J observed:332  
A level of arbitrariness and the possibilities of mistake that might be inescapable and therefore 
tolerable in relation to other forms of punishment, burst the parameters of constitutionality 
when they impact on the deliberate taking of life. 
It must be concluded then that just as the constitutional sanction in section 16 does not 
permit mandatory death sentences, it also does not permit the arbitrariness that would 
manifest where the risk that an offender may be sentenced to death rests in the identity 
of the judge who tries and sentences him. It is therefore worth considering whether a 
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judge who is openly opposed to the death penalty should in fact preside over capital 
offences.  
The death penalty in Malawi is also susceptible to arbitrariness because of the „death or 
life imprisonment‟ dichotomy.333 The absence of legislative or judicial guidance on this 
matter, coupled with the fact that courts are not diligent or aware of the problem with 
this dichotomy, means that an offender does not really know whether he is facing a 
death sentence or life imprisonment. Indeed, even after being sentenced, an offender 
may never really know whether the sentence was based on the maximum of death or life 
imprisonment.  
There are also several problems with the right to seek mercy. The dictates of section 326 
of the CPEC, which require referral of every deaths sentence to the President, are not 
borne out in practice. Incredibly, court clerks and judges alike are unaware of their 
duties under this provision.334 The Law Commission believes that the non-compliance 
with this provision is also partly attributable to the moratorium on the death penalty and 
the automatic commutation of all death sentences to life imprisonment which „makes 
the whole exercise fruitless‟.335 Notwithstanding this, even if section 326 were complied 
with to the letter, problems would still abound. For instance, it does not require that 
prisoners on death row must be informed of the procedure; it does not give them any 
role in the process; it does not make the judge‟s recommendations available to 
prisoners; and it fails to prescribe the timeframes dictating when the record must be 
forwarded to the President and when the President must make a decision. This falls 
short of the international standards by a large margin. Ultimately, arbitrariness cannot be 
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excluded from the death penalty in Malawi because of the manner in which the 
prerogative of mercy is exercised.336 
While section 326 of the Penal Code may be commended for ensuring that all death 
sentences are considered for mercy, the fact that the mandatory death penalty is no 
longer applicable detracts from the propriety of this provision. This is because unlike 
mandatory sentences which are imposed in spite of what a court deems to be the right 
sentence, discretionary sentences are imposed after careful examination of the 
circumstances of the case as whole. As such, a death sentence may now only be imposed 
where a judge is satisfied that it is the appropriate penalty. It is therefore difficult to 
require a judge to then make recommendations to inform the exercise of the prerogative 
of mercy. After all, with the suspension of jury trials in Malawi,337 judges are unlikely to 
form a different view of a case from that which is on record. Therefore, a better 
position would be to simply require that a copy of the record should be sent to the 
President.  
With regard to offenders sentenced to death under the DFA, the exception to the right 
to appeal death sentences and seek mercy in section 150 of the DFA is undesirable for a 
number of reasons. For example, it is inconsistent with the right to seek mercy 
recognised in international human rights law. It also deprives an offender of the right to 
appeal and therefore violates the right to appeal and access to justice. Furthermore, it 
unfairly discriminates between offenders sentenced under the DFA and the Penal Code. 
Moreover, the proviso may be regarded as an unconstitutional limitation on the pardon 
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power of the President. On a different note, the DFA does not provide a mechanism 
through which death sentences may be referred to the President in accordance with 
section 112 of the Act.338 This raises uncertainty as to how offenders sentenced under 
the DFA may be considered for mercy. 
While the disappearance of mandatory death sentences brings Malawi a step closer to 
the total abolition of death penalty, the immediate challenge is to ensure that 
resentencing is done timeously. The continued detention of offenders sentenced under 
the mandatory death penalty regime raises other constitutional violations such as 
unlawful detention and unreasonable delay in sentencing contrary to the right to fair 
trial. The Malawi Human Rights Commission has rightly observed that the continued 
confinement of these prisoners violates the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment „by subjecting the prisoners to psychological and 
mental torture‟.339 
Of further concern is that so far, the majority of the reviews of mandatory death 
sentences have been done through appeals in the MSCA which does not provide an 
opportunity to present mitigating evidence but relies on factors that existed during the 
trial.340 Technically, the cases reviewed by the MSCA can still be brought before the 
High Court, as the trial court, for resentencing and be taken on appeal to the MSCA. 
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This is because in view of Kafantayeni, every pre-2007 death sentence is subject to 
resentencing. Otherwise, the review by the MSCA deprives the appellants of the benefit 
of Kafantayeni and curtails the right to appeal to a higher court. Further, in the MSCA, 
the state does not have to advance reasons as to why the death penalty must be upheld. 
As a general principle of sentencing, the onus is on the appellant to show why the court 
must tamper with the sentence and, as with all appeals against sentencing, there is a 
presumption in favour of a sentence imposed by a trial court.341 Consequently, an 
offender bears the burden of showing the court why the sentence must be reduced. The 
MSCA has not departed from this practice in its review of mandatory death sentences. 
As a result, the state is largely absolved of its duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that the death penalty is justifiable in the case at hand. This is inconsistent with the spirit 
of Kafantayeni. 
Despite these problematic features of the death penalty in Malawi, it is heartening that 
Malawi has maintained an unbroken moratorium on executions for the past 22 years. 
However, given that the moratorium is unofficial and survives only on the political will 
and religious convictions of the President, there is a real danger of a resumption of 
executions. Furthermore, it is as a result of the death penalty that most prisoners are 
serving life sentences in Malawi through the prerogative of mercy. The retention of the 
death penalty in Malawi now hangs on mere public opinion and it is doubtful whether 
public opinion may change any time soon. However, this justification for the retention 
of the death penalty is conspicuously questionable because it goes without saying that 
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public opinion is not in favour of the moratorium on executions either and yet that has 
not been cited as a reason for resuming executions. In any case, in a constitutional 
democracy, the basis for deciding whether a person lives or dies cannot rest on public 
opinion. 
Overall, it can be said that Malawi does satisfy most of the international law restrictions 
on the death penalty. It appears that it is more in the practice than the law that Malawi 
fails to meet international and constitutional standards. 
5.2 Imprisonment 
The discussion on imprisonment demonstrates that this penalty is mainly imposed for 
retribution, community protection (public safety) and deterrence. It is commendable 
that Malawian law proscribes the imprisonment of persons below the age of 18 years in 
any circumstances. Further, the country has taken steps to reduce institutionalised 
imprisonment through the recent introduction of periodic imprisonment which causes 
less disruption to an offender‟s life during the course of punishment. However, in its 
current form, periodic imprisonment can be criticised in that it can only benefit 
employed offenders. It is therefore discriminatory based on employment status. This 
puts unemployed offenders and those who lose their jobs upon conviction at a 
disadvantage. Typically, offenders convicted of offences such as theft by servant, abuse 
of office, corruption and other job related offences are likely to lose their jobs after 
conviction thus not entitled to make an application for intermittent imprisonment. 
Furthermore, since section 28(A) of the Penal Code is discretionary, a court may decide 
in favour of continuous imprisonment despite the conditions set out in section 28A 
being met. The use of periodic imprisonment may also be limited by the fact that it may 
only be imposed on application and consent by an offender. This is primarily because 
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most offenders in Malawi are illiterate, uneducated and generally not conversant with 
legal provisions. As such, very few offenders will apply for periodic imprisonment. It is, 
therefore, suggested that a court must have the power to invoke section 28(A) on its 
own motion as is the case with all penalties. Since an offender would not normally apply 
for periodic imprisonment if he were unwilling to serve it, the requirement for consent 
is apparently redundant. In any case, it is very unlikely that an offender would opt for 
continuous imprisonment instead of periodic imprisonment of the same length.  
Regarding the use of imprisonment, it is worrisome that imprisonment is applicable to 
the majority of offences in the Penal Code, including those not serious enough to 
warrant a custodial punishment such as vagrancy342 and being an idle and disorderly 
person.343 It is also disquieting that default imprisonment is readily imposed by courts, 
resulting in an increased use of imprisonment. An even more tenacious challenge to 
imprisonment in Malawi is the limited availability of rehabilitative programmes in 
prisons across the country. This may pose problems for the early release of prisoners 
since rehabilitation is supposably a factor that informs pardon process.344 
5.2.1 Preventive sentences 
There are also a number of problematic issues with regard to preventive imprisonment, 
some of which have constitutional implications. For instance, since a preventive 
sentence may exceed the maximum provided for an offence, an offender may be treated 
more severely than an offender who has committed the offence in the worst form. 
There are also concerns regarding the criteria for preventive sentences which may 
impact the right to equality. For example, the application of preventive sentences may 
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also apply to various offenders because there are many crimes that are punishable with 
five years, the most common of which is simple theft.345 For instance, an offender with 
three theft convictions in respect of the theft of cell phones and who has served 
immediate imprisonment on two occasion for these offences faces a possible 14 year 
prison sentence.  On the other hand, an offender who has three rape convictions and 
who has served 8 year sentences in each instance may be excused from the application 
on the ground that he was convicted by a second grade magistrate in one or both cases. 
It is unclear why convictions by second grade magistrates do not count towards 
convictions relevant to preventive sentences yet they can impose sentences of up to 10 
years.346 The result is that an offender may be exempt from preventive sentencing 
simply because he was previously convicted by a court of a second grade magistrate.  
This may introduce arbitrariness in the application of preventive sentences because the 
allocation of cases in the magistrate courts does not take into account such 
consequences.  
Preventive sentences also infringe the prohibition of cruel and inhuman punishment 
and the right to dignity. The public protection element in section 11 of the CPEC entails 
that a court must go beyond the punishment deserved for the offence committed, 
resulting in harsh punishment that is disproportional to the offence and inconsistent 
with the prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment. Moreover, section 11 also 
violates the right to liberty to the extent that it allows for punishment beyond that which 
is proportionate to the offence committed. Liberty can only be lawfully deprived on a 
justifiable cause. Since an offence is the cause that makes imprisonment of an offender 
justifiable, only a prison term that is proportional to the offence renders imprisonment 
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justifiable.347 The right to human dignity is also violated where preventive imprisonment 
exceeds the punishment that an offender deserves for the offence committed. As 
Ackerman J succinctly stated in S v Dodo:348 
To attempt to justify any period of penal incarceration … without inquiring into the 
proportionality between the offence and the period of imprisonment, is to ignore, if not to deny, 
that which lies at the very heart of human dignity … Where the length of a sentence, which has 
been imposed because of its general deterrent effect on others, bears no relation to the gravity of 
the offence … the offender is being used essentially as a means to another end and the 
offender‟s dignity assailed. So too where the reformative effect of the punishment is 
predominant and the offender sentenced to lengthy imprisonment, principally because he cannot 
be reformed in a shorter period, but the length of imprisonment bears no relationship to what 
the committed offence merits. 
The harshness of preventive imprisonment is also aggravated by the fact that it is not 
subject to review; it must be served in full unless remission or pardon is granted.349 
Therefore, it does not accommodate the objective of rehabilitation and allows the 
continued detention of an offender even when he is no longer a danger to community 
protection. As argued in chapter three,350 this is inconsistent with the right to liberty 
which requires that continued detention must be matched with continued justification 
for deprivation of liberty must exist throughout the period of detention. As held in 
Rameka et al v New Zealand,351 a once-off decision is not enough; to avoid arbitrariness, 
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there is need for regular periodic review of the sentence once the punitive element has 
been served. 
Another problem with preventive imprisonment in Malawi is that in terms of its 
execution, the law does not distinguish between the punitive and preventive periods of 
such sentences. This means that an offender is never relieved of the conditions of a 
punitive sentence even during the preventive part of the sentence. As such, the 
observation made in Rameka et al v New Zealand that the distinction between the 
„punitive‟ and „preventive‟ periods of preventive sentences has no practical significance 
is true of the situation in Malawi. Section 11 therefore becomes problematic in two 
ways: it allows punishment beyond that which is proportional to the offence committed 
and punishes an offender for offences which it is feared might occur in the future. This 
infringes not only the presumption of innocence and the principle of legality but also 
the settled sentencing principle that an offender must only be punished for offences 
charged, pleaded to and proved beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law.  
A further problem with preventive sentences is that they are based on the premise that 
an offender is likely to commit further offences and that his detention is necessary for 
incapacitation. The criteria for making such an assessment are so unsatisfactory as to 
render the detention arbitrary in respect of the period for community protection. Courts 
rarely, if ever, benefit from expert testimony on an offender‟s behavioural dispositions 
that may affect his criminality and propensity to commit further crime. It is unsurprising 
then that courts have not developed any comprehensive criteria for deciding the 
dangerousness of an offender. The law also omits to provide any substantive guidance 
on such criteria. Section 11 is therefore inconsistent with the Constitution and 
international standards. 
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5.2.2 Life imprisonment 
Regarding life imprisonment, Malawian law aptly reflects the international human rights 
law requirement that persons below the age of 18 years should be exempted from whole 
life sentences. However, as is the case with the death penalty, the scope of crimes that 
are punishable with death is inconsistent with international standards as explained in 
chapter three. While some offences like murder and manslaughter are within the 
category of serious offences as required by international law, there are several other 
offences that do not fit into this category. These include forgery of wills or documents 
of title to land, judicial record, power of attorney, bank note, currency note, bill of 
exchange, or promissory note, judicial records and bank notes; rioting after 
proclamation and related offences such as demolishing buildings; stupefying in order to 
commit felony or misdemeanour; causing or committing an act intended to cause 
grievous harm or prevent arrest; theft by public servant; destroying or damaging a river 
bank or wall, navigation works or bridges; counterfeiting coins and making preparations 
for coining; illegal possession of Indian hemp and rescuing or attempting to rescue from 
lawful custody a person sentenced to death or imprisonment for life or charged with an 
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offence punishable with death or life.352 The application of life sentences to these 
offences is disproportionate and amounts to cruel and inhuman punishment.353 
This problem is slightly offset by the fact that in practice, life sentences are reserved for 
murder and that the sentencing trends as discussed above indicate that courts often 
refrain from imposing life sentences. However, in the cases that life sentences have been 
imposed, it appears that courts have focussed more on the seriousness of an offence 
than the circumstances of an offender. As a result, the dangerousness of an offender is 
not the main factor in deciding whether to impose a life sentence. An offender‟s 
capacity to reform has also not been given adequate attention. Furthermore, unlike the 
case with the death penalty, courts have not stressed that life imprisonment should be 
restricted to the worst instance of an offence. This is probably due to the fact that life 
imprisonment is provided as an alternative to the death penalty, a dichotomy which, as 
noted earlier,354 is yet to receive any judicial attention. Consequently, life sentences are 
imposed under the misapprehension that they are lenient sentences as compared to the 
death penalty. This is in contrast to the wording of section 210 of the Penal Code and 
fails to give life imprisonment careful attention as a severe form of punishment. As aptly 
                                                 
352 The offences punishable with life in Malawi can be found in sections 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 54, 77, 78, 79, 
114(1)(a), 210, 211, 217A(2)(a), 301, 357, 358, , 114(1)(1), 133, 134, 138, 157, 209, 211, 223, 228, 231, 233, 
235, 236, 237, 261, 283(4), 301(2), 302(2), 309(1) and (2), 337, 341, 344(2), 344(3), 372 and 373 of the 
Penal Code; and regulation 19(1) as read with section 4(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Chapter 35:02 of 
the Laws of Malawi. The Defence Force Act Chapter 12:01 of the Laws of Malawi, as amended by Act 
No 11 of 2004 (DFA), has three offences that are punishable with life: aiding the enemy; unauthorised 
communication with the enemy; and failure to suppress mutiny: see sections 33(1), 34(2) and 41 of the 
Act.  
353 See Van Zyl Smit (1995), arguing that the prohibition of cruel and inhuman punishment covers two 
scenarios: punishments which are barbaric in themselves and those that are disproportionate to a 
particular offence. 
354 See sections 2.4.2 and 3.4.4 above. 
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argued by Van Zyl Smit, life imprisonment is a severe punishment „because of its 
potential to deny liberty indefinitely; this calls for vigilant consideration of the 
circumstances in which it is used so as to limit it to the most serious cases‟.355 
The definitional issues with life imprisonment in Malawi are also problematic. The fact 
that children may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
release356 may insinuate that adult offenders may be sentenced to whole life sentences. 
However, the view that life imprisonment means that an offender will spend the rest of 
his life in prison regardless of whether he continues to pose a danger to society is 
inconsistent with rehabilitation and the regular review of long-term prisoners required in 
section 111 of the Prisons Act. It is also at odds with international standards. As 
explained in chapter three,357 international human rights law dictates that while life 
imprisonment per se is consistent with human rights, whole life sentences are inimical to 
the right to liberty and dignity, and the prohibition against cruel and degrading 
punishment. As held by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, „it is the 
possibility of parole which saves a sentence of life imprisonment from being cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment‟.358 
Regrettably, the view that life imprisonment means a whole-life sentence is borne out in 
practice since courts do not set a tariff period for life sentences and they are not 
reviewed periodically as required by the Prisons Act. While some solace can be found in 
                                                 
355 Van Zyl Smit (2006). 
356 See section 42(2)(g) of the Constitution. 
357 See section 3.3.2 of chapter three.  
358 Bull and Another v The State 221/2000 [2001] ZASCA 105 (26 September 2001) para 23. See also S v 
Tcoeib 1996 (1) SACR 390 (NmS) 399. Cf S v Tjijo (unreported but quoted extensively in S v Tcoeib 1993 (1) 
SACR 275 (NmS) 275-276) where Levy J did not consider the possibility of release as mitigating the 
severity of life imprisonment. 
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the fact that life sentences are rarely imposed, it is within the understanding of life 
imprisonment as a whole life sentence that courts impose such lengthy sentences as 35 
years. Such sentences are inconsistent with rehabilitation and the right to dignity and 
amount to cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment because they often exceed the 
life expectancy of an offender and ultimately mean that an offender will never have a 
chance to gain his freedom at the end of his sentence.359 
Defining life imprisonment in terms of life expectancy may also have its own 
complications. For instance, with the life expectancy of 58 years for men and 60 years 
for women as was the case in Malawi in 2012, a life sentence for a 20 year old offender 
would, depending on an offender‟s gender, mean 38 or 40 years while for a 50 year old 
offender it would be eight or 10 years. The meaning of a life sentence would also vary 
depending on the age of an offender. This raises issues with the right to equality in that 
life imprisonment would mean different things depending on not only whether an 
offender is male or female but also the age at which an offender is sentenced.360 In 
addition, should the life expectancy drop in future, the meaning of life imprisonment 
would also have to change. This would mean that a drop in life expectancy may at some 
point imply that life imprisonment would be as low as 10 or 15 years. Likewise, an 
increase in the life expectancy would entail a redefinition of a life sentence. In turn, 
                                                 
359 See Nkosi and Others v S [2002] JOL 10209(SCA) 1, where the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
set aside sentences of 120 years, 65 years and 45 years. See also Mhlakaza and Others v S 1997 (1) SACR 
515 (SCA) where sentences of 47 years and 38 years were found to be excessive. The sentences set aside 
in these cases were apparently symptomatic of judicial attempts to sidestep the tariff for life 
imprisonment. With the death penalty no longer available in South Africa (see S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) 
SA 391 (CC)), the maximum sentence was life imprisonment which carried a 20-year tariff. To ensure that 
serious offenders were not released back into society through parole, courts imposed lengthy sentences as 
a subtle alternative to life imprisonment, courts resorted to imposing lengthy sentences as a subtle 
alternative to life sentences: see Mujuzi (2008) 24-25. 
360 See Mujuzi (2009) 352. 
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sentences that are close to a „life sentence‟ would be rendered unlawful and even 
unconstitutional since as maximums they must be invoked only in the worst instance of 
an offence. Ultimately, it would be unlawful to sentence an offender whose age is above 
the life expectancy to imprisonment, let alone life imprisonment, as it would amount to 
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment or a manifestly excessive sentence. More 
importantly, the certainty of life imprisonment could be undermined if it were 
dependent on a variable factor like life expectancy. This outcome would be inconsistent 
with the principle of legality which requires that the law must clearly declare a 
punishment in advance. In this case, legality requires that the meaning of life 
imprisonment must be clearly prescribed by law and not in terms of the life expectancy. 
It can therefore be concluded that but for the prohibition of whole life sentences on 
children, life imprisonment in Malawi largely falls short of constitutional and 
international standards. There are also gaps between international standards for 
preventive sentences and the situation in Malawi. 
5.3 Non-custodial sanctions 
Malawian courts have an opportunity to obviate imprisonment in punishing offenders 
through several non-custodial penalties such as community service andpolice 
supervision. However, in practice, the use of these measures is at a low. This is due to 
several factors. For instance, courts often resort to non-custodial sanctions in minor 
offences committed by young and first offenders.361 Furthermore, the law and 
sentencing guidelines restrict the use of most non-custodial penalties to minor offences. 
Moreover, the law reduces some sentences such as community service to mere 
                                                 
361 See section 4 above. 
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conditions on which a fine or imprisonment may be suspended.362 This implies that 
imprisonment is the first port of call and that it will most likely be served in default. 
Furthermore, judicial perceptions of the effectiveness of community sanctions also 
stifles the application of these measures in practice.363 
Although not often invoked, police supervision also raises a number of issues. To start 
with, the liberty of an offender is greatly limited by this penalty in light of the conditions 
applicable,364 more so since supervision can last for up to five years after the expiry of 
prison sentence.365 The Law Commission is of the view that this restriction of liberty is 
justifiable because police supervision „seeks to assist the police in crime prevention 
especially in view of the fact that there are some offenders, such as sexual offenders, 
                                                 
362 In practice, community service is imposed as an independent penalty, usually with a default sentence of 
imprisonment This position is also insinuated by the Form CS/1 of the Community Service (General) 
Rules GN 34/2000 which states that a court „should estimate the custody time the offender would serve if 
community service were not an option‟. The form further states that no estimation should be made if the 
offence would not normally involve custody „but rather a fine, probation, etc‟. Community service is also 
listed as a substantive penalty in section 25(j) of the Penal Code. 
363 The effectiveness of community sanctions is questionable in view of challenges in implementation: see 
Kishindo (2012) 40-62, who states that community service is fraught with myriad obstacles such as poor 
supervision and coordination due to lack of resources. This results in some offenders absconding their 
punishment unnoticed. 
364 In terms of sections 343(1) and (2), a person subject to police supervision is required to personally 
report to the nearest police station once a month and to inform the police of his place of residence and 
any changes to it. The execution of and other conditions applicable to police supervision are stipulated in 
the Criminal Procedure (Police Supervision) Rules GN 12 of 1939. The proposals of the Malawi Law 
Commission to amend the rules (see the CPEC Review Report, 190 -193) were not adopted in the 2010 
amendment of the CPEC. As such, police supervision is still governed by 1939 rules. This anomaly 
appears to be inadvertent as it can be traced to the omission of the proposed amendments in the CPEC 
Bill. 
365 See section 342(1) of the CPEC. 
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with a tendency to repeat their crimes‟.366 This rationale serves to show that in its 
current form, police supervision is arbitrary in that it is applicable to all offences 
punishable with at least three years‟ imprisonment. Moreover, a court is not required to 
assess the likelihood of re-offending when imposing the penalty. Indeed, the fact that 
the sentence is imposed at the same time as the original sentence precludes a court from 
making a meaningful assessment of the likelihood of re-offending. There will always be 
a chance, no matter how slim, that an offender may come out of a prison a changed 
man. Therefore, the restriction on the right to liberty is unjustifiable since, as argued in 
chapter three, it is not based on the dangerousness of an offender. 
The arbitrariness of police supervision is further brought to bear in instances where an 
offender serves a long prison sentence or consecutive sentences resulting in a long stay 
in custody. In addition, a reading of the CPEC (Police Supervision) Rules shows that the 
measure is wholly punitive and a mimic of pre-trial bail conditions; police supervision 
merely subjects an offender to present himself to the police and notify the police of his 
residence. There is no provision that may enhance the rehabilitation or reformation of 
an offender. The question must also be asked whether the Malawi Police Service is the 
right institution to administer post-sentence supervision of an offender. The police in 
Malawi are understaffed and ill-equipped to contribute to the reformation of an 
offender. Police supervision is also unnecessary in view of the availability of probation. 
To conclude, it can be observed that while the law provides for a number of community 
sanctions, there remain several practical challenges which undermine their use and 
efficacy. As a result, there is more that needs to be done to ensure that Malawi 
                                                 
366 See the CPEC Review Report 164 which states that the retention of section 342 was partly strengthened 
by the oral submission of two High Court judges and the then Chairman of the Malawi Law Society on 
the recidivist tendency of sexual offenders. 
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effectively restricts the use of imprisonment through the available non-custodial 
sanctions and to achieve their intended goals such as reformation of offenders.  
6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that in as far as the forms of punishment are concerned, the 
Malawian penal regime does meet some of the constitutional and international standards 
punishment. For instance, the law prohibits the application of the death penalty to 
persons below the age of 18 years and pregnant women. Further, prisoners on death 
row may be considered for seeking by the President. The abolition of the mandatory 
death penalty is also in line with the global trend towards abolition. As a result of this 
development, death sentences are rarely imposed in Malawi despite the existence of a 
number of capital crimes. However, there are some aspects of death sentences in 
Malawi that are troubling. For example, while it is commendable that death sentences 
are in practices limited to murder cases, the scope of capital offences is too wide as can 
be seen in the application of death sentences to robbery and burglary. Further, the right 
to seek pardon is not guaranteed to offenders sentenced to death under the DFA.  
Similarly, the application of life imprisonment is partly consistent with international 
human rights law. For example, courts are prohibited from imposing whole life 
sentences on persons below the age of 18 years. In line with rehabilitation, the law also 
provides for the mandatory review of life sentences. However, the circumstances in 
which life imprisonment is imposed reveal that courts focus mainly on community 
protection and retribution; they have not paid sufficient attention to rehabilitation and 
the capacity of an offender to reform. Further, in the absence of a statutory definition, 
life imprisonment is largely understood to mean that a prisoner will spend the rest of his 
life in prison. In this regard, the Prisons Bill has the potential to change this perception 
202 
in view of its proposal that prisoners serving life sentences must be considered for 
review after 12 years. This reflects a more rehabilitation-oriented approach to life 
imprisonment and indeed sentencing as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE AIMS OF PUNISHMENT IN MALAWI  
1 INTRODUCTION 
So far, the study has established that while international human rights law recognises all the 
traditional theories of punishment, it leans more towards rehabilitation as the primary aim of 
punishment. It has also shown that Malawi has a range of sentencing options that represent a 
hybrid penal regime that reflects both retributive and utilitarian justifications for punishment.  
However, courts tend to place more emphasis on retribution, incapacitation and deterrence 
when sentencing, particularly when imposing death sentences and imprisonment. In view of this, 
it is important to examine how the aims of punishment are employed when courts are deciding 
on what goal a particular sentence must achieve.  
This chapter seeks to establish how the courts have understood the Constitution and used 
international law to improve the penal regime; whether they have embraced rehabilitation as the 
predominant theory; the manner in which they understand the theories of punishment; the 
impact of the court‟s views on the aims of punishment on their sentencing decisions; and 
whether there has been a shift in the understanding of these aims from before to after 1994. 
Drawing mainly from case law, the chapter commences with an overview of the role of aims of 
punishment in sentencing discussion of the courts‟ view of the aims of punishment in 
sentencing. It then turns to consider the aims of punishment before and after 1994. Thereafter, 
the chapter provides an assessment of the aims to achieve the stated objectives of this chapter.  
2 THE ROLE OF THE AIMS OF PUNISHMENT IN SENTENCING 
There seems to be some inconsistency as to the proper role of the aims of punishment during 
the sentencing process. The Magistrate’s court sentencing guidelines1 state that the seriousness of the 
                                                 
1 Malawi Judiciary Magistrate’s court sentencing guidelines (2007), hereafter Sentencing guidelines. 
204 
 
offence must be assessed before a court decides the aim of punishment in a particular case. This 
suggests that the decision as to which aim(s) of punishment to pursue must be informed by the 
seriousness of an offence. Writing in 1997, Chimasula Phiri J was of the view that the aims of a 
sentence must be the first decision to make in sentencing.2 However, in 2013 case of Rep v 
Kufandiko,3 Mwaungulu J decided that public interest considerations regarding the aims of 
punishment should only come into play after the right sentence has been identified. Similarly, Rep 
v Keke4 held that the goals of punishment („public goals‟) must be the last factor to consider when 
sentencing.5 
Since the factors that a court considers in sentencing and the weight attached to them is 
intricately linked to traditional theories of punishment, it is insignificant whether chronologically 
the aims of punishment are considered first or last in the sentencing process. Indeed, even where 
a court does not make specific reference to a particular theory of punishment, as is often the case 
in Malawi, the factors used in arriving at the sentence are the key to identifying the underlying 
rationale for the sentence imposed. Therefore, the aims of punishment are always the framework 
within which a sentence is imposed; the only difference is that courts will vary as to the emphasis 
they place on particular factors and, by implication, the theories of punishment. It is this variance 
in emphasis that determines the quantum of punishment in the end. 
                                                 
2 Chimasula-Phiri (1997). 
3 Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009. 
4 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, hereafter Keke. 
5 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 3-4: „Over all, in considering whether the sentence is cruel inhuman 
or degrading, the appellate court will investigate if the sentence fits the offence (crime), the victim, the offender, and 
the public interest or public goals. Courts sentencing at first instance must carefully examine these four heads of 
sentence and treat them in this order. In practical sentencing, the sentencer must operate in this order. This 
sequencing is more likely to produce uniform and fair sentences after properly considering factors exogenous to the 
crimes that are determinative of final disposal of the crime and the offender‟. 
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Courts have drawn a clear distinction between the aims of punishment and sentencing principles. 
For instance, in Rep v Phiri and another,6 the accused, a first and young offender, was sentenced to 
seven years for the theft of three cows. The aim of the sentence was purportedly reformation of 
the offender. It was held on appeal that the sentence reflected confusion between the purpose of 
a sentence and sentencing. The court noted that the purpose of a sentence helps little in arriving 
at an appropriate sentence in a particular case. It found that the sentence was disproportionate in 
the circumstances and also in the light of sentences imposed in more serious cases. This 
judgment reveals that courts are wary of overemphasising the purposes of a sentence in the 
sentencing process as this might lead to a situation where the circumstances of the offender are 
overlooked or overemphasised. This would result in sentences that are either too lenient or too 
severe. Rep v Phiri and another also reveals the centrality of proportionality in sentencing. Indeed, 
the High Court has warned that regardless of its purported objective, a sentence must be 
imposed in the context of a just and fair punishment in relation to the crime and the offender 
that does not offend the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.7 
Proportionality continues to be recognised as the paramount principle in sentencing and is 
therefore regarded as independent of retribution itself as an aim of punishment. In Rep v 
Nangwiya,8 the court held that „the sentence passed must be just to the offender, the offence and 
the victim and should reflect the public interest in prevention of crime‟. Rep v Nkhoma9 also held:  
It is not proper that the court, to achieve any of the purposes of sentencing, retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, reformation and rehabilitation, should compromise principles of sentencing. Principles of 
sentencing are different from purposes of sentencing. Normally the purposes of sentencing do not assist 
the court in arriving at the appropriate quantum of a sentence. An appropriate sentence must achieve 
                                                 
6 Rep v Phiri and another [1997] 2 MLR 92 (HC). 
7 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 8. 
8 Rep v Nangwiya Confirmation Case No 608 of 1997. 
9 Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996. 
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proportionality, equality and restraint. The sentence must be equal to the crime committed, ensure that 
offenders of equal culpability are treated alike and must not connote vengeance. 
Courts have also linked proportionality to the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment or treatment. The High Court has stated that long sentences that are 
disproportionate to the personal circumstances of an offender violate the fundamental right not 
to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment.10 In Rep v Pose and another,11 it held that 
whether a violation had occurred would depend on the circumstances of the offence and 
comparable sentences both for an aggravated form of the offence and more serious offences. 
3 THE AIMS OF PUNISHMENT BEFORE 1994 
Before 1994, the aims of punishment were largely deduced from the aims of criminal law. It was 
recognised that the aim of criminal law was not just retribution but ultimately crime prevention. 
Therefore, the courts emphasised crime prevention as the primary purpose of punishment. This 
required that deterrence and community protection (incapacitation) should be the priority in 
sentencing. In R v Robert,12 Villiera J held: 
The first and foremost [consideration in sentencing] is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly 
enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper 
sentence passed in public serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted 
to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition that if the offender is caught and brought 
to justice the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular offender from 
committing a crime again or induce him to turn from criminal to honest living. 
Accordingly, deterrence and community protection were individually seen as major aims of 
punishment.13 Community protection was often regarded as a justification for imposing long and 
                                                 
10 Rep v Pose and another [1997] 2 MLR 95 (HC). 
11 Rep v Pose and another [1997] 2 MLR 95 (HC). 
12 R v Robert [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 291 (HC) 293, citing R v Ball (1951) 35 Cr App R 164, 165-166. 
13 Rep v Katole [1993] 16(1) MLR 472 (HC); Rep v Mpira and others [1982-1984] 10 ALR Mal 67 (HC). 
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immediate sentences for serious offences. In Banda and others v Rep,14 the Malawi Supreme Court 
of Appeal (MSCA) held that serious offences should be severely punished with long prison 
sentences in order to protect the public and that the goal of public protection would in such 
cases justify an order that the sentences should run consecutively. Similarly, in Rep v Phale and 
another,15 the court held that community protection was a justification for imposing otherwise 
harsh sentences in serious cases. Apart from community protection, long and immediate 
sentences were also considered necessary in serious cases to mark the gravity and public 
disapproval of the offence, and to punish the offender.16 The pursuit of community protection 
and deterrence, especially where the offence was serious, would also justify a departure from 
sentencing principles provided this did not result in an extraordinarily excessive sentence.17 
In employing deterrence, courts distinguished between specific and general deterrence. Specific 
deterrence provided the rationale for considering an offender‟s criminal record in sentencing; 
unlike first offenders, repeat offenders were not entitled to leniency.18 The reason for this was 
that a repeat offender showed that he had not learnt from or been deterred by his previous 
punishment. This rationale was evident, for example, in the general principle that the significance 
of previous convictions diminished with time.19 The justification for this principle was that a 
lapse of time between the previous conviction and the current one must be considered in the 
offender‟s favour as an indication that the defendant has demonstrated that he tried to lead a 
                                                 
14 Banda and others v Rep [1990] 13 MLR 56 (SCA) 59.   
15 Rep v Phale and another [1991] 14 MLR 438 (HC) 
16 Rep v Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal 394 (HC). 
17 Banda and others v Rep [1990] 13 MLR 56 (SCA); Kamil v Rep [1973-1974] 7 MLR 169 (SCA); Kumwenda v Rep (1993) 
16(1) MLR 233 (SCA). 
18 R v White [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 401 (HC); Bwanali v R [1964–1966] 3 ALR Mal 329 (HC).Cf Makawa v Rep 
Criminal Appeal No 196 of 1975 where previous convictions were used to justify the imposition of the maximum 
penalty; Maikolo v R [1964–1966] 3 ALR Mal 584; Rep v Havula and another [1991] 14 MLR 429 (HC); Chief Public 
Prosecutor v Nkosi and another [1990] 13 MLR 97 (HC) (previous convictions evidence of bad character). 
19 See, for instance, Rendall-Day v Rep [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 155 (HC). 
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clean life.20 In 1964, Cram J held that a reasonable and proper sentence is one that is appropriate 
to the offence and the circumstances and that is not enhanced merely because the convict has 
previous convictions:21 
[I]t is not right to hold over a man‟s past offences which have been dealt with by appropriate sentences, as 
we must assume [that] past offences have been dealt with, and add them up and increase … the severity of 
sentence for a later offence. That is dangerously like punishing a man twice for an offence. If a man who 
has been convicted shows himself unresponsive to leniency and persists in life of crime, that is a reason for 
giving him the proper and deserved sentence in the particular case. If, on the other hand, there are some 
merits, it may be that the court will treat him more leniently because he has shown himself in some way 
responsive to the warning which he has had.
22 
General deterrence, aimed at deterring potential offenders, entailed that the prevalence of an 
offence was a basis for increasing a sentence.23 This meant that, like community protection, 
general deterrence was often used to justify stiff sentences in the form of long and immediate 
imprisonment in punishing serious cases.24 In addition, it justified departure from established 
sentencing principles.25 Suspended sentences were generally seen as inadequate for general 
deterrence. In Rep v Nabanda,26 for example, Unyolo J held that a serious offence like child 
stealing should be punished with immediate imprisonment because a suspended sentence would 
send a wrong signal to the offender and potential offenders.  
Interestingly, courts were of the view that general deterrence was not a suitable goal of 
punishment for first and young offenders and therefore often refrained from imposing lengthy 
                                                 
20); John v Rep Criminal appeal No 131 of 1975, where a lapse of six years prompted the court to disregard the 
offender‟s criminal record.  
21 Maikolo v R [1964–1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA) 594. 
22 Maikolo v R [1964–1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA) 594. 
23 R v Phiri and others [1993] 16 2 MLR 748 (HC) 751; R v Zagwa [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 415 (HC). 
24 Rep v Katole [1993] 16(1) MLR 472 (HC); Rep v Phale and another [1991] 14 MLR 438 (HC); Mpondamwala v Rep 
[1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 306 (HC). 
25 See for instance Kamil v Rep [1973-1974] 7 MLR 169 (SCA). 
26 Rep v Nabanda [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 166 (HC). 
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sentences on them. Relying on Rep v Banda,27 Rep v Domingo28 held that it is in the public interest 
that young offenders must not be used as ends for general deterrence. According to the court, 
where young offenders were concerned, general deterrence might still be achieved through short 
sentences.29 The rationale for this was that general deterrence entailed long sentences which were 
unsuitable for such offenders as they would inhibit their rehabilitation. This reasoning clearly 
underscores the fact that general deterrence was synonymous with long sentences. 
It is important to mention that courts generally viewed first offenders as more likely to respond 
positively to punishment or the threat of punishment. For instance, according to Jere J in Rep v 
Matindi:30 
The philosophy behind [suspended sentences] is that first offenders should be kept out of prison because 
contact with hardened criminals might have a bad influence on them, and, secondly, they should be given a 
chance to mend their ways but with a real threat that if they commit another offence during the period, the 
suspended sentence will be revived. In this way, therefore, the suspended sentence provides an incentive to 
first offenders to keep the law.31 
This reasoning presupposes that first offenders have a higher chance of changing their ways than 
repeat offenders. Therefore, specific deterrence was likely to be achieved when dealing with first 
offenders.32 In fact, according to Chatsika J, „[i]t has been proved in certain cases that certain 
persons who are tempted to commit offences thinking that they would not be found, refrain 
                                                 
27 Rep v Banda [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal (HC) 7. 
28 Rep v Domingo Confirmation Case No 850 of 1990.  
29 See also Rep v Nthara [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal  338 (HC) - long sentences not for first and young offender aged 
20, thus sentence reduced from 42 months to 18 months for bestiality; Maniote v Rep [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 174 
(HC) – first offenders must be punished with lenient sentences; Rep v Phiri [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 176 (HC). 
30 Rep v Matindi Confirmation Case No 1699 of 1976.  
31 Rep v Matindi Confirmation Case No 1699 of 1976.  
32 See for instance Kalambo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 199 of 1975 (the purpose of a suspended sentence is to give an 
offender „a chance to reform and become a good member of community‟). 
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from falling into similar temptations, when they have once been found and subjected to terms of 
imprisonment which have been suspended‟.33 
Courts also considered retribution as a major aim of sentencing. Sentences were largely 
determined on the basis of what an offender „deserved‟ in view of the seriousness of an offence 
and the culpability of an offender. In Rep v Phiri and another,34 it was held that a sentence must 
reflect the seriousness of the offence. The centrality of retribution in the sentencing process was 
also evident in how courts determined whether a first offender should be sentenced to 
immediate imprisonment or not. Imprisonment was deserved if the offence was serious.35 The 
principle of proportionality, which, as discussed in chapter two, is the central tenant of 
retribution, was long recognised as the central principle in sentencing.36 However, as noted 
above, courts readily endorsed otherwise disproportionate sentences for purposes of deterrence 
and community protection to maximise the overall aim of crime prevention.  
Rehabilitation was often invoked when sentencing first and young offenders. Courts were lenient 
in dealing with such offenders ostensibly because they believed that such offenders had a chance 
of reformation. For instance, suspended sentences, which were seen as serving specific 
deterrence and reformation, were often used in cases involving first and young offenders.37 In 
John v R,38 for example, the accused, a first offender, was sentenced to three years for 
housebreaking. On appeal, the court held that long sentences should not be imposed on young 
offenders who have never been to prison. The sentence was set aside and the accused bound 
                                                 
33 Kalambo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 199 of 1975. 
34 Rep v Phiri and others [1993] 16(2) MLR 748 (HC) 751. 
35 Mwambala v Rep [1990] 13 MLR 283 (HC) 287-288; R v Nasoni [1990] 13 MLR 400 (HC); Rep v Kampango [1991] 14 
MLR 432 (HC); Kamil v Rep [1973-1974] 7 MLR 169 (SCA); Rep v Atimu Confirmation Case No 274 of 1992 
(suspended sentence inappropriate for first and young offender who raped his victim twice with impunity while 
threatening her with a knife). 
36 Rep v Shauti [1975-1977] 8 MLR 69 (HC). 
37 See Kalambo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 199 of 1975 (suspended sentence gives an offender „a chance to reform 
and become a good member of community‟). 
38 John v R [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 655 (HC). 
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over to give him a second chance. According to Rep v Domingo,39 it was in the public interest that 
first offenders were given a chance to mend their ways through „shorter and proportionate 
confinement followed by immediate integration into the society: the better teacher and 
reformer‟.40 The court stressed that young offenders should not be „unduly thrust into the 
company of hardened criminals for a long period of time‟, especially where there were other 
mitigating factors.41 However, it was held in Thomo v Rep42 that a sentence should not be reduced 
on the basis that a longer sentence would militate against the speedy rehabilitation of an 
offender. Endorsing a deterrent perspective, the High Court reasoned that the prospect of a long 
sentence should be foreseen by a criminal before he commits a crime.  
It is clear from this that the meaning ascribed to rehabilitation was not associated with 
correctional interventions. Rehabilitation was perceived as an inevitable consequence of a short 
sentence in prison; it did not involve a positive act. It can, therefore, be said that there was a blur 
between rehabilitation and specific deterrence since in both instances, the understanding was that 
an offender would refrain from committing further crimes because of his unpleasant past 
experience in prison or the fear of punishment. 
In summary, it can be observed that the penal philosophy before 1994 did not emphasise crime 
prevention as the overarching goal of punishment. This entailed that community protection 
(incapacitation) and deterrence were given the priority in sentencing and were used to justify long 
sentences. Therefore, although retribution was also recognised as an aim of punishment, the 
principle of proportionality was subject to the public interest in crime prevention. In other 
words, disproportionate sentences were justifiable if they were aimed at general deterrence and 
community protection. In practice, this rationale provided leeway for the imposition of long 
                                                 
39 Rep v Domingo Confirmation Case No 850 of 1990.  
40 Rep v Domingo Confirmation Case No 850 of 1990. 
41 Rep v Domingo Confirmation Case No 850 of 1990.  
42 Thomo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 12 of 1975. 
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sentences in serious cases. Rehabilitation played a lesser role in punishment and was limited to 
non-serious offences committed by first and young offenders who, as a result, were punished 
with short sentences.   
4 THE AIMS OF PUNISHMENT AFTER 1994 
Since 1994, courts have increasingly engaged with the objectives of punishment and what they 
entail. Courts continue to recognise the traditional aims of punishment: deterrence, retribution, 
denunciation, incapacitation and rehabilitation.43 In Rep v Chikatha,44 it was observed that 
sentencing policy may have competing and conflicting purposes from which a court has to 
choose. It has repeatedly been held that the overarching aim of punishment is crime prevention. 
Courts have emphasised that the public has an interest in knowing how a sentence will help to 
curb criminality.45 Echoing R v Robert,46 it was held in Rep v Pose and another47 that sentencers 
should always bear in mind that „criminal law is publicly enforced to prevent crime‟. In Rep v 
Nkhuya,48 the court added that the protection of society through ensuring public order is a 
primary goal of criminal law. The „public interest in preventing crime‟ remains one of the four 
                                                 
43 Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008, 1; Rep v London Confirmation Case No 468 of 2002; Rep v Kayenda 
Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003; Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 4; Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation 
Case No 3 of 1996; Rep v Nkhuya Confirmation Case No 1002 of 2002. 
44 Rep v Chikatha Confirmation Case No 1602 of 1998. 
45 Rep v Banda and others Confirmation Case No 359 of 2012, 3. 
46 R v Robert [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 291 (HC) 293. 
47 Rep v Pose and another [1997] 2 MLR 95 (HC). See also Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996; Rep v Laiton 
Confirmation case No 1997. 
48 Rep v Nkhuya Confirmation Case No 1002 of 2002. See also Rep v Manyozo Confirmation Case No 431 of 2002; 
Rep v  Chapendeka and others Confirmation Case No  451 of 2000; Rep v Chimaliro and others Confirmation Case No; 
461 of 2000; Rep v Mustafa Confirmation Case No 523 of 2001; Confirmation Case No 234 of 2001; Rep v Chikopa 
Confirmation Case No 530 of 2000; Rep v Banda Confirmation Case No 884 of 2002; Rep v Joseph Confirmation Case 
No 516 of 2002; Rep v Makuluni Confirmation Case No 276 of 2001, Rep v Edisoni  Confirmation Case No 421 of 
2001; Rep v Kayenda Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003; Rep v Silaji Confirmation Case No 452 of 2002; Rep v 
Zinkambani Confirmation Case No 481 of 2000; Rep v Chilimba Confirmation Case No 114 of 2011, Rep v Khonga 
Confirmation Case No. 157 of 2002. 
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considerations – in addition to the offence, the offender and the victim – that must be 
considered in sentencing.49 
It is important to mention that in the context of sentencing, „public interest‟ refers primarily to 
the purposes of punishment. Courts are aware that the public generally demands heavy 
sentences. While courts are responsive to public outcry, it has been held that public interest 
requires adherence to sentencing principles. In Rep v Steshi and another,50 Madise J held that it is in 
the public interest that the principle of proportionality must be upheld: „a sentence must reflect 
the general feeling of the public and … should not outrage the public as too harsh or too 
lenient‟. It has also been held that it is in the public interest that young offenders should continue 
their education to better their lives.51 In Rep v Kwalala and another,52 it was said that the public 
interest requirement will be met 
if the court, having regard to the nature of the offence and the personal circumstances of the defendant 
and the victim, arrives at a sentence which a reasonable member of the public would say the defendant has 
really got what he deserves for the offence … being that it is proportionate to the gravity of the offence, 
effuses equality with those similarly culpable and shows restraint.53 
This indicates a retributive approach to sentencing. Indeed, according to Rep v Chikuli,54 victims 
must also derive contentment in the sentence imposed. 
                                                 
49 See Rep v Akimu Revision Case No 9 of 2003; Rep v Banda, and others Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999; Rep v 
Ajibu Confirmation Case No. 1011 of 1997; Rep v Maele Confirmation Case No 654 of 2001; Rep v Themule 
Confirmation Case No. 228 of 2002; Gulumba v Rep Miscellaneous Criminal Application Case No 51 of 2003; Rep v  
Phiri Confirmation Case No 430 of 2003; Rep v Chabwera Confirmation Case No 728 of 2002; Rep v Ngozo 
Confirmation Case no 231 of 2003; Rep v Samson Chilimba Confirmation Case No 114 of 2001; Rep v Kwalala and 
another Confirmation Case No 6 of 1996. 
50 Rep v Steshi and another Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2001. See also Phiri v State Criminal Appeal No 63 of 2009.  
51 Rep v Mvalume and another Confirmation Case No 278 of 2000; Sipiliyano v Rep Criminal Appeal No 59 of 1998. 
52 Rep v Kwalala and another Confirmation Case No 6 of 1996. 
53 Rep v Kwalala and another Confirmation Case No 6 of 1996, 2.  
54 Rep v Chikuli Confirmation Case No 174 of 2005. 
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However, it is the public interest in crime prevention which is given precedence in the principle 
that the overall aim of punishment is crime prevention. As was the case before 1994, this 
principle has entailed the prioritisation of deterrence and community protection in sentencing 
offenders.  
4.1.1 Retribution 
The central principle of retribution is that the punishment must fit the seriousness of the crime 
and the blameworthiness of the offender. Retribution is widely employed as a justification for 
punishment in Malawi. While reference to the word „retribution‟ itself is rare, sentencing courts 
have referred to notions of retributive justice in their sentencing judgments. For instance, they 
often make subtle reference to the notion of just deserts by stating that an offender „deserves‟ a 
particular punishment. Retribution is also evident in that young offenders are generally treated 
with mitigation.55 This is because they are regarded as being less blameworthy, committing 
crimes due to peer pressure, impetuousness, immaturity, youth or adventure.56 
The seriousness of the offence is the most determinative factor in sentencing and indeed the 
decision to imprison. As noted earlier, courts have prescribed that serious offences must be 
                                                 
55 Mzungu v Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 21 of 2007; Rep v Banda and others Confirmation Case No 359 of 2012; Rep 
v Yasin Confirmation Case No 219 of 2012; Asekwe and another v Rep Criminal Appeal No  59 of 2000 (offenders aged 
27 and 28 years); Matewere v Rep Criminal Appeal No 63 of 2005 (23 year old offender); Rep v Phiri Confirmation 
Case No 430 of 2003; Patel v Rep (23 year old offender); Rep v Kachule Confirmation Case No 234 of 2001; Nzabva v 
Rep Criminal Appeal 6 of 2007 (21 year old offender); Phiri v Rep Criminal Appeal No 111 of 2006 (21 year old 
offender); Rep v Magombo and others Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011 (23 years young); Rep v Chatepa and another 
Confirmation Case No 822 of 2004. In some cases, older offenders aged between 30 and 40 years have also been 
regarded as young offenders: see for instance Sipiliyano v Rep Criminal Appeal No 59 of 1998 (34 years); Rep v 
Mtendere Confirmation Case No 310 of 210 (34 years); Chanza v Rep Criminal Appeal No 170 of 2005 (36 years „very 
young‟); State v Mbale Criminal Case Number 32 of 2008 (32 year old „fairly young‟). 
56 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010; Rep v Chavula Confirmation Case No 93 of 2005, 5; Patel v State 
Criminal Appeal No 81 of 2007. Research indicates that peer pressure is a common factor that influences older 
offenders to commit crime: see Burton et al (2005) 27. 
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punished with long and immediate imprisonment in order to send a right message to society.57 It 
was stated in Rep v Masula and others58 that the consideration in sentencing should always be the 
seriousness of the offence. The seriousness of an offence can be garnered from the nature of the 
offence (the actions and mental component comprising the crime),59 the circumstances in which 
it was committed60 and the maximum sentence (which, theoretically, reflects the public‟s view of 
the offence and is an indicator of the public interest in a crime because it is set by parliament as 
the representative of the public),61 the effect of the crime on society,62 the motive;63 and the modus 
operandi.64 
                                                 
57 Chitsonga v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC) 88. 
58 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008. 
59 Rep v Edisoni Confirmation Case No 421 of 2001. Strict liability is mitigating factor: see Mangani v Rep Criminal 
Appeal No 3 of 2007. 
60 Rep v Maele Confirmation Case No 654 of 2001; Rep v Themule Confirmation Case No. 228 of 2002. 
61 Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998; Rep v Timba Criminal Case No 88 of 2009; Rep v Misomali 
Confirmation Case No 738 of 2000; Rep v Cheuka and others Criminal Case No 73 of 2008. Offences that are serious 
by nature include murder, manslaughter, robbery, housebreaking (see William Hassan v Rep Criminal Appeal No 102 
of 2005) and theft by public servant (see Rep v Koloko [1995] 2 MLR 723 (HC)). 
62 Rep v Kambalame Criminal Case No of 108 of 2002 (effect of corruption on economy considered). 
63 Rep v Mbewe [1973-1975] 7 ALR Mal 124 (HC) where the defilement of a 13 year old girl in the presence of 
another person was found not to have been committed out of lust but aimed at degrading and humiliating victim; 
Nyamatcherenga v Rep Criminal Appeal No 56 of 2000. 
64 See for instance Rep v Tito [1995] 2 MLR 638 (HC); Rep v Chikazingwa [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 160 (HC); Chimenya 
v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 8 of 2006 (SCA) 5. The offence will be aggravated where the manner in which an 
offence was committed reveals elements that show a disposition beyond the ordinary elements or requirements of 
the offence portraying a dangerous criminal: see Harry v Rep Criminal Appeal No 5 of 2005); Asekwe and another v Rep 
Criminal Appeal No 59 of 2000 („peculiar determination and criminal ingenuity‟, a „real criminal mind at work‟); Rep 
v Banda and others Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999 (violent and evil person with a high level of criminality 
evidenced by the fact that the victims were terrorised and manhandled); Idi v Rep [1994] MLR 99 (HC) 102 (19 year 
old first offender  described as „a determined and dangerous criminal‟ after raping his victim while brandishing a 
knife). Aggravation of the offence may also be enhanced by the way the victims were treated by an offender: such as 
brutality (Chinkango v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2009 (SCA) (victim was brutally stabbed to death); victim 
held captive (Rep v Alick [1997] 2 MLR 73 (HC);  Mwale v Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 5 of 1994); victim 
threatened, humiliated or injured (Rep v Mandawala Confirmation Case No  930 of 2003 (victim threatened); Rep v  
Layelo Confirmation Case No 577 of 2000; Rep v Manjeza and another [1995] 2 MLR 571 (HC) – complainant was tied 
up naked and his wife raped „in a very disgraceful and revolting manner‟ in the presence of her husband and 
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Courts have also emphasised retribution by taking account of public sentiments in sentencing. It 
was held in Rep v Chikuli65 that a victim must „derive contentment in the sentence imposed‟. In 
some cases, courts have hinted at retribution in a manner that borders on revenge. A case in 
point is Khoviwa v Rep66 where the accused was convicted of murder and the Malawi Supreme 
Court of Appeal (MSCA) held that the accused deserved the death penalty because he did not 
give the deceased a chance to live. 
Courts have also been encouraged to pass meaningful sentences that will reduce resort to mob 
justice on the part of society.67 Banda and another v Rep68 held that a sentence must reflect the 
general feeling of the public so that it does not outrage the public as too harsh or too lenient.69 
Punishment is also aimed at denunciation of certain conduct. For instance, the court in Rep v 
Kaira70 held that a sentence of three and a half years for defilement was not enough to reflect 
public revulsion of the offence and its seriousness. It noted that courts must be alive to public 
sentiments regarding offences and show public disapproval through the sentences they impose. 
The High Court has in fact reasoned that a combined consideration of all the aims of 
                                                                                                                                                        
children; Rep v Malola Idi Confirmation Case No 658 of 2000) repeated assaults (Rep v Mawaya and others 
Confirmation Case No 794 of 2000; Rep v Makuluni Confirmation Case No 276 of 2001; Manuel Peter v Rep Criminal 
Appeal No 65 of 2008; Nwangwu v Rep Criminal Appeal No 11 of 2008 (SCA); dangerous weapon was carried or 
actually used (Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998; Rep v Mkoma [1995] 2 MLR 598 (HC); Rep v Chikakuda 
and others [1997] 2 MLR 288 (HC) 294; Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008; Naison and another v Rep 
Criminal Appeal No 42 of 1996; Kachimanga v Rep Criminal Appeal 180 of 2005; Khonje v Rep Miscellaneous Criminal 
Case No 41 of 2009; Moses v Rep Criminal Appeal No 106 of 2006; Uladi v Rep  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 5 of 
2008 (SCA), 20 years for murder where bare hands used to fight victim; Kwalala v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 3 
of 2008 (SCA); Rep v Banda and others Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999; Rep v Chalunda and others Miscellaneous 
Criminal Case No 3 of 2008); victim tricked into the crime (Wesle v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 367 (HC); Rep v Kamwendo; Rep 
v Chida [1995] 2 MLR 644 (HC); Phiri v Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 54 of 2007). 
65 Rep v Chikuli Confirmation Case No 174 of 2005. 
66 Khoviwa v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 6 of 2007. 
67 Mulewa v Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC) 66. 
68 Banda and another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2011. See also Rep v Steshi and another Criminal Appeal No 7 of 
2001; Phiri v S Criminal Appeal No 63 of 2009. 
69 See also Rep v Steshi and another Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2001; Phiri v S Criminal Appeal No 63 of 2009. 
70 Rep v Kaira Confirmation Case No 689 of 2003. 
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punishment (retribution, denunciation and deterrence) simply means „that courts must „pass 
meaningful sentences which will not generate contempt in the eyes of the public. Courts must 
pass sentences that will fit the crime, the defendant and also satisfy the legitimate expectations of 
the public.71 
The High Court in Rep v Masula and others,72 stated that a sentence should be of sufficient severity 
such that „right-thinking members of the public with full knowledge of the relevant facts and 
circumstances learning of [the] sentence‟ should „not question the court‟s sanity‟ or wonder if 
„something had gone wrong with the administration of justice‟. Courts are also wary of public 
responses to the sentences imposed on offenders. For example, courts have by and large 
responded by imposing harsher sentences to avoid mob justice. In Mulewa v Rep73 the High Court 
remarked: 
Apart from other things, there is a perception that the increase in the number of [burglary] offences could 
only have come about because of the sentences that courts impose. Whether this perception is right or not, 
the public has resorted to mob justice, burning to death, not bringing to the courts, those that offend. It is 
a reaction, uncivil though it is, which can only be matched by an adjustment in our sentencing policy. This 
court has, therefore, for these reasons and many others approved of longer and immediate imprisonment. 
4.1.2 Deterrence 
In Rep v Alick,74 deterrence was described as „the primary purpose of punishment and the criminal 
process‟. Similarly, Rep v Kufandiko75 held that the first and foremost issues among public interest 
considerations during sentencing are deterrence and antecedents. It is generally believed that 
                                                 
71 Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 4. 
72 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008, 2, citing R v Fawcett (1983) 5 Cr App R 158. 
73 Mulewa v Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC) 66. See also Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 where the High 
Court agreed with the trial court‟s observation linking mob justice attacks where suspected thieves have been burnt 
to death to lenient sentences. 
74 Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000. 
75 Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009. 
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deterrence calls for stiffer sentences.76 However, unlike before 1994, it is readily accepted that 
this does not mean that sentences aimed at general deterrence are justified even when they are 
disproportionate to the offence and the offender.77 The reason for this is that sentencing goals 
should not be confused with sentencing principles.78 
Deterrence is usually employed for prevalent, serious and violent offences such as robbery,79  
burglary,80 housebreaking,81 rape and theft by servant.82 General deterrence is also invoked in 
punishing offences involving the obstruction of public duty and administration of justice such as 
resisting lawful arrest83 and escape from lawful custody.84 In such cases, immediate imprisonment 
is likely to be imposed in order to send out a warning to potential offenders. Further, in order to 
maximise the deterrent effect, it has been held that sentences for serious offences should run 
consecutively to a sentence that is being served.85 Courts have stressed that as a general principle 
serious and prevalent offences must be punished with long and immediate imprisonment.86 This 
is departed from only in „extremely rare‟ or exceptional circumstances when the mitigating 
                                                 
76 See for instance Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008, 4. 
77 Rep v Kayenda Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003. 
78 Rep v Kayenda Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003. 
79 For instance it was held in Rep v Chitembeya and others that robbery with violence is a serious offence and offenders 
deserve severe sentences to deter them from further committing crimes and to protect society by keeping them 
away. 
80 Rep v Misomali Confirmation Case No 527 of 1996. 
81 Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC); Rep v Chizumila and others [1994] MLR 288 (HC); Rep v Tembo Confirmation 
Case No 726 of 2000 (irrespective of the mitigating factors, a simple burglary should be punished with no less than 
three years).  
82 Rep v Madando [1995] 2 MLR 733 (HC); Banda v Rep Criminal Appeal No 221 of 2009. 
83 Rep v Harry (1997) 1 MLR 119 (HC); Rep v Matiki [1997] 1 MLR 159 (HC). 
84 Rep v Lampu Confirmation Case No 89 of 1996; Rep v Gwaza [1995] 2 MLR 752 (HC) 754: „The news of escape 
from prison may spread to inmates like bushfire and they may attempt to try their luck too‟.84 
85 Rep v Gwaza [1995] 2 MLR 752 (HC) 754. See also Rep v Matiki [1997] 1 MLR 159 (HC) 162, holding that a 
sentence for resisting lawful arrest must run consecutively to a sentence for the substantive offence. 
86 Mtetera v Rep Criminal Appeal No 88 of 2005; Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 5; Rep v Austin 
Confirmation Case No 1222 of 2003; Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 554 of 1996; Rep v Mzuzi Confirmation 
Case No 1607 of 1998. 
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factors outweigh the aggravating factors „considerably‟, such that a court may opt to suspend the 
sentence or impose a non-custodial one.87 
However, the fact that an offence is serious does not imply that imprisonment must be imposed 
automatically. The Sentencing guidelines state that reasons must be given as to why an offence is so 
serious as to justify imprisonment.88 In practice however, serious offences are still likely to attract 
long and immediate imprisonment even in the presence of strong mitigating factors:89 
[S]ome crimes are so heinous that a plea of youth, a plea that the crime was a first offence or that the 
offender has never been in prison before is irrelevant. Those who participate in such crimes should know 
that they will be subjected to long and immediate imprisonment, though they are young, even if they 
pleaded guilty, even if they had no previous convictions, even if the victims were neither young nor infirm. 
Courts will not readily accede to pleas of guilty or the age of the defendant where offences are very serious 
and committed in the most austere of circumstances.90 
Courts have gone even further to prescribe starting points for various offences and flagged them 
for long and immediate imprisonment. These include rape (six years),91 robbery, (three92 or four93 
years), burglary and housebreaking (six years)94 arson95 and theft of cattle.96 Shorter sentences are 
considered more appropriate for less serious offences such as breaking into a building, minor 
                                                 
87 Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC) 72; Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009. 
88 Sentencing guidelines 55. 
89 Mussa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 44 of 1995. 
90 See also Rep v Mkoma [1995] 2 MLR 598 (HC) 601; Rep v Mtaya Confirmation Case No 98 of 1995; Phiri and others v 
Rep Criminal Appeal No 6 of 1996; Mbekeani v Rep Criminal Appeal No 48 of 2006, 20; Lusale v Rep Criminal Case 
No 141 of 2005; Lobo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 110 of 2008; Rep v Chavula Confirmation Case No 93 of 2005, 6. 
91 Rep v Ndamera Confirmation Case No 314 of 2001. Cf Rep v Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal (HC) 394 
recommending three years as the starting point for rape if the aggravating factors equal the mitigating factors. 
92 Rep v Harry [1997] 2 MLR 74 (HC). 
93 Rep v Napulula Confirmation Case No 665 of 2003. 
94 Rep v Chizumila and others [1994] MLR 288 (HC); Chitsonga v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC); Rep v Iddi Confirmation 
Case No 48 of 1998. 
95 Rep v Kathumba [1997] 1 MLR 390 (HC) 392; Rep v Chitseko Confirmation Case No 78 of 1997 
96 Rep v Phiri and another [1997] 2 MLR 92 (HC) 94. 
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cases of sexual indecency, petty frauds, assaults and other instances of violence causing minor 
injuries.97 
The general principle that serious offences must be punished with immediate imprisonment is 
also underscored by considerations of community protection which may require that an offender 
should be removed from society. However, the principle is also accentuated by the perception 
that non-custodial sentences and short prison terms are insufficient for deterrence.98 
Deterrence is also reflected in the emphasis placed on a number of sentencing factors which 
largely remain the same as before 1994. It is worth mentioning that while courts continue to 
consider previous convictions in sentencing,99 a number of cases have criticised this practice. Rep 
v Sozinyo and another100 held that, except where statute provides for an enhanced sentence for a 
second offence,101 enhancing a sentence on the basis of previous convictions is „tantamount to 
                                                 
97 Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998. 
98 Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC). See also Rep v Akimu Revision Case No 9 of 2003. In Rep v Josephy 
Confirmation Case No 261 of 2013, a short immediate sentence of six months‟ was justified in that it was imposed 
for deterrent purposes and that community service is not generally seen as fit for this purpose. 
99 See, for instance, Rep v Phiri and another [1996] MLR 365 (HC); Rep v Manyozo Confirmation Case No 431 of 2002, 
Rep v Kamuna Confirmation Case No 669 of 2002; Rep v Zwangeti Confirmation Case No 179 of 2002; Moses and 3 
others v Rep Confirmation Case No 140 of 2011; Rep v Ngalu Confirmation Case No 196 of 1999; Rep v Kafwambira 
Confirmation Case No 37 of 2008; Rep v Yohane Confirmation Case No 1851 of 2005; Nyirenda v S Criminal Appeal 
Case No 6 of 2011; Bonomali v Rep Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2010; Rep v Gondwe Confirmation Case No 27 of 2006; 
Mangani v Rep Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2007; Nkhoma v Rep Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2010; Rep v Jumbe Criminal 
Appeal No 565 of 2008; Dandaula v Rep Criminal Appeal No 11 of 2008; Rep v Amosi Criminal Appeal No 569 of 
2008. The failure to respond to past sentences may affect the seriousness of an offence: see Malawi Judiciary (2007) 
53. 
100 Rep v Sozinyo and another [1997] 2 MLR 16 (HC).  
101 Malawian statutory law is awash with provisions that prescribe higher sentences for a second offence: see, for 
instance, sections 88(3) (official corruption), 169(4) (offences relating to gaming houses), 180 (idle and disorderly 
persons), 184 (rogues and vagabonds) and 183(1) (nuisances by drunken persons) and 290 (theft) of the Penal Code. 
See also section 29 of the Road Traffic Act, Chapter 69:01 of the Laws of Malawi, providing for a general penalty 
clause and sections 90(11), 126(4)(c), 128(9)(b), 141(3), 152(4)(b), 153(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Act, Chapter 69:01 
of the Laws of Malawi.  
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punishing an offender twice over for offences for which he has already been punished‟.102 It can 
be argued that if enhancing a sentence based on previous convictions breaches the principle of 
double jeopardy and therefore the right to a fair trial, it is fictitious to regard legislation-
sanctioned enhancements any differently.  
The treatment of pleas of family hardship or obligations also highlights the significance of 
deterrence in punishment.103 These pleas usually arise in connection with immediate 
imprisonment as it involves the removal of an offender from his family and exposes him to the 
risk of losing a job. The general rule is that domestic obligations are not relevant to sentencing, 
let alone the decision to imprison.104 Departure from this general rule will only be justified if 
imprisonment will cause „unusual or exceptional hardship‟ to the offender‟s family or the 
domestic obligations are „exceptional or unusual‟: unless there are unusual and exceptional 
circumstances.105 Courts have often said that the possibility of imprisonment and resulting family 
                                                 
102 Rep v Sozinyo and another [1997] 2 MLR 16 (HC) 18. See also Rep v Chizenga Confirmation Case No 297 of 2008; 
Rep v Ngomwa Confirmation Case No 1021 of 2003, 2 (previous offences „must be deemed to have been paid for by 
the penalties that attached to them and so they do not attract extra punishment, so to speak‟); Rep v Kapitawo 
Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005 (it is wrong to base sentence on the fact that the accused is not a first offender). 
103 The rejection of family obligations as a mitigating factor is also partly based on retribution and community 
protection. For instance, courts have emphasised that the consideration of family obligations may detract a court 
from imposing the right sentence by making it focus on the hardship a sentence may inflict on an offender‟s family: 
see Rep v Eneya and others Criminal Case No 53 of 2003; Chitsonga v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC) 88 (family hardship as 
a result of imprisonment is part of the price to pay when committing a crime); Rep v Asidi and another Confirmation 
Case No 955 of 1999.  
104 Kanyinji v Rep Criminal Appeal No 116 of 2008; Rep v Mutawo Confirmation Case No 237 of 1999 (the obvious 
reason for rejecting domestic matters in sentencing is that offenders know that „they are likely to be sent to prison 
and that this will affect their children. Sound sentencing policy should be such that it conveys to those who commit 
[crimes] that the court is going to look at the crime rather than their domestic matters‟); Millo v Rep Criminal Appeal 
No 30 of 2000 (the public interest in criminal justice cannot be „easily dispelled by domestic considerations. The 
public interest in the criminal process would be precariously compromised if courts unduly consider such matters‟); 
Rep v Jasi Confirmation Case No 1026 of 1994; Rep v Chimbelenga (1996) MLR 342 (HC) 354 (offender‟s family 
responsibilities not considered in sentencing him to 30 years imprisonment for stealing over K1 million from the 
government). 
105 See Rep v Mafaiti Confirmation Case No 660 of 1990; Rep v Mutawo Confirmation Case No 237 of 1999. Chitsonga 
v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC). See also Rep v Asidi and another Confirmation Case No 955 of 1999; Rep v Chilenje [1996] 
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hardship should have acted as a deterrent to committing crime in the first place. According to 
Chipeta J,106 
[a] man who opts for and goes ahead to commit a crime should factor in the possibility that if the long arm 
of the law catches up with him and accords him a custodial penalty, his family will suffer and that the 
courts are not encouraged to be moved by such pleas.107 
Similarly, Millo v Rep108 held that „offenders should put domestic matters in the equation when 
embarking in conduct society disapproves and enforces with criminal sanctions‟. The underlying 
assumption here is that offenders weigh their options carefully before committing an offence. 
Courts continue to distinguish between specific and general deterrence.109 In Rep v Wilson; Rep v 
Khapuleni and others,110 Banda CJ was of the view that a first custodial sentence should be aimed at 
specific and not general deterrence. It was held in White and another v Rep111 that a sentence should 
not be suspended if the aim is to achieve general deterrence such as where the offence is serious 
                                                                                                                                                        
MLR 361 (HC) – the test for exceptional circumstances is satisfied where the effect of imprisonment is to deprive 
young children of parental care or where a close family member is terminally ill. In other cases, courts have readily 
regarded ordinary family responsibilities as mitigating without applying the exceptional hardship test or having 
regard to the seriousness of the offence: see for instance Makanjira v Rep Criminal Appeal No 67 of 2007 (offender 
responsible for grandparents and orphans); Daukire and another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 148 of 2004; Rep v 
Kachimanga Confirmation Case No 1746 of 2007 (caring for old grandmother accepted as mitigating factor); Rep v 
Chinthiti and others (2) [1997] 1 MLR 70 (HC). 
106 Rep v Eneya and others Criminal Case No 53 of 2003.  
107 Rep v Eneya and others Criminal Case No 53 of 2003, 3. See also Kapolo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 82 of 2007; 
Kwilasya v Rep Criminal Appeal No 62 of 1975; Thomo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 12 of 1975; Rep v Saidi Criminal 
Case No 4 of 1975; Rep v Chimbelenga [1996] MLR 342 (HC) 354. 
108 Millo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 30 of 2000 
109 Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 (special deterrence is directed at preventing an offender from 
committing further crime); Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009 (a general deterrent sentence is an 
exemplary sentence imposed to prevent others from committing crimes). 
110 Rep v Wilson; Rep v Khapuleni and others [1995] 2 MLR 567 (HC) 569, citing R v Curran 57 Cr App R 945. 
111 White and another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 19 of 2007.  
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and public safety has been compromised such that meaningful and punitive sentences are 
deserved.112  
According to Rep v Nkhoma,113 general deterrence should attract lengthier sentences with an 
added „premium‟ of imprisonment for deterrent purposes.114 This literally means that sentences 
imposed for general deterrence are in effect disproportionate sentences. In fact, Rep v Chikwana115 
unequivocally states that general deterrence entails „passing a sentence that is beyond one the 
offender deserves based on the crime committed‟.116 Chikopa J observed in Rep v Nkhata117 that 
punishment should not be used as a warning to the general public because this is punishing an 
offender for wrongs he has not committed.118 It was said in Rep v Sakhwinya119 that general 
deterrence „is immoral because it leaves the feeling that human beings can be used as a means to 
an end and … it may be a cruel and degrading punishment under section 19(3) of the 
Constitution.120 Similarly, it was observed in Rep v Jeke121 that a sentence based on general 
deterrence „is wrong in principle because it is tantamount to using (or is it abusing) humans as 
means to an end. Such sentences would be degrading cruel and inhuman(e) punishment or 
treatment‟.122 These sentiments have been reiterated in several High Court judgments such as Rep 
                                                 
112 Cf Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996: „The question of suspension of a sentence, a principle of 
sentencing, should be treated distinctively from the question of deterrence ... The question of suspension arises 
after, not before, an appropriate prison sentence has been arrived‟. 
113 Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996. 
114 Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996; Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995. 
115 Rep v Chikwana Confirmation Case No 131 of 2013. See also Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996. 
116 Rep v Chikwana Confirmation Case No 131 of 2013, 4. 
117 Rep v Nkhata Confirmation Case No 534 of 2003. 
118 Rep v Nkhata Confirmation Case No 534 of 2003. 
119 Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. 
120 Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. See also Rep v Nelson and another Confirmation Case No 1852 
of 2005, 4; Rep v Naluso Confirmation Case No 387 of 2013, 4; Rep v Matemba Confirmation Case No 243 of 2012, 4. 
121 Rep v Jeke Confirmation Case No 178B of 2013. 
122 Rep v Jeke Confirmation Case No 178B of 2013, 4-5. See also Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 3-4; 
Rep v Mushali and another Confirmation Case No 242 of 2013, 4; Rep v Assam and another Confirmation Case No 907 
of 2008, 4. 
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v Kanena,123 Rep v Naphazi,124 and Rep v Kanyumba and another125 to mention a few. However, except 
for the views expressed in Rep v Nkhata,126 all these sentiments have been expressed only to show 
that general deterrence is an inappropriate goal for the punishment of first offenders. In other 
words, the criticisms are justification for not imposing general deterrent sentences on first and 
young offenders, except where the offence is very serious. The general view is that sentences 
imposed on first offenders „can only be as [to] fit the offence and only for the purpose of 
reforming or preventing the offender from committing offences in the future‟.127 
For first and young offenders, general deterrence is readily accepted by the courts as a 
consequence of punishment. For instance, entrenching the position before 1994, it is often 
stated that punishment imposed on first and young offenders should only aim at specific 
                                                 
123 Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 130 of 2013 
124 Rep v Naphazi Confirmation Case No 386 of 2011, 4.  
125 Rep v Kanyumba and another Confirmation Case No 904 of 2008, 4. See also See also Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation 
Case No 126 of 2009, 6; Rep v Foster Confirmation Case No  1690 of 2005, 9; Rep v Tembo Confirmation Case No 
187 of 2013; Rep v Yasin Confirmation Case No 219 of 2012; Rep v Samson and another Confirmation Case No 466 of 
2010, 4; Rep v Mulolo and another Confirmation Case No 362 of 2012, 4; Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 130 of 
2013; Rep v Makoko Confirmation Case No 469 of 2009, 4; Rep v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013, 3; Rep v 
James Confirmation Case No 244 of 2013, 3; Rep v John Confirmation Case No 528 of 2010, 4; Rep v Mapeni 
Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010; Rep v Kaufa Confirmation Case No 314 of 2011, 3. 
126 Rep v Nkhata Confirmation Case No 534 of 2003, holding that punishment should not be used as a warning to 
the general public because this is punishing an offender for wrongs he has not committed. 
127 Rep v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013, 3, citing Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. See 
also Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000 (the preference for specific deterrence in cases of young and 
first offenders means that sentences in such cases „should fit the crime, the offender the victim and the public 
interest in preventing crime); Rep v Akishoni Confirmation Case No 196 of 1997(„it should be really seldom that first 
offenders should receive sentences whose purpose is to prevent others from crime. Consequently, a first offender 
should only receive [a punishment that prevents] him from further mischief. This will be achieved if the sentence 
fits the crime, the offender, the plight of the victim and the public interest in preventing crime‟. 
See also Rep v Headson and 4 Others Confirmation Case No 129 of 2013, 4; Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 of 
2013, 3. 
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deterrence and that general deterrence may still be achieved as „a matter of course‟.128 It has been 
held that first and young offenders should not be used as „means to the end of‟,129 „as guinea 
pigs‟130 or „scapegoats‟131 for general deterrence and that „[s]uch sentences would be degrading 
cruel and [inhuman] punishment or treatment‟.132 It has been held that such offenders may be 
reformed or deterred from future crime by the likelihood or certainty of punishment rather than 
its severity.133 Therefore, „a short, sharp and quick sentence may just be as effective as a longer 
one‟.134 On the other hand, Rep v Kufandiko135 held that for repeat offenders, the use of sentences 
aimed at general deterrence is justified because society should be protected from repeat criminal 
conduct.136 In other words, longer sentences are more appropriate for repeat offenders as they 
have not been deterred by previous punishment and are unlikely to be deterred by the likelihood 
of punishment.  
It has been held that whether a sentence in fact achieves deterrence should be the concern of 
penologists and not courts, and that where certain levels of sentences are incapable of affecting 
crime, it is in the public interest that courts should shift their sentencing policy so that it reflects 
the public interest in curbing crime.137 According to Rep v Adam,138  
[w]hen that point is reached, individual personal circumstances have to be weighed against public interest. 
                                                 
128 See for instance Rep v Banda and others Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999; Mtanga and another v Rep Criminal 
Appeal No 15 of 1998; Rep v Bayani Confirmation Case No 11 of 2000; Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 
2000; Rep v Akishoni Confirmation Case No 196 of 1997. 
129 Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000. See also Rep v Mwakikunga Confirmation Case No 326 of 1998 
130 Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996. 
131 Rep v Akishoni Confirmation Case No 196 of 1997. See also Mwachilira v Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 86 of 2006 
(there is something „unwholesome‟ about using first offenders as a means to an end). 
132 Rep v Samson and another (2013) Confirmation Case No 169 of 2013, 4-5 
133 Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. 
134 Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. 
135 Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009, 6.  
136 See also Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. 
137 Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995.  
138 Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995. 
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The way forward, a way justified by public policy, is to attach a premium on conventional sentences to 
reflect the need to deter crime by enhancing sentences‟.  
Consequently, deterrence has been used as a justification for increasing the levels of sentencing 
where past sentences are perceived to have been unsuccessful in reducing crime. For example, 
Rep v Bayani139 held that prevalence of an offence means that the prevailing sentencing policy has 
failed to dissuade potential or repeat offenders either because of inadequate punishment as 
provided by statute or as passed by courts. In the latter scenario, the solution is for courts to 
generally increase the sentences imposed.140 Similarly, Rep v Nyungwe,141 held that the „phenomenal 
upsurge‟ in burglary cases at the time was partly as a result of „the sentencing policy of our 
courts‟ which passed „medium sentences‟ on offenders.  
It was this perception that lengthier sentences could curb crime that prompted the issuance of 
the sentencing guideline two decades ago in Rep v Chizumila,142 one of the earliest reported cases 
after 1994 that has had a great impact on sentencing trends for burglary and housebreaking.143 
According to Chizumila, short sentences are responsible for the increase in burglary cases and 
mob justice is a result of public dissatisfaction with lenient sentences.144 The court therefore 
suggested a departure from lenient sentences in cases of burglary and housebreaking. It 
recommended that the starting point for burglary should be six years, which at the time was 
about six times and twice the average sentence previously imposed on first and repeat offenders 
                                                 
139 Rep v Bayani Confirmation Case No 11 of 2000. 
140 Rep v Bayani Confirmation Case No 11 of 2000. See also Rep v Chizumila and others [1994] MLR 288 (HC) 
reasoning that short sentences are responsible for the increase in burglary cases and suggesting a starting point of six 
years of imprisonment. 
141 Rep v Nyungwe [1997] 2 MLR 127 (HC) 130. 
142 Rep v Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC), hereafter Chizumila 
143 The guideline in Chizumila has been adopted in several cases: see for instance Chitsonga v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 
(HC) 88; Rep v Ndamera Confirmation Case No 314 of 2001. 
144 Rep v Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC) 306 
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respectively.145 Similar reasoning is evident in Mulewa v Rep146 where the court, despite noting that 
long sentences have not necessarily led to a decrease in crime and uncertainty as to whether the 
length of sentences was responsible for the increase in crime, imposed a higher sentence to curb 
crime and the incidence of mob justice on the part of society. This tendency has been justified 
on the basis that courts should be responsive to public outcry.147 In other words, the lengthier 
sentences are meant to satisfy public sentiment.  
It is noteworthy that some cases have not approved of the general principle that serious offences 
should be punished with long and immediate imprisonment. For example, it was said in Rep v 
Limbani and others148 that in view of prison conditions, courts should follow „a deliberate policy of 
decongesting prisons‟ by imposing short sentences even for serious offences such as such as 
manslaughter, robbery, rape, defilement, burglary, housebreaking, theft of bicycle, theft of 
livestock „and many more to be in the category of serious offences‟.149 The High Court has 
pointed out that guidelines that emphasise long imprisonment for serious offences are skewed 
because they ignore the importance of reformation of the offender as they only focus on 
retributive justice and deterrence without any consideration of the negative consequences of long 
sentences both on an offender and others.150 Contending that short sentences can be as effective 
as long sentences and that the public is more deterred by getting of caught and punished, Ndovi 
J observed in Rep v Kholoviko:151 
                                                 
145 See Rep v Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC) 306: „Up to about three months ago [September 1994] sentences 
passed by the courts have generally been short term sentences ranging between 9-30 months for burglary. Longer 
sentences of up to 36 months have been reserved for repeat offenders‟. 
146 Mulewa v Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC). 
147 Rep v Makata and another Confirmation Case 968 of 1996. 
148 Rep v Limbani and others Confirmation Case No 839 of 2005. 
149 Rep v Limbani and others Confirmation Case No 839 of 2005, 2. 
150 Rep v Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC). 
151 Rep v Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC) 359-360, adding that effectiveness in law enforcement as seen for instance 
through arrests, convictions and recovery of stolen property may deter a person from embarking on a criminal 
career by creating „a lingering possibility of being caught and deprived of the fruits of his or her nefarious activity‟.  
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The courts must also consider how such long sentences that are advocated can deter other accused 
persons, present as well as future ones. There is no evidence that these offences have reduced by reason of 
long sentences. In fact they are on the increase. For first time offenders, not only common sense but the 
law as well, require[s] that they should not be sent to prison willy-nilly. They should only be sent to prison 
if there are real and compelling reasons for doing so. This court does not believe, nor is it convinced, that 
mere trend or level or even conventional sentences alone have any impact on the accused himself. It may 
have merit on generating confidence in the courts and promoting the concept of predictability of the 
sentences that the courts will impose generally, but there is no real impact on deterrence and reformation. 
These views have not found much common ground. In fact, post-1994 sentencing practices 
indicate a gradual increase in the severity of sentences. For instance, in some cases, the 
recommended starting points for serious offences have tripled.152 Furthermore, although the 
justification for leniency in dealing with first and young offenders has largely remained the same 
after 1994, the duration of sentences imposed on them have increased. Courts have advocated 
for stiffer sentences in light of public opinion and prevalence of serious offences.153 The 
Sentencing guidelines now provide for starting points that are much higher than sentences imposed 
before 1994. For instance, sentences for burglary used to range from 9-30 months for first 
offenders and three years for repeat offenders. The starting point for a threshold case of burglary 
is now six years. These developments are mainly premised on the pursuit of deterrence because it 
is believed that stiffer sentences have a greater deterrent value. This understanding is also 
                                                                                                                                                        
See also Rep v Mwakikunga Confirmation Case No 326 of 1998 (public deterred by a „real possibility that a first 
offence could land you in jail‟); Rep v Thomas Magombo and others Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011(the likelihood 
and possibility of prison sentence may be more effective than actual imprisonment‟. 
152 For instance, the 1987 case of Rep v Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal (HC) 394 recommended that a sentence 
for rape should start at three years, while the 2007 Sentencing guidelines recommend a starting point of 10 years: see 
Sentencing guidelines (2007) 5. However, in 2011 the High Court in Nani v Rep Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2011 
recommended a starting point of six years. 
153 See for instance Rep v Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC) 306; Rep v Wilson; Rep v Khapuleni and others [1995] 2 MLR 
567 (HC) 571, where, in light of the prevalence of the offence of unlawful possession of dangerous drugs and the 
large quantities of Indian hemp being found in unlawful possession of persons, Chief Justice called for an increase in 
the maximum sentence for possession of Indian hemp contrary to section 19 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Chapter 
35:02 of the Laws of Malawi. The maximum was raised to life imprisonment. 
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responsible for the recent enhancement of maximum sentences in the Penal Code. In the long 
run, these enhancements will lead to lengthier sentences since the maximum sentence is an 
indicator of the seriousness of an offence which is the most determinative factor on the quantum 
of punishment.154 
It is important to note some recent developments regarding the role of deterrence in sentencing. 
In 2013, the High Court155 issued a string of judgments advocating for a shift in sentencing 
policy regarding the punishment of serious offences. It has urged courts to move beyond 
deterrence as the goal of punishment and consider rehabilitation as a legitimate purpose of 
punishment. For instance, in Rep v Keke,156 it was held that public interest goes beyond deterrence 
and extends to the reformation of an offender so that the punishment process results in making 
him a better person in the community.157 Further, in a clear departure from the principles 
advanced in earlier cases like Rep v Chizumila,158 the High Court has held that immediate 
imprisonment should not be seen as an automatic disposal of serious offences such as burglary 
and housebreaking; such offences may be punished with suspended sentences or indeed a non-
                                                 
154 See Patel v S Criminal Appeal No 81 of 2007 (an increase in the maximum sentence reflects that the offence 
concerned is regarded as more serious and thus courts must respond accordingly); Namate v Rep [1975-1977] 8 MLR 
132 (SCA); Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998 (the higher the maximum of the offence, the stiffer the 
punishment to be imposed). 
155 All the judgments were authored by Mwaungulu J. 
156 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010. 
157 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 8. 
158 See for instance Rep v Mushali and another Confirmation Case No 242 of 2013, 3; Rep v Assam and another 
Confirmation Case No 907 of 2008, 3; Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 of 2013, 3; Rep v Kanyumba and 
another Confirmation Case No 904 of 2008, 3; Rep v Mulolo and another Confirmation Case No 362 of 2012, 3; Rep v 
Kandodo and two others Confirmation Case No 240 of 2013, 3; Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 130 of 2013, 3; Rep 
v Headson and 4 Others Confirmation Case No 129 of 2013, 3; Rep v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013, 3; Rep v 
James Confirmation Case No 244 of 2013, 3; Rep v John Confirmation Case No 528 of 2010, 4; Rep v Mapeni 
Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010, 3; Rep v Kaufa Confirmation Case No 314 of 2011, 3; Rep v Naphazi 
Confirmation Case No 386 of 2011, 3. 
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custodial sentence altogether.159 The court has also encouraged the use of non-custodial 
sentences for simple theft.160 
In summary, it can be observed that deterrence retains a significant role in sentencing and is 
often cited to justify stiff sentences for serious and prevalent offences. While courts recognise 
that deterrence carries the risk of the instrumentalisation of offenders, this is deemed 
problematic only when dealing with first offenders. The application of sentencing principles 
emanating from community protection paint a similar picture as deterrence. 
4.1.3 Community protection 
In several cases, courts have stated that community protection is a major aim of sentencing and a 
primary goal of criminal law.161 For example, in Rep v Chavula,162 it was held that community 
protection requires that serious and prevalent offences should be punished severely despite 
mitigating factors. According to Katsala J, community protection will be a paramount 
consideration in punishing an offender if the offence is rampant and the security of the public is 
compromised; in such cases stiff sentences are required.163 Incapacitation and public protection 
have also been endorsed as appropriate goals for serious offences like robbery,164 burglary, 
                                                 
159 Rep v Yasin Confirmation Case No 219 of 2012; Khonje v Rep Miscellaneous Criminal Case No 41 of 2009. 
160 See for instance Rep v Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012, 6; Rep v Kachaso and another Confirmation Case 
No 26 of 2012, 6; Rep v Muwamba Confirmation Case No 247 of 2012, 2; Rep v Foster Confirmation Case No 1690 of 
2005. See also Rep v Tembo Confirmation Case No 187 of 2013. 
161 Rep v Nkhuya Confirmation Case No 1002 of 2002. See also Rep v Manyozo Confirmation Case No 431 of 2002; 
Rep v Chapendeka and others Confirmation Case No  451 of 2000; Rep v Chimaliroand others Confirmation Case No;  461 
of 2000; Rep v Mustafa Confirmation Case No  523 of 2001; Rep v Kachule Confirmation Case No 234 of 2001; Rep v 
Chikopa Confirmation Case No 530 of 2000; Rep v Banda Confirmation Case No 884 of 2002; Rep v Joseph 
Confirmation Case No 516 of 2002; Rep v Makuluni Confirmation Case No 276 of 2001, Rep v Edisoni  Confirmation 
Case No 421 of 2001; Rep v Kayenda Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003; Rep v Silaji Confirmation Case No 452 of 
2002; Rep v Zinkambani Confirmation Case No 481 of 2000; Rep v Chilimba Confirmation Case No 114 of 2011, Rep v 
Khonga Confirmation Case No. 157 of 2002. 
162 Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 4. 
163 Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 4. 
164 Rep v John Confirmation Case No 122 of 2013; Rep v Chikakuda and another Confirmation Case No 536 of 1996. 
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housebreaking,165 and rape.166 The potential risks of drug offences such as possession and 
cultivation of Indian hemp have also been used to justify incapacitation of an offender through 
imprisonment.167 Case law indicates that the certainty of incapacitation during the period of 
imprisonment provides a compelling justification for imprisonment such that an offender may 
be imprisoned for incapacitation even if the sentence cannot achieve deterrence.168 
Unlike deterrence and community protection, rehabilitation does not take pre-eminence in 
sentencing. 
4.1.4 Rehabilitation 
In 1997, Chimasula Phiri J observed that arguments that rehabilitation should be the main aim of 
punishment were not well received by judges.169 He indicated that rehabilitation should be 
employed „in so far as it is applicable‟170 because „[t]he function of the criminal law is deterrence, 
not reform. As law, it [is] not concerned with the reform of the criminal‟.171 It appears that courts 
are now more desirous to give rehabilitation a greater role in sentencing. Manda J held in Rep v 
Mussa172 that every sentence should aim at the reformation of the offender.173 And in Rep v Eneya 
and others,174 Chipeta J observed, obiter, that prisons are places of not only punishment but also 
rehabilitation and reflection, and that imprisonment is imposed with the hope that an offender 
„will eventually come out with a mended life and return to society as a useful citizen‟.175 In Rep v 
                                                 
165 Rep v Mwanyengamapazi Confirmation Case No 742 of 1997. 
166 Rep v Cidreck [1995] 1 MLR 215 (HC). 
167 Patel v S Criminal Appeal No 81 of 2007. 
168 Mwale v Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 5 of 1994; Rep v Brown and others [1995] 1 MLR 212 (HC). 
169 Chimasula-Phiri (1997). 
170 Chimasula-Phiri (1997) 10. 
171 Chimasula-Phiri (1997).  
172 Rep v Mussa Confirmation Case No 686 of 2010. 
173 Rep v Mussa Confirmation Case No 686 of 2010. 
174 Rep v Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003. 
175 Rep v Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003, 3. 
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Keke,176 the court held that sentences must cohere with reformation, restoration and 
rehabilitation. It stressed that an offender remains part of the public whose interest a sentence 
must serve. In an apparent reference to the belief that long sentences may contribute to 
recidivism fuelled by a desire to vengeance on the part of offenders, the court warned that an 
overemphasis on deterrence may be counterproductive:177 
Harsh or lenient sentences may not necessarily serve the public interest; they are likely to have [the] 
opposite effect. While sentences must fit the crime, the offender and the victim, they must also fit and 
cohere with overall sentencing goals, justice, reformation, restoration and rehabilitation. Our sentences 
may not be in the public interest if they only succeed in instilling crime and fail in bringing the prisoner a 
better person in society‟s continuum.178 
The court further observed that the doctrine of spent convictions may foster rehabilitation, 
adding that based on section 80(9)(c) of the Constitution, „courts should completely disregard 
convictions over seven years old as a matter of principle‟.179 
It is generally accepted that short sentences are appropriate for the rehabilitation of first and 
young offenders since they are enough to teach them a lesson where a less serious offence is 
involved.180 Courts often associate rehabilitation with suspended or short sentences which are 
                                                 
176 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 8. 
177 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 8. 
178 See also Rep v Chikatha Confirmation Case No 1602 of 1998: „Heavy handedness … may increase and complicate 
rather than reduce crime. Offenders who know that death or disproportionately long sentences … are likely 
punishment for rape will choose to eliminate the victims and witnesses to avoid detection‟. 
179 Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 7. Section 80(9)(c) of the Constitution requires a lapse of seven 
years after conviction of an offence involving moral turpitude or dishonesty or electoral fraud before a person can 
be elected as president. Similar provisions apply for persons who may be appointed as government ministers or hold 
a parliamentarian: see sections 51(2) and 94(3) of the Constitution. For the definition of dishonesty and moral 
turpitude, see Tembo and others v Attorney General Civil Cause No 50 of 2003. Malawi does not have a legal framework 
for spent convictions: see Nyirongo (2005). 
180 See for instance Nkhambule v Rep Criminal Appeal No 27 of 2006. Sipiliyano v Rep Criminal Appeal No 59 of 1998, 
2 (three-year sentence replaced with 18 months. a young convict „should be spared the agony of a long prison life‟). 
Cf S v Chirambo (manslaughter convict with prior record where he had served 3 years at Mpemba Approved School 
(a reformatory school) placed on probation for 3 years). 
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recommended for young181 or first offenders.182 First offenders are regarded as „disposed to law 
abiding‟.183 Courts have held that suspended sentences are inappropriate for serious offences and 
general deterrence.184  
The perceived link between suspended sentences and rehabilitation on the one hand, and 
suspended sentences and first and young offenders on the other, has translated into a situation 
where rehabilitation is considered an appropriate goal when sentencing first and young 
offenders. However, when coupled with the undesirability of suspending sentences for serious 
offences, the propriety of rehabilitation in sentencing is relegated to cases where the offence is 
not serious. Nevertheless, the association of rehabilitation with first and young offenders is 
                                                 
181 The definition of a „young‟ offender is fluid because it is not fixed to a specific age: see Rep v Magombo and others 
Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011 (offender 35 years); Rep v Mtendere Confirmation Case No 310 of 210 (offender 
34 years); Rep v Malizani Criminal Case No 219 of 2010, 5 (35 years not youthful age but may be taken beneficial to 
first offender as he has lived long without legal blemish); Rep v Masamba Confirmation Case No 411 of 2013 (28 year 
old offender). In Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, the court attempted to expound some general 
principles to govern the treatment of age in sentencing which can be summarised as follows: Offenders below the 
age of 25 years should be punished with short and quick sentences because at this age involvement in crime may be 
due to „impetuous, immaturity, youth or adventure. A severe sentence may be perceived by a young offender as 
reflecting a harsh society on which to avenge. Long prison sentences for young persons may actually delay social 
integration to enable a young life to start a new life and lead a meaningful life. For young offenders, therefore, a 
short, quick and sharp sentence may achieve the ends of justice and deter future offending‟. However, offenders 
above 25 years are considered to be mature enough to refrain from criminal behaviour based on a proper 
understanding of the consequences of crime. This means that on the one hand, such offenders deserve „a full rigour 
of the sentence that fits the crime‟. On the other hand, a court may be lenient in such cases because an offender has 
lived long without committing crime and therefore less likely to reoffend. Consequently offenders aged above 25 
may also be punished with „short and quick sentences‟. Here again the reason is that elderly offenders are less likely 
to reoffend. Sentencers must seriously consider suspending sentences for offenders aged 61 years and above. 
However, it appears that a court will not exercise leniency unless the offender is very elderly: see for instance Rep v 
Mulinganiza and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010 – 82 year old offender; Rep v Ng’ambi [1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 
457 (HC) – 80 year old offender. Cf Rep v Misomali confirmation Case No 527 of 1996, where a 55 year old offender 
considered to be „a responsible adult‟ deserving of no mercy despite the fact that he was a first offender and had 
pleaded guilty. 
182See, for instance, Rep v Manyamba [1997] 2 MLR 39 (HC).  
183 Rep v Namichire Confirmation Case No 803 of 2000, 7. 
184 Rep v Banda Confirmation Case No 266 of 1997, adopting the position in Rep v Mkwate [1973-1975] 7 ALR Mal 
407 (HC). 
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preserved in the principle that immediate imprisonment imposed of first or young offenders 
must be „short and quick‟ because in such cases short sentences can be just as effective as long 
ones.185 Indeed, it has been held that there is a „public interest in affording young [first] offenders 
an opportunity to reform‟.186 
There is also authority for the proposition that short sentences foster rehabilitation by avoiding 
the negative effects of long imprisonment. It has been held that young offenders should not be 
„unduly thrust into the company of hardened criminals for a long period of time‟, especially 
where there are other mitigating factors.187 According to Rep v Kabichi,188 long sentences may 
backfire by breeding resentment and resignation resulting in a life of recidivism, a situation which 
would neither achieve deterrence nor serve public interest.189 Courts have also found short 
sentences appealing because they do not endanger social reintegration. In Rep v Masamba,190 it was 
held that long prison sentences may actually delay social integration to enable a young life to start 
a new life and lead a meaningful life. In order to achieve the ends of justice and deter future 
offending, the court held, young offenders should be punished with „short, quick and sharp‟ 
sentences‟.191 Rep v Mvalume and another192 held that due to their age, young offenders „have a 
bigger future‟ and „should be given a chance unless they have really squandered it‟. In Rep v 
                                                 
185 Rep v Kathumba [1997] 1 MLR 390 (HC) 39; Sipiliyano v Rep Criminal Appeal No 59 of 1998 (first offenders must 
be „spared the agony of a long prison life if possible‟); Rep v Brighton and another Confirmation Case No 653 of 1997. 
Rep v Ngalu Confirmation Case No 196 of 1999; Rep v Banda Confirmation Case No 266 of 1997; Rep v Banda 
Confirmation Case No 266 of 1997. 
186 Rep v Mofolo Confirmation Case No 651 of 1999, 3. 
187 Rep v Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC); Rep v Sambani [1994] MLR 311 (HC). 
188 Rep v Kabichi Confirmation Case No 294 of 1997. 
189 Rep v Kabichi Confirmation Case No 294 of 1997. See also Mzembe and others v Rep Criminal Appeal No 42 of 2006, 
holding that long sentences imposed on young offenders may be counterproductive as they may be perceived by a 
young offender as reflecting a harsh society on which to avenge, breeding resentment and resulting in recidivism. 
190 Rep v Masamba Confirmation Case No 411 of 2013. See also Rep v Magombo and others Confirmation Case No 264 
of 2011; Rep v Mbichama Confirmation Case No 147 of 2013. 
191 Rep v Masamba Confirmation Case No 411 of 2013. See also Rep v Magombo and others Confirmation Case No 264 
of 2011; Rep v Mbichama Confirmation Case No 147 of 2013. 
192 Rep v Mvalume and another Confirmation Case No 278 of 2000. 
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Chirwa,193 the High Court said that first offenders should get shorter and quicker sentences 
because: 
Generally, for first offenders, it is the likelihood that the sentence will be passed rather than the length of 
the sentence that may reform or dissuade or persuade the offender from future crime. In those 
circumstances, opting for a longer sentence as against a shorter, quicker and sharper sentence might be in 
principle a wrong exercise of the discretion.194 
Courts have at times justified the imposition of long sentences by ruling out the possibility of 
rehabilitation.195 Rep v Chikatha196 recognises that a failure to prioritise rehabilitation where an 
offender has the capacity to reform may violate the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment. 
Acknowledging that a court has discretion to choose amongst competing and conflicting 
purposes and goals of punishment, Mwaungulu J held:  
A deterrent purpose may have to give way to a more corrective and rehabilitative purpose. If there is a 
chance [that an offender may be reformed by] a shorter sentence, a longer sentence may be regarded as a 
degrading and cruel treatment under the [C]onstitution.197  
The reasoning here is that that a longer sentence would be unnecessary to the extent that it 
ignores the importance of reformation. This gives primacy to rehabilitation over deterrence and 
                                                 
193 Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 of 2013, 4. 
194 Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 of 2013, 4, citing Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013. Cf 
Rep v Chavula Confirmation Case No 93 of 2005, 6, where Katsala J held that faced with the aftermath of violent 
crimes like armed robbery, „[i]t would … be irresponsible and insensitive if the courts were to mete out lenient 
sentences to these offenders on the ground that they are first offenders, and/or that they have pleaded guilty, 
and/or that they are young or old and/or that they ought to be given a second chance in life (as if that chance will not 
be available after serving a long sentence)‟. Emphasis added. In casu, the court upheld a 12 year sentence imposed on a 19 
year old young and first offender convicted on his own plea of guilty of armed robbery. 
195 See, for instance, Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008, where a life sentence was partly justified by 
the court‟s finding that the accused was not a suitable candidate for reformation. For a discussion of this case, see 
section 2.4 of chapter five. As noted in that chapter, the criteria for determining whether an offender has the 
capacity to reform are unsatisfactory. 
196 Rep v Chikatha Confirmation Case No 1602 of 1998. 
197 Rep v Chikatha Confirmation Case No 1602 of 1998, 3. Senior prison officials hold the view that rehabilitation 
cannot be achieved during a sentence of less than two years: see Kishindo (2012) 31. 
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community protection because the court unequivocally holds that despite other competing aims 
of punishment, a sentence longer than that required for the reformation of an offender would 
fall short of the prohibition of the cruel and degrading punishment.  
Lastly, the principle of „short and quick‟ sentences for first offenders appears to be judicial 
rhetoric. Indeed, in practice, the actual sentences imposed on first and young offenders can 
hardly be described as „short and quick‟. For instance, in robbery cases, these offenders have 
been sentenced to 7 years,198 8 years,199 10 years200 and 12 years.201 In Rep v Chimbelenga,202 a first 
offender was sentenced to 30 years theft of over K1 000 000 from the government. In fact, in 
murder and manslaughter cases, the „short and quick‟ sentences argument is abandoned 
altogether, although age and criminal record may be considered mitigating. In Rep v Banda and 
others,203 for instance, a first offender was sentenced to 35 years for murder.204 Little can be made 
of an argument that such sentences are conducive to rehabilitation, let alone social reintegration.  
                                                 
198 Rep v Masamba Confirmation Case No 411 of 2013 (sentenced reduced from 10 years); Rep v Banda and others 
Confirmation Case No 359 of 2012. 
199 Rep v Mtendere Confirmation Case No 310 of 2010. Rep v Mbichama Confirmation Case No 147 of 2013; Phiri v Rep 
Criminal Appeal No 22 of 2007. Rep v Zaola Confirmation Case No 276 of 1995. 
200 Rep v Thamando and others Confirmation Case No 59 of 1995. Rep v Wyson Criminal Appeal No 38 of 2004. See also 
Rep v Magombo and others Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011 (9 years). 
201 Harry v Rep Criminal Appeal No 5 of 2005. 
202 Rep v Chimbelenga (1996) MLR 342 (HC) 354. 
203 Rep v Banda and others Criminal Case 25 of 2011. 
204 See also Namizinga another v Rep Criminal Appeal No 18 of 2007 (SCA) 3 (25 year murder sentence for 22 year old 
first offender); Rep v Cheuka and others Criminal Case No 73 of 2008 (12 years for manslaughter); Rep v Mulinganiza 
and another Criminal Case No 306 of 2010 (31 year old offender sentenced to life imprisonment for murder); 
Namboya v R MSCA Criminal Appeal No 14 of 2005 (SCA) (28 year old first offender sentenced to 15 years for 
murdering her son due to oppression from her ex-husband); Rep v Tongole and another Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2011 
(eight years for manslaughter); Rep v  Malizani Criminal Case No 219 of 2010 (35 year old first offender sentenced to 
27 years for murder); Rep v Ganizani and another Criminal Appeal 261 of 2010 (17 years for murder by first offender); 
Rep v Sukali and another Criminal Appeal No 21 of 2011 (7 years for murder committed by a child offender); Rep v 
Katimbe Criminal Case No 29 of 2008 (14 years for manslaughter); Zakaliya v Rep Criminal Case No 30 of 1997 (15 
years for manslaughter); Rep v Chimimba and another Criminal Case No 11 of 2009 (12 years for manslaughter); Rep v 
Danger Criminal Case No 83 of 2009 (20 years for manslaughter); Rep v Mwale Criminal Case No 13 of 2008 (2 years 
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In light of the above, it can be said that post-1994, sentencing decisions speak more to the 
importance of rehabilitation and how it can be achieved than was previously the case. It has also 
been recognised that rehabilitation is embodied in the prohibition of cruel and inhuman 
treatment. However, as was the case before 1994, rehabilitation and social reintegration are 
generally regarded as suitable aims in punishing young and first offenders convicted of minor 
crimes. This shows that courts have not embraced rehabilitation as the main aim of punishment. 
Rather, punishment is, to a large extent, used as a means to achieve crime prevention through 
community protection and deterrence of offenders. 
5 ASSESSMENT OF THE AIMS OF PUNISHMENT 
Malawi has a hybrid penal system that recognises all the traditional aims of punishment. 
Imprisonment remains largely used for community protection and deterrence while rehabilitation 
is deemed suitable for first and young offenders. The reluctance of courts to employ general 
deterrence as a justification for punishment of first and young offenders reflects the criticism 
advanced in chapter three against deterrence and utilitarianism in general, namely, the 
instrumentalisation of an offender. What is unique with the sentencing jurisprudence in Malawi 
is that courts regard general deterrence as an unsuitable goal for the punishment of first and 
young offenders. This qualified criticism of general deterrence raises a number of questions in 
light of the Bill of Rights. For instance, is it acceptable for a second custodial sentence to be 
disproportionate? Secondly, how justifiable is general deterrence for offenders other than first 
and young offenders?  
                                                                                                                                                        
for manslaughter); Phiri v Rep Criminal Case No 11 of 2008 (8 years for manslaughter); Rep v Kaira and 3 Others 
Criminal Case No 40 of 2008  (10 years for manslaughter); Rep v Mbowe Criminal Case No 21 of 2008 (12 years for 
manslaughter); Rep v Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003 (18 years for manslaughter, later reduced to 10 years on 
appeal on the premise that the deceased was partly to blame for his death: see Eneya and others v Rep MSCA Criminal 
Appeal No 15 of 2001). 
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It can be argued that courts are overly speculative when it comes to justifying leniency in 
sentencing first and young offenders. With respect, there seems to be no demonstrable basis for 
claims such as that lengthy sentences „backfire‟ by breeding vengeance which may promote 
recidivism. In any event, there is no reason why the claim, if true, should not hold true for other 
offenders as well, unless, of course, they are locked away for such a long time that by the time 
they are released they are too old to commit certain crimes.  
The qualified use of general deterrence is clearly rooted in the conceptualisation of general 
deterrence as synonymous with disproportionately lengthy sentences. Restricting general 
deterrence to repeat offenders is essentially endorsing that they may be punished with 
disproportional sentences. This downplays the instrumentalisation of repeat offenders. The 
selective application of general deterrence is partly justified on community protection. However, 
the need to protect society does not arise from the fact that the offender is not a first offender 
but rather on the extent to which the offence compromises public safety. Surely, a first-time 
murderer compromises public safety more than a repeat petty offender? An argument can be 
made that the way in which general deterrence is applied in Malawi indefensible in light of the 
right to human dignity and equality. If general deterrence reduces an offender to a „guinea pig‟ 
then it should be a wholly objectionable goal of punishment regardless of the status of an 
offender. As held in S v Makwanyane, the instrumentalisation of an offender violates the right to 
human dignity.205 The age or criminal record of an offender is of no consequence. Otherwise, 
compliance with the non-discrimination injunction in section 20 of the Constitution may be 
called into question.  
The discussion on deterrence reveals that the manner in which general deterrence is applied in 
Malawi results in sentences that are inconsistent with the principle of proportionality and 
therefore violates the right to human dignity and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and 
                                                 
205 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 313 and 316. 
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degrading punishment. Once the element of disproportionality in general deterrent sentences is 
removed, the justification for not imposing general deterrent sentences on first and young 
offenders becomes vague. The concern will then be whether the sentence is proportional to the 
offence and the offender. If, as has been suggested in various sentencing judgments, general 
deterrence  can be achieved as „a matter of course‟, then there is no reason to actively pursue it 
by increasing sentences.  
In view of the foregoing, there is no proper justification for not applying the same objections 
against general deterrence to repeat offenders. General deterrence should be an objectionable 
goal of punishment if it results in sentences that are cruel, inhuman or degrading by reducing an 
offender to a „guinea pig‟ or „a means to an end‟. It should not make any difference whether or 
not an offender is a first or repeat offender, young or old. The reason for this is that the right to 
human dignity is violated if offenders are reduced to a means to an end. Criticism from some 
judges that general deterrence is generally an inappropriate aim of punishment lends credence to 
the argument that the manner in which general deterrence is understood and applied in Malawi 
results in sentences that are disproportionate and inconsistent with the right to human dignity 
and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.  
The selective application of general deterrence also defies the deterrent effect of the certainty of 
punishment. As noted in chapter two, certainty of punishment is a key concept of deterrence 
theory in general and if there is no likelihood of actually being caught, prosecuted and punished, 
a person is likely to commit a crime.206 There is no compelling reason for only applying the 
certainty principle to young offenders. 
                                                 
206 See section 3.3.1 of chapter two. See also See also S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 122: „The greatest 
deterrent to crime is the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and punished. It is that which is 
presently lacking in our criminal justice system; and it is at this level and through addressing the causes of crime that 
the State must seek to combat lawlessness‟; Sangmin (2007) 57 („what brings down the level of crime is the 
knowledge, on the part of criminals, that if I commit an offence, I will end up in jail‟); Walker (1991) 17; Bagaric 
(2010) 147-148; Canadian Sentencing Commission (1987) 136-137; Wilson (1994) 174. 
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On a somewhat different note, the continued justification of long sentences on the basis of 
general deterrence is particularly perturbing in the light of seemingly judicial indifference to 
whether or not longer sentences in fact have a greater deterrent value than shorter sentences. 
Case law does not indicate why lengthier sentences are considered to have a greater deterrent 
effect. Courts readily assume that punishment has a deterrent effect and that heavier sentences 
have a greater deterrent value than lighter sentences. This is not necessarily the case and is 
symptomatic of the pitfalls of deterrence as explained in chapter two.207  
Therefore the case of Chizumila, discussed earlier,208 can be criticised for concluding, without 
much proof, that short sentences were the reason for the increase in burglary cases at the time. 
Mob justice cannot be blamed on sentencing alone and it is not entirely correct to claim that 
mob justice is an indicator of society‟s views as to the appropriate punishment. In the face of 
high crime rates, mob justice in Malawi is most probably fuelled by a general dissatisfaction with 
the criminal justice system including the failure of police to apprehend suspects and the release 
of suspects on bail. This dissatisfaction is in fact antagonistic with the presumption of innocence, 
especially where an offender was flagrante delicto. It is ironic that while courts are unsure as to the 
underlying reasons for an upsurge in mob justice incidents, they have by and large responded by 
imposing harsher sentences. Courts cannot endorse such societal views which at best are 
uninformed of the sentencing process and the circumstances that inform it. Indeed, the question 
of whether sentences imposed on offenders are adequate cannot be determined through the 
lenses of perpetrators of mob justice. The majority of such people cannot be within the remit of 
– to use the words of Chombo J in Rep v Masula and others209 – „right-thinking members of the 
public with full knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances‟ of the case and who upon 
learning of the sentence can „question the court‟s sanity‟ or wonder if „something had gone 
                                                 
207 Se section 3.3.2 of chapter two. 
208 See section 4.1.2 above. 
209 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008. 
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wrong with the administration of justice‟.210 After all, it is questionable that judicial officers in 
fact know the views of society.211 
A crucial question that Chizumila raises is how a court can, on the one hand, be ostensibly 
unconcerned about whether imprisonment succeeds in deterring offenders and, on the other, 
justify increasing the level of sentences on the basis that lower sentences are incapable of 
reducing crime. The latter reasoning can only be true if the deterrent effect of imprisonment is 
certain and that longer sentences have a greater deterrent effect. Therefore, if the court is not 
interested in knowing whether deterrence is at all achieved by imprisonment then it has no basis 
for adopting a sentencing policy that imposes longer sentences in a bid to attain deterrence. Such 
sentences would be contrary to the right to liberty in that the deprivation of liberty is not 
rationally connected to its stated aim. It is paradoxical that a court, as the authority responsible 
for depriving the offender‟s liberty, has no interest in knowing if the stated aim can be achieved 
but rather proceeds on an assumption that deprivation of liberty for a longer time will achieve 
the desired goal. As explained in chapter four,212 a limitation of a right is justifiable in terms of 
section 44 of the Constitution if, among other things, it is reasonable in that the aim it seeks to 
achieve is actually achieved. In the context of imprisonment, the deprivation of liberty cannot 
pass constitutional scrutiny where the authority restricting the right is indifferent as to whether 
such deprivation will in fact achieve the stated objective.  
Furthermore, the tendency of enhancing sentences with little concern as to whether the purpose 
for the enhancement will be achieved violates the right to human dignity because it reduces an 
offender to a means to an end. In this case, an offender is used to purely satisfy public sentiment 
without any regard as to whether the restriction of his rights will achieve the legitimate goal of 
reducing crime. Sentencing cannot be led by public sentiment alone; if anything, courts must lead 
                                                 
210 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008, 4. 
211 Terblanche (2009) 166. 
212 See section 4.2 of chapter four. 
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public opinion by upholding the constitutional rights of offenders. In addition, it is not proper 
for a court to be indifferent as to whether or not an enhanced sentence has a greater deterrent 
value than a lesser sentence since a limitation must constitute the least restrictive means to 
achieve the objective. Needless to say, public sentiment is not a lawful basis on which the right 
to liberty may be limited. In the case of imprisonment, a court cannot justifiably impose a longer 
sentence in the absence of proof that a shorter sentence (a less restrictive means) cannot achieve 
the same objective. This is supported by Rep v Kapitawo213 where Chikopa J held that a court must 
not only state its basis for claiming that an offence is prevalent but also why the offence is on the 
increase and how or why a stiffer sentence would reverse the situation. Such statements, the 
judge continued, are matters of fact, the truth of which must be carefully established beyond 
reasonable doubt.214 Therefore, indifference to the realisation of the aims of punishment is 
indefensible and duplicitous.  
On a positive note, the emerging jurisprudence that places more emphasis on rehabilitation and 
cautions against an overly retributive or deterrent approach to sentencingmay have a significant 
and positive impact on the use of imprisonment in Malawi. However, if courts continue to 
follow public opinion and respond to increasing incidence of mob justice with stiffer sentences, 
then it is very likely that there will be no meaningful change in sentencing practices in Malawi 
towards rehabilitation. 
In the pursuit of rehabilitation, courts should be wary of placing too much faith in the prison 
system and what it can do for an offender. For instance in Semba v Rep,215 the court opted not to 
suspend a sentence because the offender was an „ill-tempered man‟ who „could learn to control 
his temper‟ during his time in prison. Surely, assuming that this is a justifiable ground for 
imprisonment, such a sentence would be meaningless and arbitrary if there are no measures in 
                                                 
213 Rep v Kapitawo Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005. See also Rep v Gondwe Confirmation Case No 28 of 2006. 
214 Rep v Kapitawo Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005, 3.  
215 Semba v Rep [1997] 1 MLR 388 (HC). 
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prison that can teach an offender better anger management? This makes it difficult to reconcile 
the goal of rehabilitation with the reality in Malawian prisons where there are few opportunities 
for prisoners to acquire skills through suitable rehabilitative programmes. In practice, priority for 
participation in such programmes is given for short term prisoners.216 As noted in chapter two, 
the success of rehabilitative programmes also depends on the availability of resources for 
implementation which makes rehabilitation a challenging objective for penal systems in 
developing countries like Malawi. Rehabilitation programmes are poorly funded and at times 
only a certain category of privileged offenders have access. In fact, a 2005 study found that 
offenders serving life sentences or long prison terms are generally not allowed access to the 
limited rehabilitation programmes which are often reserved for short term prisoners convicted of 
minor offences.217 Furthermore, it found that the nature of rehabilitative programmes was driven 
by the need to generate income for the prison and occupy prisoners‟ time rather than equip them 
for re-integration into the community.218 For long-term prisoners, the success of social 
reintegration after release is lessened even further by the fact that they may have virtually nothing 
to return to in society.219 This presents difficulties when it comes to the pardon process since the 
rehabilitation plans of an offender are taken into account. If practice shows that rehabilitation is 
an aim that is unlikely to be achieved through imprisonment, then it would be pointless for a 
court to impose a sentence that flies in the face of such a reality. Courts should also not turn a 
blind eye to reality.220 As stated in Rep v Nasoni,221 a court achieves nothing by imposing a 
                                                 
216 Burton et al (2005). 
217 Burton et al (2005) 68. 
218 Burton et al (2005) 68-80. 
219 For example, a prisoner who had spent 40 years in prison found that his house was non-existent: see 
Chiyembekeza (2001). 
220 Cf Mujuzi (2008), arguing that argues that courts should be wary of doubting the ability of prison authorities to 
rehabilitate an offender. 
221 Rep v Nasoni [1990] 13 MLR 400 (HC). 
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sentence which cannot be carried out in practice. Similarly, a court should not impose a sentence 
which cannot achieve the aim its stated or obvious aim; such a sentence would be arbitrary.  
Questions should also be raised as to how courts assess the prospect of reform in Malawi. In 
particular, the conclusion reached in Rep v Masula,222 that the fact that an offender committed an 
offence while on bail rules out the possibility of reform, is quite unconvincing. As observed in 
Rameka et al v New Zealand,223 every person has the potential to change and improve and therefore 
less dangerous over time. The suggestion, implicit in cases such as Rep v Chavula,224 that lengthy 
sentences are justifiable because an offender will still have a chance at rehabilitation after release 
from prison ignores the fact that prisons must work towards the rehabilitation and social 
reintegration of an offender. It also reflects an overemphasis on retribution, deterrence and 
community protection with total disregard for the offender. 
Lastly, it can be deduced from the sentencing decisions analysed in this chapter that the 
conceptualisation of rehabilitation in Malawi remains detached from a positive act on the part of 
the prison authorities and an offender through the provision and participation in rehabilitative 
programmes during the course of imprisonment. Rather, rehabilitation is considered as an 
outcome of inward reflection as a result of painful experiences such as imprisonment or the fear 
of punishment. Understood this way, rehabilitation is often confused with deterrence. For 
instance, it is generally accepted that short sentences are appropriate for the rehabilitation of first 
and young offenders since they are enough „to teach them a lesson‟. As a result of the overlap 
between rehabilitation and deterrence, little attention has been given to the question of whether 
prisons provide a conducive environment for the rehabilitation of offenders. Rehabilitation in 
prison is only possible if the prison environment is conducive to reform. On the other hand, it 
                                                 
222 Rep v Masula and others Criminal Case No 65 of 2008, where a life sentence was partly justified by the court‟s 
finding that the accused was not a suitable candidate for reformation.  
223 See the Individual Opinion of Committee Member Mr Walter Kälin Rameka et al v New Zealand Communication 
No 1090/2002. 
224 Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005. 
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has also been recognised that imprisonment has the undesirable outcome of producing hardened 
criminals.225 While this shows a lack of faith in the rehabilitative effect of imprisonment, it does 
not, in practice, preclude a court from imposing imprisonment. Often, courts address such 
concerns by imposing short sentences.226 
Overall, it can be concluded from the foregoing analysis that there has been no significant shift 
in the understanding of the aims of punishment post 1994.  
6 CONCLUSION 
Sentencing jurisprudence shows that courts have understood that the Constitution has 
significance in punishment. For example, courts have linked the principle of proportionality to 
the right to human dignity and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment. However, the 
courts‟ understanding of the aims of punishment and how they should influence sentencing 
decisions has not changed significantly since 1994. In general, courts have not recognised 
rehabilitation as the essential aim of punishment. Reminiscent of the position before 1994, they 
generally stress retribution, deterrence and incapacitation as the main justifications for 
punishment. Therefore, the aims of punishment have not been infused with constitutional and 
international standards. Although some cases have invoked the right to human dignity and the 
prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment to discredit general deterrence, courts have found 
justification for overlooking this when sentencing serious and repeat offenders. As a result, there 
is an emphasis on retribution, incapacitation and deterrence, resulting in the imposition of stiff 
sentences.  
On a positive note, there is emerging jurisprudence that draws links between rehabilitation and 
the right to human dignity and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment. It remains to be 
                                                 
225 See for instance Rep v Sambani [1994] MLR 311 (HC). 
226 Rep v Kadwala Confirmation Case No 725 of 2005. See also Rep v Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC); Rep v Sambani 
[1994] MLR 311 (HC). 
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seen whether this jurisprudence will bring about a significant shift in the courts‟ understanding of 
the aims of punishment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EARLY RELEASE MECHANISMS IN MALAWI 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The last two chapters have established that the aims and forms of punishment in Malawi do not 
wholly conform to international standards and the ideal of rehabilitation. They found that the 
forms of punishment in Malawi reflect both retributive and utilitarian justifications for 
punishment and that for the large part, courts attach little significance to rehabilitation in 
sentencing. Further, courts have not infused the sentencing process with constitutional and 
international standards values which promote rehabilitation as the essential goal of punishment. 
The task of this chapter is to consider whether the early release system in Malawi is consistent 
with constitutional and international standards. It will be recalled that chapter three 
demonstrated that the pursuit of rehabilitation as the essential aim of punishment requires that a 
penal regime must have an effective mechanism for release. This mechanism must provide a 
reasonable possibility of release for prisoners and must fulfil certain standards such as that it 
must be administered by an independent body with the power to release an offender and that 
offenders must have a right to be heard during the process. This chapter will therefore answer 
three key questions: what early release mechanisms are available in Malawi? Are they conducive 
to the promotion of rehabilitation as the essential aim of imprisonment? To what extent do they 
reflect constitutional and international standards? The first part of this chapter will answer the 
first question by describing the forms of early release system in Malawi while the other two 
questions will be dealt with in the second part. 
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2 FORMS OF EARLY RELEASE1 
2.1 The prerogative of mercy 
Like its predecessor, the 1994 Constitution allows the President to „pardon convicted offenders, 
grant stays of execution of sentence, reduce sentences, or remit sentences‟2 in consultation with 
the Advisory Committee on the Granting of Pardon (Pardon Committee or Committee).3 This 
Committee is comprised of the President as chairperson, the Attorney General and such number 
of cabinet ministers as determined by the President.4 It determines its own procedure while the 
President, as chairperson, presides over the meetings and determines when the committee is to 
meet.5 
The Prisons Act6 sets out a number of ways in which a case can be considered for mercy. Section 
108 of the Act provides for special remission by the President. It states that all prisoners 
including those serving less than one month7 and life sentences may be recommended for 
remission by the President on grounds of „meritorious conduct or mental or physical condition 
                                                 
1 The failure to timeously confirm sentences subject to automatic review triggers a fascinating early release 
mechanism under section 15(3) of the CPEC which prohibits the continued imprisonment of an offender beyond 
the terms stipulated in section 15(1)(b) unless they are confirmed on appeal or review. However, this provision is 
not discussed in this study because it is not connected to any aims of punishment. In Rep v Isaaki Confirmation Case 
No 410 of 2005, 2, NyaKaunda Kamanga J observed that section 15(3) ensures that there is no prolonged 
confinement of prisoners in the face of the risk of an unfair trial arising from a disproportionate sentence. 
2 Section 89(2). This power is not limited to „prisoners‟ but extends to all offenders and may be exercised before a 
sentence is imposed. Cf section 1.1 of the 2005 Amended Guidelines for the Exercise of Prerogative of Mercy 
Adopted by the Advisory Committee on the Granting of Pardon (Pardon Committee Guidelines) which refers to 
convicted „prisoners‟. The title of these guidelines („Amended Guidelines for the Pardon Committee Guidelines‟) 
suggests that there is/are earlier version/s. However, the author was unable to get a copy of any earlier versions. It 
is also difficult to determine if the guidelines are still in force or have been amended since 2005. 
3 Section 89(2)(a). 
4 Section 3 of the Advisory Committee on the Granting of Pardon Act, Chapter 9:05 of the Laws of Malawi (Pardon 
Committee Act). 
5 Section 4 of the Pardon Committee Act. 
6Chapter 9:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
7 In practice, immediate imprisonment of less than one month is rare. 
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of such prisoner‟. Special remission must first be recommended by the Commissioner of Prisons 
to the Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security,8 „who if he thinks fit‟, may make a 
recommendation to the President.9 According to Chihana v State and another,10 the practice is that 
prisoners who have „demonstrated good conduct in the course of serving at least half of their 
prison sentences on offences classified as minor‟ are „carefully selected by a Committee of Senior 
Prison Officers‟.11 Thereafter, the recommendations are considered by the Pardon Committee 
before the Minister seeks the approval of the President to release the prisoners recommended 
for mercy.12 
The second method for bringing a case to the President‟s attention relates to the review of 
sentences imposed on „long-term prisoners‟. A long-term prisoner is „any prisoner serving a total 
sentence of imprisonment of seven years or more‟.13 Section 111(1) of the Prisons Act requires 
that every four years, the Commissioner „must‟ send a report to the Minister regarding every 
prisoner serving a life sentence or imprisonment of more seven years. The Minister may also 
request for such reports at any time.14 Section 111(3) of the Prisons Act suggests that the power 
to release long-term prisoners can only be exercised by the President. This is because section 
111(3) states that where the Minister requests a report to be supplied at any time or at intervals 
more frequent than stipulated in section 111(1) of the Act (that is, an interval of less than four 
years), „the Commissioner shall arrange for compliance with any instructions as to pardon, 
respite, reprieve, commutation or remission of the sentence by the President‟. It is reasonable to 
conclude then that reports received under section 111(1) must be sent to the President in order 
that a prisoner may be considered for mercy. On the other hand, this argument is ostensibly 
                                                 
8 The Malawi Prison Service falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security. 
9 Section 108 of the Prisons Act. 
10 Chihana v State and another Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 41 of 2009. 
11 Chihana v State and another Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 41 of 2009, 16. 
12 Chihana v State and another Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 41 of 2009, 14-16. 
13 Regulation 2 of the Prison Regulations. 
14 Section 111(3). 
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defeated by the wording of section 111(3) which, it may be argued, is only applicable in cases 
where the Minister requests a report and not where the report is submitted to him in observance 
of the statutory duty in section 111(1). 
However, the latter interpretation is unduly restrictive, especially in view of the fact that the law 
is silent as to what action the Minister must take after receiving reports under section 111(1). It is 
not in accordance with the principle that penal provisions must be construed generously to the 
benefit of an offender, which is the corollary of the principle that penal provisions must be 
construed restrictively in the benefit of an offender. In other words, a court must be wary to 
interpret a penal provision in a restrictive manner which limits the rights of an offender when a 
more generous interpretation encompassing such rights is possible. Therefore, section 111(1) 
should be read in the context of section 111(3), with the result that reports received under the 
former must be forwarded to the President. It can, therefore, be said that sentences imposed on 
long-term prisoners must be reviewed every four years. This conclusion also finds strength in the 
mandatory nature of section 111(1): a report must be sent to the Minister every four years.  
The third route to consideration for mercy is regulation 35 of the Prison Regulations which 
states that a medical officer must submit a report to the officer in charge where he is of the view 
that: 
a. the life of a prisoner is likely to be endangered by his further confinement in prison; or  
b. a sick prisoner is unlikely to survive his sentence; or 
c. a prisoner is totally and permanently unfit to undergo prison discipline; or 
d. the mental health of a prisoner appears likely to become impaired by his further confinement in prison. 
The regulation further requires that the officer in charge must „immediately‟ forward the report 
to the Commissioner for transmission to the Minister.15 It is quite clear from the circumstances 
listed in regulation 35 that the appropriate remedy in each case would be the release of the 
offender concerned. Indeed, the continued confinement of such prisoners would amount to 
                                                 
15 Regulation 35.  
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cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. Since the Minister is not empowered to release a 
prisoner except on licence,16 he must arrange for such cases to be considered for mercy. 
A case may also be brought to the President‟s attention through section 72(2) of the Prisons Act 
which provides: 
If any prisoner … was sentenced to death before being adjudged to be a mentally disordered or defective 
person and such sentence has not, at the time he is certified to be of sound mind, been commuted to a 
term of imprisonment, the Minster shall report the matter to the President. 
This indicates that the President need only be notified after the prisoner concerned has been 
declared to be of sound mind. There is therefore no general duty on the Minister to report any 
instances of mental illness of prisoners under sentence of death. However, the duty exists if the 
death sentence has not been commuted to imprisonment, regardless of whether the prisoner was 
already considered for mercy in the past.17 
The fifth mode of bringing a case for mercy can be found in regulation 23 of the Prison 
Regulations. This provisions allows a prisoner to petition the Minister „with respect to any matter 
relating to his imprisonment or in mitigation of sentence‟. The Minister may „if he thinks fit‟ 
forward the petition to the President „if the circumstances so require‟.18 This is a more general 
provision which applies to all sentenced prisoners since there are no special qualifications. 
Therefore, any prisoner, including those serving life sentences and those on death row can apply 
for mercy through regulation 23. With regard to how this provision relates to other specific 
provisions which require prisoners to „qualify‟ for mercy, it can be said that a prisoner would not 
be barred from invoking regulation 23 on the basis that he does not „qualify‟ for mercy under 
another provision of the Prisons Act. For instance, a life prisoner would not be barred from 
                                                 
16 Section 110 of the Prisons Act, discussed in section 2.2 below. 
17 There is no legal reason for restricting the prerogative of mercy to a once-off event regarding an offender. As 
such the President may consider mercy multiple times for the same offender and even reconsider his past decisions 
by exercising even more lenience. An objection might only be raised where an unconditional  
18 Regulation 23(2). 
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petitioning the Minister under this regulation simply because he has not served four years as 
required by section 111(1) of the Act. Indeed, holding otherwise would cause injustice, since one 
of the purported utilities of the prerogative of mercy is to correct miscarriage of justice and, in 
Malawi, pardon is principally reserved for this purpose.19 Consequently, phrase „if circumstances 
so require‟ in regulation 23 should be interpreted generously to cover cases where an applicant 
cogently pleads innocence.  The Minister will also have to apply his mind to the Pardon 
Committee Guidelines in determining whether the matter should be sent to the President.  
The sixth mode of bringing cases for mercy is court-driven. Section 326(1) of the CPEC requires 
automatic referral to the President of all cases where a death sentence has been passed. The duty 
is on the court to send all such cases together with the recommendations of the presiding judge 
to the President.20  
Victims of crime may also petition the President for mercy on behalf of an offender „for the sake 
of promoting peace, tolerance and harmony in society‟.21 Such a petition may be entertained 
regardless of the seriousness of the offence concerned.22 Lastly, practice indicates that the media 
also provides a channel to prompt the President to exercise the prerogative for mercy.23 
                                                 
19 See clause 2 of the 2005 Amended Guidelines for the Exercise of Prerogative of Mercy Adopted by the Advisory 
Committee on the Granting of Pardon (Pardon Committee Guidelines). Actually, as a general rule, pardon should 
„generally be reserved for cases of miscarriage of justice after the matter has been thoroughly exhausted through the 
judicial system‟ 
20 For further discussion of this provision, see section 2.2 of chapter five. 
21 Clause 6 of the Pardon Committee Guidelines. 
22 Clause 6 of the Pardon Committee Guidelines. 
23 For instance, in 2002, following media reports, President Muluzi pardoned a woman who had given birth in 
prison: see US Department of State (2014). 
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2.1.1 Eligibility criteria and relevant factors for consideration for mercy  
The Pardon Committee Guidelines24 prescribe the overarching principles, eligibility criteria and 
factors that the Pardon Committee should consider in the exercise of its functions. The 
guidelines state that the public protection is the paramount consideration in the exercise of 
mercy.25 Other considerations include whether „the prisoner‟s release will cause no undue risk 
that he will reoffend before his sentence expires‟26 and whether his release „will contribute to the 
welfare and protection of the community by helping or furthering his reintegration into the 
community as a law-abiding person‟.27 
The Guidelines set down three general rules for eligibility. First, pardon „shall generally be 
reserved for cases of miscarriage of justice after the matter has been thoroughly exhausted 
through the judicial system‟.28 Second, prisoners must have served at least half of their sentences 
to be eligible for presidential remission or reduction of sentence.29 Third, serious offenders 
convicted of „murder, violent offences such as robbery and burglary; serious sexual offences such 
as rape and defilement; and grand corruption‟ should not benefit from the prerogative of 
mercy.30 While the guidelines do not state the circumstances in which the first and second rule 
may be departed from, it makes it clear that departure from the third rule is permissible if the 
prisoner is terminally ill31 or if „for the sake of promoting peace, tolerance and harmony in 
society‟, a victim or his close relative petitions the President for mercy.32 
                                                 
24 The title of these guidelines („Amended Guidelines for the Pardon Committee Guidelines‟) suggests that there 
is/are earlier version/s. However, the author was unable to get a copy of any earlier versions.  
25 Clause 1.1. 
26 Clause 1.2. 
27 Clause 1.3. 
28 Clause 2. 
29 Clause 5. 
30 Clause 3. 
31 Clause 4. 
32 Clause 6. 
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The Pardon Committee must consider the eligibility criteria in conjunction with the following 
information on the prisoner as provided by the Commissioner of Prisons:33 
8.1 an assessment of his  character and history 
8.2 previous convictions (if any); 
8.3 an assessment of his attitude to the offence; 
8.4 any matters of custom relevant to the offence committed;34 
8.5 particulars of any disputes within the community which have arisen as a result of the commission of the 
offence or which may be likely to arise if he is released; 
8.6 the amount and nature of any compensation paid in relation to the offence; 
8.7 the likelihood of his re-offending if he is released; 
8.8 an assessment of the probability of his successful reintegration into the community if released; 
8.9 an assessment of his rehabilitation plans, particularly in respect of education and training, employment, 
proposed housing, community and church/religious involvement, and the likelihood of future employment 
and education; 
8.10 an assessment of his financial situation, assets and property, family circumstances and marital status; 
8.11 any other particulars which the Commissioner of Prisoners thinks relevant in assisting the Committee to 
decide whether to reduce or remit his sentence. 
Clause 7 of the Pardon Committee Guidelines states that where the offender is „terminally ill and 
the Commissioner of Prisons … is desirous of recommending their names‟ to the Pardon 
Committee, the Commissioner‟s report must contain the information on an assessment of 
character and history during imprisonment, medical and psychiatric reports, and a report of a 
chaplain where appropriate. 
In view of the Constitution, there are other factors that should inform the pardon process such 
as the rights to human dignity and liberty and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment. 
                                                 
33Clause 8. 
34 It is unclear what is meant by „matters of custom‟ and how they are relevant to a decision on whether an offender 
should benefit from early release.  
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2.2 Remission and release on licence 
There are two forms of release under the Prisons Act: remission and release on licence. Section 
107(1) of the Act stipulates that a prisoner „may earn by satisfactory industry and good conduct a 
remission of one third of his sentence‟, provided that the remaining sentence is not less than one 
month.35 Remission is only applicable to offenders serving fixed sentences of more than one 
month.36 As noted earlier,37 prisoners serving life sentences or imprisonment for less than a 
month may be recommended for remission by the President in terms of section 108 of the 
Prisons Act. Apart from the difference in the category of offenders and the grantor, the other 
difference between remission under sections 107 (general remission) and 108 (special remission) 
is that the latter may be granted on account of mental or physical health. In addition, unlike 
general remission, special remission is not limited to one third of the sentence and cannot be lost 
through punishment under section 110(1) of the Prisons Act. 
Release on licence is only applicable to prisoners serving life imprisonment.38 The Minister may 
grant a licence „at any time he thinks fit‟ and „subject to such conditions as may be specified in 
the licence‟ and which „the Minister may at any time vary, modify or cancel‟.39 He may also recall 
the prisoner „at any time‟ „but without prejudice to the power of the Minister to release him on 
licence again‟.40 
                                                 
35 The Commissioner of Prisons must calculate the release dates by drawing up a Remission Table: see regulation 
132 of the Prison Regulations. Where the release date falls on a Sunday, the prisoner must be released on „the next 
preceding day not being a Sunday or public holiday‟: see section 113 of the Prisons Act; Chihana v Attorney General 
[1993] 16(2) MLR 483 (HC). 
36 Section 107(1) of the Prisons Act. 
37 See section 2.1 above. 
38 Section 110(1) of the Prisons Act. 
39 Section 110(1) of the Prisons Act. Regulation 134 of the Prison Regulations requires that a prisoner must, as a 
condition of the licence, report to a designated police station. 
40 Section 110(2) of the Prisons Act. 
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2.3 Release under the Prisons Bill 
2.3.1 The aim and administration of early release 
The aim of conditional release under the Bill is „to contribute to the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of prisoners into the community as law abiding citizens‟.41 To facilitate this aim, 
prisoners must be placed in pre-release programmes42 and may be granted temporary absence of 
up to 12 hours in preparation for release or „any other reason related to the successful 
reintegration of the prisoner into the community‟.43 Conditional release shall be cancelled if a 
parolee is convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine as 
prescribed.44 
The Bill entrusts the general administration of early release in the Inspectorate of Prisons, a 
constitutional body charged with the inspection of prisons.45 The Inspectorate may only release 
prisoners conditionally; it has no powers to grant unconditional release. It is composed of a 
justice of appeal or judge of the High Court nominated by the Judicial Service Commission, as 
chairperson; the Chief Commissioner of Prisons or his nominee who must be a senior member 
of the prison service; a member of the Prison Service Commission nominated by the 
commission; a magistrate nominated by the Judicial Service Commission and the Ombudsman.46 
In addition, the Inspectorate may co-opt persons to represent local or international organisations 
having an office in Malawi involved in the monitoring of human rights or more generally 
concerned with the welfare of offenders as may be approved of by the membership of the 
                                                 
41 Section 53(1) of the Prisons Bill. 
42 Section 46(1) of the Bill. 
43 See sections 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Bill. 
44 Section 53(4) of the Bill. Time spent on parole is considered as part of the sentence: see section 55(1)(b) of the 
Bill. 
45 See sections 169 and 170 of the Constitution. 
46 Section 170(1) of the Constitution. 
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Inspectorate of Prisons.47 The Inspectorate must be independent of any interference from any 
person or authority in the exercise of its functions and duties.48 In addition to any powers 
granted by statute, the Inspectorate is charged with, among others things, the monitoring of 
prison conditions, administration and general functioning of penal institutions taking due 
account of applicable international standards‟.49 
2.3.2 Eligibility for early release 
The Bill proposes that all prisoners must automatically be granted remission of one third of the 
sentence upon admission.50 Such remission is mandatory and may only be reduced by up to 90 
days as punishment for a disciplinary infringement.51 
The Bill provides for six instances in which early release may be granted. The first category of 
offenders eligible for parole is that of prisoners who have served at least one third or 12 years of 
a determinate sentence in accordance with section 53(1)(a) of the Bill.52 This means that the 12-
year tariff will apply where a sentence exceeds 36 years; that is where one third of the sentence is 
more than 12 years. Long-term prisoners whose release may be triggered upon expiry of 12 years 
may also be considered for release much earlier in their sentences. This is because order 142(1) 
of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders, in keeping with the spirit of section 111 of the Prisons Act, 
proposes that sentences over seven years must be reviewed every four years „or when otherwise 
directed‟. The relevant review documents must be carefully scrutinised by the officer in charge of 
a prison and submitted to the Commissioner of Prisons at least seven days before the due date.53 
Although not stipulated in the Draft Standing Orders or the Bill, it is judicious to conclude that 
                                                 
47 Section 170(2) of the Constitution. 
48 Section 169(2) of the Constitution. 
49 See sections 169(1), (3)(a) and (3)(d) of the Constitution 
50 Section 52 of the Bill. 
51 See sections 35(2)(e) of the Bill. 
52 Section 53(1)(a). 
53 Order 142(2). 
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for offenders sentenced to 12 years or less, review documents referred to in order 142(2) must 
be forwarded to the Inspectorate of Prisons or the President so that the prisoners concerned 
may be considered for conditional release or mercy respectively. Indeed, for a seven year 
sentence, four years is way beyond the one third-tariff required which must be served before 
parole may be considered under section 53(1)(a) of the Bill. Four years would also satisfy the 
tariff for a sentence of 12 years under the same provision. In so as far as order 142 may trigger 
early release, it would apply to sentences beyond 12 years only once the required tariff has been 
served.  
The second category of prisoners eligible for conditional release is that of prisoners sentenced to 
one year or less without the need to consider individual cases, provided they have served one 
third of their sentences.54 Section 53(5)(a) states that the Inspectorate may make general rules to 
govern such release.55 In addition, the Inspectorate may, „in exceptional circumstances‟ release 
short-term prisoners who do not qualify for release in terms of its rules, provided they have 
served at least one third of their sentences.56 
The fourth group of prisoners who qualify for conditional release is terminally ill prisoners. Such 
prisoners may be released on the basis of the medical report certifying that they are terminally 
ill.57 Such release is not subject to the conditions in section 53(1). Therefore, terminally ill 
prisoners may be released at a very early stage in their sentences. However, the Inspectorate must 
have due regard to the factors listed in section 43(1)(c)58.  
The fifth class of prisoners eligible for parole is those serving life sentences. Section 53(1)(b) of 
the Bill provides that a lifer must be considered for release after serving at least 12 years. When it 
                                                 
54 Section 53(5)(a). 
55 See section 53(5)(a). 
56 Section 53(5)(b) of the Bill. 
57 Section 54. The medical officer will be appointed by the Prisons Service Commission: see section 68 of the Bill. 
58 See section 3.3.3 below. The medical report must be sent to the Inspectorate „immediately‟: see regulation 34(3) of 
the 2003 Draft Prison Regulations. 
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is recalled that the highest tariff for a determinate sentence is 12 years,59 the ramification of this 
provision is that a life sentence would be equated to sentence of 36 years. Consequently, 
sentencing an offender beyond 36 years or to life imprisonment would make no difference in as 
far as eligibility for early release is concerned.  
Order 141(2) further provides that after a lifer has served four years „a copy of the record and an 
assessment of their characters shall be sent to the Chief Commissioner [of Prisons] who may 
make special recommendations‟.60 However, it is not stated what the Commissioner‟s 
recommendations may be. Unlike section 111(1) of the Prisons Act, except where an offender is 
eligible under a different provision of the Bill, the Commissioner cannot recommend that the 
prisoner should be released because this would contradict section 53(1)(b) of the Bill. The 
recommendations may likely relate to how the sentence should be served going forward to 
maximise the rehabilitation and potential for social reintegration of the offender concerned. 
Thus, order 141(2) may facilitate the development of suitable programmes for prisoners taking 
into account their needs „regarding reintegration into the community‟ in terms of sections 
40(1)(d) and (e) of the Bill. 
Order 141(1) of the Draft Standing Orders state:61 
Officers should explain to prisoners concerned [prisoners serving life sentences] that although a sentence 
of imprisonment for life may be substituted in commutation of a capital sentence it is not the practice to 
keep offenders in prison interminably, and that in order that proper consideration may be given to each 
such sentence, the law requires a case of every life sentence prisoner to be submitted for review 
periodically. 
The import of the explicit mention of life sentences commuted from death in order 141(1) 
cannot be gainsaid. It underlines the fact that such sentences are in essence not different from 
                                                 
59 See section 53(1)(a) of the Bill. 
60 Order 141(2). 
61 Order 141(1) of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders. 
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other life sentences. An interesting question in this regard and indeed more generally in the 
context of life imprisonment is: from which date should the tariff be calculated? Should it run 
from the date of commutation, the date on which the death sentence was imposed or the date of 
arrest? These are important questions because death sentences are not commuted to life 
sentences immediately. This is partly due to the fact that section 326(1) of the CPEC, which 
requires that every sentence of death must be brought to the attention of the President, does not 
stipulate time frames within which the administrative aspects of the process must be done.62 
Further, since the innate nature of a life sentence precludes consideration of the time spent in 
pre-trial custody, life prisoners are in general invariably disadvantaged. This disadvantage is 
compounded by the fact that with life imprisonment is often imposed in serious cases such as 
murder, the length of pre-trial custody is usually lengthy. These issues raise legitimate concerns 
as to how the 12-year tariff would be calculated. It should also be borne in mind that as a general 
rule, determinate sentences run from the date of arrest.63 It would defeat the whole purpose of 
parole under the Bill if a life sentence is to be calculated from the date of its imposition or 
commutation since this would exclude the lengthy period of time spent in custody and may 
result in the tariff expiring after a prisoner has practically been in prison for a long period of 
time.64 Therefore, the default position must be that the 12-year tariff must run from the date of 
arrest. 
                                                 
62 Section 326(1) simply requires that the record must be sent to the President „as soon as conveniently may be after 
the sentence of death has been pronounced‟. If an offender appeals the sentence, the delay is further prolonged if 
the death penalty is upheld. 
63 See for instance Rep v Banda and others Criminal Case 25 of 2011; Rep v Malizani Criminal Case No 219 of 2010. Cf 
Kapolo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 82 of 2007, holding that pre-trial custody may be ignored provided the resulting 
sentence is proportional. See also section 15 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act, Chapter 3:01 of the Laws of 
Malawi, which creates a presumption against the consideration of time spent in custody during sentencing. 
64 In 2010, the CPEC introduced pre-trial custody limits as follows: 30 days for offences triable by a subordinate 
court (section 161D); 30 days pending committal to the High Court (section 161E); 60 days pending trial by the 
High court after committal (section 161F); and 90 days pending trial for serious offences; namely treason, genocide, 
murder, rape, defilement and robbery (section 161G). However, these periods cannot be observed in practice due to 
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Lastly, release of prisoners under the Bill may also be triggered by prison overcrowding. Section 
56 reads:  
1. If the Inspectorate is of the opinion that the prison system is so overcrowded that the safety, human 
dignity or physical care of prisoners is being affected materially, it may recommend to the Minister 
that one or more of the following steps be taken: 
a. sentenced prisoners who would not otherwise qualify are released conditionally; or 
b. the conditional release dates of any group of sentenced prisoners are advanced.65 
2. If the Minister accepts the recommendations of the Inspectorate, he may order the release of 
prisoners or groups of prisoners either unconditionally or on such conditions as he may set in 
consultation with the Inspectorate. 
This provision expands the categories of persons eligible for parole. It also creates the possibility 
that prisoners may serve much shorter terms than those prescribed in section 53(1); that is, 
prisoners may be released before they serve one third or 12 years of a determinate sentence or 12 
years of a life sentence. Section 56(3) states that the powers of the Inspectorate in section 56(1) 
may also be exercised at the instance of the Chief Commissioner.  
It should be mentioned that in terms of section 7(2)(c)(i) of the Bill, the Chief Commissioner of 
Prisons may transfer prisoners from an overcrowded prison to another prison where adequate 
space is available. However, this power is expressly subject to clause 44(1) which requires that in 
order to promote close family and community contacts, offenders „shall be housed closest to the 
place where he is to live after release‟. While this may greatly limit the application of section 
7(2)(c)(i), it is interesting to note that section 44(1) itself is subject to accommodation.66 
Nevertheless, in practice, the possibility of adequate space in another prison is unlikely because 
                                                                                                                                                        
several factors including lack of funding for capital trials, shortage of legal aid lawyers and, more recently, court 
strikes. 
65 Concern over prison overcrowding is also evident in section 57 of the Bill which places an obligation on the 
officer in charge of a prison to approach and request the Chief Resident Magistrate or the High Court to consider 
granting bail to unsentenced prisoners where overcrowding materially affects the dignity, safety and physical care of 
prisoners.   
66 See clause 44(2). 
262 
 
the prison system as a whole is ever overcrowded. In addition, there are only two maximum 
security prisons in Malawi which, in terms of order 116(1)(a) of the 2003 Draft Standing Orders, 
will be reserved for serious offenders including those sentenced to life imprisonment; this will 
limit the transfer of such prisoners. The only viable option then will be to consider special 
release under section 56 of the Bill. 
2.3.3 Factors to consider in granting parole 
The Bill establishes a Classification and Security Assessment Committee (CSAC) whose duties 
include preparing reports for prisoners to be considered for conditional release.67 This report 
must be made available to the prisoner who has the right to make and submit written 
representations when being considered for release.68 In terms of section 43(1)(c) of the Bill, the 
report should include the following information regarding the prisoner:69 
a. the offence and the court‟s remarks regarding sentencing; 
b. previous criminal record; 
c. conduct, disciplinary record, adaptation, training, aptitude, physical and mental state;  
d.  the likelihood of relapse into crime, the risk posed to the community and the manner in which such risk 
can be reduced; 
e. a recommendation on the possible conditional release of the prisoner; 
f. such other information as the Inspectorate may request. 
                                                 
67 See sections 39 and 43(1)(c). See also order 117(2) of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders which requires the CSAC to 
provide monthly reviews of each prisoner and to make them available to the Inspectorate of Prisons and the 
prisoner concerned. The CSAC will be comprised of the Prison Welfare Officer, the Discipline Officer, the Block 
Officer and the Independent Prison Visitor. It may also take counsel from the prison medical officer on matters 
concerning the health of an offender: see sections 39(1) and (2) of the Bill. 
68 Section 43(2) of the Prisons Bill. 
69 Section 43(1)(c) of the Bill. 
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Order 143(2) of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders sets out additional information that must be 
provided in respect of a life prisoner:70 
a. employment whilst in prison;  
b. the trade he shall follow when released;  
c. whether or not he shall be able to earn his living or some other trade when released; 
d. names and addresses of his relatives with whom he shall stay;  
e. whether or not his relatives have visited and corresponded with him; and 
f. a report by the District Commissioner showing the [attitude] of the local authority to the suggestion that 
the prisoner might be released from prison.71 
It is clear from the above that the CSAC will play a crucial role in the parole process, especially 
since it must make a recommendation on the suitability of a prisoner for early release.72 In cases 
involving life prisoners, a recommendation that a prisoner is unsuitable for release must be 
accompanied by sufficient reasons which should also be made available to the prisoner.73 
Like the factors that inform the granting of mercy under Pardon Committee Guidelines, the 
factors that will inform the parole decision reflect a blend of the traditional theories of 
punishment. For example, the likelihood of relapse into crime and the risk posed to the 
community reflect the need for community protection while consideration of the adaptation, 
training and skills of an offender speak more to rehabilitation and may be indicative of the 
potential for social reintegration and recidivism. An assessment of risk and likelihood of relapse 
into crime is likely to involve consideration of family ties and the prospects of employment. The 
remarks of the sentencing court may prove valuable since the reasons must, ideally, encapsulate 
the court‟s view of culpability and level of criminality of an offender as evidenced from factors 
                                                 
70 See order 143(1) of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders. 
71 Order 143(3) states that: „When writing to the District Commissioner officers shall not convey the idea that the 
prisoner shall be released early, but shall draft the letter as though it were a routine enquiry‟. 
72 Section 43(1)(c)(v) of the Bill. 
73 Order 143(2) of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders. 
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such as how well the crime was planned and his participation in the crime. The emphasis on 
community protection in the parole process is also evident in section 53(4) which states that 
conditional release shall be cancelled if a parolee is convicted of an offence and sentenced to 
imprisonment without the option of a fine as prescribed. However, rehabilitation considerations 
also come into play in that a recalled prisoner may be considered for release within two years of 
his recall.74 
The rationale for the additional factors required in cases of prisoners sentenced to life is that 
such offenders would have committed serious offences. The emphasis here is rehabilitation and 
the potential for social reintegration. Indeed, all the factors listed in order 143(2) speak to these 
two objectives. Theoretically, offenders who are employed or otherwise able to earn a living and 
have steady family support are more unlikely to relapse into crime than those who do not. The 
degree to which an offender has maintained contact with his relations and the reaction of the 
community to his release are a measure of how an offender will be received into society and his 
chances of a successfully reintegrating into it.  
3 ASSESSMENT OF THE EARLY RELEASE SYSTEM 
3.1 The prerogative of mercy 
Estimably, the eligibility criteria for pardon are broad enough to cover all prisoners including 
serious offenders. This gives room for the possibility of release in cases where an offender has 
been reformed or ceases to be a danger to society. The character, history and antecedents of an 
offender may inform the likelihood of re-offending and danger posed by an offender. An 
offender‟s attitude to the offence may indicate remorse, which is usually taken as a pointer to the 
                                                 
74 Clause 55(5). The duty is on the officer in charge to inform the Inspectorate that such time is about to lapse and 
that the prisoner has served the stipulated period qualifying him or her for conditional release: see order 34(4) of the 
2004 Draft Prison Standing Orders. The decision to recall a prisoner is made by magistrate and can only be made if 
there is a „material‟ breach of the conditions: see clause 55(3).  
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possibility that an offender will not re-offend. Some factors may make it more likely that an 
offender will lead a responsible life as they increase the prospect of rehabilitation. These include 
the prospect of rehabilitation or reintegration into society as deduced from factors such as the 
offender‟s rehabilitation plans in respect of prospects for employment, education, community 
involvement and others listed in clause 8.9 of the Pardon Committee Guidelines. Additionally, 
factors such as an offender‟s financial status, assets, family circumstances and marital status may 
also have an impact on the successful reintegration of an offender upon release. An offender 
who has no financially stable or family support may find it difficult to resist temptations to slip 
back into a life crime. Consideration of compensation speaks more to the restorative ends of 
punishment. 
The Pardon Committee Guidelines also reveal concern for the welfare of an offender even 
where the offence is serious by providing for terminally ill prisoners regardless of the offence. 
This is consistent with the right to dignity and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment. 
The Guidelines also reflect a restorative justice approach to punishment, which is rarely pursued 
in the Malawian criminal justice system, in the victim petition process.  
With respect to the factors that inform the pardon process, factors such as the assets, family 
circumstances, and financial and marital status of an offender, should be treated with 
circumspection because of the non-discrimination provision in section 20 of the Constitution. 
Therefore, they should count in favour of and not against an offender.75 An offender‟s attitude 
to the offence may indicate whether he is remorseful; remorse is usually taken as a pointer to the 
possibility that an offender will not re-offend. This factor may, however, may pose difficulties 
since a prisoner who continues to claim his innocence is likely to be jeopardized by his claim. 
                                                 
75 See Leger v France 11 April 2006 (Application No 19324/02) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fura-Sandström. See 
also Recommendation Rec (2003)22 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Conditional Release 
(Parole) (adopted on 24 September 2003). 
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This is demonstrated by Leger v France,76 where, among other things, the applicant‟s claim of 
innocence throughout his incarceration following a conviction of murder was seen as evidence 
of a lack of „serious effort to readjust to society‟.77 A lack of remorse for the offence committed 
should therefore not be a major consideration.78 In addition, the likelihood of re-offending 
should be carefully assessed to avoid arbitrary detention.79 More importantly, the test should not 
be „zero risk‟ of offending.80 Other factors pose challenging questions. For instance, it is not easy 
to decipher what is meant by „matters of custom‟ and how they are relevant to a decision on 
whether an offender should benefit from early release. It is also unclear how proof of subsequent 
disputes in the community is assessed and why such a factor, which is beyond an offender‟s 
control, should be relevant to an early release decision. The lack of clarity on these factors may 
render the pardon process arbitrary. 
Interestingly, it appears that there is little consideration given to most of the factors in the 
Pardon Committee Guidelines in practice. Actually, the generic official justification for the 
exercise of mercy is invariably that an offender has been of good behaviour, has served more 
than half his sentence and was not convicted of serious crimes. This indicates that retribution, 
rehabilitation (as gauged from good behaviour) and community protection (as seen from the 
seriousness of the offence) all play a role in deciding whether to grant pardon.  
There are several problems with the pardon process. The first relates to how matters are brought 
to the President‟s attention. The Minister, for instance, has wide discretion in forwarding 
regulation 23 petitions under the Prisons Regulations and in recommending prisoners under 
clause 7 of the Guidelines. Similarly, the Pardon Committee Guidelines also give the 
Commissioner wide discretion. Further, under section 108 of the Prisons Act, special remission 
                                                 
76 Leger v France 11 April 2006 (Application No 19324/02).  
77 Leger v France, Judgment, 11 April 2006.  
78 Leger v France 11 April 2006 (Application No 19324/02) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fura-Sandström. 
79 Stokes (2008) 293. 
80 See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Costa in Leger v France 11 April 2006 (Application No 19324/02) para 13. 
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by the President is contingent on „meritorious conduct‟ on the part of the prisoner and a 
recommendation of the Commissioner to the Minister. The meaning of what constitutes 
meritorious conduct for this purpose remains elusive. Moreover, the Minister has discretion to 
forward the recommendation to the President. Thus, in order to be considered for mercy, a 
prisoner must overcome two hurdles: recommendation by the Commissioner and the Minister. 
A prisoner has no role to play in this process. As such, there is no certainty as to whether a 
prisoner will in fact be recommended and considered for remission, let alone when this will be 
done. Such certainty is crucial since long term prisoners may not be considered for remission for 
lengthy periods. This also has negative implications for life prisoners who are already excluded 
from general remission under section 107(1) of the Prisons Act. The uncertainty in remission 
procedures for long term prisoners infringes the principle of legality and therefore the right to a 
fair trial. As held in Kafkaris v Cyprus,81 discussed in chapter three, release procedures must be 
clear and should be communicated to a prisoner so that he is aware of what should be done in 
order to be considered for release.82 
A further problem with the pardon process is that the law does not cast a duty on the 
Commissioner or the Minister to inform a prisoner of his recommendation. Therfore, a prisoner 
may never actually know if he has been recommended or if not, why he has not been 
recommended. It is only in relation to prisoners on death row who have been certified to be of 
sound mind that referral of a case to the President is mandatory. Moreover, it is important that 
all terminally ill prisoners are considered for release since, as noted in chapter three, their 
continued detention may amount to cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment. 
The Pardon Committee Guidelines also raise other issues. For example, while it is clear from the 
Guidelines that exceptional circumstances may justify a departure from the prescribed criteria, 
                                                 
81 Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 21906/04. 
82 The European Commission also reached a similar finding in Hogben v United Kingdom 3 March 1986 (11653/85) 
(EComHR) 231. 
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there is no indication of what these circumstances are or may be. They do not specifically cover 
life imprisonment and death sentences. Further, there is no specific provision for the elderly. 
Additionally, the Guidelines do not adequately provide for the consideration of long-term 
prisoners every four years as required by section 111 of the Prisons Act. They also fail to 
guarantee procedural safeguards in the pardon process. For example, an offender has no right to 
be heard before the Committee either orally or through written submissions. It is not surprising 
then that the Committee is under no obligation to inform a prisoner of the outcome of the 
proceedings or reasons for withholding mercy. In practice, individual and formal notification of 
mercy is not given to a prisoner, leading in some cases to humiliating legal battles where apparent 
beneficiaries of mercy are unable to satisfy a court as to the basis for their early release and its 
implications for the enjoyment of their rights.83 It is only in respect of regulation 23 petitions 
under the Prisons Regulations that the law requires an offender to be informed of the outcome. 
This jeopardises the possibility of a court challenge in case of an adverse decision.  
In addition, the failure to hear an offender in the process of determining whether he is suitable 
for early release makes a mockery of the factors that the Pardon Committee must consider and 
denies the offender a chance to rebut any adverse contents of the report of the Commissioner to 
the Committee. For instance, it is important to hear an offender for the Committee to make an 
informed decision regarding his attitude to the offence; his rehabilitation plans; the likelihood of 
his re-offending; his family circumstances; and whether he is likely to compromise public 
protection, to mention a few. Decisions on these chapters will invariably be arbitrary if an 
offender is not given a chance to demonstrate to the Committee how he satisfies these criteria. 
                                                 
83 See Ngwali v Judicial Service Commission and another Civil Cause No 487 of 2012 where the applicant failed to prove 
that his early release was based on a pardon which obliterated his guilt and therefore entitled him to reinstatement as 
a judicial officer. See also Chihana v State and another Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 41 of 2009 where the applicant 
had no proper documentary proof that he had been pardoned let alone lawfully released from prison. 
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It is noteworthy that during the review of the CPEC in 2003, the Malawi Law Commission 
debated the propriety of stipulating procedures for the pardon process. It concluded that such 
stipulation might „disadvantage the majority of Malawians who are illiterate‟ and that section 326 
of the CPEC deals with „policy issues which may not be properly prescribed‟ under the CPEC. 
These conclusions are quite unconvincing. Section 326 falls under Part XII of the CPEC which 
deals with „sentences and their execution‟; issues connected to pardon can conveniently be 
included in this Part as they relate to the execution of sentences. In any event, section 326 itself 
outlines the pardon procedure for death row inmates. The absence of substantive offender-
driven pardons leaves the fate of prisoners in the hands of the executive alone. A simple and 
well-defined procedure would ensure that prisoners are aware of their rights in the mercy 
process. At present, not even the procedure for victim petitions under clause 6 of the Guidelines 
is provided for. It should also be recalled, that the routes to consideration for mercy are spread 
out in various sections of the Prisons Act and that with the exception of regulation 23, offenders 
cannot initiate the pardon process. It is also important to state that the „Committee of Senior 
Prison Officers‟ which is said to be responsible for recommending prisoners for mercy  is not 
regulated by any law. As such, there is no telling as to the appointing authority, the actual 
composition of this ad hoc committee, the factors and documentation that it actually relies on, 
its meeting schedules and what rights offenders have with respect to the committee‟s 
proceedings. This is a regrettable situation, considering the fact this committee constitutes the 
first and probably most important step in the mercy process. 
With regard to serious offenders, it is worrisome that the opportunity for their release is very 
narrow. Indeed, only offenders convicted of relatively minor offences benefit from mercy; it is 
only in rare cases that serious offenders are pardoned, often amidst controversy.84 The exclusion 
                                                 
84 Such as the pardoning of Edward Hayles, a British national, barely 18 months into his 12-year sentence for the 
sexual abuse of three street children: see Hayles v Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 8 of 2000. Two offenders 
convicted of rape and murder were also released in 2012 amidst allegations that the pardons were based on the fact 
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of serious offenders from the general scheme of the prerogative of mercy means that they will 
not be eligible for early release unless they are terminally ill or if a victim petitions the President 
for mercy. These are very restrictive conditions that indicate an overly retributive approach in the 
pardon process. Despite provision for terminally ill serious offenders in clause 7 of the Pardon 
Committee Guidelines, very few terminally ill serious offenders are pardoned in practice.85 
Recent media reports tell that pardon is often denied to serious offenders convicted of offences 
such as rape, defilement, armed robbery and murder. The then President Joyce Banda reportedly 
said in relation to an offender convicted of defilement and denied pardon: „One of them has [a] 
serious liver problem but we will bury him if need be because he knowingly doomed the future 
of a young girl whom he raped repeatedly‟.86 Ironically, and without explanation, two serious 
offenders, convicted of rape and murder, were also pardoned on the same occasion.. As 
explained in section 2.2 above, terminally ill prisoners are likely to have been brought to the 
President‟s attention through regulation 35 of the Prisons Regulations. As such, they are 
prisoners who are unlikely to survive the full duration of the sentence or totally unfit to undergo 
it. The continued detention of such prisoners is unlawful if the offender no longer poses a 
dangerous threat to society. As noted in chapter three, it is based solely on retribution and 
constitutes a violation of the right to human dignity and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman 
punishment.  
It must be recalled that the release of prisoners on grounds of terminal illness does not amount 
to a tangible prospect of release. To borrow the words of the European Court of Human Rights 
                                                                                                                                                        
that one was related to the President and the other to a senior chief. Other serious offenders have been pardoned on 
the basis that they suffered a miscarriage of justice: see Nation Online (2012). 
85 During Malawi‟s 39th independence celebrations, for instance, President Muluzi released 592 prisoners convicted 
of minor offences and out of which only 26 were released due to poor health or because they were female prisoners 
breastfeeding infants: see Presse (2003). 
86 See Muheya (2012.). 
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(ECtHR) in Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom,87 discussed in chapter three, such release 
„cannot really be considered release at all, if all it meant was that a prisoner died at home or in a 
hospice rather [than] behind prison walls. Indeed … compassionate release of this kind was not 
what was meant by a “prospect of release” in Kafkaris [v Cyprus]‟.88 In practice, even the little 
window of hope made available through the release of terminally ill prisoners is awash with 
irregularities and political interference. For example, Jolofani and DeGabriele89 narrate a 1997 
incident where a recommendation for the release of 240 terminally ill prisoners was debated in 
Parliament. Worse still, there was an inordinate delay of almost a year in the pardon process such 
that by the time a final decision was taken to release only 21 prisoners, 14 of them had already 
finished their sentences while two had died.90 
Furthermore, the possibility of release or mercy initiated by victim petitions cannot apply to 
„victimless offences‟ such as corruption. It is not proper that the release of an offender should 
solely rest on the victim, more so in a country like Malawi where it is highly doubtful that victims 
are aware of such procedures, let alone the Pardon Committee Guidelines. Further, this position 
may bolster retributive instincts. In addition, it may threaten the right to equality in that serious 
offenders will not have an equal opportunity to be considered for release.  
Another problematic aspect of the release of serious offenders is that clause 3 of the Pardon 
Committee Guidelines is not sufficiently clear. For instance, while the „classes of offences‟ is 
ostensibly exhaustive, the scope of the offences included in each class is unclear. For instance, 
burglary is not necessarily a violent offence. The meaning of „grand corruption‟ is not clear while 
it is puzzling that murder is cited as a class of offences. The criterion used to determine the 
classes of offences to include in clause 3 is also unclear and borders on arbitrariness. One may 
                                                 
87Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013. 
88 Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013, para 
127 
89 Jolofani and DeGabriele (1999). 
90 Jolofani and DeGabriele (1999) 23. 
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have reasonably expected the inclusion of offences such as treason, manslaughter and even theft 
by public servant which in some cases may be as, if not more, serious than corruption.  
A final observation regarding the Pardon Committee Guidelines is that they are not fully aligned 
with the Prisons Act. For example, they do not highlight how a matter that is brought to the 
Pardon Committee in terms of section 72(2) of the Prisons Act is handled. Second, the 
consideration of special remission for lifers pursuant to section 108 of the Prisons Act is not 
catered for in the Guidelines. For obvious reasons, the remission of life sentences cannot be 
based on an offender serving half of his sentence as required by clause 5 of the Guidelines. For a 
lifer, the real question should be how many years must be served before he can be considered for 
mercy.  
The absence of stipulation as to when the general rule that an offender must have served at least 
half of his sentence before he can be considered for mercy may be departed from makes it 
difficult to tell with certainty the circumstances in which life sentence prisoners may be 
considered for mercy. This in turn raises questions as to how life sentences are handled in 
practice. Similarly, the practice of commuting death sentences cannot be traced to any provision 
of the Pardon Committee Guidelines. This is alarming in view of the frequent mass 
commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment since 1994. It is also unclear how matters 
pursuant to section 326 of the CPEC are handled. These omissions flout the principle of legality 
which requires that the procedures for early release must be sufficiently clear.  
The last issue concerning pardons in Malawi is that the independence of the Pardon Committee 
is undermined by the fact that all its members are political appointees of the President91 who also 
determines the number of minsters to form part of the Committee. Having the President as 
chairperson brings the Committee strictly within the control of the President and politically 
biased. This is contrary to section 89(2)(a) of the Constitution which envisions a two-stage 
                                                 
91 See sections 94 and 98(3) of the Constitution. 
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process: consideration for mercy by the Pardon Committee and then by the President. This can 
only be achieved if the Committee is self-standing and independent; of the President. Indeed, it 
is difficult to see how the „consultation‟ required by section 89(2) can be realised when the 
President is the chairperson of the very committee upon whose recommendation he is required 
to act. The absurdity of this arrangement is manifested where, as is professedly the practice, the 
Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security writes a memorandum to the President 
supposedly seeking his approval of the early release of prisoners following recommendation by 
the Committee which was in fact chaired by the President himself.92 The constitutionality of the 
Pardon Committee Act is also brought into question on the basis that Parliament has effectively 
delegated its powers under section 89(2)(a) to the President. The Constitution requires that 
Parliament determines the „composition and formation‟ of the Committee. However, the Act 
apparently delegates this duty to the President. This leaves the whole process under the 
President‟s control and effectively brings the current set up at par with that under the 1966 
Constitution.  
In view of the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that although the pardon process has 
potential to be an effective mechanism for release, it does not fully reflect international and 
constitutional standards. While it accommodates the goal of rehabilitation in line with 
international human rights law, the pardon process is compromised by inadequate procedural 
safeguards such as the right to be heard and the independence of the Pardon Committee.  
3.2 The Prisons Act and Prisons Bill 
Remission under section 108 of the Prisons Act remains the most transparent and consistent 
avenue for early release which benefits the majority of prisoners in Malawi.93 In practice, the 
                                                 
92 See Chihana v State and another Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 41 of 2009, 14-15. 
93 African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (2001) 34. A remission table is drawn up to calculate the 
release date for each prisoner in accordance with regulation 132 of the Prison Regulations: see Chihana v Attorney 
General [1993] 16(2) MLR 483 (HC).  
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requirement of „satisfactory industry‟ is not enforced as offenders are automatically granted 
remission. In any case, this standard is antiquated considering that prisoners are not subjected to 
significant prison labour as was the case previously. The availability of release on licence of lifers 
is commendable. However, a glaring problem is that it is too deferential to the Minister in that it 
gives him unbridled discretion as to the circumstances in which licences may be granted or 
revoked. Indeed, the Prisons Act does not enumerate the circumstances in which an offender 
may be released on licence, recalled or allowed to be released again. It is even more unfortunate 
that licence procedure has fallen into disuse.  
The mandatory review of long-term prisoners and lifers as provided under section 111 of the 
Prisons Act is desirable in the light of the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment, the 
right to dignity and liberty, and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. It 
is also consistent with the goal of rehabilitation and recognises that the continued detention of a 
long-term prisoner would be unjustifiable if he is no longer a danger to society although his 
sentence has not expired. The fact that section 111 does not require a prisoner to be terminally ill 
or advanced in age buttresses this line of thought. However, the tariff of four years appears to be 
on the lower side and may, as a result, be counterproductive. For instance, the release of long-
term prisoners, especially those serving life imprisonment, may be indiscriminately postponed to 
avoid their release only four years into their sentences. In practice, prison authorities do not 
report on long-term prisoners as required by section 111. This is a deplorable situation which 
undermines the rule of law.94 
Therefore, the proposals in the Prisons Bill are laudable, if only to complement the poor early 
release mechanism in place at the moment. The release mechanism in the Bill is not only centred 
on rehabilitation but also proposes the placement of offenders on pre-release programmes to 
facilitate their release. Unlike the Prisons Act, the Bill provides for remission of automatic 
                                                 
94 A 1999 study found that there was a general perception amongst prison staff that the Prisons Act has been 
suspended: see Jolofani and DeGabriele (1999) 30. 
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remission. It is noteworthy that the Bill sets a lower tariff (a third of the sentence) for fixed 
sentences than the Pardon Committee Guidelines (half of the sentence) and therefore indicates a 
lesser emphasis on retribution. The 12-year tariff for fixed sentences is significant in that it 
equates a sentence beyond 36 years to a life sentence. Sentencing patterns predict that the 12 year 
tariff for fixed sentence will rarely be invoked in practice because very few sentences are as long 
as 36 years.95 The absence of a tariff for terminally ill prisoners illustrates that the Bill evinces 
that retribution is not the dominant premise for their punishment.  
The Bill also generously caters for short-term prisoners who may be released subject to the 
Inspectorate‟s guidelines or „exceptional circumstances‟. Although the Bill does not clarify what 
would amount to „exceptional circumstances‟, the paramount consideration will remain the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of an offender into society, since this is the primary aim of early 
release according to section 53(1).96 It can also be expected that exceptional circumstances would 
include situations where further detention would be inconsistent with the right to human dignity 
such as where a prisoner is elderly or terminally ill. This is more so because the Bill is premised 
on the right to human dignity and detention in the humane conditions as stated in the preamble 
and clause 4. In practice, very few prisoners other than those serving default sentences will 
benefit from this provision since courts are encouraged to suspend sentences of up to one year97 
and, in any case, terminally ill prisoners are not readily sent to prison for short sentences. 
„Release as a special measure‟ marks a further departure from wholly retributive or utilitarian 
justifications for imprisonment by focussing on the rights and welfare of an offender. The 
Inspectorate will have to consider international standards in assessing the extent to which 
                                                 
95 The highest fixed sentences found during the course of research for this study are the 35 years imposed for 
murder in Rep v Banda and others Criminal Case No 25 of 2011 and the 30 years imposed for theft in Rep v Chimbelenga 
[1996] MLR 342 (HC) 354. 
96 Section 45(1)(d) of the Bill which cites preparation for release cannot provide any guidance in this regard since 
early release is not certain until granted by the Inspectorate.  
97 See Rep v Josephy Confirmation Case No 261 of 2013. 
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overcrowding is affecting the dignity of prisoners.98 Should this be done, release as a special 
measure has the potential to be a very powerful mechanism of early release for a majority of 
prisoners in view of perpetually poor prison conditions in Malawi. In the end, it will be the 
factors that must be considered in granting parole that would curtail the application of this 
measure. Considering that this form of release may be unconditional, it is plausible to predict 
that serious offenders would not be the primary beneficiaries unless they have almost served the 
tariffs set out in section 53(1). Of further significance is the fact that while the Minister can 
release a prisoner on parole, he can also release prisoners unconditionally under section 56(2), a 
power not given to the Inspectorate of Prisons. Such release will culminate in the expiry of a 
sentence.  
The factors that will inform parole decisions serve as indicators of the likelihood of reoffending. 
Employment and strong family ties, for example, foster the rehabilitation and social reintegration 
of an offender. However, although these factors may reflect on how well an offender may 
reintegrate into society, they should not count against an offender. It is desirable that factors 
beyond the control of an offender should not be given undue weight since some factors such as 
visits by and correspondence with family during imprisonment may be hampered by the stigma, 
location of the prison99 and other factors beyond an offender‟s control. Since life imprisonment 
is likely to be imposed in serious cases like murder, family members may shun away from an 
offender, especially where the victim was another family member. Stigmatisation from the 
community and the limited availability of employers willing to employ such serious offenders 
                                                 
98 Section 169(3) of the Constitution states that the Inspectorate of Prisons shall take „due account of applicable 
international standards‟ in monitoring the conditions, administration and general functioning of penal institutions. 
99 For instance, Burton et al (2005) 40-41, report that for most prisoners, visits from family and friends are few and 
far between because of distance while other prisoners have completely lost touch with their families.  
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also pose insurmountable difficulties for social reintegration, worsened by the absence of social 
workers and psychologists who can offer after-care for offenders.100 
It is significant that while the Bill requires an assessment of the risk that an offender may pose to 
society, it also demands that due attention must be given to how the risk, if any, can be 
minimised. Inevitably, a risk assessment would involve prediction of future dangerousness or 
criminality, an exercise which is inherently problematic and borders on arbitrariness in the 
absence of sound criteria.101 Moreover, the CSAC has no experts who can make such a 
prediction.102 The danger of arbitrariness is slightly attenuated by the fact that order 117(4)(e) of 
the 2003 Draft Standing Orders allows the CSAC to seek assistance from an expert in assessing, 
among other things, the performance, attitude and behaviour of a prisoner. However, this is not 
mandatory. It is commendable that the CSAC‟s report must include an assessment of how the 
risk posed by an offender can be reduced; this means that a prisoner may still be released if the 
Inspectorate thinks that the risk can be managed. This is in line with the principle of 
proportionality which entails that the continued detention of an offender must be necessary in 
that „the acknowledged risk posed by the offender cannot satisfactorily be managed in the 
community‟.103 
Admirably, unlike the Pardon Committee Guidelines, the Bill affords offenders the right to be 
heard during the parole process. However, there is no appellate process in the proposed parole 
mechanism. This means that offenders will have to approach the courts to challenge any parole 
decisions.  
                                                 
100 See Burton et al (2005) 79. 
101 See the Individual Opinion of Committee Members Mr Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, Ms Christine 
Chanet, Mr Glèlè Ahanhanzo and Mr Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen in Rameka et al v New Zealand Communication No 
1090/2002. 
102 The CSAC will be composed of the Prison Welfare Officer, the Discipline Officer, the Block Officer and the 
Independent Prison Visitor (if one has been appointed for the prison by the Inspectorate of Prisons under section 
96(f)). None of these persons can be said to have the necessary skill to make predictions of future criminality. 
103 See Elliot (2007) 43. 
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A few other concerns may be raised regarding the early release proposals in the Bill. For 
instance, it does not expressly provide for the conditional release of elderly prisoners. While it 
may be argued that advanced age may constitute an exceptional circumstance under section 
53(5)(b), this provision is only applicable to prisoners serving one year or less and who have 
served at least one third of their sentences. As such, elderly prisoners serving longer sentences 
cannot be considered under this provision. Further, special release under section 56 is limited 
since it may only be triggered by acute overcrowding and there are no guidelines as to how 
prisoners will be selected for release. Some solace can be found in the fact that courts are 
unlikely to imprison very elderly prisoners especially for short terms.  
Another concern relates to the reliance on the nature of the sentence as the basis for recalling a 
parole. It appears from section 53(4) of the Bill that it is not the nature or gravity of the offence 
itself or its penalty but rather the actual sentence imposed by a court that will revoke parole; that 
is, only offences that are punishable with imprisonment and in fact punished with imprisonment 
without the option of a fine may be considered. To some extent, the actual sentence plays a 
crucial role in that an offence which only attracts a fine can never form the basis of a revocation 
of parole. This is probably based on the assumption that imprisonment is only prescribed and 
imposed for serious offences. While this is the international standard, it does not fully reflect the 
situation in Malawi. The problem is that the offences which may fit this description coupled with 
sentencing discretion in imposing imprisonment instead of a fine will render the threshold for 
revocation of parole too low. A good example is that a conviction on vagrancy charges would be 
sufficient ground for revocation of parole since vagrancy is punishable with imprisonment.104 
Revocation would also be justified where a court imposes imprisonment for an offence which 
may be punished with a fine. As explained in chapter five,105 although a fine is generally a 
                                                 
104 See section 184 of the Penal Code. 
105 See section 2.4.2  
of chapter five. 
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competent substitute for imprisonment, courts do not usually consider the propriety of a fine 
unless it is specifically mentioned in the penal provision for an offence. Creating an hierarchy of 
offences based on their penalties may also lead to absurdities in some cases. For instance, the 
possession of Indian hemp is punishable with a fine while vagrancy attracts imprisonment. 
Further problems with section 53(4) of the Bill lie in the fact that in practice the imposition of 
imprisonment without the option of a fine may be based on several grounds such as the fact that 
an offender has no means to pay a fine. Therefore, a better option could be to base revocation 
on the length of a prison sentence or amount of a fine to be revised from time to time.  
With respect to the factors that will inform early release decision, a contentious factor is the 
report of the District Commissioner (DC) concerning the attitude of the community to an 
offender‟s release. Since the fact that parole is being considered would not be disclosed,106 a DC, 
labouring under the false impression that the report is part of a „routine enquiry‟ and is of no real 
consequence, might not give the matter the attention it deserves as a factor that may affect the 
liberty of an offender. Moreover, it is doubtful that the DC, even if he were told of the reason 
for the enquiry, could devote much time and resources into finding out the views of community 
members regarding an offender. It is also doubtful whether a DC is best placed to assess the 
public attitude to the early release of an offender.  
More importantly, consideration of public attitude towards an offender is in and of itself 
questionable because, if the incidence of mob justice in Malawi is anything to go by, public 
attitude is generally hostile towards offenders. It would be unjust and arbitrary to solely premise 
continued detention on the basis of the public reaction to the early release. At the end of the day, 
the real question turns on the extent to which an offender‟s liberty should be curtailed by the 
possibility of negative ramifications on society. Little weight if any should be given to this factor. 
                                                 
106 Order 143(3) of the 2004 Draft Standing Orders reads: „When writing to the District Commissioner, officers shall 
not convey the idea that the prisoner shall be released early, but shall draft the letter as though it were a routine 
enquiry‟.  
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As Stokes reminds us, early release must ultimately be based on whether the continued detention 
of an offender is justifiable.107 
The proposal that the Inspectorate should be responsible for the granting of parole is also cause 
for concern. This is because the composition of the Inspectorate is not representative of the 
wider interests of society; the co-option of an additional member pursuant to section 170(2) of 
the Constitution is discretionary. Second, the inclusion of judicial officers may also compromise 
the independence of its parole decisions due to conflict of interest. It is not far-fetched to 
conceive of a case where an offender appears before the same judicial officer who sentenced 
him. Another challenge is that the Inspectorate has been handicapped in its functions since its 
inception due to financial constraints. This is largely attributable to the fact that it lacks financial 
independence. It lacks financial independence as its funding is controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance and, in practice, has not been provided with adequate and timely funding. Additional 
functions for the Inspectorate may stretch its funding even more. Section 100(3) of the Bill 
proposes that the Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security must be responsible for all 
expenses of the Inspectorate. However, this shift in the financial structure is not sufficient to 
ensure financial independence of the Inspectorate. What is required is a direct allocation of funds 
to the Inspectorate by Parliament. The powers of the Inspectorate will be greatly undermined if 
its independence both in terms of finances and operations is not achieved.108 This will have 
significant repercussions on the parole system which would primarily depend on the proper 
functioning of the Inspectorate. Indeed, there should be little optimism that the parole functions 
of the Inspectorate will be funded very well in view of the fact that the government does not 
seem to place any priority on the functions of the Malawi Prisons Service.109 On a different note, 
the effectiveness of the Inspectorate as a parole board may also be undermined by the fact that it 
                                                 
107 Stokes (2008) 293. 
108 See Harding (2007) 548-549. 
109 The Malawi Prisons Service is routinely provided with inadequate funding. 
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will have to practically move across the 23 prisons in the country to conduct parole hearings, 
which is too burdensome and time consuming for its members who have full-time jobs. 
Overall, the proposed parole system is underscored by retributive and utilitarian theories of 
punishment. However, the main aim is to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
offenders into society. Further, the Bill places emphasis on the right to dignity through provision 
of special release based on poor prison conditions likely to apply to minor offences. In addition, 
administrative challenges such as inadequate staff and monitoring may undermine the efficacy of 
a parole system in Malawi. Without effective monitoring, and adequate human and financial 
resources, the system is likely to be ineffectual.  
In view of the foregoing analysis, it can be said that notwithstanding its shortcomings, the 
Prisons Bill remains a significant attempt to give meaning to the Bill of Rights in the early release 
system. It proposes a release mechanism which reflects international and constitutional 
standards. The Bill embraces rehabilitation as a bedrock of release decisions while carefully 
balancing this with community protection.  
3.3 Implications for life and long-term imprisonment 
The above analysis of early release mechanisms in Malawi does not bode well with prisoners 
serving long-term and life sentences. Since prisoners serving life sentences do not benefit from 
remission under the Prisons Act, their only hope of release lies in the prerogative of mercy. 
However, life prisoners are not specifically provided for in the Pardon Committee Guidelines 
since, for obvious reasons, they are excluded from the general principle that prisoners must have 
served at least half of their sentence to be eligible for mercy. This situation is inconsistent with 
regulation 35 of the Prison Regulations and sections 108 and 111 of the Prisons Act. It is worth 
noting that regulation 35, which provides for unfit and terminally ill prisoners, is couched in 
general terms and is not contingent on the severity of the sentence or the seriousness of the 
offence. Therefore, the law clearly envisages the pardoning or early release of a prisoner where 
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his health has deteriorated regardless of the sentence he is serving. This indicates that the law is 
not wholly retributive or utilitarian but allows for the consideration of the welfare of an offender 
and recognises that further detention may not be acceptable in certain cases. This is also 
supported by the fact that under the Prisons Regulations, every prisoner sentenced to more than 
seven years is classified as a „long-term prisoner‟ and therefore entitled to a review of his 
sentence every four years.110 
Further, the exclusion of serious offenders from the general consideration for release also has an 
adverse effect on prisoners serving long-term and life sentences as they are likely to have been 
convicted for serious offences. The problems cited above regarding the release of serious 
offenders, coupled with the inherent failure of the Pardon Committee to be independent, 
underscore the argument, made in chapter three, that the prerogative of mercy does not 
constitute an effective form of early release. In any case, an advisory panel is not enough because 
it concentrates power in the President alone. As held by the minority in Kafkaris v Cyprus,111 noted 
in chapter three, the absence of clear procedural rules for release mitigates any certainty as to 
whether lifers will be considered for release and the prisoner‟s legitimate expectation that his 
possible release will be considered once the tariff has been served.112 
Another negative implication arising from the nature of the early release system in Malawi is that 
there is no opportunity for lifers to present their submissions to the Pardon Committee and no 
obligation on both the Pardon Committee or the President to inform the prisoners concerned of 
the reasons why they have not been recommended or granted release. As explained in chapter 
three,113 the right to human dignity and rehabilitation requires that the law should provide for a 
„real and tangible prospect of release‟ for life and long term prisoners. This entails among other 
                                                 
110 See regulation 2 of the Prison Regulations. 
111 Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 21906/04 (12 February 2008) 
112 Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 21906/04 (12 February 2008) para 6 of the Joint Dissenting Judgment of Judges 
Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens. 
113 See section of 3.2.2 of chapter three. 
283 
 
things that the early release system must respect the right to be heard and other principles of 
natural justice. 
Furthermore, as explained in chapter three, the justification for detention must exist throughout 
the entire period of detention.114 In this regard, long-term and life prisoners cannot be justifiably 
detained if they no longer pose a danger to society. The right to challenge the lawfulness of 
detention under section 42(1)(f) of the Constitution can therefore be interpreted to require that 
prisoners should be given an opportunity to challenge their continued detention before an 
independent court and to be released if their detention is unlawful. The absence of an effective 
review mechanism for long-term and life sentences by an independent body breaches the right to 
liberty. 
Ultimately, the early release system in Malawi is an insufficient form of release in view of 
international standards which require that the law must provide for a real prospect of release for 
prisoners serving life sentences. The pardon process fails to offer a real prospect of release to 
lifers. The secrecy surrounding the pardon process and the flagrant disregard of the Pardon 
Committee in the process renders the prerogative of mercy an inadequate mechanism for the 
release for prisoners serving life imprisonment.115 The composition of the Pardon Committee 
only worsens matters because it is politically biased as all its members are from the executive. 
Moreover, no provision is made for life imprisonment in the Pardon Committee Guidelines. As 
serious offenders, most lifers may only benefit if they become terminally ill or through victim 
petitions. The result is that life imprisonment in Malawi amounts to a violation of the right to life 
and dignity, and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman punishment. Indeed, it is parole that saves 
                                                 
114 See section 4 of chapter three. 
115 See Van Zyl Smit (2001) 302. 
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indeterminate or life sentences from the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment.116 
It is therefore admirable that the Prisons Bill makes a deliberate move away from whole life 
sentences by prescribing a 12-year tariff for life imprisonment. This will have significant 
consequences for the nature of life imprisonment in Malawi. The possibility of release for 
prisoners serving life sentences indicates a less retributive approach to punishment and is 
consistent with international standards for prisoners serving lengthy sentences. However, a 
potential problem with the Bill may spring from the fact that life prisoners may end up serving 
relatively short terms. This is because the 12-year tariff, though higher than the four-year tariff in 
section 111 of the Prisons Act, is quite low and there is a possibility that prisoners sentenced to 
life imprisonment may be released earlier under section 56 of the Bill. For one thing, the 
maximum fixed sentence under the Penal Code is 21 years.117 For another, the maximum tariff 
for fixed sentences under section 53(1)(a) of the Bill is also 12 years. Although this effectively 
equates life imprisonment to 36 years which is a lengthy sentence, it can be said that the 
proposed tariff for life imprisonment upsets the penal scheme in Malawi. The only way around 
the tariff would be the imposition of consecutive sentences. It is trite, however, that a court must 
not take into account the possibility of release in sentencing an offender.118 
It can be concluded that as far as life and long-term imprisonment is concerned, the Malawi 
penal system is merely retributory and therefore inconsistent with international standards. Once 
again, the failure largely stems from practice and not the law in that the few restrictions provided 
by the law and are not implemented in practice. As such, the proposals in the Prisons Bill are 
                                                 
116 S v Bull and another; S v Chavulla and Others 2002 (1) SA 535 (SCA) para 23; S v Tcoeib 1996 (1) SACR 390 (NmS) 
399-340; S v Siluale and another 1999 (2) SACR 102 (SCA) 106-107; S v Mahlakza and another 1997 (1) SACR 515 
(SCA) 521-523; Van Zyl Smit and Snacken (2009) 8. 
117 This is the penalty for genocide: see section 217A(2)(b) of the Penal Code. 
118 Manyela v Rep 4 ALR Mal 279 (HC); Terblanche (2007).  
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desirable because they give clarity on the meaning of life imprisonment and afford a tangible 
possibility of release for lifers and other long-term prisoners. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The early release system in Malawi is largely inconsistent with international and constitutional 
standards. The law and practice do not promote rehabilitation as the major aim of punishment. 
As a result, the release system remains overly retributive and fails to provide an effective release 
mechanism that complies with international human rights law. In some cases, the shortcomings 
stem from practice and not the law. For instance, while the law provides for the review of 
lengthy sentences including life sentences, this is not done in practice. The result is that lifers and 
long-term prisoners do not have a tangible prospect of release; this violates the prohibition of 
cruel and inhuman treatment and the right to dignity and liberty.  
The Prisons Bill has the potential to improve the early release system and bring it more in line 
with international and constitutional standards. It proposes a mechanism that is centred on 
rehabilitation and ways in which this goal can be achieved. For instance, the Bill proposes the 
development of suitable programmes for prisoners that take into account their needs regarding 
social reintegration upon release and requires the placement of offenders on pre-release 
programmes. The mechanism proposed in the Bill also embodies the procedural safeguards such 
as the right to be heard dictated by international human rights law. It is therefore cause for 
concern that the Bill is no closer to enactment than it was over a decade ago when it was drafted. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This study set out to examine the status of punishment in Malawi and the extent to 
which it conforms to international and constitutional standards for punishment. Chapter 
one identified three main aspects of punishment for this analysis: the aims of 
punishment, the forms of punishment, and the early release system. The conceptual 
framework for the study was laid out in chapters two and three which looked at theories 
of punishment and international standards for punishment in respect of the three 
aspects identified in chapter one. Chapter four gave a brief background to punishment 
in Malawi and described the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights pertinent to 
punishment. Chapters five, six and seven of the thesis discussed the forms and aims of 
punishment and early release mechanisms respectively in relation to the position in 
Malawi. These chapters also explored whether the situation in Malawi regarding these 
aspects of punishment is consistent with the constitutional and international standards 
for punishment. In this concluding chapter, the study highlights the main findings of the 
thesis through a detailed summary of the previous chapters. It then makes some 
recommendations on how punishment in Malawi may be improved in line with the 
international and constitutional framework for punishment.  
2 FINDINGS 
2.1 The aims of punishment 
Both the retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment have strengths and 
weaknesses. Retribution is hailed for recognising that wilful wrongdoing is the catalyst 
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for punishment and for its emphasis on the principle of proportionality which requires 
that punishment must be commensurate with the seriousness of an offence. However, 
retribution is problematic in that it fails to give concrete meaning to what the principle 
of proportionality actually entails. It also does not take into account the fact that social 
factors influence criminal behaviour and cannot effectively deal with crime because it 
largely rejects the fact that punishment may be imposed to achieve certain goals in the 
interest of the public. Despite these weaknesses, retribution remains a relevant theory 
because, among other things, it embodies an important distributive principle of 
punishment which should guide the imposition of punishment, namely that punishment 
must reflect the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of an offender. 
Utilitarianism justifies punishment by focussing on its consequences and holds that 
punishment must seek to protect the community.  However, it runs the risk of justifying 
disproportionate punishment and instrumentalising an offender. This is because it 
overemphasises the benefits of punishment to society of punishment and regards the 
welfare of an individual as subservient to that of society. As a result, utilitarianism fails 
to sufficiently consider the circumstances of an offence and an offender. This 
encourages the use of harsh punishments and does not seek to redress the underlying 
causes of punishment. These observations extend to deterrence and incapacitation. For 
instance, while both theories are desirable for serious offences that undermine public 
safety, they are often used to justify increasingly stiffer sentences in the face of prevalent 
offences and trivialises the circumstances of an offence and an offender. Incapacitation 
also becomes problematic when it involves the prediction of future criminality to punish 
an offender and indeterminate sentencing.  
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Rehabilitation is a more suitable goal for punishment because it is concerned with the 
welfare of an offender and attempts to avert him from a life of crime by dealing with the 
underlying causes of crime. In this way, it serves community protection by preventing 
future criminality through reforming offenders into law abiding citizens. Rehabilitation 
is also attractive because it focuses on the eventual re-integration of an offender into 
society; this underscores the idea that an offender remains a part of society throughout 
his punishment. By requiring that offenders must have access to rehabilitative 
programmes, rehabilitation entrenches the right to dignity by promoting the need for 
humane conditions of detention. However, the problem with this theory is that it is 
dependent on the ability of an offender to reform and may therefore result in lengthy or 
indeterminate sentences to ensure that an offender is reformed. This calls for a vigilant 
approach which ensures that there is proportionality between punishment and the 
offence. In spite of this, rehabilitation remains an attractive theory of punishment which 
must have a bigger role in punishment. This conclusion is also supported by 
international law.  
2.2 International standards for punishment 
The emphasis that international law places on rehabilitation is seen in the 
recommendations and principles it provides with respect to the forms of punishment 
that may be imposed. For example, it has been shown that despite the fact that the 
death penalty has not yet been outlawed, international law recommends its abolition. 
Furthermore, both the death penalty and life imprisonment may only be applicable to 
serious offences committed by persons above the age of 18 years. For those above 18 
who are sentenced to death, international law gives them the right to seek pardon while 
those sentenced to life imprisonment are entitled to a reasonable prospect of release. 
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Additionally, the early release mechanism must adhere to certain standards. For 
example, there must be an independent body with the power to release an offender and 
offenders must have a right to be heard during the process. These principles are meant 
to give credit to the prisoner that shows remorse and has been reformed. 
2.3 The situation in Malawi 
2.3.1 The Constitution and punishment 
Malawi‟s penal regime has a long history of retributive and deterrent punishment and 
unfair trials. In the absence of a constitutional set up that recognised human rights, 
punishment during the colonial period was largely premised on retribution and 
deterrence, driven by the need to maintain colonial authority. Offenders were subjected 
to corporal punishment and the mandatory death penalty. Rehabilitative measures were 
mostly restricted to young offenders. During the latter years of colonial rule, there were 
a number of reforms that took place with a view to create a more rehabilitation-oriented 
system of punishment. This saw the introduction of rehabilitative programmes in 
prisons and the enactment of several statutes pertinent to criminal justice in general and 
punishment in particular. The one-party regime was characterised by gross violation of 
human rights. It maintained corporal punishment and the mandatory death penalty for 
murder and treason. Political opponents were often tried in traditional courts where 
they were denied basic procedural rights such as legal representation.   
The adoption of the new Constitution in 1994 was supposed to usher in a new penal 
regime in which rehabilitation would play a major role compared to retribution and 
deterrence. The new Constitution introduced a Bill of Rights that guaranteed many 
rights including the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security of person, the 
right to human dignity, and freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
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The Constitution also introduced restrictions on certain forms of punishment and 
prohibited others. For example, corporal punishment is expressly prohibited, the death 
penalty cannot be imposed unless it follows a conviction of an offence under Malawian 
law by a competent court. The courts have interpreted the rights to dignity and a fair 
trial, and the prohibition of cruel and inhumane treatment to mean that the death 
penalty cannot be imposed as a mandatory sentence. 
Many other provisions of the Constitution point towards an intention to create a penal 
system that is just and fair, informed by human rights and in which rehabilitation plays 
an important part. For example, the Constitution requires the courts to have regard to 
international law when interpreting its provisions. It also has domesticated several key 
international treaties which are key to punishment. For example, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights have domestic force in Malawi. The Constitution specifically requires the state to 
adopt policies and legislation that promote the humane application and enforcement of 
laws and policing standards.  
The Constitution has triggered significant law reform to achieve a more human rights 
based criminal justice system. These reforms largely signal a shift towards a more 
humane penal regime that promotes rehabilitation. This can be seen, for example, in the 
prohibition of the imprisonment of children for any offence, and the introduction of 
more non-custodial punishments such as community service, periodic imprisonment 
and attendance centre orders. Reforms to prison law also point to a more humane 
approach to the treatment of offenders that embraces several rights such as dignity, 
liberty and the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment. The ideals of the 
Constitution for punishment have also been enforced through litigation. Indeed, poor 
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prison conditions and the mandatory death penalty have been held to be at odds with 
the Constitution.  
2.3.2 Assessment of the aims and forms of punishment 
The forms of punishment in Malawi partly reflect international and constitutional 
standards. The death penalty is restricted to persons above the age of 18 years and those 
sentenced to death have a right to seek pardon. Courts have stressed that death 
sentences must be reserved for worst instances of murder. Life imprisonment is 
generally accepted to mean a whole-life sentence and is mainly imposed for community 
protection. The law provides for a number of restrictions on the application of death 
and life sentences. For example, life imprisonment without the possibility of release 
cannot be imposed on persons below the age of 18 years. In practice, courts do not 
focus on an offender‟s capacity for reform when imposing death or life sentences. 
Furthermore, death and life imprisonment in Malawi do not meet some of the 
international requirements. These punishments are not restricted to the most serious 
crimes. In addition, offenders on death row are detained in despicable prison conditions 
and do not have an effective right to seek pardon. Active members of the Defence 
Force may be denied the right to seek mercy altogether in the interests of discipline and 
securing the safety of the Defence Force. Release procedures for prisoners serving life 
and long-term sentences also fail to provide a reasonable prospect of release, with their 
hope lying only in the pardon process. 
Sentencing jurisprudence indicates that courts have generally not understood how the 
Constitution and international law can be used to improve the penal regime. Indeed, 
there is little reference to the Bill of Rights in the determination of sentences. Apart 
from the absence of the mandatory death penalty, sentencing practices have not 
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changed from before 1994 to after 1994. Courts have not embraced rehabilitation as the 
major aim of punishment. Courts continue to limit the consideration of rehabilitation to 
the punishment of first and young offenders in cases that involve minor offences. In 
practice, this manifested in the imposition of short sentences with the hope that an 
offender will come out of a prison as a reformed person. While a few cases have 
recognised that rehabilitation is consistent with the right to dignity and the prohibition 
of cruel and inhuman treatment, and even argued that rehabilitation must be given 
primacy, the predominant theories of punishment remain retribution, deterrence and 
community protection. This has resulted in the imposition of lengthy sentences, 
especially where general deterrence and community protection are invoked. 
2.3.3 Assessment of the early release mechanisms 
The early release system in Malawi largely fails to comply with international standards. It 
does not adequately promote the ideal of rehabilitation. The pardon process, for 
example, is overly retributive in that offenders convicted of serious offences are not 
given an equal opportunity to be considered for mercy. In practice, only offenders 
convicted of minor crimes are pardoned, with a few exceptions where serious offenders 
have been pardoned. The effectiveness of the pardon process is also undermined by the 
lack of clarity in procedure and the independence of the committee responsible for 
making recommendations to the President. Remission and release on licence are also 
problematic in that they are based on the rehabilitation efforts of offenders. In any case, 
licences are not granted in practice.  
The proposals in the 2003 Prisons Bill reflect more compliance with the Constitution 
and international standards in as far as the early release procedures are concerned. 
Modelled on the importance of public protection, rehabilitation and social reintegration 
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of offenders, the Bill provides a real prospect of release for offenders serving both fixed 
and life sentences. It proposes the establishment of a parole system that adheres to the 
international standards such as the existence of procedural safeguards. However, the 12-
year tariff proposed for life sentences is too low as compared to the punishments in the 
Penal Code.1 
3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The forms of punishment in Malawi do not wholly comply with constitutional and 
international standards. In particular, the law does not accommodate all the restrictions 
on the imposition of death and life sentences. Furthermore, sentencing decisions on the 
death penalty and life imprisonment show that the capacity to reform is not given 
careful consideration by the courts. Moreover, the wording of penal provisions for 
capital crimes does not provide sufficient guidance on when the death penalty or life 
imprisonment should be imposed because these punishments are provided for in the 
alternative without qualification.  
In view of this, it is recommended that the Penal Code should be amended to restrict 
the death and life sentences to the most serious crimes such as aggravated forms of 
murder and genocide with killing. The circumstances in which offences that attract 
death should be regarded as non-capital crimes must be set out in the law. This will 
ensure that courts reserve the death penalty for the worst instances of a capital crime 
and promote consistency in sentencing since the law would stipulate the broad 
circumstances that should escalate an offence to a capital crime. Furthermore, to ensure 
that the capacity to reform is properly considered in sentencing, the Judiciary should 
                                                 
1 Penal Code, Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
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develop sentencing guidelines on the imposition of death and life sentences.2 It is also 
recommended that the right to seek pardon for death row prisoners should be made 
more effective by amending the legal framework for pardons and repealing the proviso 
to section 150 of the Defence Force Act3 which curtails this right with respect to active 
members of the Defence Force.  
With respect to life imprisonment, it is recommended that it should be limited to the 
most serious crimes such as genocide, murder, manslaughter and rape. The law should 
also clearly stipulate the circumstances in which these offences would attract life and 
those in which they would be punishable with fixed sentences. The law should also 
stipulate a tariff for life sentences. This would provide the much needed clarity on life 
imprisonment in Malawi. Moreover, the Judiciary should develop sentencing guidelines 
regarding the circumstances in which life imprisonment may be imposed. These 
guidelines should give concrete guidance on matters such as the treatment of particular 
factors, the threshold for a „dangerous‟ offender, and the role of rehabilitation in the 
determination of whether a life sentence should be imposed. 
The study has shown that courts have not embraced rehabilitation as the predominant 
aim of punishment and have generally limited it to first and young offenders convicted 
of minor offences. The Constitution and international law are not often used when 
sentencing. Sentencing decisions reveal courts emphasise retribution, public protection 
and deterrence when imposing punishment. Further, general deterrence is understood 
to require punishment that exceeds what is proportional to the offence. It is therefore 
                                                 
2 Judicial officers have apparently undergone training sessions on capital sentencing and have been 
provided with copies of capital sentencing guidelines by Fitzgerald and Starmer (2007). However, it 
appears that these guidelines are not utilised. 
3 Defence Force Act, Chapter 12:01 of the Laws of Malawi, as amended by Act No 11 of 2004 (DFA). 
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recommended that courts should give rehabilitation a greater role in sentencing and 
infuse sentencing decisions with the constitutional and international standards. Courts 
should also reconsider the conceptualisation of general deterrence. Indeed, once it is 
accepted, as Malawian courts have done, that general deterrence may lead to 
disproportionate sentences, and that this would infringe the right to human dignity and 
the prohibition of cruel and degrading treatment, it is futile to assert that repeat 
offenders may be subjected to general deterrent sentences. It must be recalled that the 
right to human dignity will be violated where the length of sentence is not 
commensurate with the gravity of an offence, regardless of whether or not the sentence 
has been overtaken by penal objectives such as deterrence and rehabilitation. In this 
regard, it is recommended that courts must adopt a stricter interpretation of 
proportionality which does not allow for punishment that exceeds the bounds 
commensurate with the offence.  
The early release system in Malawi is also in need of reform. Presently, it fails to provide 
a reasonable possibility of release and is overly retributive. It is also ineffective and does 
not have adequate procedural safeguards. In view of this, it is recommended that the 
Prisons Bill should be passed as soon as possible to ensure that prisoners have a real 
prospect of release that promotes rehabilitation and social integration. However, it is 
recommended that the proposed tariff for life sentences must be increased and that a 
lower tariff should be introduced for elderly offenders. In addition, the Pardon 
Committee Act should be amended to include provisions that guarantee adequate 
procedural safeguards for offenders such as the right to be heard, the right to be 
provided with all relevant documents concerning their petitions, the right to be 
informed of the recommendation made to the President, and the reasons for such a 
296 
recommendation and to respond to it. Further, the composition of the Pardon 
Committee should be amended by removing the President and adding more members 
who represent the wider interests of society. This will ensure that the Committee is 
independent. It is further recommended that the Pardon Committee Guidelines should 
be amended by removing the restrictions on serious offenders and including provisions 
on the pardoning of prisoners serving life sentences. These amendments will provide a 
more reasonable opportunity for offenders. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The Constitution was meant to be a turning point for the treatment of offenders, more 
so with the importance it places on international law. While significant law reform has 
taken place in the criminal justice system, the punishment of adult offenders remains. 
Indeed, the punishment of adult offenders is not fully in conformity with international 
and constitutional standards. Restrictions on death sentences and life imprisonment are 
wanting, and the early release system leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, it is 
encouraging, that Malawi has made some strides towards improving the penal scheme 
for punishment after 1994. However, there is a lot that needs to be done to fully realise 
the promise of the Constitution for punishment. 
It is hoped that the recommendations made in this chapter will bring punishment in 
Malawi more in line with international and constitutional standards, it must not be 
forgotten that ultimately, regardless of extensive law reform, real change can only be 
achieved if there is compliance with the law. In fact, if the law presently in force were to 
be followed to the letter, Malawi would fare much better in terms of compliance with 
international and constitutional standards for punishment. 
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